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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A) SUMMARY OF THE CASE
This appeal of Case No. CV-10-6088 arises out of the following circumstances;
1. I Did Very Well Financially During Great Recession - During the Great Recession,
I (Frantz) was very fortunate to do very well while most businesses lost money. From
2007 thru 2010, I personally made over $5,000,000 cash income in my Assisted Living
Business ventures. For example, during late 2008, the worst months during the Great
Recession, I closed a REIT sale transaction which alone personally netted me $3.1m in
cash (tax deferred).

See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 189 “REIT Accounting

Statement detail breakdown” & Pg 190-232 Sale-Lease-Back “REIT Master Lease
Agmt”.
2. A Year After The Recession I Offered To Pay Down The Bank Loan - Flush with
cash during the Great Recession, in mid-2008, I offered Idaho Independent Bank (IIB)
to pay down my $4.5m construction/development loan or alternately to reinvest my
good fortune into growing my portfolio during the Great Recession.

For example,

reinvesting the $3.1m cash I made the end of 2008 (see Master Guide Pg 249 “$3.1m
October 2, 2008 bank deposit”) in building projects would generate hundreds of jobs in
our community and allow me to continue growing my healthcare project portfolio (see
Master Guide Pg 245-248 “$32m in new projects in various stages of development”) .
It would also generate the bank substantial loan fees.

APPELANT’S BRIEF

PAGE 4 of 46

3. A Year After The Recession, Bank Agrees I Should Reinvest Instead Of Paying
Down Loan - Due to my strong financial cash position, one year after the Great
Recession began, the bank (IIB) decided to continue lending on my project. So instead
of using my $3.1m personal cash to pay down the loan (see Master Guide Pg 249
“October 2, 2008 “$3.1m bank deposit”) IIB agreed to continue lending to my project
based upon loan to value ratios (LTV) after completing an appraisal which they ordered
a few months later in 2009. The appraisal came in fine and IIB approved a 3 year loan
extension.
4. During First 2 Years Of The Recession, Bank Initially Performs As Agreed - The
bank initially met the terms of their lending promise. They extended to me a $4.5m
Eagle Ridge loan in 2008, 2009, 2010 on fair terms and formally approved a 3 year
loan extension mid 2010 thru 2013. Furthermore, in early 2010, IIB internal memos
show that the bank underwriter suggested increasing my personal credit line (see below
February, 2010 bank underwriter Mr. Hendricks internal bank memo). Please refer to
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 44252 Pg 844 & 845 of Expert Witness Scott Gibson,
an OCC Bank Examiner (not in the attached Exhibits) or see his report in the attached
EXHIBIT Master Guide Page 303- 329 “Scott Gibson Report”. As referenced in the
Miller report, the bank’s (IIB) underwriter, Mr. Hendricks wrote an internal memo to
VP Colwell the following which underwriting review was written February 2010, only
three months before the bank CEO (Gustavel) filed a fabricated false loan default
against me. This is what he said;
(February, 2010) “Our borrower” has very strong character and that provides
us with good opportunity to continue forward to a successful project… Marty
Frantz is well known to the bank, provides high net worth, good credit,
significant liquidly, and outside/secondary sources of repayment… Marty had
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been instrumental in bringing over $2.5MM in deposits to the branch… I can’t
think of another borrower that provides a better combination of strength’s that
we can work with on a significant project like Eagle Ridge… …the bank can
consider additional funding to Marty personally via an increase to his LOC.
5. I Performed As Agreed Throughout The Recession - Upon signing the 2009 IIB
loan renewal, I did as I promised and reinvested my $3.1m cash (see Master Guide Pg
249 “October 2, 2008 “$3.1m bank deposit”) into construction projects creating
hundreds of jobs in our community. As a result of the capital improvements I made
with my own cash during 2009, the Eagle Ridge bank appraisal at the end of 2009
justified several million more in credit lending. I used my millions of dollars of
personal cash to reinvest in viable projects during the Recession instead of yielding to
panic and fear, widespread during the Recession. My business continued to grow and I
remained financially sound through the entire recession.
6. By 2010 The Bank (IIB) Was In Serious Trouble - By early 2010, IIB’s stock
plummeted over 90% from a high of $33.00/share to $2.45/share. It became listed as a
“troubled” bank with poor industry ratings. See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 250266 “Stock price, IIB bank ratings, and other pertinent bank information. While I
made millions of dollars during the Recession, the bank, (IIB), lost millions. The
bank CEO, Jack Gustavel, was in deep trouble by 2010 and reacted strongly; he
reneged on his lending promises to good customers as myself. While he did agree to
extend credit from 2010-2013, the collateral terms were not as promised due to his
internal financial problems. See previously referenced EXHIBITS Master Guide Page
303- 329 “Scott Gibson Report, Expert banker & former OCC examiner).
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7. By 2010 (FDIC) Board of Governors & U.S. President Urges Banks To Lend To
Small Business - See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 259-298 “Western Independent
Bankers Conference FDIC Governor’s speech and the President’s speeches during the
Great Recession.”

In summary, Elizabeth A. Duke, Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System (FDIC) stated:
“At the Fifty-third Annual Western Independent Bankers Conference,
Scottsdale, Arizona, March 31, 2010 Restoring Credit to Communities Governor Elizabeth A. Duke
…Now I would like to turn to small business lending. Small businesses are, in
many cases, the most important customer segment for community banks. And
because community banks are an important source of credit for small
businesses, their challenges and their fates are closely linked. Despite the best
efforts of bankers and regulators, we continue to hear of the difficulties
experienced by small businesses in obtaining credit. A recent study conducted
by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) found that of
small employers who attempted to borrow in 2009, about half received all the
credit they wanted. But nearly one-quarter received no credit at all. A similar
study in 2005 found nearly 90 percent of small employers had most or all their
credit needs met and only eight percent obtained no credit…
Finally, small business lending often is based on relationships that are
solidified over time. Sometimes those relationships are broken as a result of
the bank's inability to lend, such as when banks fail or when they reduce
lending due to strains or concentrations in their own portfolios.
In those
circumstances, small businesses may find it quite difficult to establish similar
arrangements with a new bank…”
In my case (Frantz), I could not get credit from another bank because the CEO
banker (IIB) had viciously filed a fabricated false loan default against me immediately
ruining my credit which acted as instant “economic sanctions”.

That caused my

profitable development business to immediately close and laying off dozens of
subcontractors.
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Next Quote:
President Obama Addresses Joint Session of Congress
washingtonpost.com
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
…And when we learn that a major bank has serious problems, we will hold
accountable those responsible, force the necessary adjustments, provide the
support to clean up their balance sheets, and assure the continuity of a
strong, viable institution that can serve our people and our economy.
I intend to hold these banks fully accountable for the assistance they receive,
and this time, they will have to clearly demonstrate how taxpayer dollars
result in more lending for the American taxpayer. This time, CEOs won't be
able to use taxpayer money to pad their paychecks or buy fancy drapes or
disappear on a private jet. Those days are over.
State of the Union: President Obama's Speech
BY ABC NEWS JAN 27, 2010
…We should start where most new jobs do – in small businesses,
companies that begin when an entrepreneur takes a chance on a dream, or
a worker decides its time she became her own boss……Through sheer grit
and determination, these companies have weathered the recession and are
ready to grow. But when you talk to small business owners in places like
Allentown, Pennsylvania or Elyria, Ohio, you find out that even though
banks on Wall Street are lending again, they are mostly lending to bigger
companies.
But financing remains difficult for small business owners
across the country…
…So tonight, I'm proposing that we take $30 billion of the money Wall
Street banks have repaid and use it to help community banks give small
businesses the credit they need… People are out of work. They are
hurting. They need our help. And I want a jobs bill on my desk without
delay...But the truth is, these steps still won't make up for the seven million
jobs we've lost over the last two years... One place to start is serious
financial reform.
Look, I am not interested in punishing banks, I'm
interested in protecting our economy. A strong, healthy financial market
makes it possible for businesses to access credit and create new jobs...”
Barack Obama
Speech Proposing Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee
delivered 14 January 2010
“It was little more than a year ago that we stood on that precipice. Several
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of the world's largest financial institutions had already failed. Credit
markets froze and banks refused to lend… Now, the fact is these financial
institutions are essential to our economy. They provide capital and credit to
families purchasing homes, students attending college, businesses seeking
to start up or expand… Our goal is not to punish Wall Street firms, but
rather to prevent the abuse and excess that nearly caused the collapse of
many of these firms and the financial system itself.
8. I (Frantz) Criticized My Banker’s Actions But Was Ready To Sign Loan Extension
- By 2010, I was disappointed at (IIB) Gustavel’s panic driven, desperate behavior due
to their failing bank. I sharply criticized him for not honoring his bank charter and
failing his duty to the public and community. For example, there was one provision in
the bank approved loan renewal that would delay the development of one of my
projects. Many workers would be laid off for no good reason.

Before signing, I

requested it to be removed. My loan officer (VP board member) said the bank would
come up with a solution but Gustavel apparently didn’t agree with him and cut off
negotiations and later fired him.

Jack Gustavel (IIB CEO), against his own bank

underwriter recommendations, threatened to retaliate and in effect destroy my 35 yearlong successful career and business unless I signed the loan renewal without any
modification. But my loan officer (VP board member) assured me the bank would
resolve the matter before signing. I was getting two different messages from the bank,
both board members.

With reasonable assurance from my (VP) loan officer,

proceeded with negotiations.

I

The next thing I knew Gustavel proceeded with a

fabricated false loan default and personal suit that immediately caused me to lose about
three quarters of a million dollars in sunk capital costs in projects that could not proceed
due to the litigation. For example, see Lewiston assisted living project that had broken
ground and shelved in EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 233-242; and others on Pg 244-248.
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9. Banker (Gustavel) Fabricates False Loan Default - Mid 2010, the founder/CEO
carries out his threat and fabricates a false loan default against me.

See EXHIBITS

Master Guide Pg 301-303 “IIB loan officer statement verifying that there was no loan
default.” The $4.5m erroneous default would not have affected my businesses since IIB
would have to foreclose first on the collateral (which according to the current bank
appraisal would more than cover the loan balance). However, Gustavel would not
foreclose, rather sued me personally immediately cutting off my access to personal
credit and savagely destroying my 35-year successful career and business
10. Mortgage Foreclosure 5 Years Later - Idaho law requires mortgage foreclosure first
to determine if there is any loan short-fall after selling the collateral before the bank can
go after the mortgage borrower. Foreclosure proceedings would have little if any effect
on my businesses as our family ranch was a small part of my over-all $65m portfolio
and the current bank appraisal was greater than the loan balance.
I was willing to sign the loan agreement if the unjustified condition was removed or
if he agreed to extend the 3 year term out longer. It wasn’t a big deal to the bank
according to expert bank witness, Scott Gibson report referenced above.

With

assurance from my (VP) loan officer, the ball was in their court. Gustavel shockingly
proceeded with the fabricated false loan default. He, in effect, pretended there was no
bank collateral and sued me personally as if the loan was unsecured.
The CEO’s multimillion suit immediately resulted in causing $32,000,000 of my
successful healthcare projects in various stages of development to be scuttled including
the loss of millions in sunk capital expenditures. One of those healthcare projects was
located in Lewiston, Idaho and had broken ground with an approved U.S. Government
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PAGE 10 of 46

HUD 232 construction loan but with Gustavel’s personal litigation, it had to be scuttled.
See attached EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 233- 243. If he had foreclosed, it would
not have affected my personal credit and that and other projects would have proceeds as
scheduled. The ripple effect resulted in dozens of my subcontractors being laid off,
some having to close their business, and hundreds of workers in the community lost
their jobs making the recession far worse than it needed to be. See attached EXHIBITS
Master Guide Pg 330-331 “Declaration Of Thomas Storey” who had to close his
business as a result of Gustavel suing me personally instead of foreclosing on the
mortgage loan.

In summary, I offered Gustavel viable options which his loan

underwriters recommended (see EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 303-329 “Scott Gibson
expert banker and prior OCC bank examiner report”
11. Banker Intentional Economic Sanctions

IIB’s fabricated sanctions caused me to

immediately scrap approximately three quarters of a million in sunk capital (i.e. the
Lewiston project) and I was unable to finance an appropriate legal defense team to
match the approximate $1m funding the bank initially spent on their legal team. The
attorney team I sought required a $1m retainer. If he had foreclosed on the mortgage
loan, I had the cash resources to fund the $1m retainer. See previous referenced Scott
Gibson Declaration an Expert Banking CEO “Conclusion” in EXHIBIT Master Guide
Pg 326-327:
“I find it very odd and would appear that IIB’s subsequent economic sanctions
over the past 5 years have been motivated out of justifying and attempting to
mask a mistake made when the dispute began. Such actions have suppressed
Frantz financially so that he is limited in ability to properly defend himself. I
do not believe it was reasonable and prudent for IIB to have sued Frantz
personally, shutting down his profitable healthcare business activities.”
12. Lower Court Pre-disposition & Discharge Misinterpretation
APPELANT’S BRIEF
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legal funds cut off by Gustavel’s strategy to sue me (instead of foreclosing first or offsetting the collateral in his suit), the stigma of bankruptcy and the lower district court
lack of knowledge about Chapter 7 bankruptcy waivers, I was fighting an uphill battle.
The bankruptcy made it appear I was the one in financial trouble when in fact I was in
excellent financial condition and the bank was not.
Importantly, the lower court also misinterpreted the fact that I had legal
“ownership” in my counterclaims and affirmative defenses.

I understand their

skepticism because Chapter 7 Debtors don’t have ownership. Litigation rights are lost
and automatically become the jurisdiction of the Court Estate/Trustee who can then do
whatever he wants with them (i.e. litigate, sell or dismiss them). However, I employed
a legal maneuver that is rarely used in bankruptcy court. I didn’t need a discharge, so I
voluntarily sign a “Chpt 7 waiver of discharge” and automatically regained my
ownership of IIB CV-10-6088 and the Roeller CV-11-6420 litigation. The Estate
Trustee then lost his jurisdiction in those cases and could no more act on them similar
in some ways abandonment of Estate assets. The Trustee never objected to the waiver
of discharge and therein lost any jurisdiction or rights he had to the litigation and the
statute of limitation has long expired. Resultantly, both litigation cases have had
extensive proceedings during the last 3 years. The Trustee has never intervened,
objected or had any involvement in these cases until a few months ago when he
erroneously sold the IIB case to IIB without jurisdiction.
I got to regain my ownership of CV-10-6088 but at the same time, as a tradeoff, I
became responsible for any and all remaining debts in my bankruptcy for the rest of my
life as if I had never filed bankruptcy in that respect.
APPELANT’S BRIEF
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obtaining the “ownership” privilege and preserving my constitutional rights to have my
case heard in trial on its merits. However, the lower court, unknowledgeable about
Chpt 7 bankruptcy waivers, mistakenly question whether-or-not I had “ownership”
biasing their direction and conclusions right from the start. Even though I made fatal
clerical mistakes and inadvertently missed soft submission deadlines, Judge
Christensen had the authority and case law to allowed my EXHIBITS. However, he
chose to strike them (for example; EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 303-329 “Gibson
Expert Banker Report” along with five other expert reports and affidavits, accounting
for all of my primary defenses). Also see (See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 146 & 151
“Motion To Strike” Order). His actions scuttled any attempt for trial. These important
factors hurt my case and I did not get past summary judgment and never received my
right to have my evidence as part of the record even though I executed the “waiver of
discharge” to obtain ownership and the right of trial.
B) COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
The constitution grants the privilege to have my case heard on its evidence and the
merits.

However, the case evidence was suppressed from its origin by the

predisposition misinterpretation of law in the District court.

The court did not

allow any significant evidence and swiftly entered a monetary judgment resulting in the
execution of my assets and circumstances subject of this appeal without giving me a
chance. If the lower court decisions are upheld, I have a $9m+ debt that can never be
discharged in bankruptcy that will be with me for the rest of my life. I gave up my
right to discharge in trade to pursue my defenses in a civil court trial. That should have
been considered by Judge Christensen in #CV-10-6088.
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whether-or-not I had “ownership” in order to pursue the case.

If I lose, to an

entrepreneur like me, the penalty may as well be life in prison because I can never
contribute in the American economy again. So the proceedings need to be fair and
square given the weight of the egregious penalty associated with losing.
1. April 12, 2016 Judgment - In summary, the District Court swiftly entered a judgment
On April 12, 2016, as a result of the following circumstances;
a. The lower court’s lack of knowledge concerning Chpt 7 waiver of discharge,
misinterpretation concerning my legal ownership of CV-10-6088 and, not given
consideration for the uncommon high penalty associated with losing the case;
b. The lower court’s bias/assumption due to the misguided appearance associated with
my bankruptcy;
c. The bank CEO suing me personally instead of foreclosing on the mortgage.

I

therefore could not fund an appropriate ($1m) legal defense. With minimal lawyer
resources, that contributed to all of my expert witnesses reports and affidavits being
struck from the court records on technicalities;
2. Supreme Court Appeal - The district court denied my reconsideration and on May
19, 2016, I filed a notice of appeal to the Supreme Court.

This case was about who

was perceived to have acted reasonably during the Great Recession.

Leaning on

caution, the Supreme Court denied me relief. I got the impression that the court
believed me but wanted a higher standard of proof. It also appeared I didn’t do a very
good job in framing the “ownership” legal issue of whether-or-not I even had the right
to file case #CV-10-6088. I was also uncertain if the Supreme Court really understood
that in this case there is no legal venue or court forum for relief to discharge the $9m+
APPELANT’S BRIEF
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in bankruptcy except by civil trial. July 10, 2017 the Supreme Court denied relief and
issued Docket No. 44252-2016 opinion No. 81 and did not allow a reconsideration
hearing.
3. 2nd Appeal To The Supreme Court - On December 15th, 2017 I filed a 2nd appeal to
the Supreme Court for a “mistrial” of the same district case No. CV-10-6088 due to a
judicial evidence bias which is what I’m responding to in this brief.
4. 3d Appeal To The Supreme Court - On August 4th, 2018 I filed a 3d appeal to the
Supreme Court on this same case No. CV-10-6088 with regard to the lower court’s
erroneous “dismissal” order, again over the issue of “ownership” of #CV-10-6088 to
have filed the case in the first place. This issue has been an underlying key issue and is
one of the most prominent matters of all of these proceedings that has never been
addressed by the Supreme Court. See Pg 12-13 of this brief for more discussion. Also
see “Issue On Appeal“ page 18 (#3.) of this brief. Also see summary discussion of the
“ownership” issue on page 25 second paragraph of this brief.)

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. I Was In a Financial Position To Substantially Pay Off The Loan A Year After
The Great Recession Began - I have provided more proof to the Supreme Court this
time that I could have paid off the loan. Most importantly, I have enclosed a bank
factual email demonstrating I did not miss any loan payments and was following the
precise payment terms of my bank loan officer. This document proves Gustavel’s loan
default was fabricated and false. See bank email statement in EXHIBITS Master
Guide Pg 301-303 verifying that he instructed me to make no further loan
APPELANT’S BRIEF
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payments until closing the loan renewal.
2. IIB In Serious Trouble -

In summary; I have provided proof in the attached

EXHIBITS that I was in excellent financial condition and IIB was in serious financial
trouble. Those same documents demonstrate that the CEO immediately harmed me
financially by filing a fabricated false loan default but far more importantly sued me
for millions ($4.3m) instead of foreclosing or at least off-setting the loan collateral. So
I could not finance an appropriate legal defense clearly as part of his sinister
strategy. I was willing and had the cash financial resources in 2010 to repay the loan as
agreed in the 3 year loan renewal when Gustavel cut off negotiations, contrary to the
assurances given by my (VP) loan officer who Gustavel later fired.
3. I Have Ownership of CV-10-6088 and A Constitutional Privilege To A Trial But
Without The Ability To Discharge The $9m If I lose - I have attached evidence (see
court order in EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 127) which is my voluntary waiver of
discharge. I was granted that waiver so that I could regain my ownership in District
court Case No. CV-10-6088 and not for any other purpose (see EXHIBITS Master
Guide Pg 125 (2.) Waiver Of Discharge). Discharge is only for businesses that are not
profitable. I was very profitable during the Great Recession and had no use for a
bankruptcy discharge. I filed Chpt 11 reorganization to stay the civil court action
while I attempted to recover from the immediate cash losses I incurred from IIB’s false
default action. IIB did not foreclose on the mortgage loan which would have little
effect on my larger portfolio. But instead they directly sued me personally without any
mortgage collateral off-set. That immediately froze my credit sources and scuttled
$32m in new projects draining my cash resources to fund the $1m retainer required for
APPELANT’S BRIEF
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my defense team. (See $32m of scuttled projects in EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 245248).

I hoped Chpt 11 reorganization would give me time to find ways to fund the

retainer. While IIB’s retaliation strategy scuttled $32m in new projects and drained my
cash resources to fund an appropriate defense, I remained profitable in all my existing
properties and businesses and did not need a discharge of my obligations. But it was
hard to raise cash for a legal defense during those days. Time was running out so I
converted to Chpt 7 and gave up my “ownership” in all legal actions. I then took what
limited funding sources I had and put together a make-shift legal team. I filed the
“waiver of discharge” to get back my “ownership” and then pursued my action in civil
court.

I was granted the waiver of discharge in exchange for getting back my

“ownership”, the right to pursue IIB in civil court as though I had never filed
bankruptcy. That was a happy day. Due to the waiver trade-off, I own CV-10-6088
which became my sole recourse to settle claims against me because Discharge
Waiver’s are permanent and irreversible. But since my businesses were profitable, I
didn’t need a discharge.
However, I having gained back ownership of my litigation, I have never received
my constitutional privilege to have a trial nor to have my expert witness reports and
affidavits admitted as part of the lower court record.

So therefore with no ability to

discharge IIB claims, I must be granted a fair chance at #CV-10-6088.
4. I Have Learning Disabilities -

I have recently been diagnosed by (2) independent

medical doctors with learning disabilities qualifying me for ADA relief. Those medical
reports are sealed as part of these court records of this appeal and are not in the attached
EXHIBITS.

Judge Christensen appeared to have made his own medical assessment
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and determined I need little if any accommodation opposing recommendations by the
doctors. Dyslexia is a complex disorder and those that do not have it often do not
understand it.

So it’s important that someone on the bench pull those sealed records

and look at them.
Pg 141.

You can also see my ADA declaration in EXHIBIT Master Guide

I can read/write the words but have difficulty processing.

I simply do not

have and have never had the processing ability other people take for granted. While I
have waves of brilliants in some areas, my brain is in a state of mental confusion most
of the time. Although it was humbling for me to disclose my condition, all the court
technicalities and different regulations in five different courts are extremely confusing
and impossible for me to mentally process, retain and understand. I needed assistance.
So I reluctantly admitted to my condition and requested ADA accommodation to get
the help I need to have the same opportunity as other Pro se litigants without my mental
disability.
I also have been searching for Pro-bono representation. The only court with a well
working Pro-Bono program I have found is the U.S. 9th Circuit Court.

I recently

became aware that the Idaho Bar Appellate Practice Section is working on a new ProBono Appellate program which I applied for and is in the review/solicitation process.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
1. Judge Christensen ruled that Judge Verby’s newly discovered evidence, pertinent to
#CV-10-6088, which he learned from his outside simultaneous employment as
privately paid attorney/Mediator in the companion Roeller case, did not bias or
prejudice the ruling. Did Judge Christensen err in the Verby decision? Once Judge
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Christensen learned of Verby’s new damaging evidence and then made rulings
(including the Verby decision), which (3) other courts directly relied on for their rulings
that are now irreversible, did Christensen’s forever soil case #CV-10-6088
necessitating a retiral?
2. Did the 1 hour of “reading” assistance granted by Judge Christensen in the past
10 months of proceedings and subsequent (4) rulings satisfy the courts ADA
mandate requirement in whole as ruled by the Judge in the October 24, 2017 ADA
hearing? If not, did the lack of assistance result in my technical errors (i.e. 14 day
notice error; continuance refusal and; the 5 minutes to argue the reconsideration)
contributing to a miscarriage of justice in #CV-10-6088 and resultantly the other (3)
outside court cases, necessitating a retrial?
3. After I filed the “Waiver Of Discharge”, which extinguished my right forever to
discharge IIB claims in bankruptcy, did I regain ownership of my IIB claims and did
the court Estate/Trustee lose any and all jurisdiction; or was Judge Christensen
correct in questioning my “ownership”? After my “waiver”, did I have “ownership” in
#CV-10-6088 to proceeded with my defenses in August, 2015 and to proceed with court
matters on my behalf for the case during the past 3 years of litigating #CV-10-6088?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When faced with an appeal from the lower court, [the appellate court] employs the
standard of review properly applied by the trial court when originally ruling on the motion.”
Jones v. Micron Tech., 129 Idaho 241, 244 (Id. Ct. App. 1996) (citations removed). “Under
Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment is proper if ‘the pleadings,
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depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment and
execution as a matter of law.” La Bella Vita, LLC v. Shuler, 158 Idaho 799, 805 (2015). All
disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party.” Silicon Intern. Ore,
LLC v. Monsanto Co., 155 Idaho 538 (2013) (citations omitted).

ARGUMENT
1. Mistrial Motion & Grounds For Retrial - Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure
as required by IC 8-507c, Title 8 - Provisional Remedies In Civil, 60(b)(6), and ADA
provisions, I moved the lower court on October 12, 2017 for a Mistrial & Judgment
Vacation. The motion was

denied by the lower court on October 24th, 2017. The

grounds for the motion follows reasoning under Extrajudicial Non-disclosure &
Partiality. 28 U.S. Code § 455 states: “ (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of
the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality
might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall disqualify himself in the following
circumstances: (1) Where he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or
personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;”… This
includes familiarity with the facts or the parties which originated in a source outside the
case itself” (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer regarding the
controversy…” [See: Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions Corp.],

the court

emphasized that § 455 only requires the appearance of partiality in promoting the
public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process. The concept included all
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;udicial relationship or connections with a party where the Judge has "extra-judicial
sources" of information related to the case and has not disclosed those sources and
obtained consent from both opposing parties prior to serving as Judge for the case.
Even though the Judge may not have remembered anything about his private work on
the related district court civil case# CV-11-6420, and therefore no partiality exists, or
the judge is pure in heart and incorruptible as is presumed in Steve Verby 's case, it
does not matter for purposes of this code.

The judge's possible forgetfulness is not the

sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid the "appearance of partiality".
[See: Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F. 2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1983)7. The
Yerby facts create precisely the kind of appearance of impropriety that §455(a) was
intended to prevent. The violation is neither insubstantial nor excusable. Yerby met me
in person briefly at the mediation. Nearly all of his mediation face to face contact was
between my attorney (Mark Jackson) and Roeller.

If Judge Yerby did not initially

recognize me or my name from the mediation, (the six month old mediation and case was
still on-going), he had a duty to keep track of his private outside Attorney jobs and
should have checked his private case log for a client conflict prior to accepting the
position as Judge for my companion case #CY-10-6088. If Yerby had typed in Frantz in
his roster, it would have come up on a conflict check due to his private employment on
the Roeller case #CY-11-6420. The flaw in the private practice tracking system to keep
Attorney Steve Yerby informed with regard to his private clients could constitute a
separate violation of§ 455 (See § 455(c)).

Moreover, providing relief as requested by

me in this case may prevent a substantive injustice in some future case.

It may

encourage a judge or litigant to more carefully examine possible grounds for ethical
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conflicts and to avoid these situations by paying closer attention to client tracking.

2. Judge Verby District Court Out-side Private Practice -

On around July 2017,

Attorney Steve Verby acted in the capacity of a private practice lawyer/mediator for
#CV-11-6420 in Frantz vs Roeller. The case came about as a result of IIB’s (2) day
deposition of Roeller. The deposition had to do with the IIB’s loan in IIB/Frantz case
#CV-10-6088 and subsequent $9m+ loan deficiency judgment. Roeller disparaged me
by testifying in the IIB deposition that I had induced IIB to make the loan by giving
them erroneous sale documents that Roeller admitted he signed but claimed were
erroneous. He filed a $183,000+ claim against me for the alleged erroneous transaction.
So I filed a counter defamation action against Roeller in #CV-11-6420.

At the

conclusion of the case, Roeller recanted his IIB deposition in the court approved
settlement/dismissal. He abandoned his monetary claim against me and Judge Haynes
dismissed the case with prejudice. But importantly, that did not happen until (4) months
after Verby, acting in dual positions at the same time as Judge in CV-10-6088, ruled on
the levy matter. Verby and Christensen did not and could not have had the benefit of
knowing that Roeller recanted his defaming IIB statements because that didn’t happen
until after both of their decisions/orders were official.
Roeller rejected my suggestion for a mediator, Attorney Chuck Lempesis. So I
agreed he could pick the mediator to settle the related IIB dispute as it pertained to IIB’s
deposition of Roeller, his disparaging remarks and corresponding claim he sought
against me.

Roeller selected Attorney Steve Verby in his capacity as

private/independent lawyer. Steve Verby studied the details of the Roeller/IIB/Frantz
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dispute and the one day mediation occurred on November 8, 2016 at my attorney’s
office (Mark Jackson).

Verby learned that Roeller was a key witness for Idaho

Independent Bank (IIB) in my bankruptcy case and while that case was mooted, he
would likely be a key witness in the Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088 at some point. Judge
Verby later presided in the capacity as Judge while at the same time participating as
Mediator in #CV-11-6420 which was still open to further Mediation proceedings.
Verby did so without disclosure, without my knowledge nor preapproval from me or IIB
as required by previously stated regulations in opening arguments #2 above.
The Roeller IIB defamation case #CV-11-6420 was pursued by me right after the
Federal court granted my waiver (“ownership”) at the same time I pursued #CV-106088. In Roeller’s erroneous IIB deposition testimony, he cooperated with IIB to accuse
me of impropriety for his personal financial gain. So I filed a defamation complaint
against Roeller to exonerate myself and prevent the Roeller erroneous testimony
from being used against me in #CV-10-6088 .
IIB has argued that the “Roeller” matter was not of record in #CV-10-6088 and
therefore cannot create a conflict of interest. That reasoning is flawed.

If the Judge

personally obtained knowledge that I was accused of IIB misrepresentation from a
source outside of #CV-10-6088, they are required to recuse themselves to protect the
partiality integrity of #CV-10-6088 or disclose and obtain consent from all parties.
Roeller and I were in a stalemate because the defamation hinged partly upon my
word against Roeller’s word.

Resultantly, prior to Roeller’s recant of his IIB

deposition, any reasonable person could not overcome forming a negative bias of my
business dealings with IIB.

Specifically, Roeller and IIB jointly alleged Roeller signed
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erroneous land sale documents that I then gave to IIB to induce them to make the #CV10-6088 loan.

Judge Verby’s new founded knowledge of this through his private

employment had to disfavor me in #CV-10-6088. Verby agreed to stayed on the
Roeller case after the one day Mediation to continue working on a settlement and the
case was still open when he became Judge in #CV-10-6088.
If the timing would have been different and Roeller had recanted his IIB testimony
before the conclusion of #CV-10-6088 decisions, with that exoneration, Verby and
Christensen likely would have ruled in my favor and IIB, instead of me, would be
seeking a Mistrial on the same grounds today.
Co-Judge Verby & Christensen did not have the benefit of knowing that Roeller
later recanted his IIB deposition, dropped his claim and dismissed the case. Roeller
exonerated me with regard to wrong doing in my representations to IIB which case I
was concerned would be used at some point in case #CV-10-6088. Judge Haynes
approved the Roeller IIB deposition recant and dismissed the Roeller claim with
prejudice on November 17, 2017. See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 117-129 “Roeller
Judge Orders”.

The #CV-11-6420 recant occurred (4) four months after Co-Judge

Verby’s July 20, 2017 decision and (9) days after Judge Christensen affirmed Verby’s
rulings on November 8, 2017.

3. Comparing Judges Rulings In Companion Cases (Judge Haynes/Christensen)- In
respect to addressing some of the issues subject of this appeal, it’s helpful to compare
the Roeller #CV-11-6420 case to IIB #CV-10-6088. In summary, Judge Haynes granted
my right (“ownership”) to trial and Judge Christensen on the IIB companion case didn’t
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grant my right to trial among other things, concerned about my “ownership”. The two
different Judges handled the cases very differently. Yet the companion cases were
identical with respect to the fact that Roller sought a judgment against me in my
bankruptcy case with regard to the IIB loan collateral and at the same time, IIB sought a
judgment against me in my bankruptcy case court with regard to the same IIB loan
partly due to Roeller’s sworn testimony.
Ownership Of Civil Litigation Cases - When I converted from Chpt 11 to Chpt 7,
I lost my ownership of all my litigation to the Chpt 7 Estate in both the pre-petition
Roeller and IIB case and could not pursue either one. To regain my ownership in both
cases, I filed a waiver of discharge in my Chpt 7 case. The Federal court approved my
waiver and I got back my ownership in both cases. I could now pursue any litigation I
wanted without interference from the Chpt 7 Estate/Trustee.

I pursued the two

companion cases, IIB & Roeller.
Even though both case had the same background, in the Roeller case;
a) Judge Haynes did not question my ownership of the Roeller bankruptcy case as
Judge Christensen/Verby did in the IIB case #CV-10-6088;
b) Judge Haynes did not strike any of my affidavits or witnesses like
Christensen/Verby did;
c) Judge Haynes sanctioned Roeller for bad court behavior three times while
Christensen/Verby never sanctioned IIB for similar behavior (see sanction request
EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg 60-68 “Sanction request”);
d)

Judge Haynes allowed the related Roeller case to go to trial whereas
Christensen/Verby did not.
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On November 17, 2017, Judge Haynes approved Roeller’s stipulation to recant
erroneous testimony he had given to IIB and extinguished his entire claim against me
with prejudice. That district court ruling significantly improved my position in IIB v
Frantz case #CV-10-6088.

See EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 117-129 “Roeller Case

Judge Orders”.
Ownership of #CV-10-6088 - From the start of these proceedings. August, 2015,
IIB and Judge Christensen have brought up the question of “ownership” which has
clouded these proceedings.

If I did not secure sole ownership of #CV-10-6088 by

filing the “waiver of discharge” in 2015, then why didn’t IIB file a dismissal (3)
years ago?

Have all the IIB proceedings during this time been a colossal abuse

and hoax?

This issue has again been recently raised in my 3d Supreme Court Appeal.

See Page 14 (#4.)
In IIB’s dismissal to Judge Christensen, they assert that they legitimately purchase
my ownership of #CV-10-6088 from the bankruptcy Estate Trustee as if the
Trustee/Estate still had ownership of #CV-10-6088 all along during the past 3 years of
litigation. It appears they are pretending I never filed a waiver of discharge in trade for
ownership of #CV-10-6088.

Of course if I was never granted ownership of my claims,

then there would be no reason why IIB would not have purchase #CV-10-6088 (3) years
ago and avoided the litigation from the start.

4. Judge Verby Introduces Damaging Outside Evidence - Roeller rejected my
suggestion and he selected private attorney Verby to mediate the related IIB case #CV11-6420. I was told Verby had retired from the bench. See my declaration in EXHIBITS
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Master Guide Pg 14-19 “Declaration Of Frantz In Support Of Mistrial”. The Mediation
was held November 8, 2016.

During the mediation Verby spent most of his time with

Roeller, became familiar with him as IIB’s witness and the story regarding the IIB loan,
the same loan in the companion case #CV-10-6088. Steve Verby, took on a dual role as
Judge for the district court without disclosure six months after the mediation, still as the
standby mediator for case #CV-11-6420. .

Verby did not insure the integrity of the

proceedings. He apparently forgot to disclose to the parties his dual role.

More

importantly he failed to disclose that he previously received IIB deposition documents
and had personal knowledge of the parties and cases which information was obtained as
private paid attorney/mediator in the Roeller/Frantz companion IIB loan case #CV-116420.

We don’t know if Steve Verby did a conflict check. We don’t know if he knew

but forgot to disclose. But the code and case citations in #2 opening arguments clearly
state that doesn’t matter.
Part of my ADA learning disability results in impaired name/face recognition. I
was also told Verby retired from the bench so was not expecting him in that dual role
and did not place him. After his hearings and rulings, I met with my Roeller case
attorney, Mark Jackson on September 28, 2017 to prepare for his November scheduled
trial in Judge Haynes court. It was at that pre-trial meeting, Mark Jackson confirmed
that Verby was the same person who was mediating the Roeller case and still acting as
standby mediator, although there had been no recent mediation activity.

5. Judge Verby Disclosure/Permission In Dual & Concurrent Roles -

If private

attorney Verby had requested my permission to act in a dual role simultaneously as
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Judge and Mediator, that would have been a major mistake because he had detailed
nasty knowledge of the Roeller IIB loan disparagement case against me. That case was
largely Roeller’s word against mine and he wasn’t backing down in his mediation
conversations with Verby. Furthermore, Verby was acting as stand-by Mediator hoping
to settle the Roeller matter after the unsuccessful mediation, a case that was unresolved
and pending court trial proceedings scheduled for November, 2017 in Judge Haynes
courtroom. If Verby had asked me for consent, there’s no way I would have granted his
request with the Roeller case still open to mediation and settlement.

6. Judge Verby Unsuccessful In One Day Mediation -

After the one day mediation,

Verby continued as stand-by Mediator part-time by phone which was handled by
Roeller, my attorney (Jackson) and Verby.

His detailed knowledge of Roeller’s

defamation IIB testimony was very damaging to me unless Roeller would recant his
sworn IIB testimony. On November 17, 2017, Roeller not only finally did recant his
sworn testimony but also dismissed his $183,000 claim against me with prejudice.
While the conclusion of the Roeller case could well have changed Verby’s opinion of
my credibility due to Roeller’s exoneration, it happened too late, after the Verby &
Christensen has already made their fatal decisions in #CV-10-6088.

7. Counter Rebuttal To Judge Verby Bias Argument (See EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg
95-99 “Memorandum”) - Judge Christensen’s memorandum argument was largely based
upon the fact that the Roeller defamation case evidence was not part of the record in
#CV-10-6088 and not known by the Judges. Therefore the Roeller case could not have
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biased Verby or Christensen decisions. However, that fact is precisely the reason why
there was bias by not only one Judge but both. Both eventually became aware of the
defamation case that was not part of #CV-10-6088 through “Verby’s” other private
employment. Instead of recusing themselves, after obtaining that outside damaging
evidence against me, they both continued to make decisions/orders.

If the Roeller

matter had already been of record in #CV-10-6088, then the fact that Verby brought that
previously known damaging evidence to case #CV-10-6088 through his private
employment, it would not create constructive bias, only a conflict of interest. But as the
Judge pointed out in his memorandum, the damaging evidence was not known or on
record in #CV-10-6088. Therefore the Judges should have recuse themselves or at
minimum obtained consent from all the litigants prior to making (4) separate
decisions/orders after they became aware of the details of the on-going Roeller case
from Verby’s outside employment.

Only litigants can bring in new evidence to #CV-

10-6088.
In the October 24th, 2018 Judge Christensen hearing,

IIB stated that “legal

authority does not support the defendant’s position”. Their reasoning was as follows;
“Even when the Judge had acted as counsel on a case which then the judge later
became a judge on, where he did not act as counsel on the issue before the Court, he
was not disqualified from hearing the motion.”

There are cases where Judges can and

do act in dual judicial roles without running amuck but just as many where they don’t. It
all depends upon the specific circumstances of each case.
The citations IIB reference have different circumstances that do not comport to the
Verby circumstances. In one of the citations, all of the parties were fully aware of the
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conflict but did not request recusal and/or the Attorney’s private practice case was
adjudicated prior to the client’s attorney becoming the Judge. I wish that would have
happened in our case which likely would have changed Verby’s decision. In Verby’s
case, he was acting simultaneously as attorney for me in one case that was on-going and
as Judge for me in the other case concerning the same IIB loan dispute. Also in IIB’s
citations the companion cases had no relevance or causation to reasonably result in bias
and/or the damaging evidence was already on record and known previously by the
Judges in the main case. In the case subject of this appeal, both the Judge and IIB have
admitted that the Roeller case damaging evidence was never part of #CV-10-6088
record nor did the Judges know about it until Verby’s private mediator employment.
In Co-Judge Verby’s case;
1) (Conflict) Did he apparently forgot to disclosed to all parties that he was acting as
paid private attorney in the Roeller case and;
2) (Bias) Did he not disclosed that he had detailed knowledge of the IIB defamation
case between myself and Roeller that was not of record in #CV-10-6088 and could
bias his fact finding in #CV-10-6088, and
3) (No Consent) Did he obtain consent from IIB or myself to serve as Co-Judge for
fact finding in #CV-10-6088.

That outside damaging information could sway,

influence and likely biased Verby’s fact finding in #CV-10-6088 with regard to who
he could believe, myself or IIB’s in matters where it’s my word against their word.
Verby’s involvement in my defamation IIB/Roeller case is exactly the kind of
nasty information that sways Judges and bias’s decisions. It is important that both
Judges could not and did not have knowledge of Roeller’s infamous recant and reversal
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of his IIB disparaging sworn testimony exonerating me. The Judges could not have
known about the exoneration because Judge Haynes Roeller ruling was not made until
(4) months after Verby’s #CV-10-6088 fatal decision and (9) days after Christensen’s
several rulings.
A client’s attorney cannot, during an on-going case (Roeller IIB loan defamation
case #CV-11-6420) simultaneously act as Judge in its companion case (Frantz/IIB same
loan case) without disclosure and consent of all the litigants (See regulation reference in
opening argument #2).

A client’s attorney has a duty when acting as Judge in a

companion case to full disclosure to both litigants when the case evidence they obtained
in their outside private employment could result in bias to either party, evidence that had
not been introduced as evidence in the companion case by either myself or IIB anytime
-during the proceedings. The intent of disclosure and consent rules are for the purpose of
avoiding perceived bias, conflicts of interest, avoiding miscarriage of justice and
maintaining trust and confidence in the judicial system. The unique circumstances of
this matter are precisely what the courts have reproved as judicial blunders both by
Judge Verby & Christensen.
One must ask, would Verby and Christensen had made a different “call” if they
knew that Roeller recanted, reversed his IIB sworn testimony, dropped his demand for
$183,000, dismissed the IIB defamation case with prejudice and exonerated me? The
Roeller recant concerning my representation dealings with IIB speaks volumes to my
credibility and sworn testimony.

That information could have certainly swayed Judge

Christensen/Verby to decide in my favor. Case #CV-10-6088 hinged on who was more
likely telling the truth, me or IIB. If they had known about Roeller’s exoneration and
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ruled in my favor, then IIB would be the party motioning for a retrial for the same
reason. In other words it would have worked in the reverse, as the Judges would still be
biased with new damaging evidence that disfavored IIB which was not of record in
#CV-10-6088.

8. Judge Christensen Pro-Se ADA Non-compliance

I have been managing IIB’s

complex multiple claims from their four attorney team in five different courts.

I have

had an excellent court experiences in key cases like the IIB Roeller case in Judge Haynes
District Court and in the 9th Circuit Court where in both cases I was properly represented
by counsel. However, in courts where I have been Pro-se or limited in counsel funding, it
has been “a lamb to the slaughter”. The common denominator is clear, with proper
representation I win and as Pro se litigant I lose on technicalities as a result of my
learning disability.

To provide an equal chance as other Pro se litigants,

the

Department Of Justice ADA directives provide the following procedures as referenced in
my ADA court request, see EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg 130-142.
1. DOJ ADA Directive Pg 4; (4.) “Notice For Accommodation” “4. The local court
administrative ADA authority, with the assistance of the local ADA advocate
coordinator, determines what reasonable accommodation will be made.
Consultation shall occur with the individual to explore his or her limitations
and the option available for accommodating the disability…”
Although I asked the Judge to explore my limitations and options for accommodation
(see below), Judge Christensen did not arrange for any collaboration between the court ADA
authority and the local ADA advocate coordinator and refused to sit down with me and the
court reader to address ADA needs and directions. Even when I attempted to meet with the
Judge with the “reader” to go over the accommodations at the ADA hearing, the Judge
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refused.
(See Oct 24, 2017 court reporter transcript Pg 5, Line 15 in EXHIBITS Master Guide
Pg 101-112) “MR. FRANTZ; What I would like to do is request a meeting in the
judges chamber in regard to the ADA accommodations. (Pg 5, Line 18…) THE
COURT: …Mr. Sturgell’s been appointed here as a reader for you, so we’re not
going to need chambers. (Pg 5, Line 23…) MR. FRANTZ: … So I am -not looking for
a reader, I’m looking for other kinds of accommodation that I made in the ADA
notice that I filed with the court…. I am not seeking counsel, I am seeking an
interpreter…to facilitate those matters that I’ve been diagnosed with in regard to my
dyslexia… I would like to be provided that assistance…up to that point where it does
not become… legal representation… THE COURT: Then I’m - I guess I don’t
understand, Mr. Frantz… You have Dyslexia. Does that affect how you hear things?
And I’m not being facetious or smart, sir. MR. FRANTZ: …It affects a number of
ways…However, when the Court directed to provide a reader… The tests I provided
the administration’s office… I can read at a high school level. It’s the
comprehension and understanding of…that reading that I was diagnosed at a firstgrade level… So it’s not a simple matter of having somebody sit and take a piece of
paper and read it to me because…am perfectly capable of reading words on a piece
of paper…(Pg 7, Line 20…) THE COURT: You have filed a number of extensive
pleadings with the court?... Did you draft these pleadings, Mr. Frantz? MR.
FRANTZ: I did. THE COURT: Okay. The court takes note of those pleadings and
notes that they have a – they follow in the sense of there’s a process that – and a
reader, so I don’t know what you’re seeking. If you’re not seeking counsel and
you’re not seeking a reader, I don’t know what it is that you are seeking. (Pg 8, Line
5…) MR. FRANTZ: Can we go over those 17 points that I listed? (Pg 8, Line 7…)
THE COURT: I think you need to – I don’t know what you want. I don’t know what
you’re seeking by this accommodation or request for accommodation. (Pg 8, Line
15) MR. FRANTZ: I believe…there’s a place where I can receive assistance that
the Court may not interpret as legal counsel that would be accommodation that
would help resolve and - these issues, so I made a list of the 17…requests… (Note:
The 17 line items requests I made in the ADA Notice For Accommodation on Page 7
which the Judge had in front of him) I’d like you to just go over those requests. (Pg
8, Line 21…) THE COURT: Mr. Frantz, we have an hour, okay? And we are
using – I just want you to understand that’s all we have today is an hour… So if –
and I still don’t know – are you ready to proceed? (Pg. 9, Line 2) MR. FRANTZ:
…I’m not prepared to proceed with the reconsideration. (Pg 10, Line 10) MR.
FRANTZ: I object on the basis that I am not prepared…to discuss that motion.
(because I had filed a motion to set it aside and substitute Mistrial motion) (Pg 11,
Line 9…) MR. FRANTZ: I would just like to make a note that…in regard to the
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ADA accommodations…I don’t understand where that all is and what is the
procedure to…for me…to go forward with those 17 items that I was asking for...”
Judge Christensen refused to acknowledge or discuss the list of 17 items I provided to
him and would not answer my questions and/or providing the court reader with reasonable
ADA direction.

Those 17 items came from the combined (2) medical reports and doctor

recommendations.
2. DOJ Directive (Recorder Transcript Pg 4: (8.) in EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg
101-112) - “The court also must ensure that its communication with people
with disabilities are as effective as communications with others…”
At the Oct 24, 2017 court hearing, the Judge drew a medical conclusion as
to my disability by indicating that I was as capable as others and therefore did
not need accommodation other than a person to read for me. The Judge said
(Pg 12; Line 1);
“THE COURT: Mr. Frantz, you have argued before the Idaho Supreme Court
personally; is that correct? (Pg 12: Line 15-25 & Pg 13: Line 1-9) “THE
COURT: Okay. And did you draft these documents to the Court? THE
COURT: Okay. The Court notes that the – Mr. Frantz has provided legal
pleadings, legal documents to the Court by way of a motion, by way of
declarations, and by way of – I believe there was a memorandum as well.” And
the Court notes that to the extent that Mr. Frantz has requested assistance in
understanding the matters before him, that he has Dyslexia, and that he – that
the Court has provided Mr. Sturgell here to not provide legal assistance, he is
not entitled to a legal counsel, appointed legal counsel, but here to help him
understand the proceedings by – as being a reader, and Mr. Sturgell repeated to
Mr. Frantz just several minutes ago what defense counsel – or plaintiff’s counsel
had stated and that the Court has stated. And therefore, the Court finds that
reasonable accommodation has been made to Mr. Frantz for these motions.
So with that, Mr. Frantz, are you ready to proceed with your motion…?”
In the ADA proceeding, the Judge ignored the medical report lists of recommended
accommodations and appeared to make his own medical evaluation as to the extent of my
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medical condition and what I needed by probing me on my skill level in the courts.
However, Judges are not medical doctors and cannot determining cognitive skill levels or
what is needed for accommodation, rather their job is to determine how the court will provide
the accommodation recommended by the experts specializing in communication disabilities.
3. DOJ Directive (Court reporter transcript Pg 5; (14.) in EXHIBITS Master Guide
Pg 101-112) “…Accommodation examples includes…making eye contact and
listen patiently and carefully…Sometimes it takes repeated attempts at listening
or speaking for communication to be successful.
Let the person know your
communication with them is worthwhile to you… accommodation may also
include: having the court and witnesses talk slowly or write things
down;…repeating information using different wording or a different
communication approaches…allowing time for information to be fully
understood…taking periodic breaks;…”
Judge Christensen refused my request to meet with the court reader to review and
clarify the (17) ADA accommodations and medical report in my notice for accommodation.
He was hurried and did not display patience. He did not let me know my communication
with him was worthwhile per the DOJ Directive.
4. See Court report transcript Pg 6;(16) in EXHIBITS Master Guide Pg 101-112)
“All requests for an accommodating should be held confidential and/or sealed.”
Judge Christensen did not keep my accommodation request confidential by refusing to
meet in his chambers with the court reader and instead humiliated me by discussing my ADA
request in the public court hearing forum.

Lastly, after the hearing I contacted the court

reader to ask for information from the hearing. I also called and left a message but received
no reply. The Judge court cut off my access to ADA assistance it said that it had given me
for #CV-10-6088. Since that last attempted access to ADA assistance on October 30, 2017
(10 months ago), I have had no assistance from the court in the subsequent court proceedings
in or out of the court. (See court appointed “reader” email correspondence EXHIBITS
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Master Guide Pg 143-145).

9. Judge Christensen Learns Of Outside Damaging Evidence Judges don’t like
their cases being appealed but it usually doesn’t cause issues because the case is
most often suspended or actions stayed during the appeal. However, in my case
several more court proceedings continued after I appealed and are still on-going
today which Judge Christensen and then Co-Judge Verby issued decisions. Once
Verby, acting as Judge, brought in his knowledge of the outside damaging
defamation IIB evidence, that was not of record in the Frantz IIB case, #CV-10-6088
became soiled including Christensen’s role with his new founded knowledge too.
Judge Christensen likely received the outside evidence from Verby but if not, he
knew by the time I filed the Mistrial Motion.
evidence against me,

After receiving the damaging

Christensen ruled on (4) separate matters, which (3) are

subject of this appeal; the Verby reconsideration, my ADA request and my Mistrial
Motion.

Both Judges became privy to damaging outside evidence and then

afterward made multiple rulings, subject of this appeal. The fourth matter was a
dismissal order of #CV-10-6088 which is a third Supreme Court appeal currently
pending which is not addressed in this appeal.
My Retrial Motion became paramount. I promptly filed a hearing substitution
in a previous scheduled hearing to resolve the matter as soon as possible (see court
transcript October 24, 2017 Pg 9, line 2-4 in EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg 101-112).
In the hearing substitution, I tabled my Verby reconsideration matter until a decision
was made on the Mistrial since that matter would moot the re-consideration.
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IIB did not object to my substitution request. However, Judge Christensen,
over my objection, went ahead with the Verby reconsideration request anyway even
though I had substituted it for my Mistrail Motion in the court notice document (see
same court transcript Pg 9, line 1-4).
There was no objection from IIB about the substitution notice at first, but
appallingly Judge Christensen made an argument for IIB. He argued that I would
have to provide a 14 day notice for the substitution and therefore the Mistrial would
not be heard and the reconsideration, that I tabled in my court notice, would be heard
-(see court transcript Pg 9, line16). It was only after the Judges 14 day inappropriate
argument for in behalf of defending IIB who had never even brought up an objection
that IIB then joined the Judge and objected to moving the reconsideration back (see
transcript Pg 9). Lastly, Judge Christensen only granted me 5 minutes for the critical
levy reconsideration matter and would not allow a continuance and pressured me to
withdraw it (see court transcript page 29 line 23). It appears he was anxious to find a
way out of the Mistrial mess. He rushed through October 24, 2017 hearing making
hurried statements as follows;
a. “I can tell you this, Mr. Frantz, we are running out of time, okay?” (October 24,
2017 Pg 21, line 8-9)
b. “You did not file in a timely manner so didn’t have the time to reply for the brief,
so I’m not going to grant you a continuance on this matter.” (October 24, 2017
Pg 27, line 1-4)
c. “You’re going to have about ten minutes to argue it…So don’t take away more
time than that you need.” (October 24, 2017 Pg 27, line 7-9)
d. “You’re either withdrawing the motion today or we’re hearing the motion
today… You’ve got about 5 minutes.” (October 24, 2017 Pg 29, line 21-23).
That’s 5 minutes to hear the complicate levy extension reconsideration matter.
Since the time I filed for ADA assistance on October 8, 2017, there have been (4)
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rulings by Judge Christensen.

During the past (10) months, the grand total ADA

assistance I have received from the Judge is 1 hour from the court “reader” at the October
24th hearing. No further contact or assistance has been granted.

The next Judge

Christensen hearing, on a “dismissal” matter, is scheduled for September 18th , 2018 @
3pm.

10. Multiple Courts Impacted By Christensen/Verby Decision The outcome of the errors in the Christensen/Verby proceedings independently produced
injustice in (3) other related court cases. See all three case references in EXHIBITS
Master Guide Pg 31-54.

Judge Christensen was aware of these other cases which I had

filed and noticed in #CV-10-6088. They knew there would be irreputable and irreversible
damage caused if he affirmed the decisions regarding the $9+m judgment and subsequent
execution disputes.
As a result of the Judges errors, I immediately lost my home, I lost reimbursement for
administrative expenses and lost an important appeal in my case #11-21337-TLM.
These (3) other related cases have been adjudicated and substantially acted upon and
would be impractical now to unwind them in an attempt to recover the losses.
Judge Christensen’s decision to exonerate and affirm Co-Judge Verby’s decision, is
entitled “Memorandum Decision And Order On Defendants Motion To Extend Filing
Date For Claim Of Exemption” dated July 20, 2017 (See EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg
95-99). Referenced in these EXHIBITS, Judge Christensen’s decision was filed as the
primary evidence in the following other related court cases to #CV-10-6088;
a. Federal Court case #11-21337-TLM - Judge Verby’s decision order was
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immediately filed by IIB as the primary evidence in the attached EXHIBIT C
“IIB’s Response To Debtors Objection To Withdrawl Of Administrative Claim”
dated September 12, 2017 which is a true and correct copy. That Federal court
solely relied upon Judge Verby’s decision and ruled in favor of IIB against my
objection to withdraw my $113,841 Administrative Claim as a result.
b. BAP case #ID-15-1060 Judge Verby decision order was immediately filed by
IIB as the primary evidence in the attached EXHIBIT D “Idaho Independent
Bank’s Reply To Objection To IIB Motion To Substitute As Appellant”
regarding my home dated August 7, 2017 which is a true and correct copy. As a
result, the BAP ruled in favor of IIB.
c.

Arizona Supreme Court case #CV2017-011980 The Judge Verby decision was
immediately filed by IIB as key evidence in the attached EXHIBIT E as
“Noticed” in Castle Property Investments LLLP v Martin D. Frantz & Cynthia
M. Frantz” regarding the Frantz home Lis Pendens dated August 25, 2017 which
is a true and correct copy. As a result, the court ruled in favor of IIB.

The argument filed by IIB in each of these other courts was as follows (See “Idaho
Independent Bank’s Reply To Objection To IIB Motion To substitute As Appellant” dated
August 7, 2017, Pg 12-13 (D);
“D. The Claim of Exemption Has Already Been Ruled Upon Against the
Frantzes and In Any Event, t his Court is Not the Correct Forum to
Raise Such Issues. As set forth above, the Frantzes have already filed
a Motion to Extend Filing Date for Claim of Exemption in the
Guarantor Action in which they argued that they should be able to
file a claim of exemption as to the claims purchased by IIB at the
Sheriffs Sale. After full briefing and hearing, the Honorable Judge
Verby denied the Frantz Motion to Extend on July 20, 2017… “
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[JIB goes on to state:]
"The Frantzes have filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding that
decision making the same arguments they make before this Court,
which goes against the very principals underlying the RookerFeldman doctrine. "The Rooker-Feldman" doctrine bars suits
brought by state Courts. "
END ...
Due to the complexity of the multiple related litigation matters pending in (3) other
courts, all reliant upon Judge ChristensenNerby decision and order, an attempt to fix,
correct or salvage case #CV-11-6088 proceedings would fail.

The court should also

consider the unique non-dischargeability of the judgment in #CV-10-6088 and the fact
that no trial has been allowed in the case and that there are no other court forums for
relief. The appropriate solution to ensure the full integrity of the judicial system and
avoid further appearance of judicial error or a miscarriage of justice is to vacate the
orders and judgments of #CV -11-6088 and remand the case back to the court for a trial on
its merits and evidence.

11. Procedure 60(b)(6) Judgment Vacation & Retrial -

Procedure 60(b)(6) provides a

procedure whereby a party may be relieved of a final judgment and/or court order.

Rule

60(b)( 6) grants courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment "upon such

terms as are just,". The Rule provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments, orders and other rulings whenever such action is appropriate to
accomplish.

See Klapprott v.United States, 335 U S. 601, 614-615 (1949),

We

conclude that in determining whether an order and judgment should be vacated for a
violation of§ 455 (a) and Retrial, it is important to consider the injustice to the parties
which has occurred and the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in their
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other court cases.

Also the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial

process is a paramount factor in deciding the use of this remedy.

In re Murchison, 349

U. S. 133, 136 (1955) the court determined we must continuously bear in mind that to
perform its high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
Rule 60(b)(6) authorizes a district court, on motion and upon such terms as are just, to
relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for any "reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment."
In deciding this matter, the court is to consider IIB’s misconduct in these
proceedings and importantly, the resultant injustice in other court related cases. The case
is extraordinary due to the combined elements that exist as follows;
1)

Judicial error whereby Judge Verby brought in new damaging evidence to
#CV-10-6088 through other private employment;

2)

IIB Attorney misconduct in the Levy dispute (See two complaints against IIB
in EXHIBIT Master Guide Pg 60-68 “Sanction Request”);

3)

Three separate courts made irreversible final order/decisions ruling against me
because they relied upon Judge Verby’s decision/order. Those cases are
Federal court case, #11-21337-TLM, BAP case #ID-15-1060 and, Arizona
Superior Court case #CV2017-011980;

4)

ADA non-compliance

It’s uncommon that a Judge participates as Judge and private attorney Mediator in two
companion cases at the same time in a §455 conflict and then soils the case by bringing in
new damaging evidence to the main case.

There is also IIB Attorney misconduct in the

same case. It is unusual that a Judge would make his own medical assessment of a Dyslexia
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litigant and ignore the medical expert reports for accommodation and ignore DOJ’s ADA
directives. It’s unusual that the court err would result in (3) other courts relying on the
decision which are now irreversible. It is extremely unlikely and extraordinary to find all the
conditions together which are present in this case.

Fixing or correcting Judge Christensen’s

and his co-Judge Verby’s decisions via vacation only repairs part of the injustice and does not
address the irreversible damage done in (3) other courts and the bias that will forever exist
inside the #CV-10-6088 courtroom. This case has a combination of circumstances which
warrants extraordinary measures.
I started with little education, no money and an ADA disability. I worked my way
through the ranks with long hours, hard work and importantly, a few good people gave me a
chance to prove myself.

I’ve been fortunate to have been a small business contributor to

the community for over three decades completing over $170m in new businesses.

I hope

I’m not asking too much to receive reasonable and fair access to the judicial system.

ATTORNEY FEES & COSTS
I initially had some representation in this case before I went Pro Se and therefore
seek an award of those customary costs and attorney fees in my Appeal pursuant to I.C. §12120(3). A commercial transaction (development loan) was integral to this action; therefore,
attorney fees and costs are awardable.
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CONCLUSION
These are the questions I would ask you to ponder in this matter;
1. IIB Culpability - Does a failing government-chartered bank’s principle operator have
the charter authority to retaliate against a customer? Did Gustavel cut off final loan
negotiations and file a fabricated false mortgage loan default on our family property;
but far more importantly, did he sue me personally for the full amount of the loan
without foreclosing or off-setting any of the collateral in the suit. Was his strategy to
cause financial devastation to my successful, growing assisted living business so
that I would immediately lose resources to fund a fair and equal legal defense and
end up in bankruptcy where he has the advantage?
And; am I a bank customer which;
a. has never missed a loan payment in my 35 year career in any enterprise;
b. received an outstanding review from the bank’s (Gustavel’s) underwriters
(2010) with $3m in long-term cash deposits in the bank with full financial
ability and willingness to repay the loan during and after the Great Recession;
2. (3) Other Court Cases Adjudicated On Verby’s Decision - Were the several Judge
Christensen and Co-Judge Verby’s decisions biased due to the Roeller IIB parallel
case that was brought into CV-10-6088 by Judge Verby though his private
employment? Did Judge Christensen and Co-Judge Verby’s levy decision complete
execution on all my remaining assets, income sources and other revenue generators
directly resulting in me losing (3) other court cases that are now irreversible?
3. Non-dischargeable $9m Judgment Without A Trial - Now that all of my non-exempt
assets and income sources are gone, what should be done with the remaining nonAPPELANT’S BRIEF

PAGE 43 of 46

dischargable $9m+ judgement? Is it judicious that the judgment should cut off all
access to credit for the rest of my life so that I can never restart my business or begin
to pay off the interest or principle on the judgment?

Does it make sense that I

should carry this undue hardship with no opportunity for a trial on its merits and no
other court venue for relief ?
4. ADA Accommodation - Did Judge Christensen ignore the recommendations of the
medical reports and fail to provide reasonable and conclusive ADA accommodation?
Did he give me the time and courtesy to prepare for and hear my arguments? Did
the Judge refuse to meet me and the court reader to discuss ADA concerns in his
chambers? Did he humiliate me by insisting I could not read and discussing my
mental disability in the open public courtroom? Did the Judge derive his own
medical conclusion about my Dylexia/communication disability instead of relying on
the (2) independent medical reports?

Did the Judge cut of my access to ADA

assistance right after the Oct, 2017 hearing?

Did he provided a grand total of 1

(one) hour of ADA assistance, a (“reader”) during the past 10 months while making
(4) rulings and a fifth ruling scheduled for hearing October 18, 2018.

Could the

Judge’s actions in these matters have contributed to a miscarriage of justice in #CV10-6088?
5. Judges Bias - Should Verby have disclosed to all the litigants in #CV-10-6088 his
role in the Roeller companion IIB case? Should Verby have sought consent from the
litigants in a dual and concurrent roles as private paid Mediator and public Judge?
Could Co-Judge Verby’s decision in #CV-10-6988 have been biased due to the
damaging evidence he learned from the Roeller IIB defamation case proceedings?
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Before ruling in #CV-10-6088, could Verby have waited another (4) months and
Christensen another (9) days for the Roeller case #CV-11-6420 to be adjudicated. If
so, would the Judges have a more balanced view given that Roeller recanted his
disparaging statements regarding my loan representation exonerating me of IIB
wrong doing?

To my knowledge, there’s never been an ADA Pro se Dyslexic litigant that has won a civil
court case in America.

While it appears to be an insurmountable challenge, if you would

please give me a chance, I would really like to give it my best. If the court will follow the
DOJ ADA Directives and provide me with meaningful assistance so I’m not continually
tripping over complex procedure and technicalities, perhaps we can show the world that
Justice for Pro se ADA litigants is possible in our country. All you need to do is agree with
at least one of the above matters and give me a chance by remanding the case back to the
District court for a Jury Trial.

Thank you for your consideration…

Respectfully submitted on this 22nd day of August, 2018.

________________________________
By: Marty Frantz – Appellant
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EXHIBITS
Motion For Mistrial
Motion To Stay
Co-Judge Verby & Judge Christensen Decisions
Mistrial & Reconsideration Hearing Transcripts
Notice For ADA Accommodation
Court “Readers” email correspondence
Judges Roeller Order
Summary Judgement
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of August, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be delivered to Hawley-Troxell Attn: Sheila Schwagger via first class mail at:
Hawley-Troxell,

PO

Box

sschwager@hawleytroxell.com.

1617,

Boise,

ID

83701-1617

and

by

email:

I furthermore certify that I emailed a copy to: Attn: Court

Clerk, Idaho Supreme Court, 451 W State Street, Boise, Idaho 83702.

Lastly, I certify that

service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A. R.

_______________________________
Marty D. Frantz

APPELANT’S BRIEF CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF IDAHO
Idaho Supreme Court DOCKET NO. 45655
______________________________________________________________
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants/Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
APPELLANT’S EXHIBITS

______________________________________________________________________
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Kootenai; The Honorable Steve Verby & Rich Christensen presiding.
Kootenai County Case #CV 2010-6088

MARTY & CINDY FRANTZ
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Phone: 208-619-0482
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
_ _______________________

Pro-Se Appellant

SHEILA R. SCHWAGER
HAWLEY TROXELL
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701
208-344-6000
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
Attorney for Respondent, IIB
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Attached hereto are 411 pages of EXHIBITS for the above referenced case. This a
searchable PDF file. Additionally, each page is marked at the top numerically starting with 1
and ending with 411 entitled “EXHIBITS Master Guide Page No.” for quick reference.

EXHIBITS
Motion For Mistrial
Motion To Stay
Co-Judge Verby & Judge Christensen Decisions
Mistrial & Reconsideration Hearing Transcripts
Notice For ADA Accommodation
Court “Readers” email correspondence
Judges Roeller Order
Summary Judgement

Respectfully submitted on this 22nd day of August, 2018.

________________________________
By: Marty Frantz – Appellant
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcd.a@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDE NT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL &
ORDER/JUDGMENT
VACATION

Defendants

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as required by IC 8-507c, Title 8 - Provisional
Remedies In Civil, 60(b)(6), and ADA provisions, Defendant, Marty Frantz, moves for a
Mistrial. Since the Motion for Mistrial may moot the pending Reconsideration Motion, Frantz
sets aside and reserves the Reconsideration Motion.

In place of the Reconsideration scheduled

hearing previously "noticed", Frantz substitutes the Motion For Mistrial to be heard on October
24 th, 2017 at the same location and time.
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Grounds For Mistrial & Judgment Vacation

Extrajudicial Non. .disclosure & Partiality

28 U.S. Code § 455 states: " (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
(b) He shall disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has personal bias or
prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the
proceedings;"...

This includes familiarity with the facts or the parties which originated in a

source outside the case itself" (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer regarding the
controversy ... "[See: Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions Corp.], the court emphasized that
§ 455 only requires the appearance of partiality in promoting the public confidence in the
integrity of the judicial process. The concept included all iudicial relationship or connections
with a party where the Judge has "extra-judicial sources" of information related to the case and
has not disclosed those sources and obtained consent from both opposing parties prior to
serving as Judge for the case.

Even though the Judge may not have remembered anything about

his private work on case # CV-11-64 20, and therefore no partiality exists, or the judge is pure in
heart and incorruptible as is presumed in Steve Verby 's case, it does not matter for purposes of
this code. The judge's forgetfulness is not the sort of objectively ascertainable fact that can avoid
the "appearance ofpartiality". [See: Hall v. Small Business Administration, 695 F. 2d 175, 179
(5th Cir. 1983)7.

The Yerby facts create precisely the kind of appearance of impropriety that §

455(a) was intended to prevent. The violation is neither insubstantial nor excusable. Although it
appears Judge Yerby did not recognize Frantz name or face, just as Frantz did not associate or register
where he had seen Yerby before, Judge Yerby (not Frantz) has a duty to keep track of his private
outside Attorney jobs and could have known by the related content of case #CV-10-6088 and the IIB
connection, that the history of the case was rooted in state court case #CV-11-6420 and Federal
court #11-21337-TLM.

The flaw in the private practice tracking system to keep Attorney Steve

Yerby informed with regard to his private clients could constitute a separate violation of§ 455 (See §
455(c)).

Moreover, providing relief as requested by Frantz in this case may prevent a substantive

injustice in some future case. It may encourage a judge or litigant to more carefully examine possible
grounds for ethical conflicts and to avoid these situations by paying closer attention to client tracking.
Lastly, the outcome of the errors in these proceedings produced injustice in other related court cases.
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It is therefore appropriate and necessary to vacate the decision and orders of the court proceedings and
retry the case.
On around November, 2017, Attorney Steve Yerby acted in the capacity of a lawyer/mediator for
case# CV-11-6420 in Frantz vs Roeller. Attorney Yerby was requested by Roeller (Pro Se) to be
the private attorney mediator.

Attorney Steve Yerby accepted the job and was paid by Roeller

(Pro Se) and Frantz in the capacity as private/independent lawyer/mediator to resolve the matter.
The case involved a key witness, Dirk Roeller, for Idaho Independent Bank (IIB) in the same
matter and material facts as in Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088, which Judge Yerby later presided.
Roeller could become a key witness for Frantz or IIB case #CV-10-6088. The Frantz /JIB case
#CV-10-6088 that Judge Yerby substituted for, originated from JIB vs Frantz Federal court case
#11-21337-TLM. Frantz is of belief that Roeller's erroneous testimony in case #11-21337-TLM
resulted in the need for him to file case #CV-10-6088.

Therefore Frantz filed a complaint against

Roeller in case #CV-11-6420 to account for Roeller's part in damages levied by JIB in judgment
order case# CV-10-6088. Case# CV-10-6088 was "noticed" in case #CV-11-6420 as evidentiary
evidence.

CV-11-6420 is currently on-going but has been delayed due to Roeller's failure to
produce evidence which the Judge has sanctioned him for on two separate occasions. Attorney
Verby's mediation of Case #CV-11-6420 and the related damages Frantz may be entitled to
against Roeller are connected with Judge Verby's order and decision with regard to IIB's
collection on the judgment levy in case #CV-1 o. .6088.

If Frantz actions with IIB are exonerated

in Case #CV-11-6420, that ruling will also significantly affect Frantzs position in case #CV-106088. The cases are closely intertwined involving the same IIB/Frantz/Roeller stocy and material
facts.

The following year after case #CV-11-6420 was privately mediated by Attorney Yerby, now
familiar with regard to the Roeller/IIB witness and familiar with Marty Frantz and Dirk Roeller
personally,

Attorney

Yerby later acted as Judge Yerby and accepted litigating the same

Frantz/IIB/Roeller matter with respect to case #CV-10-6088. Yerby did not insure the integrity of
the proceedings by disclosing to the parties that he received and had personal knowledge of the
parties and case which information he had obtained in his private attorney/mediator business nor
that he had been paid for in his private practice as Attorney Steve Yerby in case #CV-11-6420.
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While he looked familiar to Frantz,

he did not place where he had known him during the

approximately one hour case #CV-10-6088 proceedings, Frantz did not associate Judge Verby as
the same individual as Attorney Steve Verby that acted in the capacity as private mediator for
Frantz/Roeller case #CV-11-6420 for the one day mediation the prior year. Frantz thought the
mediator he used had retired from the bench in favor of his private law business.

After the

Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088 hearing and Judge Verby's order and ruling, Frantz was making
inquiries about Judge Verby which eventually led to the connection between Judge Verby and
Attorney Steve Verby that indeed was the same person who privately mediated Frantz/Roeller case
#CV-11-6420.

On September 28, 2017,

Marty Frantz met with Mark Jackson, attorney for the Frantz/Roeller

case #CV-11-6420. At that meeting, Frantz confirmed that he had paid Judge Verby to mediate
Frantz/Roeller case #CV-11-6420 as a private mediator. The mediation was held on November 8,
2016 (See EXHIBIT A Declaration of Marty Frantz). A settlement was not reached by Attorney
Steve Verby in the Frantz/Roeller case #CV-11-6420 and the mediation continued by phone for
some time afterward, still without resolution.

In preparation for the mediation and throughout the

mediation proceedings, Attorney Steve Verby became very familiar with key matters in Frantz/IIB
case #CV-10-6088 involving Frantz vs IIB,
Frantz/Roeller case #CV-11-6420.

the underlying matter of the litigation between

The fact that Attorney Verby didn't achieve a settlement

outcome in the Frantz/Roeller case #CV-11-6420, would likely have been a negative experience
since his goal was to convince Frantz/Roeller to settle.

This prior personal experience with

Frantz/Roeller likely resulted in a negative opinion with regard to his pre-disposition toward Frantz
in favor of IIB in case #CV-11-6088.

Judge Verby in fact found in favor of IIB in case CV-11-

6088 without disclosing his prior relationship and knowledge of the case. There were a number of
circumstances leaning in Frantzs favor, and Frantz subsequently filed a reconsideration.

After

Frantz filed a reconsideration, he later became aware and confirmed that Attorney Verby was
hired the prior year in the same IIB/Frantz story matter.
The Judge Verby decision, in favor of IIB, is entitled "MEMORANDUM DECISION AND

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS MOTION TO EXTEND FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF
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EXEMPTION'' which Judge Verby incorrectly dated July 20, 2016 (it should be dated 2017). The

decision is attached as EXHIBIT B which is a true and correct copy.

The MEMORANDUM

DECISION was filed as key evidence in the following other Frantz related court cases;
1)

Lower Federal Court case #11-21337-TLM - The Judge Verby decision was filed as key
evidence in the attached EXHIBIT C "IJB's RESPONSE TO DEBTORS' OBJECTION TO
WITHDRAWAL OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM'' dated September 12, 2017 which is a true
and correct copy. The Federal court then relied upon Judge Yerby' s decision and ruled in
favor of IIB against Frantzs objection to withdraw Frantzs $113,841 Administrative Claim.

2)

BAP case #ID-15-1060 The Judge Verby decision was filed as key evidence in the attached
EXHIBIT D "JDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK'S REPLY TO OBJECTION TO JIB MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT" regarding Frantzs home dated August 7, 2017 which is a
true and correct copy. A BAP decision is expected soon in this court.

3)

Arizona Civil Court case #CV2017-011980 The Judge Verby decision was filed as key
evidence in the attached EXHIBIT E as "Noticed" in CASTLE PROPERTY INVESTMENTS

LLLP v MARTIN D. FRANTZ & CYNTHIA M FRANTZ" regarding the Frantz home Lis
Pendens dated August 25, 2017 which is a true and correct copy. A decision is expected soon
in this court.

Actual filed arguments used in the above proceedings 1,2 & 3 regarding Judge Verby's decision
are shown below.

The arguments have left Frantz with limited remedies especially in the Lower

Federal Court case #11-21337-TLM where the Judge a couple weeks ago issued his final order
and decision based upon Judge Verby' s decision prior to the Reconsideration finding, denying
Frantzs objection to IIB's withdrawal of the Administrative Claim damaging Frantz in the amount
of $113,841.

The arguments used in each of these other courts was similar as follows

(See"IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK'S REPLY TO OBJECTION TO JJB MOTION TO
SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT" dated August 7, 2017, Pg 12-13 (D);

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL & VACATION
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"D. The Claim of Exemption Has Already Been Ruled Upon Against the
Frantzes and In Any Event, this Court is Not the Correct Forum to Raise

Such Issues.
As set forth above, the Frantzes have already filed a Motion to Extend
Filing Date for Claim of Exemption in the Guarantor Action in which they
argued that they should be able to file a claim of exemption as to the
claims purchased by IIB at the Sheriffs Sale. After full briefing and
hearing, the Honorable Judge Verby denied the Frantz Motion to
Extend on July 20, 2017 ... "
[IIB goes on to state:]
"The Frantzes have filed a Motion for Reconsideration regarding that
decision making the same arguments they make before this Court, which
goes against the very principals underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
"The Rooker-Feldman" doctrine bars suits brought by state Courts."
END ...

Due to the complexity of the multiple related litigation matters pending in (3) other courts, all
reliant upon Judge Verby's decision and order, an attempt to fix, correct or salvage case #CV-116088 proceedings would fall short and risk additional prejudice now that proceedings in {4)

separate courts have been preiudiced by Judge Verby's actions, order and decision. The
appropriate solution to ensure the full integrity of the judicial system and avoid further appearance
of judicial error is to vacate the orders and judgments of the Civil Court proceeding case #CV-116088 and start over.

Pro-Se ADA Accommodation
As a Pro-Se litigant, Frantz disclosed to this court that he has a condition called Dyslexia, a
developmental neurological condition that impairs one's ability to read, write and communicate.
While opposing counsel responded and pointed out that Pro-Se litigants are held to the same
standards if represented by an attorney, IIB glossed over that the court is required to treat ADA
Pro-Se litigants with reasonable accommodations specific to their conditions. As a developmental
neurological condition,

there is no known cure for Dyslexia and its resulting impairments.

According to (2) recent independent medical tests,

Frantz was diagnosed with Dylexia and

Language disorder. The report states that he adequately mimics reading words but that his reading
comprehension/understanding and sentence structure is at a 1st grade level. The tests reveal that
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL & VACATION
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other Frantz communicatio n skills are at a grade school/adoles cent level, a condition he has had
during his entire life. See attached Declaration of Marty Frantz. Frantz provided his declaration
of Dylexia along with his education transcripts to this court case #CV-10-6088 (see Marty Frantz
Declaration EXHIBIT A). He additionally recently made the Dyslexia and Language Disorder
medical reports available to the Judge through the ADA trial court administrator under seal in
compliance with HIPPA.

Opposing counsel has objected to Frantzs arguments based upon lack of case law research and
similar judicial procedural matters requiring advanced reading, writing and communicatio n skills.
IIB has won on those "procedural" points against Frantz.

IIB also won to strike Frantz' s half

dozen expert witnesses and reports due to technical procedural errors by Frantz provoked by his
medical ADA condition. Additionally, Frantz has minimal financial resources and ability to pay
for expert representation and largely relies upon a combination of contingent fee representation,
pro-bono and Pro-Se representation. While Frantz has been highly successful in business for over
(3) decades, litigating in the U.S. judicial system is an entirely different genre requiring advanced
communicatio n skills that Frantz largely lacks.

Attorney representation helps but does not

alleviate Frantzs medical condition. Attorneys are only as effective as their clients are able to
communicate and work effectively with their attorney. Frantzs wife knows very little about the
complex business litigation and is limited to correcting Frantzs spelling and grammar errors and on
occasion giving his oral presentations. However, regardless of his medical condition, Frantz is
entitled to reasonable and fair access to the judicial system so that he has the privilege afforded to
every American regardless of race, color, economic status or impairment to receive a fair and
impartial judiciary trial.

Proceedings Misconduct By Idaho Independent Bank {IIB) Attorney
In the Levy action filed with this court in case CV-10-6088 "DEFENDEA NTS SUPPLEMEN TAL
MEMORAND UM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO EXTEND FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION " dated June 14 th, 2017, Frantz stated on Pg 8; "The Defendant respectfully asks

that JIB is appropriately sanctioned

Please bring fairness to these proceedings to deter

unnecessary, over-aggressive action so the court may focus on the core issues of No. CV-106088". Frantz made sanction requests to Judge Verby due to IIB's attorney's misconduct in the
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proceedings.

After the June request for sanctions against IIB for misconduct, Frantz filed a
second complaint on a new matter of IIB misconduct to Judge Yerby in the "Objection to IIB
Hearing Notice For Levy Reconsideration" in the same case #CY-11-6088 on the 30th day of
August, 2017, two months later. The Objection describes misconduct and interference by IIB' s
attorneys when Frantz attempted to schedule a hearing date for his objection.
condition,

Due to Frantzs

it is difficult for him to process multiple tasks at the same time because of the

significant effort and energy it takes him to focus on one single task. Through 11B 's complicated
multi-court filings related to CY-10-6088, which litigation now spans (2) state courts and (2)
Federal courts, Frantzs ability to reasonably defend himself as a Dyslexic Pro-Se litigant is
impossible. He cannot receive a fair and balanced trial under these conditions.

11B was made

aware of Frantzs condition and has taken advantage of his impairment by adding burdensome
procedural measures to complicate case #CY-11-6088 as evidenced by over 400 pages of
proceedings documents filed with the court in the current #CY-11-6088 Levy case proceedings.
The sanction request was presided over by Judge Yerby, the same Judge with a conflict. Judge
Yerby never responded to Frantzs request for fairness. Frantzs medical report confirmed that he
can only read and comprehend what he is reading at a 1st grade level. See attached court filings by
Frantz as EXHIBIT F which is a true and correct copy of the misconduct allegations Frantz filed
against IIB in this current case, subject of this Motion for Mistrial.
Public Interest In The Case

Competing in the construction development field does not require high scholastic communication
and reading comprehension skills. As such, Frantz is very capable to compete in the construction
field. In this arena, Frantz become a successful small business contributor to the U.S. economy
creating an estimated 5,000 jobs during the past several decades in construction/development. He
is a hard worker completing over $170m in rental housing in (7) western states (See attached
Declaration). He has contributed and paid an estimated $25m in Federal, State and local taxes
attributed directly from his construction/development enterprises. He has received several national
building design and construction achievement awards. He has personally owned and operated
$65m of his projects for decades.

If he were to prevail in CV-11-6088, Frantz would have his

access to credit restored and could go back to work in construction/development. Based upon his
10 year performance prior to the dispute with IIB, over the next 10 years (2018 to 2028), he
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL & VACATION
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would contribute another 2,000 jobs or approximately $45m gross business of which about $9
million would be contributed to Federal, State and local tax revenues. The decision to continue
with judgment sanctions for the remaining of Frantzs life or to remove them is a matter which
will have public job and tax revenue consequences.

In Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088 , Frantz initially requested a Jury Trial. That request was denied
due to small print loan waivers in IIB's lending documents.

As background, Frantz was in

excellent financial condition during the Great Recession and the bank was close to closing its
doors. IIB bank stock price had dropped over 90%.
bank's board room,

On June 9th , 2010, in a meeting held in the

the bank CEO and founder, Jack Gustave!, desperate to save his bank,

threatened to fabricate a loan default and place economic sanctions on Frantzs profitable assisted
living business.

The banker's action would force Frantz into bankruptcy if Frantz refused to

provide Gustavel's bank with unnecessary extra collateral for a loan extension. Frantzs loan was
fully performing (See attached link to Frantzs story in EXHIBIT G which is a true and correct
video link).

The underlying disputed issues are of value and concern to the general public. When a bank is
threatened with involuntarily closing its doors due to anomalies in the economy during recessions,
what rights does the bank have to sequester their other profitable borrowers to off-set the bank's
losses? Do banks have the right to fabricate defaults placing economic sanctions on successful
businesses and forcing them into bankruptcy if a borrower refuses to provide the bank with
unnecessary excessive loan terms during a recession to make up for the bank's losses? These core
issues in Frantz's complaint have never had a chance to be argued in case# CV-11-6088.

Procedure 60(b)(6)
Procedure 60(b )(6) provides a procedure whereby a party may be relieved of a final judgment and/or
court order.
Rule 60(b)(6) grants courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final judgment

"upon such terms as are just, ". The Rule provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments, orders and other rulings whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish. See
Klapprott v.United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614-615 (1949),

We conclude that in determining

whether an order and judgment should be vacated for a violation of § 455 (a) and Retrial, it is
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important to consider the injustice to the parties which has occurred and the risk that the denial of
relief will produce injustice in their other court cases. Also the risk of undermining the public's
confidence in the judicial process is a paramount factor in deciding the use of this remedy.
In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) the court determined we must continuously bear in mind that to
perform its high function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance ofjustice. Rule 60(b)(6)
authorizes a district court, on motion and upon such terms as are just, to relieve a party from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for any "reason justifying relieffrom the operation of the judgment. "
Therefore in deciding this matter, the court is to consider IIB' s actions in these proceedings and the
resultant injustice in other court cases inspired by IIB. The case is extraordinary due to the combined
elements that exist as follows;
1) Judicial error (Judge Yerby & Attorney private practice Yerby)
2) Attorney misconduct (two IIB sanction requests)
3) One court case, #11-21337-TL M already made an order/decision relying on CV-11-6088
Verby's decision/order.
4) Two other court pending cases are currently relying on Judge Yerby decision,

BAP case

#ID-15-1060 and Arizona Civil Court case #CV2017-011 980.
5) Medical ADA concerns
This case is rare. It's uncommon that a Judge participates as Judge and private Attorney for a litigant
in a§455 conflict. It is even more uncommon to find Attorney's misconduct in the same case with these
two other conditions. It is a relatively new concept for courts to provide accommodation for Dyslexic
Pro-Se litigants now protected under ADA It is extremely unlikely and extraordinary to find all the
conditions together which are present in case #CV- 10-6088.

Fixing or correcting Judge Verby's

decision via vacation only repairs part of the injustice and does not address attorney misconduct or other
factors.

While Frantz has been a member of the Dylexia Advantage organization for decades, he has came to
understand the depth of his Dylexia and Language disorder in more detail after recent professional
testing within the last month, encouraged by his wife. With an extremely low reading, comprehension
and communication score registering as low as a 1st grader, it is no wonder that Frantz has been late and
erred in procedural filings resulting in a half dozen key expert witness reports and affidavits being
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stricken from the court record.

He is now doubling his efforts to reach out and get the help and

accommodation he needs to have fair and reasonable access to the judiciary system. Judge Yerby, who
had a conflict, did not respond to Frantz' s request for fairness in the proceedings nor did he comment
on Frantzs request for sanctions which indicates the scales may have been slanted.
CONCLUSION
This case has a combination of circumstances which warrants extraordinary measures. Who we think
is right or wrong with regard to the Frantz/IIB case #CV-I 0-6088 core matters is not at issue and
should not be considered in this Retrial Motion.

appearance of justice".

What does matter is ')·ustice must satisfy the

In spite of Frantz' s medical condition, he has been a substantial small

business contributor to the community for over three decades. He has earned his way through hard
work and deserves reasonable and fair access to the judicial system. We ask the court to grant a
vacation and Retrial of case #CV-10-6088.
DATED THIS 12th day of October, 2017.

ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT A- Declaration of Marty Frantz
EXHIBIT B - Judge Verby Levy Decision/Order
EXHIBIT C - Federal Court Levy Final Decision/Order Dispute Relying On Judge Verby
Decision Exhibit B; and Frantz Objection $113,841
EXHIBIT D - BAP Court Pending Levy Dispute Relying On Judge Verby Decision
Exhibit B; and Frantz Objection
EXHIBIT E - AZ State Court Pending Levy Dispute Relying On Judge Verby Decision
Exhibit B; and Frantz Objection
EXHIBIT F - IIB Misconduct
EXHIBIT G - Frantz video link to 15 minute story
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON THE 13th DAY OF October, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR MISTRIAL to be served upon the following
in the manner indicated below.

Sheila R. Schwager
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

[ ]US Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 954-5261
[X] Email

MARTYD. FRANTZ

MOTION FOR MISTRIAL & VACATION

Page 12 of 12

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 13 of 411

EXHIBIT A
MARTY FRANTZ DECLARATION
IN SUPPORT OF MISTRIAL
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDE NT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M.FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088

DECLARAT ION OF MARTY
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF
MISTRIAL

Defendants

Marty Frantz declares under the penalty of perjury as follows:
I am a part-time resident of Kootenai County, Idaho and I am over the age of 18 and
competent to testify to the facts stated herein of my own personal knowledge.

Attorney Steve Verby and Judge Verby
On around November, 2017, Attorney Steve Yerby acted in the capacity of a lawyer/mediator for
case# CY-11-6420 in Frantz vs Roeller. Attorney Yerby was requested by Roeller (Pro Se) to be
the private attorney mediator. Attorney Steve Yerby accepted the job and was paid by Roeller
DECLARAT ION OF FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF MISTRIAL
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(Pro Se) and myself in the capacity as private/independent lawyer/mediator to resolve the matter.
The case involved a key witness for Idaho Independent Bank (IIB), Dirk Roeller, in the same
matter and material facts as in my Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088, in which Judge Verby later
presided. Roeller could become a key witness for Frantz or IIB case #CV-10-6088. The Frantz
/IIB case #CV-10-6088 that Judge Verby substituted for,
Federal court case #11-21337-TLM.

originated from my IIB vs Frantz

Roeller's erroneous testimony in case #11-21337-TLM

resulted in the need for me to file case #CV-10-6088.

Therefore I filed a complaint against

Roeller in case #CV-11-6420 to account for Roeller's part in damages levied by IIB in judgment
order case # CV-10-6088. Case # CV-10-6088 was therefore "noticed" in case #CV-11-6420 as
evidentiary evidence. Frantz/Roeller Case #CV-11-6420 is currently on-going but has been
delayed due to Roeller's failure to produce evidence which the Judge has sanctioned him for on
two separate occasions.
Attorney Verby' s mediation of Case #CV-11-6420 and the related
damages I may be entitled to against Roeller are now impacted by Judge Verby's order and
decision with regard to IIB's collection on the judgment levy in Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088. If
my actions are exonerated in Case #CV-11-6420, that ruling will also significantly affect my
position in case #CV-10-6088.
The cases are closely intertwined involving the same
IIB/Frantz/Roeller story and material facts.
The following year after case #CV-11-6420 was privately mediated by Attorney Verby, now
familiar with regard to the Roeller/IIB witness and familiar with myself and Dirk Roeller
personally, Attorney Verby later acted as Judge Verby.

Verby accepted litigating the same

Frantz/IIB/Roeller matter with respect to case #CV-10-6088. The outcomes of both civil court
cases affected the other. Verby did not insure the integrity of the proceedings by disclosing to the
parties that he received and had personal knowledge of myself and the case which information he
had obtained in his private attorney/mediator business nor that he had been paid for in his private
practice as Attorney Steve Verby in case #CV-11-6420.
While he looked familiar to me, I did not place where I had known him during the approximately
one hour case #CV-10-6088 proceedings. I did not associate Judge Verby as the same individual
as Attorney Steve Verby that acted in the capacity as private mediator for Frantz/Roeller case
#CV-11-6420 for the one day mediation the prior year. I thought the mediator I used had retired
DECLARATION OF FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF MISTRIAL
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from the bench in favor of his private law business. After the Frantz/IIB case #CY-10-6088
hearing and Judge Yerby's order and ruling, I was making inquiries about Judge Yerby which led
to the connection between Judge Yerby and Attorney Steve Yerby that privately mediated
Frantz/Roeller case #CY-11-6420.
On September 28, 2017, I met with Mark Jackson, attorney for the Frantz/Roeller case #CY-116420. At that meeting, I confirmed that we had paid the same Judge Yerby to mediate my
Frantz/Roeller case #CY-11-6420 as a private mediator. The mediation was held on November 8,
2016.

A settlement was not reached by Attorney Steve Yerby in the Frantz!Roeller case #CY11-6420 and the mediation continued by phone for some time afterward, still without resolution.
In preparation for the mediation and throughout the mediation proceedings, Attorney Steve
Yerby became very familiar with key matters in my Frantz/JIB case #CY-10-6088, the
underlying matter of the litigation between Frantz!Roeller case #CY-11-6420. The fact that
Attorney Yerby didn't achieve a settlement outcome in my Frantz/Roeller case #CY-11-6420,
would likely have been a negative experience since his ultimate goal was to convince
Frantz/Roeller to settle. This prior personal experience with Frantz/Roeller likely resulted in a
negative opinion with regard to his pre-disposition toward Frantz/Roeller in favor of IIB in case
#CY-11-6088. Judge Yerby in fact found in favor of IIB in case CY-11-6088 without disclosing
the prior relationship. However, there were a number of circumstances leaning in my favor. So I
filed a reconsideration. After I filed a reconsideration, I later became aware and confirmed that
Attorney Yerby was indeed the same Yerby I hired the prior year in the same IIB/Frantz story
matter.

Pro-Se Representation

As a Pro-Se litigant, I disclosed to this court in case #CY-10-6088 that I had a condition called
Dyslexia, a developmental neurological condition that impairs one's ability to read, write and
communicate. Along with that declaration, I enclosed my educational transcripts which are both
attached as EXHIBIT A hereto which is a true and correct copy. While opposing counsel
responded and pointed out that Pro-Se litigants are held to the same standards if represented by an
attorney, IIB glossed over that the court is required to treat ADA Pro-Se litigants with reasonable
accommodations specific to their conditions.

I have been a member of the Dyslexic
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Advantage.Org for decades and am familiar with the condition. As a developmental neurological
condition, there is no known cure for Dyslexia. According to (2) recent independent medical
tests, I was diagnosed with Dylexia and Language disorder.
st

comprehension and sentence structure is at a 1 grade level.

The report stated my reading
The tests reveal that other

communication skills are at a grade school/adolescent level, a condition that I have had my entire
life. I recently made the Dyslexia and Language Disorder medical reports available to the Judge
through the ADA trial court administrator under seal in compliance with HIPP A on around
October 10, 2017.
Opposing counsel has objected to my arguments based upon lack of case law research and similar
judicial procedural matters requiring advanced reading, writing and communication skills. IIB has
won on those "procedural" points against me.

IIB also won to strike all of my half dozen expert

witnesses and reports due to technical procedural errors that I made exacerbated by my medical
condition. The court has held me to the same standard as an expert attorney as pointed out by IIB.
In addition to my ADA impairment,

I have minimal financial resources and ability to pay for

expert representation and largely rely upon a combination of contingent fee representation, probono and Pro-Se representation. While I have been highly successful in business for over (3)
decades, litigating in the U.S. judicial system is an entirely different genre requiring advanced
scholastic communication skills that I lack due to my neurological condition.
Attorney
representation helps but does not alleviate my medical condition. Attorneys are only as effective
as their clients are able to communicate and work effectively with their attorney. I would need an
attorney who is an expert in communicating with Dyslexics'. My wife knows very little about the
complex business litigation and is limited to correcting my spelling and grammar errors and
sometimes giving my oral presentations. Regardless of my medical condition, I understand that I
am entitled to reasonable and fair access to the judicial system so that I have the privilege afforded
to every American regardless of race, color, economic status or impairment to receive a fair and
impartial judiciary trial.
Public Interest & Jury Trial

Competing in the construction development field does not require high scholastic communication
and reading comprehension skills. While the legal system is like a foreign language to me, I am
DECLARATION OF FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF MISTRIAL
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very capable to compete in the construction field. I became a successful small business contributor
to the U.S. economy creating an estimated 5,000 jobs during the past several decades in
construction/development. I am a hard worker and have completed over $ l 70m in rental housing
in (7) western states.

Due to my direct efforts, my businesses have contributed and paid about

$25m in Federal, State and local taxes.
construction achievement awards.
decades.

I have received several national building design and

I have personally owned and operated $65m of my projects for

If I were to prevail in CV-11-6088, I would have my access to credit restored and could

go back to work in construction/development. Based upon my 10 year performance prior to the
dispute with IIB, over the next 10 years (2018 to 2028), I could contribute another 2,000 jobs or
approximately $45m gross business of which about $9 million would be contributed to Federal,
State and local taxes. The decision to continue with judgment sanctions for the remainer of my
life or to remove them is a matter which will have job and tax revenue public consequences.
In Frantz/IIB case #CV-10-6088, I initially requested a Jury Trial. That request was denied due to
small print loan waivers in IIB' s lending documents. As background, I was in excellent financial
condition during the Great Recession and the bank was close to closing its doors. IIB bank stock
price had dropped over 90%. On June 9th, 2010, in a meeting held in the bank's board toom, the
bank CEO and founder, Jack Gustave!, desperate to save his bank, threatened to fabricate a loan
default and place economic sanctions on my profitable assisted living business. The banker's
action would force me into bankruptcy if I refused to provide Gustave I's bank with unnecessary
extra collateral for a loan extension. My loan was fully performing.
Gustave! told me at the June 9th, 2010 meeting that ifl didn't agree to his terms, he would sue me
and demand a iury trial (instead of a Judges trial). It appeared to be scare tactics. However, I
accepted his demand for a jury trial and considered it an oral loan agreement modification in the
event I pursued my claim against IlB. However, when case# CV-11-6088 proceeded, Gustave!
refused my request for a Jury trial relying on the waivers in the loan agreement and ignoring the
June 9th, 2010 oral loan modification.
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CONCLUSION

I did not recall that Judge Yerby was the same private attorney Yerby that had worked on my case until
after I filed the Reconsideration. The lifetime IIB sanctions will have negative consequences to the
general public in terms of jobs, tax revenues and services. I want to go back to work in the field that I
can achieve and feel accomplished.

I am asking to be afforded reasonable and fair access to the

judicial system so that I can work toward that goal.

»""7 \D~
MARTY~N TZ

ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT A- Marty Frantz Education Transcripts and Dyslexia disclosure
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EXHIBIT A
FRANTZ DYSLEXIA DISCLOSURE
AND EDUCATION TRANSCRIPTS
(Reference July 31, 2017 Motion For Reconsideration Pg 2 of 19)
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Pro-Se Representation

On May 17, 2017, the court approved the withdraw of Frantzs attorney and they now
represent themselves.

Marty Frantz has a condition called Dyslexia. Reading,

comprehension, writing, spelling, math and English are challenging. He had a 2.36
grade average in High School and due to his condition,

dropped out of college.

Attached to his declaration in support of this Motion is his transcript Exhibit-A which
is a true and correct copy. He apologizes for misspellings and grammar errors within
these documents. Throughout his building career as a self-employed businessman,
his wife has supported him by assisting in reviewing and editing to compensate. He
has been highly successful in business for over four decades, winning several
construction building records awards and has won national healthcare facility design
awards. They acknowledge that courts respectfully encourage litigants to have
representation. They desire representation and are continuing to review options.
2. Authority To Move Certain Bankruptcy Proceedings To Civil Court Venue
In order to obtain the authority to move litigation claims, interests or proceedings from
the Bankruptcy Court to Civil Court, all Bankruptcy Court litigants are required to
obtain a Court Order from the Bankruptcy Court for the matter, signed by the presiding
Judge. Otherwise the provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Law are defeated when
a person without Bankruptcy Court approval can change venue and act in a manner that
may interfere with the equitable use of distribution of any material part of the assets of
the estate." United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 678 n.43 (10th Cir. 1989). The
indictment need not specify the particular clause or provision of law which is intended
to be defeated. Lurie v. United States, 20 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275
U.S. 563 (1927). In around mid 2015, after a number of unsuccessful attempts to
resolve the dispute with IIB,

Frantz decided to move certain proceedings to Civil

Court. All other litigation matters remain in Bankrutpcy Court Case No. 11-21337TLM. To this end, Frantz filed a voluntary waiver of discharge under 11 U.S.C. §
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
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EXHIBIT B
JUDGE VERBY DECISION/ORDER
FILED OR “NOTICED”
IN (3) OTHER FRANTZ COURT CASES
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JUD ICIA L DIS TRI CT
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST
THE COU NTY OF KOO TEN AI
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR
IDA HO IND EPE NDE NT BAN K, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
MA RTY D. FRA NTZ , and individual, and
CIN DY M. FRA NTZ , an individual,
Defendants.

---------------I.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-10-6088
MEM ORA NDU M DEC ISIO N AND
ORD ER ON DEF END ANT S'
MO TIO N TO EXT END FIL ING
DAT E FOR CLA IM OF EXE MPT ION

INT ROD UCT ION

granting them an extension of time to file
The Defendants (the Frantzes) request an Order
sold pursuant to a sher iffs sale. The Frantzes
a claim of exemption for their prope1ty which was
ly notice in order for them to file a claim of
claim that they were not given adequate time
tiff Idaho Independent Ban k (the Bank) contends
exemption within the statutory time limits. Plain
and that the Frantzes have no valid claim of
that the required legal process was followed
exemption.
II.

FAC TS AND CHR ONO LOG Y OF EVE NTS

the Frantzes in favor of the Ban k in the
An Amended Judgment was entered against
for the sher iffs sale of the Fran tzes' personal
amo unt of $9,933,363.37. (Am. J. 2). In preparing
ON DEF END ANT S' MOT ION TO EXT END
MEM ORA NDU M DECISION AND ORD ER
FILI NG DA TE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
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property, the Bank sent the Kootenai County Sheriff's Office the levy documents and a stamped
envelope with the Frantzes' last known address, which was the address of their counsel:
Jonathon Frantz, 1810 E. Schneidmiller Avenue, Ste. 301, Post Falls, ID 83854. (Kmtz Deel. Ex.
D).
The Sheriff mailed the levy documents to the Frantzes' lawyer on April 13, 2017. (Kurtz
Deel. Ex. E). Included in the documents was a Personal Property Sheriff's Sale Form indicating
the deadline to file a claim of exemption was April 27, 2017. (Kmtz Deel. Ex. F).
Jonathon Frantz says that he was unable to collect the documents because they were not
addressed to him. (Id. Ex. G). No evidence was offered to supp011 his assertion factually or as a
matter of policy. On April 20, 2017, he contacted opposing counsel, Hawley Troxell, and
requested that they deliver the documents in an alternative method, like email. (Id.) Hawley
Troxell responded, informing him that since the ethical mies do not permit them to serve the
Frantzes directly when represented by counsel, they directed the Sheriff to send the documents in
care of Post Falls Law, Jonathon Frantz's law firm. (Kurtz Deel. Ex. H). On the same day,
Hawley Troxell contacted the Sheriff's Office asking them to mail or email another copy directly
to Jonathon Frantz. (Id. Ex. H).
On Monday, April 24, 2017, The Sheriffs Office told Hawley Troxell that the Post Falls
Post Office informed them the April 13, 2017, mailing was addressed properly and could be
picked up by Jonathon Frantz or mailed again, statting the claim of exemption time over. (Kurtz
Deel. Ex. I). Hawley Troxell emailed Jonathon Frantz the same day, informing him that he could
pick up the previously mailed documents. He replied that he would try picking them up again.
(Id. Ex. K).

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
2
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On April 26, 2017, Jonathon Frantz had the levy documents re-delivered to his office and
sent them to the Frantzes on April 28, 2017. (Id at 17, Ex. F; Mot. Ex. C).
The Sheriff mailed a Notice of Sale to the Frantzes c/o Jonathon Frantz on May I, 2017.
(Kmiz Deel. Ex. L). On May 5, 2017, Hawley Troxell emailed the Sheriffs Office to inquire
whether the Frantzes had filed a claim of exemption. (Id. Ex. M). They had not. (Id). On this
same day, Defendant Marty Frantz emailed the Sheriff, requesting the reposting of the claim of
exemption date to May 16, 2017. (Id Ex. N).
Three days later, on May 8, 2017, Ms. Cooper, a civil deputy with the Sheriffs Office,
informed the Frantzes that the Bank advised it wanted to proceed with the sale. (Id). Upon
receiving this message the Frantzes submitted claims of exemption on May 8, 2017, eleven (II)
days after the deadline. (Defs.' Claim of Exemption). The Sheriffs Sale took place on May 9,
2017. (Mem. in Opp'n. 2). The Bank was the successful bidder on both items of personal
propetiy that were sold. (Id). The propetiy that was seized and sold consisted of intangible
personal properties, which were causes of action (claims) the Frantzes owned against others. On
May 12, 2017, defense counsel Jonathon Frantz filed a motion for permission to withdraw in this
matter. His motion was granted on May 17, 2017. (Mot. for Permission to Withdraw; Comi
Record).
The Frantzes filed a Motion to Extend the Filing Date for a Claim of Exemption on May
15, 20 I 7, and the Bank filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Extend the Filing
Date for a Claim of Exemption on May 26, 20 I 7. The hearing on the motion took place on June
6, 2017 and was taken under advisement.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
3
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
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III.

ANALYSIS

In the Frantzes' motion to extend the filing date, they state that the Bank "failed to
properly address a Levy which caused delays in the USPS delivery and hand delivery of the
documents which did not give the Frantzes reasonable time to respond." (Defs.' Mot. to Extend
I). The Bank opposes the Frantzes' motion: first, because the "Defendants have never identified
an exemption that would apply to the claims that were sold by the Sheriff at the foreclosure sale"
and second, because the "Defendants argument that it did not receive timely notice of its right to
claim an exemption is without merit." (PJ's Memo in Opp'n. 2-3). "[T]he record shows that the
Levy Documents were properly mailed to [the] Defendants and [the] Defendants were properly
notified under Idaho law." (Id).
A.

The Defendants Failed To Identify Any Exemption Applicable to the Claims that
Were Sold at the Foreclosure Sale.
Idaho Code§ 11-203 sets fmih the requirements necessary to file a Claim of Exemption

by a Defendant. "The [D]efendant or the [D]efendant's representative shall complete the claim of
exemption form as provided in section 8-507C, Idaho Code." J.C. § 11-203. "The claim of
exemption ... shall be delivered or mailed to the sheriff within fourteen (14) days after the date
the sheriff hand delivers or mails the documents required to be served upon the defendant .... "
J.C. § 1 l-203(a).

After reviewing the applicable statutes, there seems to be no possible

exemption that would apply to the Frantzes' situation. Or, at least at this juncture the Frantzes
have failed to identify such a valid exemption even when requested to do so during oral
argument. It would be an exercise in futility to allow an extension of time to file a claim of
exemption when no valid exemption applies.
8.

The Levy Documents Were Properly Mailed and the Defendants Were Properly
Notified under Idaho Law.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
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The Frantzes argue they did not have adequate notice to file a claim of exemption. After a
prima facie showing is made by the Bank that service was made according to the applicable
statutes, the Frantzes have the burden of proof to establish the Bank failed to provide the
requisite legal notice. There is no affidavit or declaration from anyone at the post office,
however, and no affidavit or declaration from Jonathon Frantz or anyone else stating that
Jonathon Frantz tried to receive or pick up the documents and was kept from doing so by a USPS
employee. A number of conclusions could be reached from the declarations that were filed.
Among those conclusions are:
(1.) Jonathon Frantz simply concluded he could not sign for the documents from the Post
Falls Post Office and told Hawley Troxell so; or,
(2.) he was told by someone at the Post Office he could not sign for the documents; or,
(3.) he chose not to try to sign for and receive the documents when they were first sent.
On a more probable than not basis, the submitted declarations fail to establish that
Jonathon Frantz was prevented from signing for the sale documents. This conclusion is bolstered
by the fact that Jonathan Frantz was ultimately able to pick up the sale documents without any
change in the original address.
The Frantzes also argue that the Bank elected to hand deliver the documents rather than
mail them and therefore the deadline to file their claims of exemption should be May 10, 2017,
14 (fowieen) days after the documents were received by their attorney. (Defs' Deel. of Support.
5). But, contrary to this assertion, there is no evidence to show that the Bank elected to hand
deliver the documents rather than mail them.

MEMOR ANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DA TE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
5

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 29 of 411

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, (1.) that there was no basis to file a claim of exemption;
and (2.) because the Frantzes failed to sustain their burden of proof showing that the service of
the sheriffs sale documents was untimely, the Defendants' motion to extend the time to file a
claim of exemption is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED thisz.d!J;i y of July, 2016

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDA NTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
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I hereby certify that on the
day of July, 2017, a ttue and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE
FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION was delivered as follows:

Sheila Schwager
e-mail SRS@HTEH.com

Marty D. Frantz
e-mail martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
and mailed 307 N Lincoln St, Suite A
Post Falls, ID 83854

Cindy Frantz
307 N. Lincoln Street Suite A
Post Falls, ID 83854

I

,/ .!' . t/

JIM BRANNON, Clerk of the Court, by-~·~}_·._.·•~···._...'"".c-+)__+Y"-s1_.,,_j,~()"-"£_-·_·_ _ _ Deputy
Clerk
.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
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EXHIBIT C
FEDERAL COURT ORDER GRANTING
WITHDRAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
RELYING ON JUDGE VERBY DECISION
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO

MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M.
FRANTZ,

Case No. 11-21337-TLM
Chapter 7

Debtor.

ORDER GRANTING WITHDRAWAL OF DEBTORS' ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM

Upon consideration of Idaho Independent Bank's ("IIB") Withdrawal of Administrative
Expense Claim filed on July 21, 2017, [Docket No. 740], regarding the Administrative Expense
Claim filed by the Debtors Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz ("Debtors"), as Docket No. 327,
consideration of the Debtors' Objection to Withdrawal of Administrative Expense Claim filed on
August 18, 2017, as Docket NO. 742, Declaration of Marty Frantz, Docket No. 743, Amended
Objection to Withdrawal of Administrative Expense Claim, Docket No. 749 ("Objection");
consideration ofIIB's Response to Objection, Docket No. 755; and consideration of Debtors' surreply entitled Motion for Assignment ofFrantz $113,841.10 Administrative Claim to the Bankruptcy
Estate, Docket No. 757 ("Assignment"); and having considered the oral argument of all parties on
September 18, 201 7; and the record before this Court; and good cause appearing thereof, the Court
grants 11B's Withdrawal of Debtors' Administrative Expense Claim and denies the Debtors'

034081
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Objection and Assignment; as set forth in the findings orally entered at the hearing held on
September 18, 2017.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS DOES ORDER, that IIB's Withdrawal of
the Debtors' Administrative Expense Claim in GRANTED.
//end of text//

DATED: September 20, 2017

TERRY L. MYERS ·
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
Submitted by:
/s/ 9.19.17
Sheila R. Schwager, ISB No. 5059
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
Attorneys for Idaho Independent Bank

034081
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
307 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUTPCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In re:
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M.
FRANTZ,
Debtor

Case No. 11-21337-TLM
Kootenai County, Idaho
BAP No. ID-15-1060
Chapter 7

OBJECTION TO WITHDRAW
OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM, Doc No. 327

Debtor, Marty & Cindy Frantz, hereby object to the withdraw of Administrative
Claim, Doc No. 327.

OBJECTION TO WITHDRAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM

Page 1 of 8
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RECENT HISTORY
1.

April, 2017 to present:

During the past 4 months, the battle over the (2) Bankruptcy

court proceedings, the “Administrative claim” and “Appeal proceedings” has been
rigorous. There has been a $100,000 Sherriff sale of the (2) proceedings, numerous
motions and memorandums, objections, reconsiderations, two court hearings with about
400 pages of briefs and supporting documents filed in now (4) different courts, connected
to the “Administrative claim” subject of this objection. An estimated three hundred hours
have been spent over the past 4 months by IIB and the Frantzs directly related to the
matter.

The primary question is who has jurisdiction over these (2) highly prized

proceedings. It all started when IIB unilaterally performed a Sheriff Sale of the (2)
Bankruptcy Court proceedings in around April, 2017 without our knowledge nor the
Bankruptcy court’s knowledge until after the fact.

Currently, this matter is before the

BAP and a decision should be forthcoming within the next few weeks.
1st ARGUMENT
Improper Service For Withdrawal Of “Administrative Claim”
2.

The Frantzs did not receive an email notification of the “Withdrawal of claim” as Sheila
R. Schwager certified on Pg. 7 of her request (See Marty Frantz declaration Exhibit A).
The only email correspondence Frantz received during that time frame was IIB’s BAP No.
ID-15-1060 “Motion to Substitute As Appellant” (see attached email) which also had to do
with the same “Administrative claim” but is currently in the BAP 9th Circuit Court, not in
Judge Meyers court. Furthermore, the BAP email notice did not include the Bankruptcy
court “Withdrawal of claim” documents, only the “Motion To Substitute As Appellant”
documents. Frantz received the BAP “Motion to Substitute As Appellant” in his email box
on July 24th, 2017 (3 days after Schwager allegedly emailed the Bankruptcy court
“Withdrawal of claim” on July 21st).

3.

After visiting relatives out of state from the last week of July through the second week of
August and then filing a response to Schwager’s BAP Reply this week, yesterday,
Thursday, August 17, 2017 at around 2pm, Marty Frantz retrieved his mail at 307 N
OBJECTION TO WITHDRAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
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Lincoln St, Suite A, Post Falls, Idaho and P.O. Box 830, Rathdrum, Idaho (see Marty
Frantz Declaration).

Resultantly, Frantzs became aware, for the first time, of IIB’s

request to withdrawal his “Administrative claim” and stayed up most the night (Thursday)
preparing this response to get it into the court as soon as possible. Frantz does not have a
person to notify him or open his mail, hence why he requested email notification which
Schwager certified that she sent. Due to the short notice Frantz apologizes to the court for
grammar errors in this objection.
4.

IIB has prevailed on the majority of their litigation though emboldened mastery of
applying uncustomary court procedures. For example, this court is familiar with the story
with regard to how IIB/Trustee cashed the $20,000 Accord & Satisfaction check without
our or the Bankruptcy court’s knowledge. IIB also recently performed a Sheriff sale of
Bankruptcy Debtor assets “Administrative claim” and “Appeal proceedings” without our
or the Bankruptcy court’s knowledge.

5.

How does IIB do a Sheriff’s sale on the Bankruptcy court “Administrative claim” and
“Appeal proceedings” without anyone’s knowledge?

In this case IIB mailed us the

required notice USPS certified mail which we did not receive until after the Sherriff’s
sale! Yet IIB claims that they met all the technical requirements of proper “Notice”. I
quote from the District court July 31st, 2017 Frantz “Brief In Support of Motion To
Reconsider” Pg 14 (III), the most current update regarding the “Administrative claim”
proceedings in the District Court which is attached hereto as EXHIBIT C, a true and
correct copy, as follows;
Quote: “III. WAS THE LEVY NOTICE MAILED OR HAND DELIVERED? IF HAND
DELIVERED, THE FILING DATE FOR THE OBJECTION TO THE LEVY IS 14 DAYS FROM
HAND DELIVERY AND HAWLEY-TROXELL, WHO HANDLED THE LEVY AND
ASSERTED THE EXECUTION DATES MISLED THE KCS DEPARTMENT AND THIS
COURT TO A FALSE CONCLUSION…” “…we refer to Kootenai County Sheriff’s Office,
Brenda Cooper Civil Deputy Technician II correspondence and the USPS Certified hand delivered
green cards which were provided by her. IIB also submitted those same USPS cards in their Ninth
Circuit Court Motion which has already been testified to in the declaration of Marty Frantz attached
hereto in support of this motion along with copies of the emails.
OBJECTION TO WITHDRAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
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Note that there are (2) USPS return signed receipts (green cards) for the initial Levy
documents hand delivered to Post Falls Law. The first one was hand delivered on April
26th, 2017 and the second one hand delivered to Post Falls Law on May 3d, 2017.

The

first USPS green card states it was addressed to:
Martin & Cindy Frantz
*c/o Jonathan Frantz of Post Falls Law
1810 E Schneidmiller Ave, Ste 301
Post Falls, ID 83854
The second green card states it was addressed to:
Attn: Jonathan Frantz of Post Falls Law
*o/b Martin & Cindy Frantz
1810 E Schneidmiller Ave, Ste 301
Post Falls, ID 83854
*c/o means ‘in care of’ and *o/b means ‘on behalf of’
When asked why the difference in the (2) addresses, Brenda Cooper (KCS Office) email
stated: “I changed it on the second mailing to be sure that his name was listed first so
there was no possibility of any misunderstanding again.” She also changed in care of’ to
‘on behalf of’ clarifying that the Recipient is accepting service on behalf of not in care
of Martin & Cynthia Frantz.
Most importantly, the attached USPS official tracking record, which is a true and correct
copy, stated:
April 14th, 2017, 4:59pm

Departed USPS Facility

April 15th, 2017, 9:54am

Notice Left (No Authorized Recipient Available)

While evidence from Hawley-Troxell and KCS stated that the first package was addressed
correctly and should have been fine, why then did USPS write on their official tracking
record that there was “No Authorized Recipient Available” and why would (KCS) Brenda
Cooper change the address on the second package “Notice of Sale” if the first package
address was fine? Also note that the second package (Notice of Sale) could be signed for
by Post Falls Law secretary/receptionist and in fact was without concern, because it was
OBJECTION TO WITHDRAW OF ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIM
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now properly addressed to the Law firm. Even though a certified delivery may be marked
unrestricted, there can be an assumed liability if given to the wrong person.

Why would

Post Falls Law request an email copy if they could have accepted delivery? See attached
declaration of Jonathon Frantz (Post Falls Law) attached as EXHIBIT- E to Marty Frantz’s
declaration in support which explains what happened.
FIRST CLASS MAIL vs CERTIFIED RETURN RECEIPT CARRIER PERSONAL
DELIVERY
Pursuant to Idaho Code §8-507A, §8-507C, and §11-203 Tim Kurtz testified that (KCS)
had met the requirements for mailing but not for hand delivery which code states, in
his own memorandum, “Mailing [meaning as opposed to hand delivery] shall be by first
class mail.” Kurtz same memorandum contradicts himself by stating that the Levy
documents were not sent by “first class” mail, rather by certified return receipt
personal delivery requiring a wet signature. He contradicts himself making the
contemptible argument that certified return receipt carrier personal delivery
is the same as a first class mailing and furthermore insists that hand delivery can
only be made by an employee of KCS, not by an employee of USPS or apparently no
other legally licensed mail carrier service as explained on page 16 of his memorandum in
opposition.

Under Idaho Code § 8-507A, we agree that the KCS office is mandated to send the Levy
documents directly to the recipient. However, as long as that requirement is fulfilled
(which according to (KCS) was on April 12 th (well before Post Falls Law’s email request a
copy of the Levy documents) we can find no provisions in the Levy code nor Ethics code
which restricts, penalizes or hinders IIB in any way from the courtesy of also emailing
another copy of the Levy documents to Post Falls Law.

It appears Hawley-Troxell was

being ostensibly uncooperative.

In summary;

The USPS records are irrefutable evidence certifying the Levy documents

were personally hand delivered to Post Falls Law with a requirement for a signature as
verified on the USPS “green card” which was signed by Jonathon Frantz personally and
therefore Levy doctrine allows 14 days from the receipt of the Levy documents, not 14
days after (KCS) gave them to USPS. End Of quote.

Hence, due to IIB instructing
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KCS with an incorrect address for the Levy package and furthermore claiming that certified
mail is the same as 1st class mail and that the USPS is apparently not an authorized hand
delivery carrier service, we never got the documents until after the Sherriff’s sale.
2nd ARGUMENT
BAP Parallel Case Decision Affecting The “Administrative claim”
6.

The BAP No. ID-15-1060 is about to issue their decision in a parallel court case with
regard to “IIB’s Motion to Substitute As Appellant” recently submitted as previously
mentioned in (1.) above (see EXHIBIT “B” BAP files which are true and correct copies).
While the BAP is currently ruling on IIB’s substitution to remove Frantz as an interested
party in his Arizona home “Appeal proceedings”, a significant part of the briefs and
arguments in the BAP have to do with the “Administrative claim”, subject of this
objection.

7.

A final BAP decision will have direct ramifications with regard to the “Administrative
claim” as it applies to IIB’s offer to the Trustee to assign both the “Administrative claim”
and “Appeal proceedings” back to the Bankruptcy Estate. If those terms are enforced
by the BAP in their decision, which ruling would apply to both the “Appeal proceedings”
and “Administrative claim” and, if the Trustee still desires to withdrawal and dismiss the
Bankruptcy interests for and behalf of the Estate, it would necessitate the Trustee to make
a motion in Judge Meyers court. Otherwise, IIB could not avoid Fraudulent Receipt of
Property—18 U.S.C. § 152(5) Subsection (5) prohibits the fraudulent receipt of a material
amount of property from the debtor. The $100,000 that IIB bid for the interests is
considered a material amount of property for purposes of this statute. This paragraph is
specifically designed to reach defendants, including creditors, who improperly receive
assets from a debtor and/or debtor’s Estate. The provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy
Law are defeated when a person without Bankruptcy Court approval acts in a manner that
interferes with the equitable use of distribution of any material part of the assets of the
estate." United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 678 n.43 (10th Cir. 1989). The indictment
need not specify the particular clause or provision of law which is intended to be
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defeated. Lurie v. United States, 20 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 563
(1927).
8.

Ultimately, if the BAP enforces the te1ms of the IIB offer to the Trustee, which IIB solely
relied on for their actions, IIB could not unilaterally dismiss the "Administrative claim"
or "Appeal proceedings" as they have requested without vetting the matter before the
patties of interest in the Bankruptcy Estate.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, as a result of the improper notice and BAP parallel proceedings, Marty & Cindy
Frantz respectfully ask that IIB's filing is benched pending the ruling from the BAP with regard to
enforcement of IIB ' s assignment of the "Appeal proceedings" and "Administrative claim" to the
Bankruptcy Estate.

DATED THIS 18th day of August, 2017.

I

MARTY D. FRANTZ - Defendant

EXHIBITS:
EXHIBIT A EXHIBIT B EXHIBIT C EXHIBIT D -

HAWLEY-TROXELL EMAIL
BAP LATEST FRANTZ FILING
BAP LATEST IIB FILING
DISTRICT COURT FRANTZ LAST FILING
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
307 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

UNITED STATES 9th CIRCUIT
BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

IN THE MATTER OF:
Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M. Frantz,
Debtor Appellants,
v.

BAP No. ID-15-1060
[Bankruptcy Court No. 1121337-TLM Bankr. D.Idaho]
OBJECTION TO IIB MOTION TO
SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT

DAVID P. GARDNER, Chapter 7 Trustee,
Appellee.

APPELLANTS’ OBJECTION TO IIB MOTION
TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT
COME NOW, the Appellants (the “Frantzes”) hereby objects to Idaho Independent Bank
(“IIB”) Motion To Substitute as Appellant.
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Pro-Se Representation

On May 17, 2017, the court approved the withdraw of Frantzs attorney and they now
represents themselves.

Marty Frantz has a condition called Dyslexia. Reading,

comprehension, writing, spelling, math and English are challenging. He had a 2.36
grade average in High School and due to his condition, he dropped out of college.
Attached to his declaration in support of this Motion is his transcript Exhibit-A which
is a true and correct copy. He apologizes for misspellings and grammar errors within
these documents. Throughout his building career as a self-employed businessman,
his wife has supported him by assisting in editing to compensate. He has been highly
successful in business for over four decades, winning several construction building
records awards and has won national healthcare facility design awards. They
acknowledge that courts respectfully encourage litigants to have representation. They
desire representation and are continuing to review options.
2. Authority To Move Certain Bankruptcy Proceedings To Civil Court Venue
In order to obtain the authority to move any litigation claims, interests or proceedings
from the Bankruptcy Court to Civil Court, all Bankruptcy Court litigants are required
to obtain a Court Order from the presiding Judge of the Bankruptcy Court. Otherwise
the provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Law are defeated when a person without
Bankruptcy Court approval changes venue and acts in a manner that may interfere with
the equitable use of distribution of any material part of the assets of the estate." United
States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 678 n.43 (10th Cir. 1989). The indictment need not
specify the particular clause or provision of law which is intended to be defeated.
Lurie v. United States, 20 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 563 (1927).

In order to have the privilege to pursue affirmative defenses against the bank in Civil
Court, Frantz was required by the Bankruptcy Court to filed a voluntary waiver of
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10). In around mid 2015, Frantz filed a voluntary
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waiver and was granted approval to pursue their defenses against the bank in Civil
Court. All other litigation matters remain in Bankruptcy Court Case No. 11-21337TLM.
3. ‘Standing’ In Bankruptcy Court
In addition to granting Frantz the privilege to pursue certain defenses in Civil Court,
the waiver of discharge also granted Frantz “standing” for all other matters in Frantzs
Bankruptcy Estate Court Case No. 11-21337-TLM.

Frantzs therefore have equal

footing with the Creditors to put forth motions and to litigate matters involving the
Bankruptcy Estate. Frantz currently has (2) pending proceedings in Bankruptcy Court,
an interest in a claim for Administrative Expenses and an interest in an Appeal of a
court procedure. Frantz is entitled to and may put forth other claims and interests.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
1. November 18th, 2016 the Bankruptcy Court for the Frantz Estate, Case No. 11-21337TLM entered its “Order Authorizing transfer/Sale Of Estate Property” (the “Order”)
approving the sale/transfer of the Assets to IIB as described in the Overbid (Dkt. No.
645) and the Banks Dkt. No. 668.
2. April 26th, 2017 Post Falls Law, attorney for Appellants at that time, was delivered
Levy documents whereby IIB intended to execute on (2) Bankruptcy Court interests,
an “Administrative Claim” and a separate matter “Appeal of Court Procedure”
proceedings which IIB asserts were part of the Court’s November 18th, 2016
transfer/sale “Order” referenced in 1. above.

These interests are pending in

the

Jurisdiction/venue of the Bankruptcy Court for adjudication. IIB asserts that the rights
to these interest’s were listed and included in the Court “Order” or at least that they had
requested the Trustee to get them listed in the Court “Order”.
3. July 24th, 2017

Claiming to have acquired the rights to execute on the Appeal of

Court Procedure from the Bankruptcy Court,

IIB executed on the Appeal of Court
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Procedure at a Sheriff’s sale.

IIB then filed a Motion to substitute as the Appellants

for the “Appeal of Court Procedure”, subject of this objection.
4. July 31st, 2017 the Frantzs filed this Objection.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND & STATEMENT OF FACTS
1. The Bankrutpcy Court entered its “Order Authorizing transfer/Sale Of Estate Property”
(the “Order”) on November 18th, 2016 approving the sale/transfer of Frantz Estate
Assets to IIB in a (16) page document signed by the Honorable Judge Meyers.
Nowhere in the documents does the Judge mention, list, refer to nor contemplate
the (2) interests, subject of this Objection. There is no reference to a subsequent
Sheriff sale in the “Order” by Judge Meyers nor authorization for a change in
venue/jurisdiction from the Bankruptcy Court to the Civil Court.

ARGUMENT
We address the following (2) questions that are pertinent to this objection as follows;
I.

Were the a) Administrative claim, and; b) Appeal of a court procedure [the (2) separate
court matters] approved by the Bankruptcy Court for a Sheriff’s sale as asserted by IIB?
If the Honorable Judge Meyers did not approve these requests as part of the
transaction, then IIB is misleading the court to a false conclusion.

II.

Are the (2) separate Bankruptcy Court matters in a form and content that are even subject
to Levy Doctrine?

I.

BANKRUPTCY COURT DID NOT APPROVE IIB RIGHTS IN IT’S

TRANSFER/SALE “ORDER” TO DO A SHERIFF’S SALE FOR PROPERTY
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
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In the SUPPLMENTAL MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO EXTEND
FILING DATE FOR CLAIM OF EXEMPTION filed June 12th, 2017 in Judge Christensen’s
court, Timothy Kurtz, Attorney for IIB on Page 4 (7.) stated: “Thus, the execution and
Sheriff’s sale is what was contemplated and approved by the Bankruptcy Court’s Order of
Sale.”
Let’s take a closer look at Judge Meyers Order. Refer to the Judge Meyers (16) Page
“ORDER AUTHORIZING TRANSFER/SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY” entered in the
court records on November 18, 2016 for the Frantz Estate, Case No. 11-21337-TLM (The
“Order”) approving the sale/transfer of the Assets to IIB as described in the Overbid (Dkt. No.
645) and the Banks Dkt. No. 668 starting on Page 4 thru Page 8 items #1,2,3,4, 5,6,7,8 & 9.
The last sentence of (E) on Page 4 states what Judge Meyers defined as “The acquired assets
include all of the Debtors’ and /or the bankruptcy estates’ interests, including any claims that
may exist in favor of the owner of those interests, in the following assets: …” and then
specifically lists all those assets and interests that are applicable. Here the Judge clarifies that
the sale/transfer includes “all interests, in the following assets:” meaning if they are not listed
in the “following assets”, they are not included in the sale. The Judge then specifically names
each one on four pages. The Judge is very detailed in listing and describing nine interests and
claims on Page 4 thru Page 8. The word “claim” is used (7) times in the “Order” referring to a
number of claims the Judge authorized to be included in the transaction.

For example,

nowhere in the very carefully detailed 4 pages of claims and interests does the Judge authorize
nor mention the Frantz current interests in their affirmative defense claims they have against
IIB pending in Civil Court. But it is undisputable that they exist, yet IIB is not claiming those
interests were included. Likewise, contrary to Kurtz testimony, the Judge’s Order does not
mention nor intend to authorize a Sheriff sale for Frantzs interests in his Appeal of a court
procedure proceedings either.

Those interests are pending in the jurisdiction proceedings of

Judge Meyer’s court and the Judge expects to continue with those proceedings in his court.
Had the Court Order transfer/sale authorized a release of the Administrative claim and Appeal
of a court procedure to be sold at a Sheriff sale, Frantz would certainly have objected.

But
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the Judge’s “Order” did not.
In IIB’s 40 Pg MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT filed by IIB July, 24 th, 2017 in
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Of The Ninth Circuit Court, Sheila Schwager, Attorney for
IIB stated or quoted Kurtz on Page 2 (2. & 3.) “The Trustee stated that he would request the
Bankruptcy Court to approve the IIB offer… There is a reference to some potential benefit of
having [Debtors’] releasing certain claims against the Bankruptcy Estate…” She continues: “
3. Within the IIB offer,…IIB is willing to execute on each claim held by the Debtors [referring
to the (2) proceedings interests] and assign the same to the Bankruptcy Estate without any
expense to the Bankruptcy Estate as part of its offer…”
On Page 4 (11.) Schwager went on to say: “Now, therefore, as IIB is the proper Appellant to
this Appeal as set forth above, IIB hereby request that it (IIB) be substituted as the Appellant
in this Appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(b). Upon approval of IIB’s
substitution, IIB and the Trustee intend to stipulate to dismiss this Appeal.[referring to the
Frantz Appeal of a court procedure proceedings] ”
In the same MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLANT, Sheila Schwager, Attorney for
IIB on Page 2 (2. & 3.) loosely argues that the interests were authorized by the Bankruptcy
Court “Order” to be sold at a Sheriff’s auction, and states; “The Trustee stated that he would
request the Bankrutpcy Court to approve the IIB offer…

While it appears Schwager

understood that the Estate Administrator/Trustee was suppose to “request the Bankruptcy
Court to approve the IIB offer…” including permission to sell the interests at a Sheriff’s sale,
there is no evidence nor agreement in the Court “Order” which indicates that the Trustee
obtained approval for the subsequent sale after the Court “Order” sale.
It is an indisputable fact that

while Judge Meyers “Order” did list and included

numerous other claims, court proceeding matters and their specific details, the “Order”
clearly did not mention nor contemplate the interests subject of this objection. The
“Order” did not include permission to sell the Frantz Estate interests in a subsequent
Sheriff auction. IIB “willingness” to do the convoluted transaction simply appears no
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where within the Court “Order”.
IIB mistakenly has based their argument on the loose understanding that IIB had with the
Trustee with regard to their “willingness” to help relieve the court of what IIB referred to as
nuisance court proceedings in the same October 7, 2016 letter from IIB to the Trustee
(referenced in EXHIBIT – C of the enclosed Declaration of Marty Frantz).
Since authorization was never granted in the transfer/sale, the simple solution to their dilemma
was to have the Administrator/Trustee and/or IIB file a Motion in Judge Meyers court to
request permission to dismiss or sell the proceedings for a Sheriff’s sale. However, for some
troubling reason, IIB and the Trustee appear resistant to obtain authorization from Judge
Meyers. Rather they are intent on proceeding without Judge Meyer’s express permission and
relying on loose Trustee ‘inferences’ and their statement of ‘willingness” to the Trustee to get a
Court Order from Judge Meyers which the Judge never granted.

The problem is there is no

evidence in the record that the Trustee pursed IIB’s request nor is there any mention or
response to their ‘willingness’ to dismiss or sell the Bankruptcy Court matters at a subsequent
Sheriff sale.
We only know that Judge Meyers did not authorize the Sheriff sale in his “Order”. It seems
without a signed agreement between IIB and the Frantz Estate detailing the convoluted
transaction, how could Judge Meyers be sure that the interests would be assigned back to the
Frantz Estate within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court anyway. We have seen no written
or signed contracts detailing their plan that were motioned or presented before the Bankruptcy
Court other than IIB’s “willingness” statement. We only know that IIB and the Trustee had
some discussions about it but never formalized their “willingness” to proceed.
The proposed Levy transaction furthermore doesn’t make any sense for two reasons. It
creates confusion and chaos in (3) different courts at the same time for the exact same Levy
matter. Those courts are the Bankruptcy Court, District Court and the Ninth Circuit Court.
More importantly, even if IIB were to sign an agreement with the Trustee and obtained a
Court “Order” in Bankruptcy Court to do a subsequent sale of the Frantz Estate interests at a
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Sheriffs auction,

then transfer the interests back to the Frantz Estate to dismiss the (2)

interests, since they would be property of the Frantz Estate again, the Trustee would still be
obligated to make a Motion before the Bankruptcy Court to dismiss the interests!

Frantz,

having 'standing' in the Frantz Estate, would then object to the dismissal and arguments
would be presented before Judge Meyers. Wouldn't it not be more efficient for IIB to make
a motion in front of Judge Meyers to dismiss the court proceeding actions instead of going
about this in such a convoluted back-door manner? This is costing Frantz, the District Court,
the Bankruptcy Court and now the Ninth Circuit court untold time and unnecessary expense.
Without a written signed agreement for the transaction in the Court "Order" from the Judge
and without consent from the other Estate creditors and debtors of interest to proceed with a
subsequent Sheriff auction of Estate Interests as IIB desires, IIB 's unauthorized sale of Estate
Interests at the Sheriff sale falls under bankruptcy statute 853.

Fraudulent Receipt of

Property-18 U.S.C. § 152(5) Subsection (5) prohibits the fraudulent receipt of a material
amount of property from the debtor. The $100,000 that IIB bid for the interests is considered a
material amount of property for purposes of this statute.

This paragraph is specifically

designed to reach defendants, including creditors, who improperly receive interests from a
debtor and/or debtor's Estate. The provisions of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Law are defeated
when a person without Bankruptcy Court approval acts in a manner that interferes with the
equitable use of distribution of any material part of the assets of the estate." United States v.
Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 678 n.43 (10th Cir. 1989). The indictment need not specify the
particular clause or provision of law which is intended to be defeated. Lurie v. United States,
20 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1927), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 563 (1927).

II.

IS THE INTEREST, SUBJECT OF THIS OBJECTION,

IN A FORM AND

CONTENT THAT IS SUBJECT TO LEVY DOCTRINE?

Let's look at Uniform Commercial Code which defines "General intangibles" describing the
(2) interests subject of this reconsideration.

Section 9-102 (42) of the Uniform Commercial

Code defines "General intangibles" as "any personal property". It states: money judgment
may be enforced against any property that is assignable or transferable, whether it consists
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of a present or future right or interests and whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from
application to the satisfaction of the judgment.”
The (2) interests only have to meet one of the following two conditions to avoid Levies under
the Uniform Commercial Code;
1) If the interests are not “assignable or transferable”, OR;
2) If the interests are “exempt” from satisfaction of the judgment.
Frantzs argument is simple. The interest, subject of this objection, cannot be “assigned
or transferred” without an “Order” from the Honorable Judge Terry Meyers to avoid a
fraudulent transfer under Bankruptcy Code previously mentioned. It is undisputed that
the interests are property of Frantz whose Interests are strictly enforced and regulated in
the jurisdiction/venue of the Bankruptcy Court. No Frantz interests may be “assigned
nor transferred” without Bankruptcy Court “Order”.
Even if a transaction like this were to be approved, then several Exemptions may apply
anyway defeating IIB’s plan.

U.S. Code § 522 – Exemptions (11) The debtor’s right to

receive property that is traceable to—(e) A waiver of an exemption executed in favor of a
creditor (which voluntary waiver the Court granted to Frantz under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(10) on
May 20, 2015) that holds an unsecured claim against the debtor (i.e. IIB) is unenforceable in a
case under this title with respect to such claim against property that the debtor may exempt
under subsection (b) of this section. A waiver by the debtor of a power under subsection (f) or
(h) of this section to avoid a transfer, under subsection (g) or (i) of this section to exempt
property, or under subsection (i) of this section to recover property or to preserve a transfer, is
unenforceable in a case under this title, and/or under Idaho ID Code § 11-604, Frantz may be
entitled to reasonable support. (2) The phrase "property to the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of him and his dependents" means property required to meet the present and
anticipated needs of the individual and his dependents, as determined by the court after
consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the present and anticipated property
and income of the individual, including that which is exempt and/or (2.1) The debtor's
aggregate interest in any funds or property held on behalf of the debtor, and not yet
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distributed to the debtor, under any retirement or pension plan or system. The Frantz Estate is
holding funds which may apply to the Administrative claim if allowed.
Finally, the Appeal Of Court Procedure indisputably has no inherent “cash” value.

If the

court agrees with the Procedural Complaint, it would simply unwind what occurred and
proceed with how the transaction should have been done if proper court procedure had been
observed. IIB has stated neither the interests have any “cash” “collection” value required
under Levy doctrine.

(See Hawley-Troxell letter to Trustee October 7, 2016 attached as

EXHIBIT A Pg 2 (2. & 3.) which states; “…it certainly appears that any such claims
[referring to the (2) interests] have nothing more than nuisance value.”
IIB has even indicated that they are unsure if the interests or rights to them are in a proper form
to be able to be purchased or Levied on under Levy doctrine. For example, with regard to one
of the other Trustees court proceeding claims in the “Order” transfer/sale Judge’s approval,
IIB in the same October 7, 2016 letter to the Trustee (which reference can be located in IIB’s
40 Pg Motion submission APPENDIX “A” item (9.)) states: ”The preliminary research that
we have conducted leads us to believe that IIB can purchase those claims.” referring to an
Adversarial claim. But Kurtz continues and states: “However, if it is determined that those
claims may only be pursued by the Trustee, [in other words cannot legally be transferred or
assigned to IIB due to Bankruptcy regulations or Judge Meyers denial of such] IIB will agree
to take over the responsibility and expense of pursing those claims in a manner to be discussed
with and agreed upon with the Trustee.” IIB hasn’t done the final Bankruptcy Code
research to really know for sure if rights to the claim are transferable or not.
More specifically with regard to the interest, subject of this reconsideration,

in the

“INSTRUCTIONS FROM JUDGMENT CREDITOR” dated March 31st, 2017 (which can be
found as EXHIBIT- B which we testify is a true and correct copy), Attorney for IIB, Beth
Coonts on page 2 (2. & 3.) stated in Civil Court the following;
“2.

There may be third parties unknown to judgment creditor that have an interest in or who

hold property of the judgment debtors. Judgment creditor is not interested in executing upon
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any property in which a third party has an interest.”

IIB’s attorney admits “There may be

third parties... that have an interest” and are aware that all the other creditors (3d parties) of
the Frantz Estate have an “interest” in the Levy items.

Hence, it is the reason IIB requested

the Trustee to get a Court “Order” from Judge Meyers for the venue/jurisdiction change and
Sheriff’s sale.

However, the record shows that the Trustee did not obtain a Court “Order”

from Judge Meyers and IIB furthermore never notified any of the other creditors of their plan.
It is also irrefutable that IIB could have pursued obtaining a Court “Order” themselves, but did
not.
“3.

It is my good faith belief that the money and/or property to be attached as stated in my

attached letter of instruction to the Sherriff is not completely exempt under federal or state
law.” This statement infers that the (2) Levy items are “not completely exempt” meaning
the attorney for IIB believes they could be “partially exempt” or in some way may not qualify
under Levy doctrine, again by IIB’s own admission and statement.

CONCLUSION
IIB’s assertions are unsupported and without merit. They relied upon the Trustee to obtain a
court “Order” from Judge Meyers to do a subsequent Sheriff auction which for some reason he
never pursued. We do know IIB could file a motion in Bankruptcy Court now or at any time
to see if Judge Meyers is willing to grant an “Order” to dismiss the Frantz court proceedings or
to give approval for a subsequent sale of the interests at a Sheriff’s auction.
However,

there appears to be no logical reason to go through all the complex and time

consuming multiple proceedings in (3) different courts of law to get an answer to their simple
question; “Can the (2) Bankruptcy Court Frantz interests be dismissed?” other than some
unexplainable resistance to asking Judge Meyer’s this question.

Did the Trustee drop the

request for authorization because his research determined they were not on solid legal ground?
Does Hawley-Troxell already have knowledge that Judge Meyers will say no and therefore is
attempting to find a way around the Judge’s “Order” by claiming the Judge already gave them
approval, as a way to circumvent the Honorable Judge Meyers court “Order”?
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Hawley-Troxell is attempting to deceive this court by claiming Judge Meyer's "Order" granted
them the right to sell and execute on the interests at a Sheriff's sale and then to assign the
interests back to the Frantz Estate, interests that were never mentioned in the "Order" and
which there is no agreement that has been vetted by the other creditors of the Frantz Estate.
We are. grateful for the opportunity to present this research and hope this information will shed
light on these proceedings. We ask that IIB Motion be denied.

DATED THIS 31st day of July. 2017.

MARTY D. FRANTZ

EXHIBITS: See Declaration Of Marty Frantz
Exhibits A, B & C
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EXHIBIT E
ARIZONA STATE COURT PENDING LEVY DISPUTE
RELYING ON JUDGE VEBY DECISION AND FRANTZ
OBJECTION
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Don C. Fletcher, SBN 012140
LAKE & COBB, P .L.C.
1095 W. Rio Salado Pkwy., Ste. 206
Tempe, AZ 85281
602-523-3000 office
602-523-3001 fax
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Attorneys for Defendants
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE STATE OF ARIZONA
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IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF MARICOPA
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Case No. CV2017-011980

CASTLE PROPERTY INVESTMENTS,
LLLP, a Colorado limited liability limited
partnership,
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DEFENDANTS' PRELIMINARY
RESPONSE REGARDING ORDER
TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff,
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14
15

V.

MARTIN D. FRANTZ & CYNTHIA M.
FRANTZ, husband and wife,

16
17

Defendants.

18
19

Plaintiff Castle Property Investments, LLLP's ("Plaintiff'') claims in this matter are

20

premature. The Lis Pendens recorded as No. 20150185236 in the Official Records of

21

Maricopa County, Arizona is a valid lien on the property located at 28825 North 160th

22

Street, Scottsdale, Arizona 85262 ("Property"). Importantly, there are pending matters

23

in other jurisdictions that need to be finalized prior to any final determination in this

24

matter. Defendants herein preliminarily respond to Defendants' request that the Lis

25

Pendens on the Property be removed. Defendants reserve their right to supplement

26

and also respond to any arguments raised by Plaintiff. This Preliminary Response is

I
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1

supported with the Declaration of Jonathon Frantz attached hereto as Exhibit "A".

2

Plaintiff is correct that the Lis Pendens is based on an appeal of an order of the

3

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho authorizing the sale of the Property ("Appeal").

4

Plaintiff's arguments regarding impact of this Appeal are inaccurate. A sampling of the

5

inaccuracies is set forth below:

6

Plaintiff indicates that even if Defendants are ultimately successful in the Appeal

7

that their remedy would not include restoration of the Property to the Defendants'

8

Bankruptcy Estate because the sale of the Property removed the Property from the

9

Bankruptcy Estate; and also that the Bankruptcy Court denied Defendant's motion for

10

stay pending their appeal of the Order. Defendants disagree with this legal analysis.

11

Notably, Plaintiff has not supplied any case law in this matter regarding its contentions.

~ ire 12

It is also clear that the Bankruptcy Court did not make the required 11 U.S.C. § 363(m)

§j~
,. ul 3

13

finding of good faith. This is important as there was a higher bidder than Plaintiff for

14

the Property, and Plaintiff was aware of this fact as well as the Appeal challenging the

15

sale of the Property. Therefore, from the very beginning of this matter, Plaintiff was

16

aware that Defendants were asserting an interest in the Property and that therefore,

17

clear title was not established. See Exhibit A, Jonathon Frantz Declaration.

~
ti~

-t."'

§;!
"'

?l

18

Next, Plaintiff contends Defendants have no interest in the Appeal because on

19

May 9, 2017, Idaho Independent Bank foreclosed on Defendants' interest therein.

20

Defendants' reasoning is flawed for at least three reasons. First, there is a pending

21

Motion for Levy Reconsideration in the District Court of the First Judicial District of the

22

State of Idaho, Kootenai County, Idaho (Case No. CV-10-6088). A hearing on that

23

matter is set for October 24, 2017.

24

Reconsideration is attached hereto as Exhibit B. A copy of the CV-10-6088 Court

25

Docket is attached hereto as Exhibit C. Second, the docket of the U.S. Bankruptcy

26

Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit BAP No. ID-15-1060 dated September 21, 2017,

A copy of the Hearing Notice for Levy
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1 makes clear that the Defendants Martin and Cynthia Frantz, not Idaho Independent
2 Bank, are the current listed Appellants in that matter. A copy of the docket for BAP No.
3

ID-15-1060 dated September 21 , 2017 is attached hereto as Exhibit D. There are

4 pending pleadings in the BAP No. ID-15-1060 matter regarding the substitution of Idaho
5

Independent Bank as Appellant, but that issue is being contested.

A copy of the

6 Objection to IBB Motion to Substitute as Appellant is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
7

Once again, this shows that Plaintiff is premature in bringing this mater as there are

8

other pending proceedings that will be case dispositive.

Third, it is not clear that

9 appellate rights are indeed an asset that can be sold in the first place, but those matters

~

.!!

10

are all subject to the Idaho courts that currently have those matters under review. Thus,

11

it would be premature for this Court to address those matters.

12

In conclusion, as set forth in Defendants' Preliminary Response, Plaintiffs filings

13
8j~
CJ .. g

are premature. The Defendants' Lis Pendens is valid. Defendants' reserve the right to

~~~
;:

14

supplement their Preliminary Response and to respond to any arguments of the

~

15

Plaintiff.
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16

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 nd day of September, 2017.

17
18
19
20
21
22

LAKE & COBB, P.L.C.

~

Attorneys for Defendants
Martin D. Frantz & Cynthia M. Frantz

23
24
25
26

/4,fY{

E-FILED via AZ TurboCourt
this 22 nd day of September, 2017.
COPY of the foregoing e-mailed and mailed

3
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Marty & Cindy Frantz

307 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

l
)

Case No. CV-10-6088

HEARING NOTICE FOR LEVY
RECONSIDERATION
a.k.a.
Motion To Extend Filing Date
for Claim Of Exemption

Please take notice that on October 24, 2017, at 2:00pm PST, or as soon thereafter as
cowisel may be heard, the Motion for Levy Reconsideration a.k.a. Motion to Extend Filing
date for Claim of Exemption, shall be heard before the Honorable Richard Christensen, at a
courtroom in the Kootenai Cowit Courthouse located at 324 W. Garden Avenue in Coeur
d"Alene, Idaho.

HEARING NOTICE FOR LEVY RECONSIDERATION

Page 1 of3
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DATED IBIS 30th day of August, 2017.

MARTY D. FRANTZ

HEARING NOTICE FOR LEVY RECONSIDERATION
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EXHIBIT F
IIB MISCONDUCT AND REQUESTED SANCTION

06-15-'17 09:33 FRctl-Kootenai Dist Court

208-446-1188

T-210 P0001/0001 F-320
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STATE OF IDf,HO

\.~

COUIHY OF KOOTEHAff
fl\.~

2017 JUN 14 PH I: 05
CLERK OISTR,CT COURT

bfPUTY

Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Llncoln Street, Sllite A

Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmlii).com

IN THE DlSTIUCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TIIE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPEN DENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation.

Plaintiff,

vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ , and individual,

and CINDY M.FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088
DEFENDANTS SUPPLEMENTAL
MEMORANDUM IN SllPPORT OF
MOTION TO EXTEND FILING
DATE FOR CLAJM OF

EXEMPTION
Defendants.

Defendants, Marty & Cindy Frantz, hereby $ubmit this Supplemental Mcm0randwn
in Support of Motion To Extend Filing D11-te For Claim Of Exemption referred to herein as
"Defendant Supplemental Memorandum".

PROCEEDINGS PROTOCOL
At the scheduled hearing for the Motion on June 61\ 2017, Marty and Cindy Fnmtz
banded the court clerk Idaho Statute Title 8, Chpt S, 8-507C which regulate5 protocol with
r-egard to Levy objections. Page 4 (4.) states: "You (referring to the Defendant] should be

DRFENDANr'S SUPPLEMBNTAL Ml!MORANDUM
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prepared to explain the grounds for claiming the exemption in court on the date and time set
for the hearing. You should bring whatever documents you have to support your claim.”
During the hearing, the Frantzs gave the court Clerk Docket No. 668 in Bankruptcy Court
Case No. 11-21337-TLM, the approval of the sale of all Estate Assets and Interests to IIB.
The argument Frantz put forth at the hearing was that the sale of “all the property in which
the Debtor and/or the bankruptcy estate of the Debtors has in interest…” clearly, did not
list nor include the (2) Levies in those sale documents to IIB and therefore are not
executable interests as testified under oath by the Trustee and confirmed by the bankruptcy
court Honorable Judge Meyer’s final order.
LEVY ITEMS DO NOT FIT DEFINITION IN IIB’S LEVY DOCUMENTS
The Levy that IIB had hand delivered to Frantzs attorney included a supplemental
document entitled “EXEMPTION”. The Frantzs were to fill out this “EXEMPTION” form
and return it within 14 days of hand delivery of the Levy.

A true and correct copy of the

“EXEMPTION” form provided with the Levy demand is attached hereto as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein by reference. The “EXEMPTION” form demonstrated that the (2) Levy
item non-adjudicated court proceedings are not currently in a form that the bankruptcy court
can sell nor are they in a form that can be Levied by IIB.
The Exhibit A form stated that the Levy items could only be either “a. Money,
including money in a bank account, which was paid to me…[not which might be paid to me
after adjudication] as: Public assistance of any kind; Social Security or SSI; Worker’s
compensation; Unemployment benefits; Child Support…” etc. OR “b. Property:
Professional books; Burial Plots; Health aids; Homestead, house, mobile home and related
structures;_Jewelry;_Car, truck or motorcycle…”etc.
The (2) Levy non-adjudicated bankruptcy court proceedings do not fit the definitions
of “a. Money which was paid to me” as Frantz has not received any money from either of
the non-adjudicated court proceedings.

Furthermore, even if Frantz did prevail in the 9th

Circuit appeal over court procedures, it would not result in any money, only in the court
correcting procedure protocol. Furthermore, neither of the (2) Levies fit the definition of “b.
Property”, referring to physical assets.

Frantz has not been awarded nor would he be

awarded any physical property if he were to prevail on either of them.
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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definitions that were provided to Frantz with the IIB Levy demand are presumed to be
truthful and accurate descriptions of executable Levy assets (Exhibit A).

IIB IN WRONG COURT JURIDICTION
The Levy (2) items are non-adjudicated Bankruptcy Court proceedings that can only
be acted upon in the jurisdiction of Judge Meyers bankruptcy court. If bankruptcy claims
are adjudicated by the Bankruptcy Court and converted to cash or physical assets (which they
have not been yet and may never be), the funds then become subject to all of the creditors
interests in the bankruptcy Estate, not to the exclusive benefit of 11B. All the other
creditors in the Estate have an interest with regard to any and all matters of the Frantz Estate.
What IIB did by Levying the (2) non-adjudicated bankruptcy court proceedings in a Civil
Court, without the consent of the bankruptcy court Judge Meyers, and without consent from
the other Estate creditors of interest, falls under the bankruptcy statute 853. Fraudulent
Receipt of Property-18 U.S.C. § 152(5) Subsection (5) prohibits the fraudulent receipt of a
material amount of property from the debtor. This paragraph is specifically designed to reach
defendants, including creditors, who receive assets from a debtor. The provisions of Title 11 of
the Bankruptcy Law are defeated when a person without Bankruptcy Court approval acts in a
manner that diminishes the estate of the debtor, and thus interferes with the equitable use of
distribution of any material part of the assets of the estate." United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d
656, 678 n.43 (10th Cir. 1989). The indictment need not specify the particular clause or provision
oflaw which is intended to be defeated. Lurie v. United States, 20 F.2d 589 (6th Cir. 1927), cert.
denied, 275 U.S. 563 (1927).
If the bankruptcy court proceedings were currently in the form of executable assets,

IIB would have requested the Trustee to include them by listing them in the sale of "all" the
interests of the Frantzs bankruptcy estate when they recently consummated their purchase of

"all the assets and interests".

If the Levy interests were executable,

to avoid fraudulent

receipt of property, IIB or the Trustee would properly make a motion in the bankruptcy court
(like was made when the Trustee sold and IIB purchased all the other assets in Docket No.
668 in Bankruptcy Court Case No. 11-21337-TLM).

IIB agreed to the terms of the

bankruptcy sale which clearly stated the sale to IIB included "all" of the interests and
specifically listed all those assets and claims.

If after the fact, IIB felt there were other

executable interests that were not listed, forgotten or should be listed and/or included in the

DEFENDANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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sale, the legal jurisdiction is to address those concerns in the bankruptcy court. Otherwise,
IIB is attempting to unlawfully circumvent bankruptcy court and all the other creditors rights
and interests in the Frantz Estate to their exclusive personal benefit which action falls under
bankruptcy statute 853 Fraudulent Receipt of Property—18 U.S.C. § 152(5).
LEVY ITEMS ALREADY UNDER AGREEMENT BETWEEN IIB & FRANTZ
The (2) proposed Levies were not forgotten or missed by IIB during the sale of the
assets in bankruptcy court. IIB has been acutely aware of them for years and has attempted
on a number of occasions to get the highly prized bankruptcy proceedings
dismissed/withdrawn both inside and outside of the bankruptcy court.

The latest in IIB’s

attempts to force Frantz to dismiss the (2) court proceedings was signed and agreed to by
IIB, March 16, 2017, only several weeks before IIB filed the Levy referencing the exact
same court proceedings. A true and correct copy of the “Agreement Regarding Transfer Of
Assets” between IIB, TMS and Frantz is attached hereto as Exhibit B and incorporated
herein by reference. In response to the IIB/ TMS/Frantz agreement, Marty & Cindy Frantz
signed a promise to address among other matters the same (2) Levy items in dispute in this
Civil case matter. A true and correct copy of the “Promise To TMS” between Frantz and
TMS is attached hereto as Exhibit C and incorporated herein by reference.
Please refer to Page 7, Item (6.) of Exhibit B (IIB/TMS agreement) which states: “6.
Debtors’ Cooperation and Acts.

The Purchasers [referring to TMS] shall use their best

efforts to obtain from the Debtor the following: … d. Within (1) week of the execution of this
Agreement, dismiss all appeals of any actions taken by the Debtor’s Bankruptcy Trustee;
[Referring to the same bankruptcy appeal court proceedings as stated in the Levy several
weeks later]… e. Within (1) week of the execution of this Agreement, withdraw any claims
against the Bankruptcy Estate: including, but not limited to, the Motion for Approval of
Administrative Expenses Dkt 327 and related pleadings, and the Amended Claims of
Exemption (Dkt No. 377):”

[Referring to the exact same bankruptcy appeal court

proceedings as the Levy demand made several weeks later]…
TMS substantially met the conditions of the IIB contract as demonstrated in Exhibit C
“Promise To TMS” which states on Pg 1 – #1) (a.) “The Frantzs are currently in litigation
with IIB in Kootenai County, Idaho Case No. CV10-6088, currently under appeal before the
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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Idaho Supreme Court as Docket No. 44252… The Frantzs promise that if they lose the
pending afore-mentioned appeal (including petitions for rehearing, if any), they will not file
any further motions or seek to set aside the Amended Judgment in Kootenai County Case No.
CV10-0688, including any I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion…” Conversely, if Frantz prevails, the
Supreme Court will over-turn IIB’s judgment and IIB will have no standing to proceed with
any collections against Frantz. The Levy matter will be moot.

Based upon that agreement

only weeks prior to the Levy, IIB’s collection action is pre-mature and was carried out in
bad faith. The Supreme Court indicated they would issue their decision as early as three
weeks (June 23, 2017).

Written transcripts are not yet available from that Supreme Court

hearing held on June 2, 2017. However attached hereto as Exhibit D and incorporated
herein by reference are the links to the Supreme Court hearing on the subject matter which
we enter into the records as a true and correct copy.
Exhibit C “Promise To TMS” further states on Pg 1, #1) (c.) - “c. The Frantzs filed
Docket 327, an Application for Approval of Administrative Expenses (The “Administrative
Claim”), which is currently pending in the Frantzs bankruptcy case. The basis for that claim
included payments made by the Frantzs for the mortgage, taxes, and maintenance costs. The
Frantzs agree that they will reduce the scope of the Administrative Claim to be based solely
on the arguments concerning the payments the Frantzs made to the mortgage holder.
“[Referring to the identical Levy item IIB filed several weeks later].
IIB, unsuccessful in causing the (2) Levy items to be dismissed/withdrawn for many
years, applied pressure on TMS (TMS is owned by the adult children of the Frantzs) to
convince their parents (Marty & Cindy Frantz) to “dismiss the bankruptcy case appeal”
(Levy #1) and “withdraw the request for Administrative Expenses” (Levy #2), both the
subject of the current June 6th Levy hearing. If TMS refused, with IIB now in control of all
the Estate assets, Marty & Cindy’s adult children would lose their jobs and interests in the
family business. IIB made a written contractual agreement with regard to the (2) Levy court
proceedings in that agreement for consideration. They cannot have an agreement with the
Frantz family and at the same time execute a Levy on the same court proceedings ignoring
consideration given for the agreement compromise terms in the Exhibit B IIB/TMS
agreement and Exhibit C “Promise To TMS”. IIB’s refusal to wait for the Supreme Court

DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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ruling before proceeding with Levy actions is bad faith dealings in the wake of these
agreements signed by IIB only weeks before they filed the Levy.
IIB LATE FILING CONTESTING FRANTZ CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
IIB received the Frantz claim of exemption on May 9th .

According to Idaho

Statutes provided to the court at the live hearing on June 6, 2017, on Pg 3 item (2.), IIB then
had (5) business days to contest Frantz claim of exemption.

However, IIB filed their

Memorandum in Opposition to the Frantz exemption on May 26th which filing date was 13
business days after they received the Frantz claim of exemption or well beyond the (5)
business days allowed by code. Per the Code on Pg 3 item (3.) Quote: “If…the judgment
creditor… does not file a motion with the court contesting the claim of exemption, [meaning
within (5) business days], the sheriff will immediately… return the property.” [Invalidating
IIB’s Levy action]
CONCLUSION
1) Reason Frantz Filing Was Timely - IIB admitted in the June 6, 2017 hearing that it was
unethical to address the Levy to Marty & Cindy Frantz. Yet IIB caused the hand delivery
address on the certified return receipt to include Marty & Cindy Frantzs name on the
package anyway causing delays in delivery of the documents. IIB then delayed their
response to the delivery dilemma for nearly a week. IIB’s malevolent intent to “run the
clock” became apparent when they refused to email the documents as alternate legal
service requested by Frantzs attorney. Title 8 Chpt 5 8-507C allows the Defendant 14
days from quote; “mailing OR personal service” to file an exemption. Frantz filed it
within 12 days of hand delivery or “personal service” from USPS employee, Amanda
with (2) days to spare.
2) Ownership Interest in Bankruptcy Court Proceedings - The (2) Levy items were
never included in the Bankrutptcy Sale to IIB. IIB has never purchased or owned the (2)
Levy items nor can anyone own them, other than Frantz, without the express written
approval of bankruptcy court Honorable Judge Meyers.

DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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3) Definition Of Executable Interests - Exhibit A IIB’s documents sent with the Levy to
Frantz reveals the (2) Levy items do not fit within those definition and description of
executable asset because the (2) court proceedings items are not “a. Money, including
money in a bank account, which was paid to me…[note past tense - not which might be
paid to me in the future] OR “b. Property” referring to physical assets as Frantz has not
been awarded nor would he be awarded any physical property if he were to prevail on
either of the Levy court proceedings.
4) Fraudulent Bankruptcy Dealings -

IIB is attempting to unlawfully circumvent

bankruptcy court and all the other creditors rights and interests in the Frantz Estate to
their exclusive personal benefit which action falls under bankruptcy statute 853
Fraudulent Receipt of Property—18 U.S.C. § 152(5).

5) Bad Faith Dealings; Levy Items Under IIB Compromise Agreement - IIB devised
and signed a written agreement with the Frantz family only weeks before the Levy. The
agreement created obligations with respect to IIB vs Frantz Supreme Court ruling, the (2)
Levy items subject of the current dispute and other related matters. If Frantz prevails at
the Supreme Court June 2, 2017 hearing, the Supreme Court will over-turn the IIB
judgment and IIB will have no standing to proceed with any collection against Frantz.
The Levy matter will be moot. The high court decision could be rendered as soon as June
26, 2017. IIB is using the “shot-gun” approach hoping that one of their actions will cause
the Levy court proceedings to be dismissed/withdrawn acting as though these signed
compromise agreements have no bearing on the Levy. In the wake of the Levy items
Exhibit B & C recent compromise agreements, the Levy writ of execution is a pre-mature
action demonstrating IIB’s bad faith dealings in this matter.
6) IIB Opposition To Frantz Exemption Filed Too Late - IIB was too late in filing their
opposition to the Frantz claim of exemption (13) days after receiving the Frantz
exemption, well beyond the (5) days allowed by code, invalidating the Levy.
The Levy case is an excellent example of IIB’s over-reaching, over-whelming use of
excessive legal prowess, unethical behavior, bad faith dealings with bankruptcy court
fraudulent over-tones. The Levy never should have been an action in these Civil
proceedings costing the court and defendant undue time and expense. Due to IIB’s $2
DEFENDANT’S SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
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million legal campaign, the Frantzs have never had the opportunity to tell their important
story during the past 6 years until the Supreme Court hearing was held on Friday, June 2,
2017. The story has been suppressed by IIB confusing the issues, distorting the facts,
overwhelming Frantzs defense with a myriad of legal maneuvers that have nothing to do with
the core issue costing years of unnecessary time and expense. It is for these reasons that
various matters of No. CV-10-6088 have ended up in the Supreme Court and in the 9 th
Circuit Court.
The Defendant respectfully asks that IIB is appropriately sanctioned. Please bring
fairness to these proceedings to deter unnecessary, over-aggressive actions so the court may
focus on the core issues of No. CV- l 0-6088. For these reasons we ask that the court find in
the Defendant's favor.

DATED THIS 14 th day of June, 2017.

ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT A- "EXEMPTION'' form provided in IIB Levy to Frantz
EXHIBIT B- Agreement Regarding Transfer Of Assets IIB to TMS
EXHIBIT C- Frantz Promise to TMS
EXHIBIT D- Supreme Court Hearing Video Feed
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
307 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

~

)

Case No. CV-10-6088

OBJECTION TO JIB HEARING
NOTICE FOR LEVY
RECONSIDERATION
a.k.a.
Motion To Extend Filing Date
for Claim Of Exemption

OBJECTION TO JIB HEARING NOTICE FOR LEVY RECONSIDERATION
Marty & Cindy Frantz, hereby object to the JIB Notice of Hearing for Levy Reconsideration

filed by Hawley-Troxell on the 28 th day of August, 2017.

HISTORICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

1.

July 31 8\ 2017
a. Frantz filed a Motion for Levy Reconsideration.
OBJECTION TO JIB HEARING NOTICE
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b. Frantz emailed and left a message for the court scheduler, Kathy Booth to provide a date
for the Reconsideration (see attached EXHIBIT A email correspondence and Frantz
declaration). "I would like to schedule a hearing date with Judge Christensen. Can you
give me some dates. Thanks. "
c. Frantz filed a Hearing Notice for Levy Reconsideration. He called and left a message for
Kathy Booth and sent an email to get a hearing date however received no reply.
Therefore on the notice of hearing, Frantz stated that he would provide the hearing date
"as soon as the court recorder delivers the date".
2. August 15, 2017, Frantz emails Booth again and states; "I've been out of town for a
couple weeks and noticed that I didn't hear from you with regard to available dates for a
hearing date with Judge Christensen requested in the below email. Can you please give me
some dates. Thanks. " Also, Frantz had not received a return call from Booth from his
voice mail left on July 31st_
3. August 21, 2017,

a. Sheila Schwager emails Booth and cc's Frantz and asks states; "Good Morning Ms.
Booth, ... Would it be fine if my firm set the matter for hearing"...
b. Frantz emails Sheila and states; "I have (2) email requests into Kathy, July 31 and
Aug 15th (see below). I also left her a voice mail on July 3 J8t to get a court date ... I
understand she is backlogged I'm sure she will get back to me with dates. As soon
as she does, I will emtlil you the date."

c. Court scheduler for Kathy Booth, Cristine, emails Frantz and states: "Kathy has been
out since July 28th and we are not sure when she will be able to return... Judge
Christensen had Jury trial all last week so her desk has been busy to say the least ...
please let me know how long the requested time is. "
d. Frantz replies to Cristine and states; "Thanks for your reply. Would any of those
dates work for a 2 or 3 hour time slot? Jfnot, what would be a couple dates that
would?"
August 23 2 2017,

a.

Cristine replies to Frantzs email request and states: " ... we would have to go to
October, Judge Luster will be filling in quite a bit over the next few months, does it

OBJECTION TO IIB HEARING NOTICE
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matter if he hears this hearing?"
b. Frantz replies to Cristine and states: "Judge Chritensen is most familiar with our case
history and then Judge Virby. Ifwe can get one ofthem, we can likely keep it to 1-112

to 2 hours. What date in October are you looking at?"
4. August 252 2017,
a. Sheila emails Frantz and states; "Christine is filling in/or Kathy Booth while she is out

of the office ... she has provided a hearing date for your Motion... Will you be filing the
Notice ofHearing, or do you want my office to do it?"
b. Frantz responds to Sheila email and states: "I have been working with Christine and

am handling the ma,tter. I am expecting the informa,lion today and will file the notice
of hearing Monday."
c. Sheila emails Frantz and states; " ... The court clerk provided the hearing date and told

us we could set it/or hearing ... "
5. August 28, 2017, Cristine replies to Frantz Aug 23d email and states; "Sorry, I had three
different people emailing me on this motion to reconsider, confirming that you got the date
o/Sept 2d'1 at 3pm?"
6. August 29, 2017,
a. Frantz emails Cristine and states; "I would be confused too with (3) different people

emailing me! I am the sole petitioner for the Notice of hearing, not Hawley-Troxell,
JIB or any other party. Please refer any other inquires to me directly ... I understood
that we wouldn't have enough time on the 2dh, hence why I asked for the next date
which you indicated would be October ... Can you please call me @ 208-661-9350 cell.
Thank you. "
b. Cristine calls Frantz and states that the other parties adding confusion were Sheila
Schwager and Tim Kurtz. Cristine then orally confirms the date with Judge Christensen
that will work for the 1-1/2 hour to 2 hour time lot of October 24th at 2pm (see Frantz
EXHIBIT A declaration).
7. August 29, 2017, Frantz emails Cristine and states; "Thank you/or scheduling the hearing

date today for Oct 24 @ 2pm. I am filing the notice tomorrow and also an objection to the
notice date JIB filed yesterday. "

OBJECTION TO IIB HEARING NOTICE
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CONCLUSION
Hawley-Troxell asked twice, on August 21 and 25th ifFrantz wanted help to obtain the
Notice of Hearing date. Both times Frantz wrote and stated to Hawley-Troxell that
Frantz was working with the clerk's office and that he would obtain and file the
hearing date. Frantz furthermore provided Hawley-Troxell with his correspondence to
show that he was working with the clerk's office. Hawley-Troxell also stated that they
knew the clerk's office was backlogged due to Booth's absence. (2) attorneys at
Hawley-Troxell then ignored Frantz, interfered and created confusion for the court
clerk (Cristine) and inadvertently scheduled a date that did not provide adequate time
as communicated by Frantz to Cristine in prior emails.

For these reasons we request

that the September hearing date is replaced by the October date.

DATED TIDS 30th day of August, 2017.

MARTY FRANTZ

"

~

EXHIBITS
EXHIBIT A - Email Correspondence
EXHIBIT B - Frantz Declaration
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON THE 30th DAY OF August, 2017, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MOTION OF LEVY RECONSIDERATION to be served upon the
following in the manner indicated below.

~D
MARTY D. FRANTZ

Sheila R. Schwager
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

~~\

[X ]US Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 954-5261
[ ] Email
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EXHIBIT. A

HEARING DATE EMAIL
COORESPONDENCE
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message
Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: kbooth@kcgov.us

Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 3:23 PM

Hi Kathy
From Marty Frantz 208-661-9350 or 208619-0482
Civil Court Case # CASE #CV-2010-0006088
I would like to schedule a hearing date with Judge Christensen. Can you give me some dates. Thanks.

The messages and attachments herein may contain confidential information protected by the attorney-dient privilege or another privilege. These
communications are intended to be private and may not be recorded or copied without the consent of the author. If you believe any message has been sent to
you in error, please notify the sender and delete the message. Thank you.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message
Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: kbooth@kcgov.us

Tue, Aug 15, 2017 at 4:36 PM

Hi Kathy
From Marty Frantz 208-661-9350 or 208619-0482
Civil Court Case # CASE #CV-2010-0006088
I've been out of town for a couple weeks and noticed that I didn't hear from you with regard to available dates for a hearing
date with Judge Christensen requested in the below email. Can you please give me some dates. Thanks.
On Mon, Jul 31, 2017 at 3:23 PM, Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Kathy
From Marty Frantz 208-661-9350 or 208619-0482
Civil Court Case # CASE #CV-2010-0006088
I would like to schedule a hearing date with Judge Christensen. Can you give me some dates. Thanks.
The messages and attachments herein may contain confidential information protected by the attorney-client privilege or another privilege. These
communications are intended to be private and may not be recorded or copied without the consent of the author. If you believe any message has been
sent to you in error, please notify the sender and delete the message. Thank you.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Case: CV-2010-0006088 - Idaho Independent Bank vs. Martin D Frantz, etal.
[IWOV-IMANAGE.FID480780]
1 message
Sheila Schwager <SSchwager@hawleytroxell.com>
To: Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>
Cc: "martyfrantzcda@gmail.com" <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 10:12 AM

Good Morning Ms. Booth,
In the above referenced case, the Defendants have filed the attached Motion for Reconsideration regarding Judge
Verby's decision on the Sheriff's execution sale, but they have not set a specific hearing date, which is causing delay.
Would it be fine if my firm set the matter for hearing and if so, would it be on Judge Verby's calendar or Judge
Christensen's calendar? Also. could I attend the hearing via telephone and in that regard would you like a motion and
proposed order?
I have copied Mr. Frantz on this email. Thank you for your time. Sheila

Sheila R. Schwager
Partner
direct 208-388-4928
fax 208-954-5261
e-mail sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
HAWLEY TROXELL
Attorneys and Counselors
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
Boise, Idaho 83701
General Number 208-344-6000

--------------

This e-mail message from the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP is intended only for named recipients. It
contains information that may be confidential, privileged, attorney work product, or otherwise exempt from disdosure
under applicable law. If you have received this message in error, are not a named recipient, or are not the employee or
agent responsible for delivering this message to a named recipient, be advised that any review, disclosure, use,
dissemination, distribution, or reproduction of this message or its contents is strictly prohibited. Please notify us
immediately at 208.344.6000 if you have received this message in error, and delete the message.
r:::: :::J Please consider the environment before printing this email.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Fwd: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message
Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Sheila Schwager <sschwager@hawleytroxell.com>
Cc: kbooth@kcgov.us

Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 10:37 AM

To Sheila
From Marty
I have (2) email requests into Kathy, July 31 and Aug 15th (see below). I also left her a voice mail on July 31st to o get a
court date. She did reply to me with regard to another matter. I understand she is backlogged. I'm sure she will get
back to me with dates. As soon as she does, I will email you the date.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message

Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>
To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 2:02 PM

Hello Kathy has been out since July 28 th and we are not sure when she will be able to return. Judge Christensen had
a Jury trial all last week so her desk has been busy to say the least© below are some dates, please let me know how
long the requested time is

Sept 5 at 3pm
Sep 11 at 3pm
Sept 26 at 3pm

Thanks
Cristine
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M Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message
Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>

Mon, Aug 21, 2017 at 4:45 PM

Hi Christine
From Marty Frantz case# CV-10-6088
Thanks for your reply. Would any of those dates work for a 2 or 3 hour time slot? If not, what would be a couple dates
that would?
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M Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message

Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>
To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 4:03 PM

For 2-3 hours we would have to go late October, Judge Luster will be filing in quite a bit over the next few months,
does it matter if he hears this hearing?
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>

Wed, Aug 23, 2017 at 5:33 PM

Judge Christenson is most familiar with our case history and then Judge Virby. If we can get one of them, we can likely
keep it to 1-1/2 to 2 hours. What date in October are you looking at?
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen [IWOVIMANAGE.F1D480780]
1 message

Sheila Schwager <SSchwager@ hawleytroxell.c om>
To: "martyfrantzcda @gmail.com" <martyfrantzcd a@gmail.com>
Cc: "kbooth@kcgov .us" <kbooth@kcgo v.us>, Timothy Kurtz <TKurtz@hawl eytroxell.com>

Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 11 :52 AM

Mr. Frantz,

Christine is filling in for Kathy Booth while she is out of the office (but utilizing Ms. Booth's email address). In that
regard, she has provided a hearing date for your Motion for Reconsideration for September 20, 2017 at 3 pm your
time. It is before Judge Christensen, as Judge Verby is not available. Will you be filing the Notice of Hearing, or do
you want my office to do it?

Thank you. Sheila
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen [IWOVIMANAGE.F1D480780]
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Sheila Schwager <SSchwager@hawleytroxell.com>
Cc: "kbooth@kcgov.us" <kbooth@kcgov.us>

Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 12: 11 PM

I have been working with Christine and am handling the matter. I am expecting the information today and will file the
notice of hearing Monday.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen [IWOVIMANAGE.F1D480780]
1 message
Sheila Schwager <SSchwager@hawteytroxell.com>
To: "martyfrantzcda@gmail.com" <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Cc: "kbooth@kcgov.us" <kbooth@kcgov.us>, Timothy Kurtz <TKurtz@hawleytroxell.com>

Fri, Aug 25, 2017 at 12:16 PM

Mr. Frantz,
The court clerk provided the hearing date and told us we could set it for hearing. You filed the Motion almost a
month ago and it should not take this long to set a hearing.
I was giving you the courtesy of letting you know and whether you wanted to send the notice or whether you wanted
my firm to send the notice. Thank you. Sheila

-------------- ---
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

RE: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen

1 message

Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>
To: martyfran tzcda@g mail.com

Mon, Aug 28, 2017 at 10:54 AM

Marty,

Sorry I had three different people emailing me on this motion to reconsider, confirmin
g that you got the date of Sept
20 th at 3pm?
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Schedule Hearing Date For Reconsideration - Judge Christensen

1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>

Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 5:43 PM

Hi Christine
From Marty Frantz
I would be confuse too with (3) different people emailing me1 I am the sole petitioner for the Notice of hearing, not
Hawley-Troxell, 118 or any other party. Please refer any other inquires to me directly. See below email where we last left
off. Either Judge Christensen or Virby would be the best. It sounds like Judge Christensen would be available the
soonest. I understood that we wouldn't have enough time on the 20th, hence why I asked for the next date which you
indicated would be October. I left several voice messages for you including one today about 1:30pm. Can you please
call me@ 208-661-9350 cell. Thank you.
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Hearing Date For Judge Christensen
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Kathy Booth <kbooth@kcgov.us>

Tue, Aug 29, 2017 at 5:47 PM

Hi Christine
From Marty Frantz 208-661-9350 cell
Thank you for scheduling the hearing date today for Oct 24 @ 2pm. I am filing the notice tomorrow and also an objection
to the notice date 11B filed yesterday.
The messages and attachments herein may contain confidential information protected by the attomey--client privilege or another privilege. These
communications are intended to be private and may not be recorded or copied without the consent of the author. If you believe any message has been sent to
you in error, please notify the sender and delete the message. Thank you.
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EXHIBIT B

Marty Frantz Declaration
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
307 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088

DECLARATION OF MARTY
FRANTZ IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO IIB FILING
NOTICE DATE

Defendants.

Marty Frantz declares under the penalty of perjury as follows:
I am a part-time resident of Kootenai County, Idaho and I am over the age of 18 and
competent to testify to the facts stated herein of my own personal knowledge.
1. On July 31 s1, 2017 I filed a Motion for Levy Reconsideration. On the same date I emailed
Kathy Booth to provide a date for the Reconsideration ( for all email correspondence in this
Declaration see attached EXHIBIT A email correspondence to Notice Objection). I also left a
voice mail for her with my request.

On the same day, I filed a Hearing Notice for Levy

Reconsideration with the court stating I would provide the hearing date as soon as the court
Page 1 of 3
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recorder delivers the date.
2. On August 15, 2017, I emailed Booth again and stated~ "I've been out of town for a couple

weeks and noticed that I didn't hear from you with regard to available dates for a hearing date
with Judge Christensen requested in the below email. Can you please give me some dates.
Thanks.". Again I left another voice mail too. The recorder's office also had not returned my
voice mail left on July 31st_
3. On August 21, 2017 Ms Sheila Schwager emailed me and asked if it would be ok for her firm
to set the matter for hearing. I told her I was working with the recorder's office on the matter
and didn't need her help but would file the date with the court as soon as I got it.

On around

the same date Cristine, for Kathy Booth, emailed me and stated "Kathy has been out since

July 28th and we are not sure when she will be able to return... Judge Christensen had Jury
trial all last week so her desk has been busy to say the least ... please let me know how long the
requested time is. " I responded the same day and stated" "Thanks for your reply. Would any
of those dates work for a 2 or 3 hour time slot? If not, what would be a couple dates that
would?"
4. On August 23, 2017 Cristine responded to me and stated: " ... we would have to go to October,

Judge Luster will be filling in quite a bit over the next few months, does it matter if he hears
this hearing?" On the same day Frantz responds and states: "Judge Chritensen is most
familiar with our case history and then Judge Virby.

If we can get one of them, we can likely

keep it to 1-112 to 2 hours. What date in October are you looking at?"
5. On August 25, 2017, Sheila emailed me and said " "Christine is filling in for Kathy Booth

while she is out of the office ... she has provided a hearing date for your Motion ... Will you be
filing the Notice ofHearing, or do you want my office to do it?"
6. On the same day I responded by email and said: "/ have been working with Christine and am
handling the matter. I am expecting the information today and will file the notice of hearing
Monday."
7. On the same day, Sheila ignored my response and said:

" ... The court clerk provided the

hearing date and told us we could set it for hearing ... "
8. On August 28, 2017, Cristine replies to me and says;

"Sorry, I had three different people

emailing me on this motion to reconsider, confirming that you got the date of Sept 2rf' at
3pm?"
9. I replied to Cristine and said"/ would be confused too with (3) different people emailing me! I
Page 2 of 3
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am the sole petitioner for the Notice of hearing, not Hawley-Troxell, IIB or any other party.
Please refer any other inquires to me directly ... ! understood that we wouldn't have enough
time on the 2dh, hence why I asked for the next date which you indicated would be
October ... Can you please call me@208-661-93 50 cell. Thank you."
10. Cristine then called me and stated that the other parties adding confusion were Sheila
Schwager and Tim Kurtz or Hawley-Troxell. Cristine then orally confirmed the date with
Judge Christensen that will work for the 1-1/2 hour to 2 hour time lot of October 24th at 2pm.
11. August 29, 2017, I emailed Cristine and stated; "Thank you/or scheduling the hearing date

today for Oct 24@ 2pm. I am filing the notice tomorrow and also an objection to the notice
date IIB filed yesterday. "

SUMMARY
Hawley-Troxell {HT) asked twice, on August 21st and 25 th if I wanted them to help me obtain a
hearing date. Both times I wrote them and said that I was fine working with the recorder's office
to get a date and would obtain and file the date as soon as I got it. I furthermore provided HT with
copies of email correspondence showing them I was truly working with the recorder's office. HT
ignored my responses, interfered, created confusion for the clerks office who was already overwhelmed and inadvertently scheduled a date that did not provide adequate time as communicated
by me to Cristine in prior emails.
DATED THIS 30th day of August, 2017.

~

~-

Marty Frantz - Declarant

EXHIBITS:
See Objection filing EXHIBIT A
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EXHIBIT G
FRANTZ/IIB STORY 15 MINUTE VIDEO
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Frantz Story
(June 2nd, 2017 Supreme Court Live Hearing Video Links)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 1 - SEND EMAIL TO: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
and request one-click link to Supreme Court Video hearing. You will
be sent the same links as described below in hyperlink format;
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 2 - SHORT VERSION OF FRANTZ HEARING COPY/PASTE THIS LINK
TO YOUR BROWSER;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBpT7NWNa6U&feature=youtu.be

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 3 - 52 MINUTE ENTIRE VERSION OF HEARING COPY/PASTE THIS
LINK TO YOUR BROWSER;
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7KfrBgn1tQ0OEFUaVdGTERjM00/view
OR;
1) IN YOUR BROWSER SEARCH BOX TYPE: Idaho Supreme Court Video Archive
2) CLICK ON THE LINK THAT SAYS: Idaho Supreme Court Hearings - Video Archive
3) UNDER Hearing Date, SCROLL DOWN TO June 2, 2017 and look for: Idaho
Independent Bank v. Frantz
4) On the right side of the page next to Idaho Independent Bank v. Frantz, click on
the Video link #44252

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
Idaho Independent Bank, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Marty D. Frantz, and Cindy M. Frantz,
Defendants.
---------------

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 2010--6088
MEMORANDUM
DECISION

The present issues before the Court arise post-judgment. After the Idaho Supreme
Court affirmed this Court's Order granting summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, selfrepresented Defendant Marty Frantz filed a motion for reconsideration and a motion for
mistrial. No motion was filed by Cindy Frantz. The hearing on the motion commenced
October 24, 2017 whereby the Court took the matter under advisement. For the reasons set
forth below the Court denies Defendant's motions.
I.

A.

ANALYSIS

Frantz's motion for reconsideration is denied because it would be futile to
grant an extension to f"de a claim of exemption that would not apply to the
levied property.

Whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within the court's

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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discretion. Watson v. Navistar Int'/ Transp. Corp., 121 Idaho 643, 650, 827 P.2d 656, 663
(1992). "A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment. A
motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry of final judgment must be made
within 14 days after entry of the order." I.R.C.P. 1 l(b)(l). The Court is bound to act in a
manner consistent with the applicable legal standards: Chapters 2, 6, and 7 of the Idaho
Code.
There were two assets sold at the sheriff's sale: (1) an administrative claim of the
Franzes-as judgment debtors-asserted against the bankruptcy estate in the amount of
$113,841.10 and (2) the appeal the Franzes-also as judgment debtors-filed in response to
orders issued by the Bankruptcy Court. (May 26, 2017 Kurtz Deel. ,r 5, Ex. D.).
In order to assert a claim of exemption upon levied property, claimants shall deliver
or mail the exemption form (see I.C. § 11-707) to the sheriff within 14 days after the date
the sheriff hand delivers or mails the requisite documents to the judgment debtor (see I.C.
§ 11-709). I.C. § ll-203(a). If the exemption forms are mailed, they must be received by
the sheriff within the same 14 day period. I.C. § 11-203(a). The Frantzes did not timely
assert a claim of exemption. Instead, Marty Frantz moved this Court for an Order granting
him an extension to file because, he argues, he did not timely receive properly addressed
notice, depriving him of a reasonable time to respond. (Defs.' Mot. Extend 1-2). Judge
Steve Verby presided over the hearing on the motion and subsequently issued a
memorandum decision stating:
After reviewing the applicable statutes, there seems to be no possible
exemption that would apply to the Frantzes' situation. Or, at least at this
juncture the Frantzes have failed to identify such a valid exemption even

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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when requested to do so during oral argument. It would be an exercise in
futility to allow an extension of time to file a claim of exemption when no
valid exemption applies.
(July 7, 2017 Mem. Decision & Order 4).
In their motion for reconsideration, Frantz identifies several exemptions contained
within 11 U.S.C. section 522 and Idaho Code section 11-604 he contends apply to the
property sold at the sheriff's sale. (Br. Supp. Mot. Reconsideration 11). Idaho Code section
11-604 provides:
(1) An individual is entitled to exemption of the following property to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of him and his dependents:
(a) benefits paid or payable by reason of disability or illness;
(b) money or personal property received, and rights to receive money or
personal property for alimony, support, or separate maintenance;
(c) proceeds of insurance, a judgment, or a settlement, or other rights
accruing as a result of bodily injury of the individual or of the wrongful
death or bodily injury of another individual of whom the individual was
or is a dependent; and
(d) proceeds or benefits paid or payable on the death of an insured, if the
individual was the spouse or a dependent of the insured.
(2) The phrase "property to the extent reasonably necessary for the support
of him and his dependents" means property required to meet the present and
anticipated needs of the individual and his dependents, as determined by the
court after consideration of the individual's responsibilities and all the
present and anticipated property and income of the individual, including that
which is exempt.

I.C. § 604. Frantz have failed to connect a provision within the Idaho code to either the
administrative claim or appeal. As to the Bankruptcy Code exemptions asserted by Frantz,
the Court is not aware of Idaho law permitting the Federal Bankruptcy Code's exemptions
to apply to a Sheriff's sale directed by an Idaho state court. Cf LC. § 11-602 ("Residents
of this state are entitled to the exemptions provided by this act.") (emphasis added).
Consequently, any extension would be as futile now as it was when Judge Verby issued his
decision. Thus, the motion is denied.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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B.

The Frantzes are not entitled to relief from judgment because they have failed
to show any reason that would, even in theory, justify relief.

"On a motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ... any [] reason that justifies relief."
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). "The decision to grant I.R.C.P. 60(b) relief is reviewed under an abuse
of discretion standard." Cummings v. Stephens, 160 Idaho 847, 850, 380 P.3d 168, 171
(2016). Specifically:
The decision will be upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly
perceived the issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its
discretion and consistent with the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached
its determination through an exercise of reason. Id "A determination under
Rule 60(b) turns largely on questions of fact to be determined by the trial
court." Those factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. "If the trial court applies the facts in a logical manner to the
criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping in mind the policy favoring
relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have acted within its
discretion."
Waller v. State Dep 't of Health & Welfare, 146 Idaho 234, 237-38, 192 P.3d 1058, 1061-

62 (2008) (internal citations omitted).
Franz contends that because Judge Verby acted as a mediator in a separate case
involving Mr. Roller and himself, Judge Verby could not rule on the post-judgment motion
and that the summary judgment issued by this Court (affirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court) should be vacated. (See Def.'s Mot. Mistrial & Vacation 7-10). Idaho Independent
Bank responds by pointing out that Mr. Roller was not discussed in the motion for
summary judgment, the memorandum decision on the motion for summary judgment, nor
is Mr. Roller referenced in the appeal from the Idaho Supreme Court affirming the postjudgment or the argument and decision concerning Judge Verby's decision on the sheriffs
sale. (Oct. 24, 2017 Hr'g at 2:42 p.m.). Idaho Independent Bank further argued that Mr.

MEMORANDUM DECISION
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Roller, if relevant at all, was only relevant to a fraud claim which was never heard in the
bankruptcy case (or any other case) because the Frantzes withdrew their bankruptcy
discharge thereby mooting the need for a fraud trial. (Id at 2:44). The Court agrees with
Idaho Independent Bank.
Frantz has failed to show, and has failed to assert cogent argument, that he was
prejudiced by Judge Verby's decision in the only portion of this entire case he was
involved in - deciding a post-judgment motion whereby Frantz requested the Court to
grant an extension beyond the statutory defined period, in order to file a claim of
exemption to a sheriff's sale that already occurred for property that would not have been
exempt. The Court is not persuaded that had a different judge heard the motion for an
extension, a different result would have been reached. That finding is buttressed by this
Court's reconsidering that very issue and finding no basis to grant the extension or modify
Judge Verby's decision.
II.

CONCLUSION

This Court finds no prejudice with respect to Judge Verby's involvement. This
Court holds the motion to reconsideration is without merit. Taken together, Frantz's
present motions are denied.

~

SO ORDERED this

(3 day ofNovember, 2017
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on t h e ~ day ofNovember, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Marty and Cindy Frantz
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

Sheila Schwager
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley, LLP
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

Conditional Order of Dismissal of Appeal (Non-Payment of Estimated Transcript Cost)

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 101 of 411
1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

2

--000--

3

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, AN IDAHO
CORPORATION,

4

Plaintiff/Counterd efendant/
Respondent,

5
6

7

SUPREME COURT NO.:
45655

vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, AN INDIVIDUAL,
AND CINDY M. FRANTZ, AN INDIVIDUAL,)

8

)

9

Defendants/Counte rclaimants/)
Appellant.
)

[l

COPY

10
11

TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL
12
13
14

FOR APPELLANT:

Marty D. Frantz and
Cindy M. Frantz, Pro Se

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT:

Hawley Troxell Ennis &
Hawley, LLP
By:
Sheila R. Schwager, Esq.
PO Box 1617
Boise, Idaho 83701

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
THE HONORABLE RICH CHRISTENSEN PRESIDING

23
24

25

1

I

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 102 of 411
TABLE OF CONTENTS

1
2
3

PROCEEDINGS:

4

October 24,

PAGE:
2017, Motion to Reconsider/Motion
for Mistrial

4

5

Reporter's Certificate

34

6
7
8

9

10
11

12
13

14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22

23
24
25

2

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 103 of 411
1
2

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO,

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
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9

10
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13
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PROCEEDINGS

2

3

--oOo-

3

Have a seat, Mr. Sturgell

I
I
I

THE COURT: The Court notes that you have this
notice for ADA accommodation, but this is -- being a

4

THE COURT:

4

civil matter, you are - you're not entitled to free

5

MR STURGELL: Thank you, your Honor

5

counsel in this matter You have chosen to represent

6

THE COURT: We are here on case No.

6

yourself and the Court notes that you have filed motions

7

CV-2010--6088 We need to get Ms. Schwager on the phone.

MR. STURGELL: Your Honor, is the

8

9

bookkeeping - I didn't know Ms. Schwager was going to

10 be here

7

before the Court and sees, you know, what you have

8

filed, so if you're seeking counsel, the Court cannot

9

grant you counsel in this case

10

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. STURGELL:

She is going to be on the phone
I was going to introduce myself

MR FRANTZ:

I am

- I am not seeking counsel.

11

I am

12

matters that I've been d iagnosed with in regard to my

seeking an interpreter, per se, to facilitate those

dyslexia And so I understand that there's a •· you

13

physically so she didn't mistake me for opposing

13

14

counsel.

14

know, there's a line somewhere where it becomes counsel

15

in terms of assisting. You know, I would like to be

15

THE COURT:

16

We'll get all t his on the record

MR STURGELL: Thank you, your Honor

16

provided that assistance up to that line, up to that

17

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr Frantz

17

point where it does not become - you know, where it's

18

MR. FRANTZ: Good afternoon.

18

not legal representation, because that's not what I'm

19

seeking.

19

(Phone conference being set up )

20
21

MS. SCHWAGER: This IS She ila.

20

THE COURT: Ms. Schwager, this is Judge

THE COURT: Then I'm -

I guess

I don't

21

understand, Mr Frantz. You're seeking -- you have

22

Christensen. We are in courtroom 4 on the case of Idaho

22

dyslexia Does that affect how you hear things? And

23

Independent Bank versus Frantz, et ux It's CV-10-6088,

23

I'm not being facetious or smart, sir I want you to

24

Kootenai County case. We are here on the motion. We'll

24

understand that. I'm trying to be as respectful as I

2.5

get to that soon

25

can here But your dyslexia affects your reading; is

1

that correct?

fl
I
I

Court,

October 24, 2017; 2:01 pm.
2

7
Bui so that you know, Ms Schwager,
2

Mr. Sturgell, the court assistance officer in Kootenai

2

MR FRANTZ: Yes. It affects a number of ways

3

County in the First District, has been appointed as a

3

that I am able to communicate Now one of them is

4

reader for Mr. Frantz, and he is in the courtroom. He

4

reading. However, when the Court directed lo provide a

5

is not acting as counsel. He 1s here as a reader. And

5

reader, I can read My tests show, the tests that I

6

Mr. Frantz is in the courtroom along with Mr. Sturgell

6

provided the administration's office, the trial court

7
8
9

MR. FRANTZ: Okay. Thank you very much, your
Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Frantz, this motion

7

administrator, they - I can read at a high school

8

level. It's the comprehension and understanding of

9

that - of that reading that I was diagnosed at a first

1 O has been set for a motion - this hearing time has been

10

grade level, and then other elements in communication

11

set for a hearing for reconsideration The Court sees

11

were - were diagnosed at a grade school level. So it's

12

that you filed another motion That is not timely filed

12

not a simple matter of having somebody sit and take a

13

and time for a hearing today So if you wish to go

13

piece of paper and read it to me because I have - am

14 forward on your motion for reconsideration, you may

14

perfectly capable of reading words on a piece of paper

15

15

at a high school level

MR. FRANTZ:

What I would like to do is

16

request a meeting in the judge's chamber in regard to

16

It's the comprehension and being able to , you

17

the ADA accommodation.

17

know, spit that information back out in an understanding

18

that is - that is the problem, according to the tests

19

that I have

18

THE COURT:

You have - you have -

19

Mr. Sturgell's been appointed here as a reader for you,

20

so we're not going to need chambers.

21

20

THE COURT:

You have filed a number of

(Discussion held between Mr Frantz and Mr.

21 extensive pleadings with the Court. Did you draft these

22

Sturgell.)

22

23

MR. FRANTZ:

24

Okay. So I am not looking for a

reader I'm looking for other kinds of accommodation

25 that I made in the ADA notice that I filed with the

23
24
25

pleadings, Mr. Frantz?
MR FRANTZ:

I did.

THE COURT

Okay The Court takes note of

those pleadings and notes that they have a - they
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1

follow in the sense of there's a process that - and a

1

2

read, so I don't know what you're seeking If you're

2

3

not seeking counsel and you're not seeking a reader. I

3

4

don't know what it is that you are seeking

4

5
6
7

MR. FRANTZ:

Can we go over those 17 points
I think you need to - I don't

8

know what you want I don't know what you're seeking by

8

this accommodation or request for accommodation It's

9

MS SCHWAGER. Boe,,_""' M .... "''""
THE COURT

So you're ready to hear the motion

MS. SCHWAGER:
THE COURT:

I am, your Honor.

Okay. Well, let's go there if

there's no objection You may go ahead, Mr. Frantz
MR FRANTZ:

I object on the basis that I am

11

not prepared for that, for that - to discuss that

12

area when - you know. when 1t comes to providing legal

12

motion.

13

counsel. I'm - and I understand that I - the Court

13

THE COURT:

The motion for mistrial?

14

cannot grant legal counsel, but somewhere in there

14

MR. FRANTZ:

I - oh, did she -- see. this --

15

there's - I believe that there - that there's a place

15 oh, I guess I'm misunderstanding things. Did she Just

MR. FRANTZ:

I understand that there is a gray

16 where I can receive assistance that the Court may not

16

say that she is prepared to do a motion for mistrial?
MR STURGELL:

She said she was prepared to do

interpret as legal counsel that would be accommodation

17

18

that would help resolve and - these issues, so I made a

18

a motion for a mistrial She also said that she wants

19

list of the 17 - of 17 requests and, you know, I'd like

19

to do the motion for reconsideration She doesn't want

20

you to just go over those requests

20

that taken off of the docket, okay? She wants finality.

17

21

The Judge said we can go there. We can go to the motion

22

have an hour, okay? And we are using - I just want you

22

for mistrial, and he's prepared to hear it today. He

23

to understand that's all we have today is an hour So

23

said-

24

if - and I still don't know - are you ready to

24

MR. FRANTZ:

25

proceed? You've written a brief on your motion to

25

MR. STURGELL:

21

THE COURT:

Well, you have - Mr Frantz, we

•'fl}

for mistrial?

10

1 O not legal counsel, you say

I

OIU!y

It

7

9

11

THE: COURT

5

6

that I listed?
THE COURT:

taken off calendar.

Okay.
- let's go there. which means

I

I
I

I
I
I
I

8
reconsideration. Are you ready to proceed on that?
2

MR FRANTZ:

I sat that aside for the motion

1

Jet's hear that, and Ms. Schwager said she's prepared to

2

do 11. She feels confident. So the Court is ready to

3

on the mistrial, and so I'm not prepared to proceed with

3

go to the motion for mistnal. But as I understood what

4

the reconsideration

4

Ms Schwager said. she doesn't want the motion for

5

reconsideration taken off, and I didn't hear the Judge

today, and then you can't just on your own come in and

6

say anything about that part of it.

7

say I don't want you to hear that motion, Court. I want

7

8

you to hear this motion and not give the requisite time,

8

9

so either we're proceeding on the motion lo reconsider

9

5
6

THE COURT:

That's what was noticed by you

THE COURT:

Let's hear your motion for

MR FRANTZ:

I would just like to make a note

mistrial.

10 that, you know. in regard to the ADA accommodation, that

1O today or we're not.

11

MR. FRANTZ:

What is the time?

11

I guess t don't - I - I don't understand where that

12

THE COURT:

It's 14 days.

12

all is and what is the procedure to - you know. for me

MR FRANTZ:

Fourteen days for a notice to -

13

to go forward with those 17 items that I was asking for

13
14

lo change the - the - to do what? 1- so if I would

15 have done that 14 days ago. then we could have discussed
16
17

!hat. the mistrial today: is that correct?
THE COURT:

Perhaps I want to hear from

14

I think in that request I - when I looked at

15

some of the protocol, I looked at what Colorado did and

16

Colorado had the - had - Mr. Sturgell's office would

17

go to a third-party ADA organization and work that out,

18

Ms. Schwager You wish to be heard on any of this

18

so I - that's - and I - and I mentioned that in

19

Ms Schwager, at this time?

19

there. I just need some direction as to what am I

20

supposed - where do I go with this? Because I'm a

20

MS SCHWAGER: That would be great, your

21

Honor. And I'm actually okay - except that the Court

21

little bit uncomfortable knowing what I can expect here

22

doesn't have the benefit of being able to have the time

22

as far as help from Jay, from Mr Sturgell here. and it

23

to review perhaps Mr. Frantz's motion, but I am fine

23

seems like I have not communicated to you,

24

addressing it as well as the motion for reconsideration.

24

as your understanding of what I can have Mr Sturgell do

25

I would object to the motion for reconsideration being

25

and not do.

Judga, as far

I

I

..I
I
I
I
I
I
I
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1
2

THE COURT:

the Idaho Supreme Court personally; is that correct?

3
4

MR FRANTZ.

I did have my wife address the

supreme court, but not me personally but my wife

5
6

Mr. Frantz, you have argued before

THE COURT:

1

And your wife is a - she's a

141

Okay. So do you wish to make any .

2

further argument? The Court has read your motion for

3

mistrial. Do you wish to make any further argument?

4

defendant in this case as -well

THE COURT:

MR. FRANTZ:

Yes, I do

5

THE COURT:

Go ahead

6

MR. FRANTZ:

Okay. So can I - I'd like to go

7

MR. FRANTZ.

She is

8

THE COURT:

Okay. And she's not here today.

8

THE COURT:

9

MR FRANTZ:

She did not sign this, this

9

MR FRANTZ: Okay Okay. So in this

10

motion for mistrial She's -- I don't believe she is -

11

she can be here without having signed this.

12
13

THE COURT:

10

Okay. And it was you who signed

these documents that you've submitted to the Court

14

MR FRANTZ:

Yes

15

THE COURT:

Okay And did you draft these

16

documents to the Court?

17

MR FRANTZ:

18

THE COURT: Okay. The Court notes that the -

19

7

Yes

Now's the time to argue

particular case, in around November of 2016, Attorney

11

Steve Verby acted in the capacity of lawyer/mediator for

12

case No 11 - CV-11-6420 in Frantz versus Roelier.

13

That case was a sister case of this case that we're in

14

today, so they both had to do with Idaho Independent

15

Bank. Idaho Independent Bank had depositions with

16

Mr Roeller in regard to this case

17

Mr. Frantz has provided legal pleadings, legal documents

ahead and review some of this material

And so what happened is -- is Mr. - or

18

Steve - Attorney Steve Verby last year, in around

19

November was the mediator, ended up being the mediator

20

to the Court by way of a motion, by way of declarations,

20

under his private license to mediate that case And so

21

and by way of - I believe there was a memorandum as

21

that -- I think that lasted - that mediation was

22

well.

23

And the Court notes that to the extent that

22

approximately - it lasted for a day, and then it also

23

continued with some phone calls afterward, but there was
no settlement made.

24

Mr. Frantz had requested assistance in understanding the

24

--I

25

matters before him, that he has dyslexia, and that he -

25

I
I
I

But Mr. Verby became familiar - Attorney

13
that the Court has provided Mr. Sturgell here to not

Verby became very familiar with the case, with the 11B

2

provide legal assistance, as he is not entitled to a

2

case. So -- so when he substituted in for this case, I

3

legal counsel, appointed legal counsel, but here to help

3

had - one of the - you know, one of the symptoms of

4

him understand the proceedings by - as being a reader,

4

dyslexia is that there is short-term memory loss with

5

and Mr. Sturgell repeated to Mr. Frantz just several

5

regard to names and recognition, and so my - and it's

6

minutes ago what defense counsel - or plaintiff's

6

important to note that my wife was not in that mediation

7

counsel had stated and that the Court has stated. And

7

back in November of 2016, so she had never met Mr. --

8

therefore the Court finds that reasonable accommodation

8

Attorney Vertly, and so at the hearing that we had, that

9

has been made to Mr Frantz for these motions. So with

1O that, Mr. Frantz, are you ready to proceed with your
11

motion for mistrial?

9

he substituted for you, Judge, my wife didn't recognize

10

him She had never seen him before I looked at him

11

and there seemed to be a little bit of familiarity, but

12

(Discussion held between Mr Frantz and Mr

12

I didn't know where from.

13

Sturgell.)

13

14

THE COURT: Mr Frantz, do you wish the Court

And so, you know, we proceeded with the case,

14

and it was - it wasn't until the end of September in

15

to rule on the motion for mistrial based upon what you

15

2017, well after I had filed a reconsideration, that it

16

have presented to the Court?

16

started - kept rolling around in my brain, and I

17

thought, you know what, there is some connection there

18

somewhere, and I - and I finally went and it dawned on

17
18
19
20

MR. FRANTZ:

There is -- there is one more

document that I would - that I would like lo submit
THE COURT: The time is - it's a timing
thing, Mr Frantz You understand today you came ready

19

me and that I wonder if he was - could be the guy that

20

had mediated our case and become familiar with our case,

21

to argue this? You need to let me know whether you're

21

and so I went and talked to Mari< Jackson, who actually

22

going to argue it, or we're just going to take it on

22

was -- wor1<ed with - with Verby, the private attorney
in that mediation

23

what you've submitted, and I will allow plaintiffs

23

24

counsel lo address the matter orally

24

And, of course, he confirmed that it was the

25

same person and that - and that Judge Verby was the

25

MR. FRANTZ: Let's go ahead and proceed.
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same as Attorney Verby who was working on - worl<ing on

mistrial, okay? We've gotten a little far afield

2

the case that was essentially the same material as this

2

You're talking about some other cases Let's deal with

3

case.

3

the motion for mistrial as to what you see - you wish

4

to argue to the Court on this motion in this case

4

As a matter of fact, I don't know if it would

5

have been necessary for me to even file this case if ii

5

6

weren't for the remarks that were made in deposition by

6

make is that this is not the first time this has

7

this Roeller, and hence the reason why I filed

7

happened I recently have been diagnosed with dyslexia

8

litigation against Roeller.

9

So that's the background as far as, you know,

1O how things proceeded to this point And so my wife was

MR FRANTZ:

Okay So the point I wanted to

8

That's - part of this deal is name recognition and it

9

happened before. and I was polygraphed, and I did pass

10

the polygraph test. So I just want to state that while
it sounds unreasonable for a normal person to forget

11

not aware of the connection between private Attorney

11

12

Verby and Judge Verby until approximately the end of

12

something like that or not recall it, for a dyslexic, it

13

September when I went and had a meeting with Marl<

13

is not un-normal It's normal. It's the - it's the

14

Jackson to confirm these facts.

14

norm to have short-term memory lapse for name

15

recognition

15

Now, I understand that, you know, that

16

these - that these kind of situations, you know, may

16

17

sound, you know, skeptic or whatever, you know, as far

17

So I just want to express to the Court
sincerely that if I had known that - if I had recalled,

18

as, you know, how can - you know, how can somebody not

18

I certainly would have - would have brought the matter

19

recall a face or a name, so I'm going to again refer to

19

up as immediately when I recognized what was going on

20

the fact that I have been diagnosed, you know, with

20

that there was this conflict

21

dyslexia and that that is one of the symptoms of it,

21

22

is - is recognition. name recognition.

22

23

I'd also like to bring up the fact that this

1 also would like to note - excuse me. I have
a little bit of a cold , so - I'd also hke to note that

23

on August 30th, this is a email that I submitted to the
Court for this mistrial It's a - dated Wednesday,

24

is not the first time that I've had a recognition

24

25

problem with a - you know, where there was a conflict

25

August 23rd, 2017. And in that email, I was asking the

I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

17
Court scheduler Kathy Booth, who was actually not there,

of interest in the - in the federal court In the
2

federal court case, which is also referenced in this

2

it was another gal, but the email says. when I was

3

motion on page 5 where it talks about the lower federal

3

trying to schedule the reconsideration hearing, the

4

court case, the Court case No. 11-21337TLM , that in that

4

email says, from - from the scheduler says, "For two or

5

court case , there was also a situation where down -

5

three hours we would have to go to late October. Judge

6

after we had proceeded with proceedings for some time,

6

Luster will be" filing - or "filling in quite a bit

7

that there was a - circumstances happened where I was

7

over the next few months. Does it matter if he hears

8

cleaning out my house and I found a receipt from Hawley

8

this hearing?"

9

Troxell, and in that - which triggered my memory that I

9

10

had actually hired them to worl< on a case for me, the

1o the most familiar with this case history and then Judge

And so my answer was, "Judge Christensen is

11

same case that was part of this case, and there was

11

Verby. If we can get one of them, we can likely keep it

12

enough evidence in that that we actually did proceed

12

to one and a half to two hours What date in October,

13

with - you know, with a motion to disqualify in that

13

you know, are you looking at?"

14

particular case, because it seemed so unusual that

14

So at this lime, that was August 23rd, I had

15

somebody like me, someone who is a successful

15

no conscious idea, you know, that there was a conflict,

16

businessman , and I am a very successful businessman and

16

and I had even requested either yourself or Verby - or

17

have been for over three and a half decades with a

17

Judge Verby al that time. It wasn't until the following

18

spotless record, you know, how could it possibly be that

18

month that it kept woliling on me until I finally - it

19

I could not recall that Hawley Troxell had - had

19

finally came up to the surface and I said, I got to

20

actually been a law firm for me It was only a couple

20

check this out. There's something -· there's some

21

of years prior. And so at that point I had - you know,

21

connection going on here, and that is - you know, and

22

I had actually went out and had a polygrapher polygraph

22

that's when I actually became conscious of that

23

me and ask me the question

23

information.

24
25

THE COURT:

I appreciate what you're saying

here, Mr Frantz, but let's go back to your motion for

24
25

So the - so as far as the actual, you know.
legalities of this case. the - according to these - to

I

I

..I
I
I

I
I
I
I

--I
I
I
I
I

I
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1

this case law, it doesn't matter if Judge Verby didn't

2

recognize me, and I presume that he didn't or he would

2

3

have said something He obviously wouldn't have

3

4

recognized my wife because she was - she had never met

4

5

him and he had never met her

5

But according to the case law study that I

6

22

time over to opposing counsel
THE COURT:

Ms Schwager, you wish to be

MR. FRANTZ:

Thank you, your Honor. Am I

heard?
coming through okay?

6

THE COURT: Yes.

7

MR. FRANTZ:

7

found, the - you know, even though Judge Verby, not

8

having remembered anything about his private work on

8

loud. But, your Honor, in the mistrial motion, the

9

case No. 11 - CV-11-6420, and therefore no impartiality

9

defendants make a simple argument They contend that

10

Judge Verby previously acted as a mediator in a separate

10 would exist, and the fact that Judge Verby is pure in

Okay. And let me know if I'm too

11

heart and incredible, it doesn't matter for the purposes

11

case with another individual, Mr Roeller and

12

of the code. The code is very specific and the judge's

12

Mr. Frantz, and therefore they contend that Judge Verby

13

forgetfulness is not the sort of objectivity or

13

could not rule on the post-judgment motion that is at

14

assertible fact that can be avoided in the appearance of

14

issue today for reconsideration.

15

impartiality, so that's ,n Hall in Small Business

15

16 Administration, a 1983.

They also attempt to contend that because

16

Judge Verby issued the post-judgment sheriffs sale
decision against them in this case, that it means the

17

So the Verby facts create precisely the kind

17

18

of appearance of impropriety in 455(a) that was - that

18

defendants can vacate the entry of the summary judgment

19 was intended to prevent, you know, the violation as

19

issued by this court which was affirmed by the Idaho

20

neither insubstantial nor excusable.

20

Supreme Court, which, of course, is not the law And

21

THE COURT:

21

although, your Honor, there are many, many problems with

22

the defendant's argument, the easy response to the

22

I want to just say something,

Mr Frantz.

23

MR FRANTZ:

Yes.

23

mistrial motion is that Mr. Roeller has never been an

24

THE COURT:

I have read what you've presented

24

issue in any pleading filed in this case, which can

25

easily be determined by reviewing the summary judgment

1

pleadings filed by both 118 and the defendants, as well

25

to me, okay?

21
2

MR. FRANTZ:

Okay

THE COURT:

And I feel that you're reading it

23
2

as the corresponding declarations, this court's judgment

3

to me and I've already read it. Is there some other

3

and memorandum decision on the summary judgment, and the

4

parts of the argument that you want to make that you

4

Idaho Supreme Court decision that affirmed the judgment

5

have not made in your brief in the motion?

5

None of those pleadings discuss Mr. Roeller

6
7
8
9

MR FRANTZ: Well, let me review that
appreciate what you're saying
THE COURT:

I can tell you this, Mr Frantz.

we are running out of time, okay?

10

MR FRANTZ:

11

Okay So one of the elements that the case

12

Okay

6

Further, none of the pleadings addressing the

7

sheriffs sale nor Judge Verby's decision references

8

Mr. Roeller, In fact, the testimony that was elicited

9

from Mr Roeller, which was only relevant to a fraud

10

trial in the bankruptcy court, has never been heard by

11

any court, because shortly before the fraud trial was to

law said that needed to be looked at was how many other

12

commence against the defendants, they withdrew their

13

court cases that this affected, so I - I won't go over

13

discharge, mooting the need for fraud trial Thus, as

14

that. I've already stated that, but I'd just like to

14

has happened often

15

point out that there were three other court cases, one

15

simply a fabrication and a delay tactic which is readily

16

that's already been decided as a result of the outcome,

16

apparent by a review of the pleadings in this case.

17

and then also one other element that the case law said

17

18

that needed to be looked at was misconduct by Idaho

18

in

this case, the contentions are

Further, your Honor, I would submit that the
legal authority does not support the defendant's

19

Independent Bank. l\•e already stated those - that

19

position To the contrary, the legal authority holds

20

information in here. As far as the - another factor

20

that a judge's participation in prior legal proceedings

21

was the impact on the public as far as a public interest

21

involving related parties or issues is not grounds for

22

and where this thing might have impact on the public,

22

disqualification, and there is another case that held

23

and I addressed that issue here.

23

that even when the judge had acted as counsel on a case

24

So I'd like to reserve some time for a closing

25 argument if I can And other than that, I can turn the

24

which then the Judge later became a judge on, where he

25

did not act as counsel on the issue before the Court, he
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1

was not disqualified from hearing the motion And this,

2

your Honor, is set forth in Stevens versus Hall, which

2

3

is located at B Idaho 549 and Samuel versus Hepworth,

3

know, certainly his - his demeanor would have been

4

134 Idaho B4. And, your Honor, if I could -

4

influenced by what he experienced at that mediation, and

THE COURT:

5
6

MS. SCHWAGER:
THE COURT:

No, just if you're giving a

citation.

11

MS. SCHWAGER:

12

THE COURT:

13

MS SCHWAGER:

14

I'm sorry And am I speaking

too fast?

9
10

What's that Samuel versus Hepworth

case again?

7
8

11B.

It's 134 Idaho 84

Thank you
You're welcome. And, your

So now we move into the levy case and, you

5

I pointed out that that mediation was not settled

6

That's anolher thing that mediation attorneys don't

7

like They like to have a reputation of being able to

8

resolve these issues. He was not able to resolve the

9

issue. He did not have - go away with a good taste in

10

his mouth because it wasn't settled, and then it brought

11

up a whole bunch of accusations and things about me that

12

were very disparaging. The actual case that -where

13

I've countersued Roeller --

Honor, if I could, I would like to try to briefly

14

THE COURT:

We're on rebuttal now, okay?

15

address the motion for reconsideration that is before

15

MR. FRANTZ:

Okay

16

the Court today I do not want to, you know, further

16

THE COURT:

So what do you have to rebut

17

delay. The first objection that Mr. - or that the

17

18

defendants filed against the sheriff's sale was in May

18

19

of 2016, so we're almost six months past the initial

19 prejudiced by the disparaging manner of the Roeller case

20

objection date, and I believe that if he withdraws the

20

and that was -- directly involved 11B. tike any

21

motion for reconsideration and doesn't move forward with

21

reasonable person would be influenced by that

22

it today, that he would be untimely to proceed with it

22

23

later, so if we could argue it today, I would appreciate

23

this 134 - Idaho '84 case

24

it

24

THE COURT:

Well, Mr. -

25

MR FRANTZ

So I -

THE COURT:

It - you did not file in a timely

25

THE COURT:

Well, we'tl see I WIii give -

I

Ms Schwager's argument?
MR. FRANTZ:

That the judge was reasonably

And then I would like to understand more about

I

I
I

I
I
I
I

25
2
3

thank you. Mr Frantz, as to the motion for mistrial.

1

any rebuttal?

2

MR. FRANTZ:

Yes. So the -- with regard to

manner so didn't have the lime to reply for the brief,

3

so I'm not going to grant you a continuance on this
matter So do you have anything else in rebuttal? And

4

the Roeller case, opposing counsel told me that they

4

5

could use the Roeller in this case if they wanted to,

5

I'll tell you, Mr Frantz, we are going to get to the

6

and I think they could. So when she says that it's not

6

motion for reconsideration. You're limiting your lime.

7

a relevant factor, the issue is what did - you know,

7

You're going to have about ten minutes to argue it -

8

what did Judge Verby or private Attorney Verby learn

8

your motion to reconsideration, okay? So don't take

9

from that case that might sway his opinion in regard to

9

away more time than that that you need.

this case? And --

10

10

(Discussion held between Mr. Frantz and Mr

11

THE COURT:

On the issue -

11

Sturgell)

12

MR FRANTZ:

- on -

12

THE COURT:

13

THE COURT:

- of the exemption, because

13

14

that's all Judge Verby ruled on

14

Anything else on the motion for

mistrial, Mr Frantz?
MR. FRANTZ:

No, Judge. I don't believe so

THE COURT:

Okay The Court has heard the

15

MR. FRANTZ:

That's correct That's correct

15

16

THE COURT:

Okay. You're saying a fraud case

16

arguments of the parties and the argument of Mr Frantz

that had been filed previously affected Judge Verby's

17

and the argument of counsel for Idaho Independent Bank

18

decision in a motion for extension of time to claim an

18

I'm going to take this matter under consideration. I

19

exemption?

19

will issue an order on it subsequently

17

20

MR FRANTZ:

Well, what I'm saying is that -

20

Okay So we are at the motion for

21

is that his disposition in regard to, you know, who -

21

reconsideration. I want to reiterate to Mr. Frantz and

22

you know, who might be at fault in this thing was

22

to counsel that I have reviewed the submissions in this

23

tainted by the fact that - that he leamed about all

23

case on the hearing for - Mr. Frantz has made a

24

these other issues that came up in that - in that fraud

24

to reconsider Judge Verby's decision in denying

25

case, would taint anybody's view of the case regarding

25

Mr Frantz's motion to extend the time for exemption

motion

I

I

I

..I
I
I
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1

Are you listening, Mr Frantz, or are you talking?

2
3

1

notified as to the -- as to the sheriffs sale and that
the notification was improper.

MR. FRANTZ:

Go ahead, Judge

2

THE COURT:

Okay While the Court's talking,

3

please pay attention, okay? I am slating that I have

4

issues. You know, you know, again, this is - so

5

read all the submissions in this matter. So,

5

anyway, I would just refer to that, refer to those

6

Mr. Frantz, you have ten minutes to make oral argument

6

comments that I made about the - that there was

7

on this matter if you wish to do so.

7

improper - that there was not proper notice I never

MR FRANTZ:

9

Can I be provided with a copy of

that reconsideration request?

10

THE COURT:

No. It is your duty to come

11

prepared today, Mr Frantz. It is not the Court's -

12

the Court's not here to provide these matters to you.

8

knew about the situation, so I would tum the time over

9

to opposing counsel.

10
11
12

13 will allow you, if you wish, to come and look at the

13

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Frantz.

Ms. Schwager, you wish to be heard?
MS SCHWAGER:

Thank you, your Honor. Am I

coming through okay?

I

14
16

reconsideration request so I can refresh my memory

16

addressed the issues that have been raised by the

I
I
I

17

don't have a copy with me today

17

defendants and wlll rely on our briefing which was filed

18

on August 24th

--I

15

MR FRANTZ:

18

THE COURT:

No, I'd like a copy of my

You are taking away your own time,

14

THE COURT: Yes. We can hear you

15

MS. SCHWAGER.

Okay. Okay I will- I have

19

Mr. Frantz. The Court does not have that file before

19

20

it.

20

Court's attention, and that is in the briefing the

21

defendants argue that a bankruptcy court order was

21

Oh, wait a minute. The record will reflect

But there is one matter to bring to the

22

the Court is having the bailiff hand the defendant,

22

necessary in order to proceed with the sheriffs sale.

23

Mr. Frantz, his brief, his memorandum in this matter on

23

And we set forth in our briefing why that was incorrect,

24

the motion for reconsideration.

25

MR FRANTZ: There should be a response motion

for reconsideration. I don't see that in here
2

3
4

I
I
I
I
I

file. Are you asking for Judge Verby's decision?

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

MR STURGELL:

This is your motion for

reconsideration.
MR FRANTZ. And then the bank - and then
the -- IIB did their response and then I did a response
MR. STURGELL:

Brief in support of your

motion, declarations.
MR FRANTZ:

THE COURT: Are you asking for your own reply,
Mr Frantz?
MR. FRANTZ:

Yes. I -

12

THE COURT: You're taking your own lime, sir.

13

MR FRANTZ:

14

THE COURT. Well, this was your setting,

15
16

I don't know how to proceed.

Mr Frantz, okay?
MR. FRANTZ:

24

but then also Mr Frantz filed with the bankruptcy court

25

recently a motion objecting to the withdrawal of the

1

administrative claim , which we did based upon the

2

sheriffs sale. And in that objection to the

29

31

3

withdrawal, he had made many of the same arguments that

4

he has made before this court in the motion for

5

reconsideration, that a bankruptcy court order was

6

necessary in order to proceed with the sheriffs sale.

7
It's not here.

Judge, I was not aware of the

Judge Myers rejected that argument, and on

8

September 18th, 2017, entered an order granting 11B's

9

withdrawal of the debtor's administrative claim and

10

orally ruled !hat no bankruptcy court order was

11

necessary for that execution. So I just wanted to bring

12

that to the Court's attention, which is all, of course,

13

in bankruptcy case No 11-21337, and this court can take

14

judicial notice. But other than that, l believe we have

15

addressed all of the issues that have been raised by the

16

defendants, and I appreciate that the Court has already

17

14-day requirement and it was not objected to. I

17

reviewed everything.

18

received no objection

18

19

THE COURT:

We have heard that argument

19

THE COURT: Okay Thank you. So, Mr. Frantz,
any rebuttal as lo what counsel said?

20

already We've heard the motion to mistnal You have

20

21

noticed up for this day this motion. You're either

21

of any statements by Judge Myers in that report that

22

withdrawing the motion today or we're hearing the motion

22

said that that was necessary. Now, he did rule in JIB's

23

today, so go ahead. You've got about five minutes.

MR FRANTZ:

My rebuttal is that rm not aware

23

favor, but that was based upon the - Judge Verby's

Okay. So the - I think the

24

order, you know, granting the - you know, granting that

25 bottom line on this whole levy issue was that I was not

25

request, so that would be my --

24

MR FRANTZ:

!

I recall there are a number of other - other

4

8

30i
i

l
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1

MS SCHWAGER: Your Honor.

2

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Did you not

3

hear that, Ms Schwager?

4

MS SCHWAGER

5

THE COURT: Okay All right. Go ahead,

6

I did

Mr. Frantz

7

MR FRANTZ:

So that would be my rebuttal.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR FRANTZ: That would be 11

10
11

MS SCHWAGER:

Can I just make one comment,

your Honor?

12
13

THE COURT

I think we're done with argument

right now

14

MS SCHWAGER:

15

THE COURT: Okay We're done.

16

MS. SCHWAGER:

Sure. But in response - okay
Thank you, your Honor. No

17

problem I was just going to supplement the record of

18

the judge's oral ruling.

19
20

I

THE COURT: Okay. All right The Court has
reviewed the submissions of counsel and of Mr Frantz

21

and counsel, and has heard the arguments of both parties

22

in this matter, and the Court will take this matter,

23

this motion for reconsideration under advisement at this

24

time and issue a - either a written ruling or may call

25

the parties for just issuing an oral ruling from the

1

bench, but we'll do one or the other. So with that,

2

anything else today, Ms. Schwager?

I
I
I
I
I
I
I

33

3

MS. SCHWAGER: Your Honor, does the Court want

4

the oral rulings that Judge Myers made in the

5

bankruptcy?

6
7
8

THE COURT: No. All the submissions were to
be made at this time. so ..
MS SCHWAGER:

Okay. No problem, your Honor.

9

THE COURT:

10

MS SCHWAGER:

11

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, Counsel. And

12

Anything else today?
No, your Honor

thank you, Mr. Frantz

13

MS. SCHWAGER: Thank you, your Honor.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR FRANTZ:

16
17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

And Thank you

THE COURT: - so we are - well, as stated,
the Court will take those matters under advisement.

MR FRANTZ: Thank you
MR . STURGELL: Your Honor, permission to
approach the clerk?
THE COURT:

You may.

(Proceedings adjourned )

I
I
I
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STATE OF IDAHO

2

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

SS:

3

4

I, Keri Veare,

a notary public and duly

5

certified court reporter in and for the State of Idaho,

6

DO HEREBY CERTIFY:

7

8
9

That the foregoing proceedings was taken on the
date and at the time and place herein stated;
That the foregoing is a true and correct
to the best of my ability,

of my shorthand

10

transcription,

11

notes taken down at said time and place in the

12

above-entitled litigation;

13

I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not related to any

14

of the parties or attorneys to this litigation and have

15

no interest in the outcome of said litigation.

16
17

IN WITNESS WHEREOF,

I have hereunto set my hand

and seal dated this 16th day of February,

2018.

18
19

20
21

KERI VEARE, CSR 675, CRR,
Official Court Reporter

22
23
24
25

34
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: himartyfrantz@gmail.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUTP CY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
(Boise)

In re:
MARTIN
D.
FRANTZ
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ,

and

CaseNo. 11-21337-TLM
Chapter 7

Debtor

2nd OBJECTION TO TRUSTEE INTERIM DISTRIBUTION
(Doc No. 768 & 770) FOR ROELLER $183,683.65 CLAIM #9
STATE COURT SETTLEMENT & DISMISSAL

Marty Frantz, hereby objects to Trustee's interim distribution (Doc No. 768 & 770) for
Roeller Claim #9 ($183,683.65) #9 / State Court Settlement & Dismissal.

2 nd OBJECTION TO DISTRIBUTION FOR ROELLER CLAIM

Page 1 of 4
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BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
1.

Frantz provided a Purchase & Sale agreement, executed by Roeller and referred to in
EXHIBIT A, to Idaho Independent Bank (IIB) for the purpose of inducing the bank
to lend money secured by 104 acres at Twin Lakes. Later, Roeller, under oath, stated
to IIB that the P&S agreement he had executed to transfer/sell his interest in the land
to Frantz was not the correct true and binding agreement and did not remove his
interests/ownership in the 104 acres.

2. Emboldened by Roell er' s allegations,

IIB filed adversarial proceedings against

Frantz in this Chapter 7 case #11-21337-TLM.

As a result of the IIB land

transfer/sale allegations, Roeller became a creditor in the Frantz Chapter 7 Estate by
filing claim #9 in the amount of $183,683.65. However, Frantz lost his "standing"
in the Roeller case and his affirmative defenses against IIB when he filed Chpt 7 and
could not pursue IIB or Roeller.
3. To regain "standing" in his cases against Roeller & IIB, Frantz filed a waiver of
discharge in the Chpt 7 case. The IIB adversarial proceedings and Roeller case then
became the jurisdiction of the State Civil court and Frantz regained his "standing" to
continue pursuing these cases.
4. Frantz preceded against IIB in State court CV-10-6088 and Roeller in State court case
# CV 11-6420. Frantz asserted Roeller's statements to IIB were untrue and that his

$183,683.65 claim #9 in the Frantz Chpt 7 Estate was invalid.

See attached

declaration of Marty Frantz in EXIBIT B which is a true and correct copy.
5. During the course of the Roeller/Frantz State Civil court case #CV 11-6420
proceedings, the court sanctioned Roeller three different times and awarded attorney
fees on each of those sanctions to Frantz' s attorney which Roell er paid.
6. Then a week before trial,

on November 17, 2017, Roell er dropped his entire

$183,683.65 claim amount, recanted his statement about Frantzs representation to IIB
and requested a dismissal with prejudice. In the settlement approved by the State
Court Judge, Roeller stipulated to fact stating that Frantz "correctly represented to
IIB the true and binding purchase and sale agreement". The Settlement Agreement
and Dismissal is attached as EXHIBIT A which is a true and correct copy.
2 nd OBJECTION TO DISTRIBUTION FOR ROELLER CLAIM

Page 2 of 4
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WHEREFORE, Marty Frantz respectfully objects to Trustee's Interim distribution to
Roeller Claim #9 ($183,683.65) .

DATED THIS 27th day ofNovember, 2017.

ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT A- Roellers State Court Approved Settlement & Dismissal With Prejudice
EXHIBIT B - Frantz Declaration

2 nd OBJECTION TO DISTRIBUTION FOR ROELLER CLAIM
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Marty Frantz, certify as follows:

On November 27, 2017, I mailed by United States Postal

Service, postage prepaid, the foregoing document to the following and also sent an email with
attachments of the same to;

Attn: David P. Gardner
Winston & Cashatt Lawyers
250 Northwest Blvd, Suite 206-B
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Email: dpg@winstoncashattcom

~

D ::{A

MARTYDFRAN TZ

2nd OBJECTION TO DISTRIBUTION FOR ROELLER CLAIM

(

\
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EXHIBIT A

• ROELLER DROPS STATE COURT CLAIM AND DISMISSES WITH
PREJUDICE
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MARK A. JACKSON
MARK A. JACKSON, P.A.
110 Waflace Ave.
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 664-3626
Facsimile: (208) 666-0550
ISB #3134

.· -•--v r~

~ a, ,fl

··GIJ£~~-IfCl\fllJi_ .

·---·

Attorney for Defendants

~

!.. ·; ......-.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
DIRK ANDREW ROELLER, et al,

Plaintiffs,

Case No. CV 11-6420
ORDER RE: SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL

vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, et al,

Defendants.

The undersigned having reviewed the Stipulated Settlement
Agreement and Dismissal of Case, executed by the parties and/or their
counsel, and for good cause appearing, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the court hereby approves the terms of
the Settlement Agreement Terms, attached and Incorporated hereto, and the
above entitfed case Is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with each party
bearing their own costs. The trial scheduled for November 27-29, 2017 is
vacated. The Settlement Agreement Terms attached hereto shall be binding
upon the parties.
Dated this

,1~ day of-November, 2017.

Honoraoe Lansing L. Haynes

ORDER RE: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL - 1

.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the~ day of November, 2017, I served a
true and correct copy of the within and foregoing document, by causing it to
be delivered as follows:
Mark A. Jackson
MARK A. JACKSON, P.A.
110 Wallace Avenue
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Fax No. 666-0550

Lvmo.1P: ma,.e,.k..@ mtt-t ~ 'ci,c,fJ.oon lcu.J. Cw;
.,1.

(/

Malled to:
Dirk Roerler
449 E. 900 N
Orem, UT 84097

JIM BRANNON,
CLERK OF COURT

By:~bh~

ORDER RE: SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL - 2
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MARK A. JACKSON
MARK A. JACKSON, P.A.
110 Wallac e Ave.

Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
Telephone: (208) 664-3 626
Facslmlle: (208) 666-0 550
ISB #3134
Attorn ey for Defen dants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDIO AL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOT
ENAI

DIRK ANDREW ROELLER, et al,
Plalntlffs,

Case No. CV 11-64 20

STIPULATED SETTLEMENT

AGREEMENT AND DISMI SSAL OF

vs.

CASE

MARTY D. FRANTZ, et al,
Defendants.
COMES NOW the Plalntlffs, by and throug h Dirk Roeller, prose
, and
the Defen dants , by and throug h their attorn ey, Mark A. Jacks
on, of MARK A.
JACKSON, P.A., and hereb y move s the court to appro ve the
Settle ment
Agree ment Terms , attach ed and Incorporated hereto , and to
dismis s the
above entftle d case wfth prejud ice, with each party bearin g their
own costs.
The trial scheduled for Novem ber 27-29 , 2017 shall be vacate
d. The partie s
agree to be bound by the Settle ment Agree
nt Terms attach hereto .
DATED this 17 day qf Novem ber, 201 •

-------

Dirk Roell er, Pia lntfff

STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF CASE
- 1

l
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STATE OF

\M\\C

County of

'lUJ\tJ\1)\

)

ss.
)

On this i]_ day of November, 2017, before me, the undersigned
Notary Public In and for sald state, personally appeared Dirk Roeller,
personally known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument, and acknowledged to me that .,he executed the same.
WITNESS my hand and official seat.

STIPULATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND DISMISSAL OF CASE - 2

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 122 of 411

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT TERMS

DEFENDANT'S COURT DOCUMENTS
Defendants, Frantz, agree to keep all discovery court documents in the proceedings
private and shall not disclose those documents or copies to any other party without the
express written consent of the Plaintiff (Roeller) or, unless responding to a court subpoena
or government inquiry.

PLAINTIFF STIPULATION OF FACT

Plaintiff (Roeller) stipulates that the Defendant correctly represented to Idaho
Independent Bank the true and binding purchase and sale agreement dated May 5, 2005
of approximately 104 acres at Twin Lakes for the price of $1,117,000 and closed by
North Idaho Title October 17:. 2005.

MUTUAL NON-DISPARAGEMENT
The parties will not disparage, denigrate or discredit or seek to harm the reputation of any other
Party in relation to this dispute or Settlement to any third parties and to refrain from expressing
(or causing others to express) any derogatory or negative opinions, comments, statements, or any

other action of such a nature. Following the execution of this agreement, the parties mutually
agree to not engage in any conduct which is either intended to or could reasonably be expected to
hann the other party.

The Defendant (Frantz) agrees to have no contact with Idaho

Transportation Department with regard to plainti:trs matters and Plaintiff (Roeller) agrees to have
no contact with Idaho Independent Bank with regard to the Defendant matters. Notwithstanding
the above, nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as prohibiting the Parties from providing
truthful testimony, responding to a subpoena, or cooperating with any court or government
Offi\,;hlb.
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EXHIBIT B
• FRANTZ DECLARATION
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUPT CY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In Re:

Case No. 11-21337-TLM

MARTIN D. FRANTZ and
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ,

Chapter 7

Debtors.

DELARATION OF MARTY FRANTZ IN OPPOSITION TO
ROELLER DISTRIBUTION
STATE OF IDHO)
: SS.

County of KOOTENAI)
Marty Frantz declares under the penalty of perjury as follows: I am a part-time resident of
Kootenai County, Idaho and I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify to the facts stated
herein of my own personal knowledge.
1.

Upon knowledge and belief, Roeller was untruthful when he told Idaho Independent

Bank (IIB) under oath that the Purchase & Sale agreement he signed, transferring his interest in 104
acres at Twin Lakes to my business, was fabricated. His testimony emboldened IIB to file
adversarial proceedings against me. Roeller recently recanted his allegation on November 17, 2017

Declaration of Marty Frantz In Opposition To Roeller Distribution
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when he dropped the entire $183,683.65 amount of his claim against me in the court approved
settlement agreement and stipulated to fact that I, Marty Frantz, "correctly represented to JIB the
true and binding purchase and sale agreement".

During these proceedings, the court sanctioned

Roeller to pay for my attorney fees on three separate occasions. Roeller had already paid my
attorney, funding my litigation costs prior to the court settlement.
2. WAIVER OF DISCHARGE: When I filed a waiver of discharge in the Federal court
case #11-21337-TLM, I understood and was advised by my attorney, Steve McCrae, that doing so
would not moot the IIB Adversarial Proceedings in bankruptcy court.

The reason I filed the

waiver was to regain ownership of my affirmative defenses against IIB and Roeller which were
otherwise transferred to the Trusee of my Chapter 7 Estate who refused to pursue them. After I
filed the waiver and regained "standing", I immediately pursued those actions in State court case
#CV-10-6088 & case #CV- CV 11-6420. These were claims that I could not pursue in Federal
court Case No. 11-21337-TLM due to lack of"standing". Ifl hadn't filed a waiver of discharge, I
could not have pursued Roeller and successfully eliminated $183, 683.65 of Estate debt.
3. I did not file a waiver to avoid IIB's adversarial proceedings trial in the Federal court
nor would a waiver avoid those proceedings. Rather, when Judge Meyers ruled that they were moot
in Federal court,

the jurisdiction and "standing" for those IIB's adversarial proceedings,

transferred to the State Court including my standing in the Roeller case and other affirmative
defenses against IIB.
4. Even though I filed a waiver of discharge, I fully expected IIB's adversarial proceedings
to be adjudicated in the bankruptcy court. I even offered to travel to Boise for those proceedings in
the event of court scheduling problems during that time period. When Judge Meyers announced in
court that my waiver of discharge mooted the adversarial proceedings and that a trial would not go
forward in the Federal court, I was surprised, having been advised to the contrary (see #2 above).
None-the-less, that news didn't matter because I had also been advised by counsel that the
adversarial proceedings would not go away, rather would simply proceed in the jurisdiction or
"standing" of the State Court along with my other affirmative defenses.

So after Judge Myers

waiver ruling, I fully expected to litigate the adversarial proceeding matter in the State court and
did defend myself in the Roeller case #CV-11-6420.

It is my belief that IIB did not pursue the

adversarial proceedings case in State court due to the fact that I was contesting Roe Iler' s allegations
in State court case #CV- CV 11-6420 whereby his IIB testimony would likely be over-turned.
Declaration of Marty Frantz In Opposition To Roeller Distribution
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5.

CONCLUSION: After Judge Meyer's waiver ruling granted me "standing", I then

pursued my affirmative defenses against IIB in State court case #CV-10-6088 and against Roeller in
State court case

#CV-11-6420.

In my State court case against IIB,

the majority of my

declarations, reports and witnesses were unfortunately struck from the court records in summary
judgment due to late filings and document administrative technicalities. JIB prevailed.

However,

I did successfully pursue Roeller and obtain the November 17, 2017 recant admission and dismissal
to set the record straight and eliminate $183,683.65 debt in the Chapter 7 Estate to benefit of all the
creditors in my Estate.

DATED THIS 27th day of November, 2017.

_\
__
~-:x------.Y.\
~
)
Marty Frantz- Declarant

Declaration of Marty Frantz In Opposition To Roeller Distribution
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTC Y COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
INRE
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ,

_____ _____
Debtors.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. 11-21337-TLM

Chapter 7

ORDER APPROVING WAIVER OF DISCHARGE

On May 13, 2015, chapter 7 debtors, Martin D. Frantz and Cynthia M.
Frantz ("Debtors"), executed and filed a voluntary waiver of discharge under
§ 727(a)(l 0). See Doc. No. 508 ("Waiver"), and Doc. No. 509, a motion

requesting approval of the Waiver (''Motion").
Section 727(a)(l0) states: "The court shall grant the debtor a discharge,
unless ... the court approves a written waiver of discharge executed by the debtor
after the order for relief under this chapter." This provision imposes several
requirements. The waiver must be in writing, and executed by the debtor(s) postpetition. In addition, the waiver must be filed with the Court in order for the
Court to evaluate and "approve" the same. Generally speaking, approval follows
the Court's finding that the debtor waives discharge knowingly, voluntarily, and
with an awareness of the consequences of that act. See, e.g., In re Akbarian, 505
B.R. 326, 328-29 (Bankr. D. Utah 2014). The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure do not require notice to creditors of a debtor's request for approval of
ORDER APPROVING WAIVER OF DISCHARGE - 1
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such a waiver nor for a hearing. The rules do, however, require a notice to be
given all creditors and parties in interest after a waiver of discharge is approved.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 2002(f)(6).

On May 20, 2015, Debtors and Debtors' counsel appeared before the Court
to address the Waiver. Debtors' counsel conveyed his clients' decision to waive
discharge under§ 727(a)(l 0), and represented that they did so after consulting
with and upon the advice of counsel, and that the decision was made knowingly
and voluntarily, and with awareness of the consequences. Identical affirmations
are made in the Waiver itself that was executed by Debtors and filed with the
Court.
The Court concludes, upon this record, that the Waiver meets the
requirements of the Code. The Motion shall therefore be granted and the Waiver
shall be, and hereby is, approved. An appropriate notice under Rule 2002(t)(6)
will be prepared by the Court and served by the Clerk.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 20, 2015
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TERRY L. MYERS
CHIEF U.S. BANKRUPT CY JUDGE

ORDER APPROVING WAIVER OF DISCHARGE - 2

"EXHIBITS"
Case 11-21337-TLM
Doc 889

Master
Guide Entered
Page 129
of 411
Filed 03/29/18
03/29/18
10:42:29
Document

Desc Main

Page 1 of 1

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In Re:

Case No. 11-21337-TLM

FRANTZ, MARTIN D.
FRANTZ, CYNTHIA M.

Chapter 7

Debtors.
ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM
This matter came before the Court on the Trustee's Objection to Claim No. 9 (Doc. 854),
filed February 14, 2018, requesting the Court disallow the claim of Dirk Roeller. Notice of the
objection to the claim was sent to the creditor (Doc. 857) and a request for hearing or reply to the
objection has not been made within the time period allowed.
IT IS ORDERED that Claim No. 9 be disallowed to the extent objected to.
//end of text//

TERRY L. MYER
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Order submitted by DAYID P. GARDNER, Chapter 7 Trustee

ORDER DISALLOWING CLAIM - PAGE J
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda(w,gmail. com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENA I
IDAHO INDEPEN DENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088

NOTICE FOR ADA
ACCOMO DATION

Defendants

Pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as required by IC 8-507c,

Title 8 - Provisional

Remedies In Civil,

and Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) Title II provisions,
Defendant, Marty Frantz, herein provides Notice For Accommodation.

NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODATION
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Introduction Overview

Dyslexia and related Specific Learning Difficulties are one of the most common disabilities to be
encountered in the Justice System. As "Hidden Disabilities" they are the least understood and can
give rise to significant disadvantages in legal settings leading to miscarriages of justice. Many
litigants have not had their difficulties formally identified and do not fully understand their own
problems. They may not be fully aware of their own disability. Others may be reluctant to admit
they have these conditions. Dyslexia is usually hereditary and occurs independently of
intelligence. Dylexia affects the way information is processed, stored and retrieved, with problems
of short term memory, speed (delays) of processing, organization and sequencing. The condition
causes one to easily lose track of what they are doing and is marked by poor listening skills. They
often miss key points, lack the ability to hold on to information without referring to notes and lack
verbal fluency and precision in speech. These characteristics accompany word-finding problems
and often mispronunciations of words. Where literacy has been overcome, comprehension
problems often persist to an extent that they cannot understand what they can fluently read. They
typically fail to take account of body language and miss implications of what they are interpreting.
American's with Disabilities Act (ADA) Background
(Source: ADA Best Practices For State & Local Government)

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") was enacted to prohibit
discrimination against people with disabilities. Under Title II of the Act, no qualified individual
with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of services, programs or activities of a public entity. This prohibition applies
to the state courts as providers of public programs and services. People with disabilities are to be
given an equal opportunity to access, use and fully participate in court services and programs,
and not be discriminated against because of their disability.
A person with a "disability" is someone who has a physical, mental or communication
disability that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities such as caring for
oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and

NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODA TION

Page 2 of 10

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 132 of 411
working. The disability makes it hard for the person to do activities that most other people can
do. It also may restrict the person's way of doing things and/or where and for how long the
person can do a certain activity or function. People who have a record of such disability or are
regarded as having such disability meet the definition of "disabled" for purposes of having
reasonable accommod ation made.

Whenever reasonable, policies, practices or procedures must be modified to make court
services and programs readily accessible to, and useable by, people with disabilities. It also
includes removing communication barriers by providing auxiliary aids and services which
would allow a person with a disability to effectively work in the courts, represent himself or a
client, be a party in a lawsuit, testify as a witness, serve on a jury or observe a hearing or trial.
In providing reasonable accommodation, the courts are to give primary consideration to
the accommodation requested by the person with the disability. However, it is typically the
local court administrative ADA authority who works with a local ADA affiliate to decide what
accommodation will be made. An alternative accommod ation may be offered if equally
effective. Every effort shall be made to meet the specific needs of the individual. The court is
not required to make modifications that would fundamentally alter the service or program or
cause undue financial or administrative burden.

This Department Of Justice ADA directive is issued to ensure equal access to and full
participation in court and probation services and programs by people with disabilities, including
attorneys, litigants, defendants, probationers, witnesses, victims, potential jurors, prospective
employees and public observers of court proceedings as follows;
I.

Qualified people with disabilities shall not, by reason of their disability, be
discriminated against, or be excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
services and programs conducted by the courts.

2.

A person with a disability is defined as an individual who has a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities, has a record of
such impairment or is regarded as having such impairment.
NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMO DATION
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3.

Upon notification by a person with a disability of the need for accommodation, the court
shall, at no charge, provide reasonable accommodation that will enable the person to
access and/or effectively participate in or enjoy the benefits of any court service or
program.

4.

The local court administrative ADA authority, with the assistance of the local ADA advocate
coordinator, determine what reasonable accommodation will be made. Consultation shall
occur with the individual to explore his or her limitations and the options available for
accommodating the disability. Primary consideration shall be given to the requested
accommodation; however, alternative accommodation may be offered if equally effective.

5.

The Judicial Department shall provide and pay the reasonable costs of any necessary
auxiliary aids or services, excluding devices of a personal nature, for the duration of the time
period for which accommodation is needed. Examples of auxiliary aids or services of a
personal nature not covered by this directive include prescription eyeglasses, hearing aids,
wheelchairs, and/or personal medical or attendant care.

6.

If accommodation is needed for an individual to serve on jury duty and a time constraint
exists related to the availability of an accommodation, the court, at its discretion, may
continue an individual's jury summons to allow the court time to provide the
accommodation. Any accommodation shall be made for the duration of any jury trial on
which the person needing the accommodation serves.

7.

Any qualified person with a disability may request accommodation who has business in a
state court, including attorneys, litigants, defendants, probationers, witnesses, potential
jurors, prospective employees and public observers of court services and programs. Judges,
probation and court employees with a disability also may request reasonable
accommodation by contacting their local ADA coordinator or administrative authority.

8.

The court also must ensure that its communications with people with disabilities are as
effective as communications with others and that all can fully participate and enjoy the
services and programs provided. The type of auxiliary aid or service necessary to
ensure effective communication will vary in accordance with the length and
complexity of the communication involved and the individual's specific disability and
preferred mode of communication.
NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODATION
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9.

Another text-based way to communicate is to use email through a computer, a web- enabled
pager system, or a personal digital assistant. Telecommunications (TRS) enables standard
oral conversation in person or phone to communicate with people who have difficulty with
oral comprehension on the telephone or in person.

1o.

The court may provide a list of individuals who are qualified to interpret in the legal
setting. Every effort should be made to obtain a communication interpreter who has
knowledge in legal interpreting and communication. If a qualified communication
interpreter is not available, then the court should obtain an interpreter who has been deemed
"legally qualified".

11.

People with impaired communication often can be assisted by increasing the size of an
object, by changing viewing distance, by improving illumination, and by improving contrast.
Changing size and distance go hand in hand. Size can be changed in several different ways:
an object can be made larger, materials can be reproduced larger (such as large print), a
nearby object can be enlarged. Devices can be set into glass frames, some of which are
bioptic.

The midday light offers the best readability. Halogen bulbs and lamps that place
direct light on a subject are highly recommended. When considering which bulbs to use,
incandescent bulbs with a high wattage are preferred over florescent. Florescent bulbs
throw off a glaring blue light. If the person is referring to notes, additional light (such as a
gooseneck lamp) may be helpful.
12.

Contrast in written materials also can be important. The more words crowded onto a page
and the more similar the ink and paper colors, the less one can discriminate. Using 14-point
or larger black type on yellow paper will greatly increase the readability of materials.

13.

Developmental disability is an umbrella term referring to disabilities present before an
individual reaches 22 years of age. Cognitive disabilities refer to any disability affecting

mental processes. Examples include, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
Dyslexia, Alzheimer's disease, aphasia, brain injury, language disorder, and learning
disabilities.
14.

A person is considered to have a communication disability when that person's ability to
receive, send, or process information is reduced. Accommodation examples includes
talking directly to the person, not to an aide or interpreter, making eye contact and listen
NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODATION
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patiently and carefully. If either party doesn't understand, ask to repeat the statement
and/or ask the person to say something in a different way if you are still not sure what he or
she is saying.

Sometimes it takes repeated attempts at listening or speaking for

communication to be successful. Let the person know your communication with them is
worthwhile to you. Depending on the needs of the individual and the nature of the disability,
accommodation may also include: having the court and witnesses talk slowly or write things
down; when necessary, repeating information using different wording or a different
communication approaches, allowing time for information to be fully understood; presenting
information in a clear, concise, concrete and simple manner; when necessary, taking periodic
breaks; presenting tasks in a step-by-step manner, letting the individual perform each step
after explanation: scheduling court proceedings at a different time to meet the medical needs
of the individual; providing a coach or support person at the proceeding; or allowing
videotaped testimony or the use of video conferencing technology in lieu of a personal
appearance.
15.

Depending on the needs of the individual and the nature of the disability, accommodation
may include: scheduling court proceedings to allow adequate time to prepare for a hearing.
Providing instructions in a written or recorded format; changing procedures as they relate to
the interaction with witnesses and court staff in the courtroom; eliminating distractions;
speaking slowly and distinctly; or allowing videotaped testimony or the use of video
conferencing technology in lieu of a personal appearance.

16.

All requests for an accommodation should be held confidential and/or sealed.

17.

If the request concerns a particular court proceeding, the request should be a minimum of

five days in advance, if practicable, to allow for consideration of the request and to
arrange for reasonable accommodation.

US Code ADA Title II Regulations & Case Law References:

28 C.F.R. § 35.130(f)
42 U.S.C. § 12132; 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B) & (C)
42 U.S.C. § 12202(2XA)
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42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(8) & (C)
28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(A).
28 C.F.R. § 35.104(1)(i)(B)
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(l)( iv)
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(2)
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-49 (1999) 524 U.S. 624 (1988)

Frantz Diagnosis
Frantz was diagnosed with Dyslexia and Language Dysfunction in 2017 by two independent
sources; a CDA, Idaho Dr. Psychologist whose firm specializes in Dyslexia and additionally a
Spokane, Washington Master's Language expert whose firm

specializes in language

communication. Their tests concluded that among other impairments, Frantz functions normally
at a 12 grade level for some life skills (rudimentary functions) but as low as the 1st grade level for
other important key life functions such as oral and readin2 comprehension and sentence
structure.
Frantz has had the disability his entire life.
There is no known cure for the
neurological condition. The medical report exams are on file under HIPPA with the District Court
Trial ADA Administrator. See attached EXHIBIT A Declaration of Marty Frantz Notice Of
Accommodation.

Frantz Accommodation Request
Based upon the medical exam results, the following accommodations are requested;
1)
2)
3)

4)

Provide consideration for litigant misunderstanding or misinterpreting dates, appearances,
reversing or misreading numbers, addresses and discovery material;
Oral conversation is requested to be spoken slowly and clearly and when requested
repeated using different working or different communication approaches;
Allow time for information to be fully understood and present information, case law,
court procedure and other complex concepts in a clear, concise, concrete, and simple
terms and ample time for litigant to express himself orally and in writing without censure
or implied criticism.
Check in with the litigant and take more frequent breaks to avoid information over-load;
NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODATION
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5)
6)
7)

8)
9)

10)
11)
12)
13)

14)

15)

16)

Present tasks in a step-by-step manner, allowing litigants to perform each step after
explanation in a linear format.
Provide time between questioning to allow for after-thought cognitive reasoning and
functioning;
Provide a coach or support person famfliar with legal proceedings protocol at hearings to
read, comprehend and explain proceedings procedures and court procedural options to the
litigant in laymen terms;
Allow videotape testimony and the use of video conferencing in lieu of a personal
appearance;
Provide court written instruction and proceedings in a secondary recorded format when
needed and provide court notices and proceedings normally mailed using email with
normal font size so the litigant can make them larger on their computer screen;
Allow for change of procedures to accommodate a less formal proceeding as they relate
to the interaction with witnesses, court staff, aids and litigant in the court room;
Provide litigant access to legal assistance aids for reading and comprehension of case law
research for court room argument and preparation;
Eliminate distractions in the court room;
Provide clear and concise deadlines for various court procedures in writing and orally to
the litigant. Have litigant orally repeat those deadlines to be sure they understand.
Allow litigant time extensions for deadlines that were not presented in this format.
Do not proceed with extemporaneous oral or written arguments, examination and cross
examination without providing ample time for the litigant to prepare for those
proceedings well in advance; 0
Provide a legal assistant who can; interpret and aid the litigant to re-phrase questions
during oral arguments and cross examination to assist in lack of foundation standards,
opposing counsel objections and how question are presented/asked during cross
examination and who can assist in locating documentation for the litigant.
Provide consideration, while on the stand, to have access to case file documents aids as a
resource to help trigger memory, names, events during examinations. Provide a list of
likely cross examination topics in advance in order to give the person/witness an
opportunity to consider their responses. (Note: It is considered discriminatory to suddenly
introduce a subject of questioning designed to surprise or entrap a witness with Specific Leaming
Difficulties).

17) Talking directly to the litigant, not to an aide or interpreter, making eye contact and
listen patiently and carefully. If either party doesn't understand, ask to repeat the
statement and/or ask the person to say something in a different way if you are still not
sure what he or she is saying. Allow for repeated attempts at listening or speaking for
communication to be successful. Let the person know your communication with them is
worthwhile to you.

NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMO DATION
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Frantz Accommodat ion Effective Date

The accommodation request is made effective immediately for all hearings and proceedings
with regard to Case No. CV-10-6088.

CONCLUSIO N

Frantz' s wife encouraged him to be tested with regard to his developmental learning disabilities
about 30 years ago. He took tests confirming his condition. When Frantz took over his legal
proceedings in this case earlier this year, he notified the court of his Dyslexia condition to
explain his situation and apologized for the embarrassing oral and written sentence structure and
spelling errors. He also provided his school transcript showing that he scholastically struggled in
high school and failed in college. Frantz's line of work does not require scholastic achievement,
rather tactile achievement and in that regard he has been very successful for over 35 years.
Recently, Frantz's wife encouraged him to be tested more extensively. Frantz was then analyzed
by two medical firm experts with modem testing sequences.

Characteristic of Dyslexic' s, Frantz

was not fully aware of the depth and degree of his developmental learning disability until the
experts reviewed the results of those tests with he and his wife. The testing results prompted
Frantz to take the next step and request formal accommodations to seek a fair and reasonable
access to the judicial system to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
DATED THIS 18th day of October, 2017.

_'----Y
_____________\ ____D _ ~
MARTY D. FRANTZ
ENCLOSUR ES

EXHIBIT A - Declaration of Marty Frantz
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CERTIFICAT E OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT ON THE 18th DAY OF October, 2017, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Notice For ADA Accommodat ion to be served upon the following
in the manner indicated below.

Sheila R. Schwager
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY, LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

[ ]US Mail
[ ] Overnight Mail
[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile (208) 954-5261
[X] Email

MARTYD. FRANTZ

NOTICE FOR ADA ACCOMODA TION
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EXHIBIT A
MARTY FRANTZ DECLARATION
OF ADA ACCOMODATION
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M FRANTZ, an individual,

Case No. CV-10-6088

DECLARATION OF MARTY
FRANTZ NOTICE OF ADA
ACCOMODATION

Defendants

Marty Frantz declares under the penalty of perjury as follows:
I am a part-time resident of Kootenai County, Idaho and I am over the age of 18 and
competent to testify to the facts stated herein of my own personal knowledge.
I have been medically diagnosed with Dyslexia and Language Dysfunction in 2017 by two
independent sources; a CDA, Idaho Dr. Psychologist whose firm specializes in Dyslexia and
additionally a Spokane, Washington Master's Language expert whose firm specializes in the same.
Their tests concluded that I function normally at a 12 grade level for some life skills (rudimentary
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functions) but as low as the 1st grade level for other important key life functions such as oral and
reading comprehension and sentence building. These medical reports are on file under HIPPA
with the District Court Trial ADA Administrator.
I have been a member of Dyslexia Associations for many years and have studied the condition
during my life often concerned for my children and grand children. Medical experts do not know
what causes Dyslexia and there is no known cure.
appear to be genetically transmitted.

Scientific evidence indicates the disorders

The condition is a neurobiological-based developmental

disability whereby the brain's connections are impaired.
functioning in approximately 3-5% of the population.

It can severely affect cognitive

I am one of them and have experienced the

condition from childhood. Its symptoms can be managed through thoughtful accommodation,
understanding and education of each person's individual foot-print.
My wife encouraged me to be tested for my developmental disability about 30 years ago. I
received preliminary testing at that time which confirmed my condition. When I took over my
entire legal proceedings this year by myself, I notified the court of my Dyslexia condition to
explain my situation and apologized for the embarrassing oral and written sentence structure and
spelling errors.

I also provided my school transcript showing that I scholastically struggled in

high school and failed in college. My line of work does not require scholastic achievement, rather
tactile achievement. Due to the nature of that work, I have been very successful for over 35
years. Recently, my wife encouraged me to be tested more extensively.

I was not fully aware

of the depth and degree of my developmental learning disability until the experts reviewed the
results of the recent tests with myself and my wife. Those results prompted me to take the next
step and request formal accommodations to have fair and reasonable access to the judicial system.

'---°\

D=¥?\

MARTY D. FRANTZ
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M Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Reasonable Accomadation
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Jay Sturgell <jsturgell@kcgov.us>

Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 6:21 AM

Hi Jay
From Marty Frantz 208-619-0482 off or 208-661-9350 cetl
Got your phone tag messages and email. Thanks! My wife & I had taken our cub scout Wotf den on a hike and cook-out
yesterday afternoon and evening and were not available. This morning I am tied up in a meeting from 8:30 to 11 :30am
and then will be putting together my files for the hearing between 11 :30am to 1pm. Can we meet at say 1 :30pmbefore
the 2pm hearing at the court house spare room on Judge Christensen's floor on the north side of the hallway? 30 min is
not nearly enough time to bring you up to speed on how you can help but at least we can get started.
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M Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Reasonable Accomadation
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Karlene Behringer <kbehringer@kcgov.us>
Cc: Jay Sturgell <jsturgell@kcgov.us>
Thanks Karlene Jay- I will meet you in the Hallway and then find a room. Marty

Tue, Oct 24, 2017 at 11 :38 AM
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M

Gmail

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>

Re: Reasonable Accomadation
1 message

Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Reply-To: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
To: Jay Sturgell <jsturgell@kcgov.us>
Cc: Kartene Behringer <kbehringer@kcgov.us>

Mon, Oct 30, 2017 at 9:36 AM

Hi Jay Sturgell
From Marty Frantz 208-61-0482 off or 208-661-9350 cell
Can you please email me a copy of the case law reference provided from opposing counsel to Judge Christensen at the
hearing. I believe you may have written it down? It was something like 1 (34) Idaho 84 code? It was a case where a
Judge was previously an attorney for one of the litigants and then later acted in the capacity as Judge for the same
litigant. Thanks ...

Nov.3.2015 4:53PM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
)

CASE NO, CV 10-6088
)
)
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho )
Corporation,
)
)
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
Plaintiff. . . ,· . ) .. < S.UMMARY JUDGME\'IT; PLA1NTIFF'S
v.
)
MOTION TO STRJKE; and
)
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR
)
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and )
CINDY M, FRANTZ, an individual,
)
)

)

Defendants,• •.

.. )
)

MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M, FRANTZ, an individual,

)
)
)

.. Counterclaimant/

)
'

)
)
)

~

)
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho )
Corporation,
)
)

· Counterdefendants/

)
) ..

MARTY D, FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individu&l,

)
)
)
)

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEPENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
... -~ l:.
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)

Third Party Plainitffs,

.)
)

V.

EAGLE RIDGE ON TWIN LAKES INC., )
)
an Idaho corporation,
)

)

Third Party Defendant.

)

!, INTRODUCTION
This lawsuit arises out of a series of commercial guarantees Defendants entered into with
Plaintiff so that Plaintiff would lend money to Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc,, an Idaho
Corporation (hereinafter "Eagle Ridge"). When Eagle Ridge defaulted on its obligation to
· Plaintiff, Defendants refused to tender full payment of that obligation to Plaintiff. Plaintiff then
filed this luwsmt which was stayed for almost five· years because of Defendants' pending
bankruptcy, Defendants bankruptcy status was resolved when Defendants waivered their right to
'.

·,' ,·

,.

.' .- . <

discharge their debt in bankruptcy, and, as a result this case was allowed to move forward.
Defendants have filed a partial summary judgment alleging that their obligation to
Plaintiff has been discharged by accord and satisfaction. Plaintiff has also moved for summary
and counterclaims. It
defenses
affirmative
and all ofDefendants'
its. cause of action,
judgment on
'
"'
.
..' . . . . . . . ' ., . .
. ' .
. :
.
'

'

•','

"'

~'

"

'

has also moved to strike certain evidence Defendants' have submitted.
The Court DENIES Defendants motion and GRANTS Plaintiff's motions for the reasons
outlined below.
II. FACTS

On or about December 14, 2006, Eagle Ridge executed n promissory note in favor of
Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank (hereinafter "IIB") in the original principal amount of
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY nJDGMENT
-2

Nov. 3. 2015 4:54PM

P. 3/28

No. 8326

,Juage Cnrislensen

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 148 of 411
$3,750,000.00 (hereinafter "Note"). Declaration of Michael H. Dolezal in Support of IIB's
Motion for Summary Judgment (September 21, 2015) (hereinafter "Dolezal Deel."), ,i4, Ex, A;
First Verified Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims and Demand for Jury Trial and
Third Party Complaint (March 23, 2011) (hereinafter "Answer"), ,i 7. The note set forth the
terms of the agreement including the interest rate and repayment schedule, Id,
On or about July 11, 2007, Eagle Ridge executed a renewal Promissory Note in favor of
IIB to increase the principal amount of the note. Dolezal Deel., ,i 5, Ex. B, Answer,

~

8, The

agreement between Eagle Ridge and Plaintiff modified on April 17, 2008, June 18, 2008,
January 21, 2009, March 11, 2010, Dolezal Deel., iii! 5-9, Exs. B-F.
As part of the April 17, 2008, October 21;2M!:i,

and March 11, ioi b, modifications each

of the Defendant.s executed a Commercial Guaranty, which they unconditionally guaranteed the
foll and punct1ial payment and satisfaction of all of Eagle Ridge's obligation to Plaintiff. Dolezal
Deel., ,i 10, ex. G; Answer, ,i 3.
The final guaranty Defend;hts.signed o~ March 11, 2010, expressly provides in part:
For good and valuable consideration. Guarantor absolutely and unconditionally
guarantees foll and punctual payment and satisfaction of the Indebtedness of Borrower
[Eagle Ridge] to Lender, and the performance and discharge of all B011'0wer's
obligations under the Note and the Related Documents, This is a guaranty of payment
and performance and_ not of_ collection, .so Lender can .enforce tl)is Guarnaty against
Guarantor even when Lender has not exhausted Lender's remedies against anyone else
obligated to pay the Indebtedness or against any collateral securing the Indebtedness, this
Guaranty or any other guaranty of the Indebtedness. Guarantor will make any payments
to Lender or its order, on demand, in legal tender of the United States, in same-day fonds,
without set-off or deduction or counterclaim ...
If _Lender presently holds one or more guap11ties, . or hereqfter receives additional
guaranties from Guarantor, Lender's rights' under all the guaranties shaJI be cumulative ...

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STR1KE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTlAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Guarantor represents and warrants to Lender that (A) no representation or agreements of
any kind have been made to Guarantor which would limit or qualify in any way the terms
of this Guaranty, , ,
Dolezal Deel., Ex. G.
Eagle Ridge defaulted on its obligation to Plaintiff. Dolezal Deel.,

1 11; Answer,

~- 14.

Upon default, Plaintiff demanded payment of the Guaranties from Defendants. Id. When the
demand was made, Defendants did not tender full payment in satisfaction of Eagle Ridge's debt
us the express terms of the guaranty requires. Id.
Plaintiff then filed this action in July 2010. Later that year Defendants filed for
bankruptcy, See generally In re Frantz, No. 11-21337-TLM, 2015 WL 1778068, at *15 (Bankr.
D. Idaho Apr. 16, 2015). That litigation was finally concluded when the Defendants filed a
waiver of discharge as' to 'all creditbrs.

Ii

As

a result this case

is now able to proceed to

. summary judgment.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides for summary judgment where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In
order to make that determination, a court mnst look to "the pleadings, depositions, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any ; , ; ," IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(c)(2013); see
also Farmers Nat. Bank v. Shirey, 126 Idaho 63, 67-68, 878 P,2d 762, 766-67 (1994).

Supporting and opposing affidavits must set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence.
IDAHO R. CIV. P. 56(e); see also Kolln v. Saint Luke's Regional Medical Center, 130 Idaho 323,

331, 940 P.2d 1142, 1150 (1997),
Once the moving party has properly supported the motion for summary judgment, the
-.
.. ' . , . . . . : .
;

·,

non-moving party must come forward with evidence that contradicts the evidence submitted by
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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the moving party and that establishes the existence of a material issue of disputed fact. Zehm v
Associated Logging Contracton, Inc., 116 Idaho 349, 350, 775 P.2d 1191, 1192 (1988). lfthe
record contains conflicting inferences or if reasonable minds might reach different conclusions,
summary judgment must be denied, Roell v. City of Boise, 130 Idaho 199, 200, 938 P,2d 1237,
1238 (1997): Bonz v Sudweeks, 119 Idaho 539,541,808 P.2d 876,878 (1991). However, not all
evidence in the record will raise genuine issues: "[T]o withstand a motion for summary
judgment, the [non-moving party's] case must be. anchored in something more solid than
speculation, A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue." Edward~ v.
Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 853, 727 P,2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App, 1986); see also
Blickenstaff v. Clegg, 140 Idaho 572, 577, 97 P.3d 439, 444 (2004); Samuel v. Hepworth,
Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc,, 134ldaho84, 87,996 P,2.d,303, 306 (2000).·· , -. The facts in the record are to be liberally constmed in favor of the party opposing the
motion. G & M Farms v. Funk Irr. Co., 119 Idaho 514, 517, 808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991). The
opposing party cannot rest upon mere allegations or denials, but the party's response, by
affidavits or otherwise, must- set forth -specir1c facts showing that there ·is a genuine issue of
material fact.

IDAHO R. CtV.

P. 56(e); Smith v. Meridian Joint School District No. 2, 128 Idaho

714,719,918. P.2d 583,588 (1996); G & MFarms, 119 Idaho at 517,808 P.2d at 854 (1991);
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., I 11 Idaho 851,853, 727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986).
IV. DISCUSSION · .

A. Motion to Strike
Before considering the merits of a summary judgment motion, a tnal court must first
determine the admissibility of the evidence offered in support or opposition of that motion,
Hecla Mining Co. v. Star-Mo,:ning Mining Co.>'J22Idaho 778,784, 839.P.id 1192, 1198 (1992);
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 175 P.3d 172 (2007). A court may only rely on
evidence that would be admissible at trial when determining a summary judgment motion,

Perticevich v. Salmon Rivet Canal, Co., 92 Idaho 865, 869 452 P.2d 362, 366 (1969); I.R.C.P.
56(e). The interpretation of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is a matter of law, and, as such
the decisions of the trial court will be given free review, Hutchinson v. State_, 134 Idaho 18, 21,
995 P.2d 363,366 (Ct.App.1999); Black v. Ameritel Inns, Inc., 139 Idaho 511,513, 81 P.3d 416,
418 (2003).

1. Exhibits Attached ro ~Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summa,y Judgment for Accord.and Satisfaction with Negotiable Instrument
Idaho R. of Civ. Pro. 56(e) provides that a summary judgment motion must be supported
or opposed by affidavits that are made on personal knowledge, contains facts that are admissible
evidence, and show the at the affianfis competent to testify to the infr;rinaticin contained within
the affidavit. I.R.C.P. 56(e). Additionally, exhibits offered in support of or opposition of a
motion for summary judgment must be attached to an admissible affidavit verifying the exhibit's
authenticity, P11ckettv. Oa/ifabco, Inc,, 132 Idaho 816, 821, 979 P.2d 1174, 1179 (1999).
Defendants' have attached six exhibiis'

t6 the· me;noiandum they filed

on August 17,

2015. These exhibits are not attached to an admissible affidavit, nor are they affidavits or
declarations. It follows that the exhibits are not admissible evidence in support of Defendants'
motion, However, all six exhibits were also properly attached to Defendant Ma1ty D. Frantz's
Declaration tn Suppmt of Defendants' -Motion to Amend Defendant's A~swer to Include the
Affirmative Defense of Accord and Satisfaction and for Partial Summary Judgment for Accord
and Satisfaction (August 17, 2015), As such, the Court considered the exhibits in its following
summary judgment because they were properly attached to the aforementioned declaration.
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRJKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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2. Defendants' October 14, 2015 Submissions
The Court affirms its decision ut oral argument to strike all the evidence that Defendunts
submitted on October 14, 2015 1, because the evidence was untimely.
frfohn R nf('ilr Pm 'ifi(r,) Tht> mlA pr,wirlA.~ in mlt>,vant part·

If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavits the party must do so at least 14
days prior to the date of the hearing. The adverse party shall also serve an answering brief
at lenat I~ dnyc prior to the date of the hearing.
I.R.C.P. 56(c). This language is mandatory and may only be shortened for good cause, Id,; Sun

Valley Potatoes, Inc, v. Rosholt, Robertson & Tucker, 133 ldaho I, 5, 981 P.2d 236, 240 (1999).
The purpose of the rule is to ullow the other party a full and fair opportunity to respond to the
. evidence being presented. Sun Valley Potato, 133 Idaho at 5,981 P.2d at 240.
Following the Rule 56(c) mundatory deadline, Defendants' last dny to sel've timely
affidavits and decluration in this matter was October 7, 2015, unless they provided good cause
..
'.·
for filing the evidence later than thut date, Since all the documents that Defendants filed on
October 14, 2015 are untimely, and Defendants have not presented good cause for the Court to
consider the affidavits that were filed lute, the Court affirms its previous decision granting
filed on October
and other evidence the Defendants
Plaintiffs motion and strike all the affidavits
...
'. ' '
,•'

14, 2015.

i

Specifically they submitted th~ following documents on· Octob~r' 14, 201s·.
1. Gary Strong's Dedaratlon In Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
2. Declaration of Martin Frantz In Support of Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment
3. Scott's Gibson's Declaration In Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
4. Jim Miller's Oecl11rat1on In Support of Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment
s. Supplemental Documents to Defendant's Summary Judgment, with the following documents attached,
a. Decl11r.atlon of David E. Eash
b. Letter from Don C. Fletcher

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
. STR1KE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Strong and Don Fletcher's letter were
Additionally, even if the declaration ·.'of.·Gary
. ..
',
'
.. '
..

,

'

'

.

timely, the Court would still strike both documents because they were not made under the
penalty of perjury.
Idaho R. of Civ, Pro, 7(d) provides that a written declaration made pursuant to Idaho
Code section 9-1406 is analogous to an affidavit, and thus admissible. The section requires the
person providing the written declaration sign and date it. I.C, § 9-1406(1). Additionally, the
declaration must include the language "I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to
the law of the State ofldaho that the foregoing is true and correct." Id,
Mption for Summary
_qf Defendants..
,\n.)~upport
Oe\:'.larpti_on
Here, Gary Strong'.s_
.
.
·,
.
.
'
'

"

•'

Judgment (October 14, 2015) is unsigned. The Expert Opinion of Don C Fletcher attached to
Supplemental Documents to Defendant's Summary Judgment (October 14, 2015) is a letter-not
an affidavit or declaration-attached to a document that is not an affidavit or declaration.
Therefore, the. Fletcher letter was not made urtder-the ,penalty of perjury,• and is not attached to an
affidavit or declaration that authenticates it. As such the Court also strikes these documents
because they do not conform to Idaho R. of Civ, Pro. 7(d) and 56(e), as well as Idaho Code
section 9· 1406.

B.

Defendants' .Motion for Partial Summary Judgment-

].

Accord and Satisfaction
Defendants argue they are entitled to partial summary judgment because there was an

accord and satisfaction for the guarantees. Plaintiff opposes this argument on several grounds.
"Accord and satisfaction is a method of dischal'ging a contract or cause of action,
[w]hereby the pa.1ties agree to give and accept something in settlement of the claim or
demand of the one against the other, and perform such agreement, the 'accord' being the
agreement and the 'satisfaction' its execution or performance." Fairchild v. Mathews, 91
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOll PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Idaho 1, 4, 415 P.2d 43, 46 (1966). See also Holley v. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 507, 915
.
P.2d 733, 737 (Ct.AppJ996).
Strother v. Strother, 136 Idaho 864, 867, 41 PJd 750, 753 (Ct. App. 2002). Accord and

satisfaction is an affirmative defense, and, as such, the burden is on the patty bringing the
defense to prove all the elements. Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 689, 23 P.3d 147, 151
(2001).
Idaho statutory law under the Unifonn Commercial Code provides some direction when
the party raising the defense tendered a negotiable instrument to the claimant. The relevant
statute states in full:,
I) If a person against whom a claim 'is asse1ted 'proves that (i) that' person in good faith
tendered an instmment lo the claimant as full satisfaction of the claim, (ii) the amount of
the claim was unliquidated or subject to u bona fide dispute, and (iii) the claimant
obtained payment of the instrument, the following subsections apply,
2) Unle~s subsection (3) of this section applies, the. claim is discharged if the person against
whom the claim is asserted proves that the instrument or an accompanying written
communication contained a conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument was
tendered as full satisfaction of the claim. .
3) Subject to subse6tio~ (4) of this tection, a ciai~ is not dis~harged under subsection (2) of
this section if either of the following applies:
a. The claimant, if an organization, proves that (i) within a reasonable time before
the tender, the claimant sent a conspicuous statement to the person against whom
the claim is asse1ted that communications concerning disputed debts, including an
instrument tendered as full satisfaction of a debt, are to be sent to a designated
person, office or place, and (ii) the instrument or accompanying communication
.
was not receiv1;id by th.it designated person, office, or place. . .
b. The claimant, whether or not an organization, proves that withiu ninety (90) days
after payment of the instmment, the claimant tendered repayment of the amount
of the instrument to the person against whom the claim is asserted. This paragraph
does not apply if the claimant is an organization that sent a statement complying
· with paragraph (a)(i) of this subsection.
4) A claim is discharged if the person against whom the claim is asserted proves that within
a reasonable time before collection of the instrument was initiated, the claimant, or an
agent of the claimant having direct respon~ibility,with respect to the disputed obligation,
knew that the instrument was tendered in full satisfaction of the claim.

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
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Idaho Code§ 28°3-310.

2

After the codification of the defense, the elements of accord and satisfaction were set
forth as follows:
(I) a bona fide dispute as to the amount owed; (2) that the debtor tendered an amount to

the creditor with the intent that such payment would be in total satisfaction of the debt
owed to the creditor; and (3) that the creditor agreed to accept payment in full satisfaction
of the debt, or that both the debtor and the creditor understood that the acceptance of the
check was in full payment of all sums owed by the debtor.

Beard v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 689, 23 P.3d 147, 151 (2001) quoting Perkins v. Highland
Enterprises, Inc,, 120 Idaho 511,817 P.2d 177 (1991) (citingFairchildv. Mathews, 91 Idaho I,
415 P.2d 43 (1966)), 3
On or about April.8, 2013,. Defendant Marty, Frantz tendered a cashier check for
$20,000.00 from Inland Northwest Bank directly to Plaintiff. Mr. Frantz handwrote on the face
of that check, "Commercial Guarantees for loan #l 191309 paid in full & Loan #1211328 paid in
full." Defendant Marty D, Frantz's Declaration in Support of Defendants' Motion to Amend
Defendant's Answer to Include the Atlirtnative :Defense· of ·Accord· and Satisfaction and for

1

The defense was codified In 1993 to alter the common law rule In Idaho, Holleyv. Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 508, 915
P.2d 733, 738 (Ct. App 1996). Previously, the intent of the creditor when accepting the instrument was a crucial
factor to determine whether an accord and satisfaction was reached. Id.; Comment 2,ldaho Code§ 28-3-310. Thus,
It was possible for a creditor to accept a check, but claim that it did not Intend that acceptance to demonstrate
accord and satisfaction. Under the statute, the ~redltors·1r1tent-ls'irrelevant if the debtor can prove actual
acceptance by the creditor. Holley, 128 Idaho at 508,915 P.2d at 738 (Ct. App. 1996).
'Idaho Code section 28-3-310 and the elements In Ber;1rd v. George, 135 Idaho 685, 23 P.3d 147 (2001), do not
apply to every accord and satisfaction defense. Shore v. Peterson, 146 Idaho 903,910, 204 P.3d 1114, 1121 (2009).
The specific statute and the Beard elements apply only to situations where a negotiable instrument Is used to
di,charge the original obligation. Id. Underthe common law it is possible to effect accord and satisfaction by
discharging the original obligation with some other means then a negotiable Instrument. In such cases, the
common law elements, not the Beard elements, of accord and satisfaction apply. Id. The case at hand involves
Defendants' using a negotiable irisfrument to attempt to'discfta•rge their or'lglnal oblig~tiori to Plaintiff. As a result,
Shore's negative treatment of Beard does not apply to the case, and the Court will use the Beard elements in its
analysis.

ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
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Partial Summary Judgment for Accord and Satisfaction (August 17, 2015) (hereinafter "Frantz
Deel,"), Ex. I. Defendants argue that tendering this check was accord and satisfaction for the
guamntees, and, therefore, Plaintiff cannot bring its claim for the full amount of the guarantees,
which it says are still unpaid.
Defendants' argument fails first because there is no bona fide dispute as to the amount
owed; next, because Defendants could not, as a matter of law, tender the instrument in good
faith; and, finally, because Plaintiffs did not accept the instrument as full payment of Defendants'
debts.
i.

Bona Fide Dispute ·
Accord and satisfaction requires that there be an actual question of fact about the amount
. '·-· .·· .,

,.

.' :'. .:· '

that the debtor owes the c.reditor under the original obligation if a negotiable instrument is used
to effect accord and satisfoction. 4 Beard, 135 Idaho at 689, 23 P.3d at 151. See also Holley v.

Holley, 128 Idaho 503, 510, 915 P,2d 733, 740 (Ct. App, 1996) (there was a genuine dispute
about the amount owed because
of a disagreement
about when late
fees
could be applied to the
.
..
·'·, '.
'
',.
'

'

'•

'

monthly payment); Perkins., 120 Idaho at 515, 817 P.2d at 181 (parties disputed about owed for
completed work because of delays by a third party); Fairchild, 91 Idaho at 3, 4 I5 P.2d at 45
(there was complete disagreement about the amount owed for construction work),
Here,
Defendants
allege
that
there ..is a.· .·hona
fide dispute
about
the amount they owe
.
.
' .
.
.
., ' ., ., '
.
,. '·.
'

'

',.

'

'

,'

Plaintiff under the guaranties. Plaintiff is demanding that Defendants pay Eagle Ridge's full
obligation, which includes interest and penalties for the unpa1d loans as provided m the notes

4

A bona fide dispute may not b~ necessary wh~~ the ac~ord ~nd satisfaction is accomplished by some
means other than a negotiable instrument. Shore, 146 Idaho at 912, 204 P,3d at 1123 (2009),
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Eagle Ridge executed. Defendants argue that the guaranties do not authorize the addition of
interest and penalties to the amount that Defendants owe Plaintiffs,
"The rights of a creditor against a guarantor are determined strictly from the terms of the
guaranty agreement." Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc. v. Yack, 125 Idaho 310,319,870 P.2d 663,672
(Ct. App, 1994), If the terms of the guaranty are clear and unambiguous it dictates the
obligations of the person making the guarantee. Id.; Johnson Equip., Inc. v. Nielson, 108 Idaho
8~7, 871, 702 P,2d 905, 909 (Ct. App. 1985); see also Galaxy .Outdoor Advertising Inc. v. Idaho

Transportation Department, 109 Idaho 692, 710'P.2d 602 (1985) (a discussion of the general
principals of contract interpretation).
"An uncon.ditional guaranty is a promise by the guarantor to pay the debt or perform the
obligation. upon defaul.t without requiring the secured pl!rty to first exhaust. its remedies against
the deqtor,"_CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV Ctr., Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P,2d 890,
892 (Ct. App. 1990). Moreover, when the guaranty is unconditional, the guarantor may not imply
limitations upon t11e creditor's right to recover. Ponderosa Paint Mfg., Inc., 125 Idaho ut 319,
. 870 P,2d at 672 (Ct App, 1994). ·
There is no question of fact that both Defendants; Marty D. Frantz and Cindy M. Frantz,
signed the five guaranties for all of the obligations incurred by Eagle Ridge to Plaintiff, with the
most recent being the Commercial Guaranty signed on Murch 11, 2010. Dolezal Deel., ~lO, Ex,
G. This final agreement ·states in relevant part; "[g]uatantor absolutely and unconditionally
guarantees full and punctual payment. and satisfaction of the indebtedness of Bonower [Eagle
Ridge] lo Lender [IIB], and the performance and discharge of all Borrower's obligations under
ti1e Note and the Related Documents." Id
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The Court finds that the commercial guaranty Defendants signed on March 11, 2010, is
clear and unambiguous. As such its terms dictate the Defendants' obligation to Plaintiff
Additionally, the Court also finds that the guaranty is unconditional, and as a result Plumtiff's
right of recovery is not limited as Defendants suggest.
The Court also finds that the actual amount of Eagle Ridge's unpaid obligation to
Plaintiff is provided by the agreements between Eagle Ridge and Plaintiff. Defendants
guaranteed payment to Plaintiff of Eagle Ridge's full obligation and the guaranty does not
specifically quantify this obligation because it depends on Eagle Ridge's actual debt to Plaintiff,
not the amount Eagle Ridge initially borrowed from Plaintiff. By guarantying Eagle Ridge's full
obligation; Defendants agreed to pay the total amount of.that obligation·at- the time Eagle Ridge
defaulted plus any additional interest and penalties as provided by the note.
Further, there is no question of foct that Eagle Ridge executed several different
promissory notes in favor of Plaintiff that Defendants guaranteed with the agreement referenced
above. Id. at ~~ 4-9, Ext A-F: Defendants have not argued that these notes are ambiguous as to
Eagle Ridge's obligations. Similarly, these notes clearly and explicitly provide for Plaintiff to
impose interest and penalties on Eagle Ridge, if it did not honor its obligation. Id. Finally, there
is no question of fact that Eagle Ridge defaulted on its obligation to Plaintiff, and that the amount
it owes to Plaintiff has been iricreasirig due to iriterest"and penalties since that default. Id. at 1 11.
In sum, the express terms of the guaranties are clear and unambiguous. Likewise, the
promissory notes between Eagle Ridge and Plaintiff are also clear and unambiguous. Those
documents rend together clearly provided the amount that Defendants owe Plaintiff. As such,
there is no bona fide dispute about the amount Defendants owe"P!aintiff.
ii.

Instrument Tendered in Good Faith
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"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." LC. § 28-3103. As Comment 4 to l.C. § 28-3-310, explains it means the observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing, which will depend on the facts in a particular case, Idaho
Code Ann, § 28-3-310.
The case at hand and the relevant standard for good faith is intricately linked to
Defendants' bankrnptcy petition and their resulting status as debtors in possession (hereinafter
"DIP"). "The debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding has the power and
fiduciary obligation of a trustee to be an active agent for the prosecution of the interests of all
creditors of the estate." Crown v Klein Bros., 121 Idaho 942, 947-48, 829 P.2d 532, 537-38 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citing 11 U.S.C.A. § 1107; In Re Wiggs, 87 D.R. 57, 58 (Bankr.S.D.lll.1988); In Re

Haugen Const. Service, 104 D.R. 233, 239 (B~n~.t>.N:0:1989); **538 i948 In Re Consupak,

. Inc., 87 D.R. 529, 539 (B&nkr,N.DJLL. 1988)),
The Honorable Chief Judge Myers, United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Idaho, explained
this status and its corresponding duty as follows:

in

Debto;s are debtors posses~ion of their chapter 11 e~tate. As such, they owe fiduciary
duties to their creditors and are obligated to follow the Code and Rules. See, e.g., § §
1106, 1107 and Fed. R. Dankr.P ,2015 (delineating the duties of chapter 11 debtors in
possession, including filing periodic reports of business operations); 7 Collier on
Bankntptcy, ~ 1107.02, 1107-6 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev.
2009) ("The debtor in possession must perform not only the functions and duties of a
chapter 11 trustee, as specified in section 1106(a), but also the duties set forth in
Bankruptcy Code chapters 3 .and 5,. and-\he.•Federal Rules of-Bankruptcy Procedures,
which are applicable to chapter 11 cases."), The UST provides debtors tn possession with
guidelines to help them navigate chapter 11 by clarifying their financial reporting
requirements and addressing other requirements and the several limitations on their
postpetition actions. The guidelines echo the Code's provisions, and they specifically
warn of the need for court approval prior to paying prepetition creditors; paying
professionals, such as an attorney, accountant, or appraiser; or obtaining credit or
financing outside the ordinary course of the debtor's business,
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In re Wallace, No. 09-20496-TLM, 2010 WL 378351, at *4 (Bankr, D, Idaho Jan. 26,
5
2010) ajfd, No. 09-20496-TLM, 2011 WL 1230535 (D. Idaho Mar. 30, 2011). This Court finds

In re Wallace particularly illustrative because it ulso involved a debtor in possession paying

prepetition debts without court approval, which Judge Myers concluded was a breach of the
fiduciary duty the debtor owed its creditors.
Based on this statutorily provided duty and In re Wallace's analysis, the Court finds, as a
matter of law, that a debtor m possession tendering DIP funds to a prepetition creditor has not
acted in good faith,
The question at hand is whether the uncontested.facts show that Defendants tendered DIP
funds, and, therefore, did not act in good faith, The pertinent facts are set forth as follows:
In October 2011, Defendants voluntarily flied. u petition under Bankruptcy Code, Title 11
U.S. Code,§§ 101-1532, See generally In re Franrz, No. 11-21337-TLM, 2015 WL 1778068, at
6
*IS (Ban.kl'. D, Idaho Apr. 16, 2015), As part of the Chapter 11, Defendants were provided with

Guidelines and Reporting Requirements for Chapter 11 Debtors from the U.S. Trustee's Otlice.
Declaration of Sheila Schwager in Support ofllB's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment (October 7, 2015) (hereinafter "Schwager Opposition Deel."),~ 11, Ex, I.
These guidelines explain that a debtor should consult with its counsel about whether court
approval is needed for specific transactions, and that generally court approval is required to make
a payment on a prepetition debt. Id. This case was ultimately converted into a Chapter 7

The Court acknowledges In re Wallace is unpublished and does not consider the same to be binding authority. It
is set forth to the extent the Court finds Judge Myers persuasive on these issues.
• Plaintiff Initiated this case prior to Defendants filing for bai1kruptcy. This case Is able to go forward because
Defendants waived their discharge In the batikri1ptc{cas·e io 'aii d'etits arid all credit~rs. See Declaration of Sheila
R. Schwager In Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (September 21, 2015) Ex. B, Memorandum Decision, pp,

5

as

11-12.
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bankruptcy, Declaration of Sheila Schwager in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
(September 21, 2015) (hereinafter "Schwager Deel."), '1!3.
On April 9, 2013, the cashier check in question was sent to Plaintiffs CEO, Jack
Gustave!, by courier from Defendants' former Chapter I ! bankruptcy counsel. Declaration of
Jack Gustave! in Support oflill's opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(October 7, 2014) (hereinafter "Gustave! Deel."), 'll'll 4-5, Ex. A. Plaintiffimmedmtely forwarded
a copy of the check to its attorney. Id. at 'If 6. The next day, Plaintiff sent Defendants' Chapter 11
attorney, David Eash, a letter and informed him they received the check. Schwager Opposition
Deel., 'll'lf 2-4, Ex. A; Gustave) Deel., 'If 7, Ex. B. In its letter, Plaintiff told Mr. Eash that it would
"not be cashing the check and certainly (would] not negotiate it 'as payment in full"' of
Defendants obligation. Id. Plaintiff did not return the check to Defendants because of the pending
conversion to Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and instead gave it to the Chapter 7 trustee as soon as the
trustee was appointed. Id.
Finally, Defendants have misrepresented to this Court that the funds conveyed with the
ession account.
cashier check were from an exempt IRA account, and not from a debtor-in-poss
..
'

' • , ' ,'

Frantz Deel., Ex. 5; Schwager Deel., 'If 7, Ex. C, p. IO. Defendants' exempt IRA account does not
show a depletion of$20,000 at any time in 2013, and, in fact, the balance in 2015 is the same as
when it was initially listed in Schedule B of the Bankruptcy Schedules, See Schwager Deel., 'll'll
letter with an email
10, .2013,
to Plaintiffs April
Eash. responded
Finally, Mr.
8, 9, Exs. D-G.
, .. ',.
. ,.
' ' ,•··. -'' .:· '
.
.
.
'

',

'•

','

,.

where he said, "I understand that these fimds from the Debtors' DIP account would properly be
tu111ed over to the yet to be appointed Chapter 7 trustee." Frantz Deel., Ex. 3; Schwager Deel, 'If
5, Ex. B (emphasis added), As far as this Court can tell there is simply no evidence that these
supports the
evidenq~ .actually
the- available
and, •.a.II.
from an exempt account,
funds came
·.
.
' ""'
.
'
.
'

','

'

••'

',

'
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opposite assertion-the funds tendered were from a DIP account. Moreover, there is no evidence
showing that Defendil!lts had permission from the bankruptcy court to use the funds to discharge
the prepetttion debt.
There is no question that Defendants were debtors in possession, and, thus were bound by
this fiduciary duty to the creditors of the bankruptcy estate, Moreover, there is clear evidence in
the record that Defendants had notice that as part of their filing a Chapter 11 petition, court
permission was required before they could discharge a prepetition debt. This Court finds that all
of Defendants actions outlined above contravened this duty, as well as this knowledge.
'

'

Consequently, as a matter of law, ·the Court finds that the Defendants could not have tender the
check in good faith because they were debtors in possession at the time they attempted to tender
the check.
iii.

Acceptance

The final element of accord and satisfaction is that the creditor agree to accept the
negotiable instrument as full satisfaction of the original obligation, or that there is clear proof
ren<lered' instrument'·.fulfilled the debtor's
that
and. debtor
creditor
that both the
'
.. the
.
... . .understood
.
.
'

·

"

"'

•,

"

'

,''

'

obligation. Beard, 135 Idaho at 689, 23 P.3d at 151.
Acceptance can be demonstrated if the creditor accepts and cashes an instrument that
says on its face that it is tendered as full payment for the original obligation. Holley, 128 Idaho at
510, 915 P,2d at 740 (the creditor received paymenJ .when she cashed the check in question);
Shore, 146 Idaho at 913, 204 PJd at I 124 (creditor's performance constituted acceptance of

debtor's offer); see also I.C. § 28-3-602,
As noted previously, Plaintiffs immediate response to receiving the cashier's check was
to contact Defendants' bankruptcy attorney and tell him -that it would "not be cashing the check
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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and ce11ainly [would] not negotiate it 'as payment in full"' of Defendants obligation. Schwager
Opposition Deel.,

~~

2-4, Ex. A; Gustavel Deel.,

~

7, Ex. B. There is no question of fact that

Plaintiff never cashed the check, Instead, it delivered the actual check to the Chapter 7 trnstee
once he was appointed. Plaintiff clearly demonstrated that it did not accept the funds tendered by
endorsing the back of the check, "Pay to the Oder of the Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trnstee of Case
No. ll-21337-TLM," Frantz Deel., Exs. 2-3. In total Plaintiff held the check for approximately
thirty-eight (38) days, but never received any of the funds Defendants intended to tender with the
check. See Schwager Dec,, Ex, L; Gustave! Deel., ~1110,1 l; In re Frailtz, No. 11-21337-TLM,
2015 WL 1778068, at *15 (Bankr. D. Idaho Apr. 16, 2015) (no creditors have been paid on then·

claims in the bankruptcy case).
Based on the uncontested facts in the record this Court can only conclude that Plaintiff
did not accept the funds that Defendants· tendered. in

full. payment of their original obligation.

Plaintiff's clear intent and performauce do not demonstrate acceptance of the funds that were
meant to effect accord and satisfaction, Further, the Court finds that the Plaintiff properly held
the check until it could deliver the instrument to the Chapter 7 trustee, Plaintiff's good faith
effort to honot the bankruptcy cod~ by holding th~ check .until the Chapter 7 trustee was
appointed should not and will not be construed as acceptance by this Court.

In conclusion, the Court finds as a matter of law that Defendants foiled to show proof of
any element of accord and satisafoction, Therefore, Defendants motion for summary judgment
based on affirmative defense is denied.
2.

Unclean Hands Doctrine
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Defendants also move for summary judgtnent' u11der the uncle~n hands doctrine, They
argue that Plaintiff should foreclose on the mortgages that secured Eagle Ridge's debt instead of
seeking to recover from the Defendants for the personal guarantees that they made.
The clean hands doctrine "stands for the proposition that 'a litigant may be denied relief
by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue.' " Gilbert v. Nampa
Sch. Dist. No. 131, 104 Idaho 137, 145,657 P.2d 1, 9 (1983) (citing 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity
§ 136 (1996)). A trial court's discretion to apply the clean hands has been stated in broad
terms:
The clean hands doctrine ... is not one of absolutes and [it] should be applied in
the court's discretion, so as to accomplish its purpose of promoting public policy
. and the integrity of the courts.. . • .•• .
[E]quity will consider the conduct of the adversary, the requirements of public
policy, and the relation of the misconduct to the subject matter of the suit and to
[the) defendant.
Id at 145-46, 657 P.2d nt 9-10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Ada Cnty. Highway Dist. v. Total Success.lnvesttnenrs, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370-71, 179 P.3d
323, 333"34 (2008),
In determining if [the clean hands] doctrine applies a court has discretion to evaluate the
relative conduct of both parties and to determine whether the conduct of the party seeking
an equitable remedy should, in the light of all the circumstances, preclude such relief. A
trial court's decis10n to afford relief based on the unclean hands doctrine, or to reject its
application, will not be overturned on appeal absent a demonstration that the lower court
·
·
abused its discretion, ·

Swordv. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,251, 92 P.3d 492,501 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
"Equitable remedies are not dependent upon contractual authorization, but apply
precisely because there is no adequate remedy at law under the contract's terms, and because
sufficient grounds to invoke equity, such as miittiirl mistake, fraud, or impossibility, are present."

Holscher v. James, 124 Idaho 443,447,860 P.2d 646,650 (1993),
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Plaintiff argues that the doctrint: does not apply here because it-has brought a breach of
contract claim based on the guaranties and does not seek equitable remedies as relief. See

generally Verified Complaint for Breach of Guaranty (July 9, 20IO), Specifically, Plaintiff filed
this lawsuit seeking the money Defendants owe it because of Defendants' breach of the
guaranties. Thus, Plaintiff contends that Defendants motion fails as a matter of law.

The Court agrees with this contention, and finds that Plaintiff is not seeking an equitable
remedy, and, therefore Defendants' motion foils as a matter of law. However, even if the motion
did not fail for this reason, the Court, acting within the outer bounds of its discretion, also finds
that equity does not require the doctrine be applied to tlie ·case at hand.
Defendants have not alleged that there was a mutual mistake or impossibility in this case,
nor have they alleged any facts that show Plaintiff committed fraud in relation to the guaranties,
Moreover, as mentioned previously, the unconditional guaranties at issue here do not require that
Plaintiff seek recovery from Eagle Ridge before b1'inging iis separate claims against Defendants,

CIT Fin. Servs. v. Herb's Indoor RV Ctr., Inc., 118 Idaho 185, 187, 795 P.2d 890, 892 (Ct. App.
1990) ("An unconditional guaranty is a promise by the.guarantor to pay the debt or perform the
obligation upon default without requiring the secured party to first exhaust its remedies against
the debtor:") As such, Plai~tit'f has not engaged i~ conduct that "has be~~ inequitable, unfair and
dishonest, or fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." Gilbert v. Nampa Sch. Dist.

No. 13], 104 Idaho 137, 145, 657 P.2d I, 9 (1983) (citing 27 Am.Jur.2d Equity§ 136 (1996)). It
follows that there is no reason, as a matter of law, to apply the unclean hands doctrine to this
case.
For the reasons explained above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment under the
unclean hands doctrine is dented.
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C. Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment
nst Defendants as a matter of law.
Plaintiff has also moved for summary judgment agai
r and unambiguous contract, and there is no
First, it argues the commercial guarantees are clea
agreements. It also argues that Defendants'
question of fact that Defendants breached the
of the guaranties. As a result of these two
defenses are precluded under the express terms
Defendants oppose this motion.
arguments, Plaintiff moves for summary judgment.

J. The Commercial Guaranties
l effect are questions of law to be
"The determination of a contract's meaning and lega
and unambiguous. Galaxy Outdoor
decided by the com1 where the contract is clear
ent, 109 Idaho 692, 710 P.2d 602
Advertising Inc. v. Idaho Transportation Departm
to be ambiguous, the interpretation of
(1985). However, where a contract is determined
ses upon the intent of the paities. See,
the document presents u question of fact which focu
P:2d 1381 {1990); Luzar v. Western
Rainco v. H-K Contractors, Inc.; 118 ldahi:il08, 794
determination of whether u contract
Surely Co., 107 ldaho 693, 692 P.2d 337 (1984). The
h we may exercise free review, see
is ambiguous or not 1s a question of law over whic
794 P.2d 1381 (1990); Delancey v.
Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108,
tello jndustrial Pm·k, Co. v. Steel
. Delancey, 110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986); Poca
se v. Ransom, 117 Idaho 734, 791
West, Inc., 101 ldaho 783, 621 P.2d 399 (1980); Prou
a contract is ambiguous, our task is
P,2d 1313 (Ct.App, 1989), and in determining whether
subject to contlicting interpretation.
to ascertain whether. the contract is. reasonably
1219 (1988);DeLancey v. Delancey,
Spencer-Steedv. Spencer, 115 Idaho 338,766 P.2d
110 Idaho 63, 714 P.2d 32 (1986),
, 1345-46 (1992).
Bondy v. Levy, 121 Idaho 993, 996-97, 829 P.2d 1342
guarantees that Defendants signed are
The Court has already found that the commercial
g interpretations;
subje1el to conflictin
antie~ _are. 11ot
'
racts. The guar
cpnt
..
ous
bigt1
'..
,
clear and unam
.
cally clear and unambiguous. In relevant purt
the agreement's terms and conditions are unequivo
y and unconditionally guarantees full and
the final agreement says, "(g]uarantor absolutel
ness of Borrower [Eagle Ridge] to Lender
punctual payment and satisfaction of the indebted
ower's obligations under the Note and the
[IIB], and.the performance and discharge of all Boq
'

'•

·

'

'

guarantees also state:
Related Documents." Dolezal Deel., ~10, Ex. G. The
Y JUDGMENT;.PLAlNTIFF'S MOTION TO
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TIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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Amendments. This guaranty, together with any related Documents, constitutes the entire
understanding and agreement of the pa1ties as to the matters set forth in this guaranty. No
alteration or amendment to this guaranty shall be effective unless given in writing and
signed by the party or parties sought to be charged or bound by the alteration or
amendment.
Integration. Guarantor further agrees that Guarantor has read and fully understands the
terms of this Guaranty ... the Guaranty fully reflects the Guarantor's intentions and parol
evidence is not required to interpret the terms of the Guaranty.

Id.

As the Court has also already discussed, there is no question of fact that both Defendants,

Mu1ty D, Frantz and Cindy M, Frantz, signed this agreement. Id. There is also no question of fact
that Eagle Ridge defaulted on its obligation to Pluintiff, and the Defendants have not discharged
Eagle Ridge's obligation as is required by the commercial guarantees,
Eagle
from
is entitled to
Plaintiff
finds..·, that
In conclusion, the Court
·-. Defendants
....
. recover
. •.· .·, ,, . ' .:· "
.
:._ ·'
',".

'

''.

'

•·,

Ridge's full debt and obligation because there are no genuine issues of material fact about the
terms of the commercial guarantee or that Defendants breached that guamntee,
2. Defendants 'Defenses and Counterclaims
Plaintiff argues that all of Defendants defenses .and. collnterclaims

foH as a matter of law,

and therefore Plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment.
Defendants have asserted several defenses to their obligation under the guaranttes,
Specifically, they assert that Plaintiffs claim is barred by alleged (I) waiver; (2) equitable
estoppel, quasi-estoppel and promissory, estoppel; (3) _breach of contract;•(4) breach of good faith
and fair dealing; (5) fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentations; (6) unjust enrichment; and
(7) failure to join an indispensable party. They also bring counterclaims for (1) specific
performance of oral contract to leud money under the doctrine of equitable estoppel and part
performance; (2) claim for specific performance of' oral contmct to· lend money under the
OROER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
STRIKE; and DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTlAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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doctrine of promissory estoppel; .(3) unjust enrichment; (4) breach of contract; (5) breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

i. Counterclaims
All of Defendants counterclaims foil as a matter of law because Defendants do not have
standing to bring them as debtors in possession due to their bankruptcy petition.
A debtor in a bankruptcy proceeding is required to disclose all existing and potential
assets, Mccallister v. Dixon, 154 Idaho 891,895,303 P.3d 578, 582 (2013) (citing 11 U.S.C. §§
521(1), 541(a)(7)), "[T)itle to the debtor's assets, including causes of action that belong to the
debtor when bankruptcy is filed, vest in the bankruptcy estate." Id at 898, 303 P.3d at 585
(citing Kane v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 535 .F.3d 380, 385 (5th Cir.2008)). The bankruptcy
trustee is the only pa1ty with standing to pursue a cause of action that belongs to the bankmptcy
•

'

•

•

'

.'

'

' ,'

•

' '•

•

'

• • • •

:·

',

..

• >

•',

'

• ,,

•

estate. Id. (citing Kane, 535 F.3d at 385).
The doctrine of "O]udicial estoppel precludes a party from advantageously taking one
position, then subsequently seeking a second position that is incompatible with the first." Id at
894, 303 P.3d at 581 (citing 4 & J Const Co, y. w_oQd, 141 Iduho 682, ,~84, 116 P.3d 12, 14
(2005).

Judicial estoppel will be applied "when the debtor has knowledge of enough facts to

know that a potential cause of action exists during the pendency of the bankntptcy, but fails to
amend his schedules or disclosure statements to identify the cause of action as a contingent
asset" Id at 895,303 P,3.d.at582 (citirtg.A&J-Covst.,ui,, 141 Idaho at 686, 116 PJd at 16
(quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 2002)) (emphasis
added). It is necessary "to discourage debtors from concealing potential assets." Id. (citing
Hamilton v, State Farm Fire & Gas, Co., 270 F.3d 778 (9th Cir.2001); Burnes, 291 FJd at 1286;
Oneida Motor Frelghr, Inc. v, UnitedJerseylJank, 848 F.2d 414,4 I 9 (3d CirJ988)). The focus
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of the inquiry is the on knowledge of the party, not the intent of the party. Id. (citing McKay v.

Owens, 130 Idaho 148,155,937 P.2d 1222, 1229 (1997)).
Here, the Defendants had actual knowledge of its counterclaims when they entered
bankruptcy. They filed their Verified Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims and
Demand for Jury Trial and Third Party Complaint on August 27, 2010. They entered into
bankruptcy in October of 2011. Thus, at that point all their counterclaims vested in the
bankruptcy estate, and, as a result Defendants do not have standing to bring the counterclaims.
ii. Defenses

In addition to accord and satisfaction, which fails for the reasons explained above,
Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on the seven other affirmative defenses that
Defendants have raised. The affirmative defenses are (1) wai'ver; (2) equitable estoppel, quasiestoppel and promissory estoppel; (3) breach of contract; (4) breach of good faith and fair
dealing; (5) fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentations; (6) unjust enrichment; and (7) failure
to join an indispensable party. First Verified Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims
and Demand for Jury Trial and Third Party Complaint (March 23, 2011 ),
•

•

•",

,

I

:

•

,

'.

The affirmative defenses mirror Defendants' counterclaims, and their answer goes so far
as to direct the Court to read the counterclaim allegations as the bases for the affirmative
defenses, Jd, (" .. ,for the reasons, including but not limited to, as set forth in the counterclaims
the bar on their
to circumvent
should not be able
the Defendants.
argues. that
below.") Plaintiff
, .. ·., .
. ...
... . ' ' '
.
. : ..
.
·

•'

'

•'

counterclaims by reasserting them as affirmative defenses instead, It also argues that these
7
affirmative defenses rely on an alleged oral agreement between Plaintiff and Eagle Ridge, which

7

This Court is familiar with the Issue of whether 118 and Eagle Ridge entered into an oral agreement under which
118 agreed to loan additional money to Eagle Ridge, and. then.brea,ch.ed that agreemenJ. Thos.e allega!lons are the
basis for a cause of action pending before this Court in Eagle Ridge v. Idaho Independent Bank, CV 14-5339.
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Defendants were not a party to, and, thus do

not have standing to

bring ·any defenses that are

bused on that alleged oral agreement.
To establish standing in a case involving a contract:
[A] party need only show either privity or third-party beneficiary status to have standing
to sue on a breach of contract. See Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267, 272, 688 P.2d 1172,
1177 (1984); Ostrovitz & Gwmn, LLC v. First Specialty Ins. Co., 393 S.WJd 379, 387
(Tex,App.2012) ("Under the general law of contracts, a party must show either privity or
third-party-beneficiary status in order to have standing to sue for breach of contract.").
"Privily is established by proving that the defendant was a party to an enforceable
contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the
plaintiff." OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Viii., L.P., 234 S,W.3d 726, 738
(Tex.App.2007);. see .also Restatement .($ec.onq) .of Contracts § .305, cmt. a (1981)
(promisee of promise for benefit of beneficiary has same right to performance as any
other promisee).
Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 158 ldaho 9571 354 P.3d 1172, 1178 (2015),

Here Defendants do not have privity as to the alleged oral agreement between Plaintiff
and Eagle Ridge, Eagle Ridge is

a corporcitlon,

uno,· thus. "[a]bseni grounds to pierce the

corporate veil, a corpomtion is a separate entity from its shareholders[.]" Washington Fed Sav.
v. Van Enge/en, 153 Idaho 648, 654, 289 P.3d 50, 56 CW12); see Maroun v. Wyreless ,Sys., Inc.,

141 Idaho 604, 616-17, 114 P.3d 974, 986-87 (2005). No one in the current action has argued
that this Court should pierce the corporate veil

and find th~t Eagle Ridge and its shareholders are

the same entity. As a result, while Defendants may be shareholders in Eagle Ridge, but that does
not mean that they are a party to any alleged agreements that Eagle Ridge and Plaintiff entered.
Similarly, Defendants are not a third party beneficiary to any oral agreement between
Eagle Ridge and Plaintiff,
"The test for detennining a party's status as a third"party beneficiary ... is whether the
agreement reflects an intent to benefit the third party." Idaho Power Co. v Hulet, 140
Idaho 110, 112, 90 P.3d 335, 337 (2004). The third party must show the contract was
made primarily for his benefit; it is not sufficient that the third party is a mere incidental
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; FLAlNTIFF'S MOTION TO
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beneficiary to the contract Id, (quotirigAdkison Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406,
409,690 P.2d 341,344 (1984)); Femvrck v. Idaho Dep't of Lands, 144 ldaho 318,323,
160 P.3d 757, 762 (2007) (quoting Dawson v. Eldredge, 84 Idaho 331, 337, 372 P.2d
414, 418 (1962) (quoting Sachs v. Ohio Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 148 F.2d 128, 131 (7th
Cir.1945))). The intent to benefit the third party must be expressed in the contract itself.
Idaho Power Co., 140 Idaho at 112, 90 P.3d at 337 (quoting Adkison Corp., I07 ldaho at
409, 690 P,2d at 344;) Fenwick, 144 Idaho at 323, 160 P.3d at 762 (quoting Adkison
Corp., 107 Idaho at 409,690 P,2d at 344),

Partoutv. Harper, 145 Idaho 683,687, 183 PJd 771, 775 (2008).
Here, Defendants have essentially alleged Eagle Ridge would not have defaulted on its
obligation to Plaintiff if Plaintiff had fulfilled its alleged obligation under the pmported oral
contract. Accordingly, Plaintiff would not have grounds then to force Defendants to pay Eagle
."

Ridge's outstanding obligation under the commercial guarantees that Defendants signed. While
Defendants may receive some benefits if the alleged oral agreement did in fact exist, there are no
facts in the record of this case that show the oral agreement was made with the intention to
benefit Defendants, as athird. p~rty. Conseq~1e[!tl;y,_ they _d~ not h_ave standing as a third party to
raise any affirmative defenses that rely on the alleged oral agreement.

It appears to the Court, based

011

the allegation in the Answer, that Defendants raise the

affirmative defenses of equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment, breach of
contract, breach of good faith or fair dealing, .m,d_ fr~udul~nt or pegligi::nt misrepresentation all
based on allegations that involve the oral agreement between Plaintiff and Eagle Ridge. Since
Defendants do not have standing to bring claims based on that alleged agreement, these defenses
all fail as a matter of law.
As for .the affirmative _defense o( waiver, Defe_ndants have not allege.~.any facts that show
that Plaintiff actually waived its right to bring an action against Defendants based on the
guarantees. Defendants' defense of waiver is a bare allegation that "Plaintiff, by words and/or
ORDER RE: PLAINTlFF'S MOTlON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
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conduct has waived any right to bring an action against Defendants based on the guarantees,"
'

..

'.•',

..

Answer, 'l[C,
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage, .. ,"
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449,457,259 P.3d 595, 603 (2011) (quoting Fullerton
v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006)). "Waiver is foremost a question of

intent" and the party proving waiver is required to show a clear intent to waive. Id. Absent "a
clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amountmg to
estoppel" waiver will not be inferred from a party's conduct. Id at 458, 259 PJd at 604 (quoting
Margaret H Wayne Tru$1 v, Lipsky, 1.23 Idaho 25.3, 25/;i, 846 P,2d 904, 907 (1993)).

Here there are no facts in the record that show, or even support the allegation, that
Plaintiff unequivocally expressed their intent to waive their right to enforce the commercial
guarantees against Defendants. Thus, Defendants affirmative defense of waiver fails,
Defendants' final afficmative defem,e that Pll}intiffs have.Jailed to. join an indispensable
party, Eagle Ridge, in this suit also foils as a matter ofluw. Defendants argue that Eagle Ridge is
an indispensable party to this cause of action as the borrower whose obligation Defendants
guaranteed.
Idaho R. of Civ. Pro J.9 provides for compulsory. and voluntary joinder, ln a similar case
to the one at hand, the Court of Appeals found that the Rule does not require that a debtor whose
obligation was guaranteed be joined in a suit to enforce that commercial guarantee. Bank of

Idaho v. Colley, 103 Idaho 320, 322-23, 647 P.2d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 1982). It is well established
in Idaho that an unconditional commercial guaraiity i$ separate agreement from the agreement
between the lender and borrower, and as such suits based on the guaranty do not require the
borrower be joined. CIT Financial Services v. Herb's Indoor RV Center, Inc., 118 Idaho 185,
ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY J(JbGMENt; PLA!Nl'IFF'S MOTION TO
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187, 795 P,2d 890, 892 (Ct.App, 1990) (citing Commercial Credit Corp. v. Chisholm Bros. Fal'm

Equipment Co., 96 Idaho 194, 525 P.2d 976 (1974)).
As a result, the Court finds that Eagle Ridge is not a necessary paity to the case at hand,
and dismisses Defendants' affinnative defense on this matter.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court finds as follows:
1. Plaintiffs motion to strike the evidence Defendants filed on October 14, 2015,

because it wus untimely is GRANTED.
2. Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ·affirmative defense of accord and
satisfaction is DENIED for the reasons detailed above.
3. Defendants' motion for summary jµdgment under the unclean. hands doctrine is
DENIED for the reasons explained above.
4. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is GRANTED for the reasons explained
above.

,../)

·

So _ordered this -2'._,__day of}fovember, ~ -

,3 I
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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF IDAHO
Idaho Supreme Court DOCKET NO. 45655
______________________________________________________________
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho corporation,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants/Appellants.
________________________________________________________________
MOTION FOR EXTENDING STAY
DURING PENDENCY OF PROCEEDINGS
______________________________________________________________________
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and
for the County of Kootenai; The Honorable Rich Christensen presiding. Kootenai County
Case #CV 2010-6088

MARTY & CINDY FRANTZ
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Phone: 208-619-0482
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
_ _______________________

Pro-Se Appellant

SHEILA R. SCHWAGER
HAWLEY TROXELL
PO Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701
208-344-6000
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
Attorney for Respondent

_______________________________________________________________________
Pursuant to Idaho Supreme Court Appellate Rules (I.A.R.) No. 13(g), Appellants, Marty D.
and Cindy M. Frantz move the court to extend the (14) day automatic Stay imposed by the
Supreme Court.
appeal.

Frantz requests that the Stay be extended during the pendency of the
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
9 day of February, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
I hereby certify that on the 15th
the foregoing to be delivered to Hawley-Troxell Attn: Sheila Schwagger via first class mail
at:

Hawley-Troxell,

PO

Box

1617,

Boise,

ID

83701-1617

and

by

email:

sschwager@hawleytroxell.com. See attached separate certificate of service. I furthermore
certify that I sent an original and (2) copies to: Attn: Court Clerk, Idaho Supreme Court,
451 W State Street, Boise, Idaho 83702.

Lastly, I certify that service has been made upon

all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20, I.A. R.

DECLARATION OF MARTY FRANTZ
I declare under the penalty of perjury as follows: I am a resident of Kootenai
County, Idaho and I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify to the facts stated herein
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of my own personal knowledge, subject to provisions as approved by the court for ADA
accommodations.

I declare that all statements I have made herein are true and correct;

BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
1. Frantz Made Millions During Great Recession - During the Great Recession, I
(Frantz) made millions of dollars. From 2007 thru 2010,

I personally made over

$5,000,000. During late 2008, the worst months during the Recession, I closed a REIT
transaction which alone netted me personally $3.1m in cash.

See EXHIBIT 1 REIT

statement.
2. Frantz Offers To Pay Down Bank Loan - Flush with millions in cash, in mid 2008 I
offered Idaho Independent Bank (IIB) to pay down my $4.5m Eagle Ridge On Twin
Lakes (“Eagle Ridge”) construction/development loan or alternately to reinvest my good
fortune into construction projects. Paying down the IIB loan would generate no jobs in
the community.

Reinvesting my $3.1m in new building projects would generate

hundreds of jobs in our community and allow me to add new projects to my successful,
growing healthcare projects portfolio.
3. Bank Decides To Lend - Due to my strong financial condition, at the end of 2008, the
bank (IIB) decided to continue lending on my construction project. So instead of using
my $3.1m personal cash to pay down my loan, I deposited the $3.1m into the Eagle
Ridge project IIB checking account. IIB agreed to continue lending to the project and to
increase their lending to me based upon loan to value ratios (LTV) after completing an
appraisal which they ordered a few months later.
4. Bank Initially Performs As Agreed - The bank initially met the terms of their
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lending promise and extended to me a $4.5m Eagle Ridge loan in 2008, 2009,
2010 and formally approved a 3 year loan extension thru 2013. Furthermore,
in early 2010, IIB internal memos show that the bank underwriter suggested
increasing my personal credit line as the bank previously had promised. Please
refer to Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 44252 Pg 844 & 845 of Expert Witness
James Miller, an OCC Bank Examiner or this also can be found in EXHIBIT 6.
The underwriting review was written February, 2010 only three months before the
banker filed the fabricated false loan default. The bank’s (IIB) underwriter, Mr.
Hendricks wrote VP Colwell the following;
“Our borrower” has very strong character and that provides us with good
opportunity to continue forward to a successful project… Marty Frantz is well
known to the bank, provides high net worth, good credit, significant liquidly, and
outside/secondary sources of repayment…
Marty had been instrumental in
bringing over $2.5MM in deposits to the branch… I can’t think of another
borrower that provides a better combination of strength’s that we can work with
on a significant project like Eagle Ridge… …the bank can consider additional
funding to Marty personally via an increase to his LOC. [Referring to increasing
my wife and my personal line of credit IIB gave us for developing the Eagle Ridge
project”.]
5. Frantz Performs As Agreed - Upon signing the 2009 IIB bank loan renewal, I then
reinvested my $3.1m cash into Eagle Ridge creating hundreds of jobs needed in my
community. See EXHIBIT 2 - $3.1m deposit into Eagle Ridge IIB checking account.
As a result of the property improvements I made with my own cash during 2009, the
Eagle Ridge bank appraisal at the end of 2009 justified several million more in credit
lending to me.
6. Proud To Help Turn Around Recession - I was proud of my contribution as a small
business America leader. I used my millions of dollars of personal cash to reinvest in
viable construction projects during the Recession instead of yielding to panic and fear,
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widespread during the Recession. Squandering my good fortune by paying down the
loan would have stopped the creation of hundreds of jobs in my community. My
business continued to grow and I remained financially sound through the entire
recession.
7. By 2010 IIB (bank) Became Comatose - By early 2010, IIB’s stock plummeted over
90% from a high of $33.00/share to $2.45/share. It became listed as a “troubled” bank
with poor industry ratings. See EXHIBIT 3 bank ratings which are true and correct
copies. While I made millions of dollars during the Recession, the bank, IIB, lost
millions of dollars.

The bank CEO began reneging on his lending promises to good

viable customers as myself by refusing to extend credit previously promised by the
bank.
8. U.S. President Urges Banks To Lend To Small Business - See EXHIBIT 4 Western
Independent Bankers Conference FDIC Governor’s speech and the President’s speeches
during the Great Recession which are true and correct copies. In summary, Elizabeth A.
Duke, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FDIC) st.ated:
“At the Fifty-third Annual Western Independent Bankers Conference,
Scottsdale, Arizona, March 31, 2010 Restoring Credit to Communities Governor Elizabeth A. Duke
…Now I would like to turn to small business lending. Small businesses are, in
many cases, the most important customer segment for community banks. And
because community banks are an important source of credit for small
businesses, their challenges and their fates are closely linked. Despite the
best efforts of bankers and regulators, we continue to hear of the difficulties
experienced by small businesses in obtaining credit.
A recent study
conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) found
that of small employers who attempted to borrow in 2009, about half received
all the credit they wanted. But nearly one-quarter received no credit at all. A
similar study in 2005 found nearly 90 percent of small employers had most or
all their credit needs met and only eight percent obtained no credit…
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Finally, small business lending often is based on relationships that are
solidified over time. Sometimes those relationships are broken as a result of
the bank's inability to lend, such as when banks fail or when they reduce
lending due to strains or concentrations in their own portfolios.
In those
circumstances, small businesses may find it quite difficult to establish similar
arrangements with a new bank…”
In my case (Frantz), I could not get credit from another bank because the CEO
banker (IIB) had viciously filed a fabricated false loan default against me
immediately ruining my credit which acted as “economic sanctions”. That
caused my profitable business to close and laying off dozens of subcontractors.
See my web-site at: www.preventingcrisis.com in EXHIBIT 5 which is a
true and correct copy.
Quote:
President Obama Addresses Joint Session of Congress
washingtonpost.com
Tuesday, February 24, 2009
…And when we learn that a major bank has serious problems, we will hold
accountable those responsible, force the necessary adjustments, provide the
support to clean up their balance sheets, and assure the continuity of a strong,
viable institution that can serve our people and our economy.
I intend to hold these banks fully accountable for the assistance they receive,
and this time, they will have to clearly demonstrate how taxpayer dollars result
in more lending for the American taxpayer. This time, CEOs won't be able to
use taxpayer money to pad their paychecks or buy fancy drapes or disappear on
a private jet. Those days are over.

State of the Union: President Obama's Speech
BY ABC NEWS JAN 27, 2010
…We should start where most new jobs do – in small businesses, companies
that begin when an entrepreneur takes a chance on a dream, or a worker
decides its time she became her own boss……Through sheer grit and
determination, these companies have weathered the recession and are ready to
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grow. But when you talk to small business owners in places like Allentown,
Pennsylvania or Elyria, Ohio, you find out that even though banks on Wall
Street are lending again, they are mostly lending to bigger companies. But
financing remains difficult for small business owners across the country…
…So tonight, I'm proposing that we take $30 billion of the money Wall Street
banks have repaid and use it to help community banks give small businesses
the credit they need… People are out of work. They are hurting. They
need our help. And I want a jobs bill on my desk without delay...But the
truth is, these steps still won't make up for the seven million jobs we've lost
over the last two years... One place to start is serious financial reform.
Look, I am not interested in punishing banks, I'm interested in protecting
our economy. A strong, healthy financial market makes it possible for
businesses to access credit and create new jobs...”
Barack Obama
Speech Proposing Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee
delivered 14 January 2010
“It was little more than a year ago that we stood on that precipice. Several of
the world's largest financial institutions had already failed. Credit markets
froze and banks refused to lend… Now, the fact is these financial
institutions are essential to our economy. They provide capital and credit to
families purchasing homes, students attending college, businesses seeking to
start up or expand… Our goal is not to punish Wall Street firms, but rather
to prevent the abuse and excess that nearly caused the collapse of many of
these firms and the financial system itself.
9. Frantz Criticizes Bank -

By early 2010,

Frantz began criticizing the IIB bank

founder/CEO for not honoring his bank charter public duties and responsibility. Frantz’s
remarks offended the bank CEO. Upset and jealous of the millions of dollars Frantz
made during the recession while the bank was losing millions of dollars, the bank
CEO retaliated.
10. Banker Fabricates False Loan Default - Mid 2010, the founder/CEO fabricated a
false loan default against me.

See my loan officer’s statement in EXHIBIT 6

verifying that there was no loan default. At the same time the founder/CEO fired my
loan officer.

The false default resulted in immediate economic sanctions which were
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intended to force me to sign a problematic 3 years loan extension (2010 thru 2013). The
3 year loan extension did not provide lending as promised.

Rather it requested

unnecessary extra collateral that would stop the development of Eagle Ridge for no good
reason other than the bank’s internal financial problems and as retaliation to Frantz’s
criticism. The bank’s broken promise and actions stopped $32,000,000 of my healthcare
projects. One of those healthcare projects was located in Lewiston, Idaho and had
already broken ground but had to be shut down. See attached EXHIBIT 1. The ripple
effect resulted in dozens of Frantz’s subcontractors being laid off and hundreds of
workers in the community losing their jobs. Many of those subcontractors went out of
business.

See attached EXHIBIT 7

declaration of Frantz’s landscape subcontractors

that went out of business as a result which is a true and correct copy. The banks
underwriter for my loan stated in internal memos that there were ways the bank could
have met their commitment to me and saved hundreds of jobs. Please refer to Idaho
Supreme Court Docket No. 44252 Pg 844 & 845 of Expert Witness James Miller, an
OCC Bank Examiner which is a true and correct copy of the internal bank memo which
suggested increasing my line of credit as an avenue to meet the bank’s lending duty.
This expert witness report is also attached as EXHIBIT 6.
11. Banker Economic Sanctions Catastrophic - I am a successful American entrepreneur
who loves his country and became trapped by a bank CEO’s shocking lending practices
which were in direct defiance to the direction given by the President of the United States,
a disturbing scenario that was common and wide-spread throughout the Great Recession.
See EXHIBIT 4 President speeches. IIB’s fabricated sanctions against me immediately
froze all access I had to credit and shut down my profitable business.

My litigation
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against the half billion dollar bank wasn’t even a blip on the radar screen to cause them
any concern.

Their millions in economic sanctions caused my business to immediately

shut down rendered me powerless to fight back. See Declaration of Expert Banking
CEO, Scott Gibson in EXHIBIT 6 Page 18 “Conclusion”:
“I find it very odd and would appear that IIB’s subsequent economic
sanctions over the past 5 years have been motivated out of justifying and
attempting to mask a mistake made when the dispute began. Such actions
have suppressed Frantz financially so that he is limited in ability to properly
defend himself. I do not believe it was reasonable and prudent for IIB to
have sued Frantz personally, shutting down his profitable healthcare
business activities.”
12. Pre-disposition Bias -

The immediate effect of the economic sanctions and the

banker’s over-whelming million dollar legal smear campaign was challenging to
overcome.

The stigma and pre-conceived ideas about Chapter 7 bankruptcy presented

challenges. The lower court didn’t get that I made millions during the Great Recession
because nobody was making money.

They had a pre-conceived notion that I couldn’t

pay my mortgage, a completely false perception.

I was an exception. As a result of

predisposition bias and the bank’s legal maneuvering, the case did not get past summary
judgment and never went to trial. Resultantly, the lower court entered a monetary
judgment against us which resulted in the execution of my assets subject of this appeal
attached hereto as EXHIBIT 8 “monetary judgment”.
13. Application/Request For Stay - I previously made application to the agency of the
Federal Court for a temporary partial Stay which was denied.

That request concerned

one of the same core issues of this appeal proceedings which is attached as EXHIBIT 9.
No lower court nor agency will step in and grant a Stay in this matter.
14. 14 Day Supreme Court Stay - The “monetary judgment” was temporarily stayed
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automatically by the filing of this appeal under I.A.R. 13 for a period of 14 days.

We

now desire to extend the temporary stay for the pendency of the appeal which is expected
to be approximately 6 months.

On February 15, 2018, I Motioned the Supreme Court

to extend the 14 day automatic stay for the duration of the appeal.

ANALYSIS

1. Supreme Court Authority: The Supreme Court has the discretion to extend the 14 day
automatic stay during the remainder of the Appeal pendency.

I.A.R. 13. (g) Stay Of

Proceedings states:
“Stay by Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may also, in its
discretion, enter an order staying a proposed act, a pending action
or proceeding, or the enforcement of any judgment, order or decree,
including but not limited to an injunction, writ of mandamus or
prohibition, at any time during the pendency of an original
application or petition for any extraordinary writ, or during the
pendency of any appeal or a motion for certification of appeal..”
2. Bypass Supersedeas Bond - For good cause, the Supreme Court may delay or bypass
supersedeas bond requirements for a debtor under 62(b)(g) while the post judgment
motions are pending. Thus a court can extend the automatic 14 day time allowed after
reviewing the merits of the Motion.

TITLE VII. JUDGMENT › Rule 62. Stay of

Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment states:
“(g) APPELLATE COURT'S POWER NOT LIMITED. This rule does not limit the power of
the appellate court or one of its judges or justices:
(1) to stay proceedings—or suspend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction—while
an appeal is pending; or
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(2) to issue an order to preserve the status quo or the effectiveness of the judgment
to be entered.”
3. All Frantz Assets Were Already Transferred or Sold To IIB - All our non-exempt
assets were in the Chpt 7 Estate. IIB is a Chpt 7 creditor with over a 95% interest.
Furthermore, the Federal court recently ordered the transferred/sale of all my assets to
IIB.

IIB also completed their foreclosure on their 104 acre collateral over a year ago.

IIB has received ownership of all my assets in their entirety. See attached EXHIBIT
11 which is a true and correct copy of the sale of all my assets to IIB. IIB can only
object to the extended Stay if they can show that Frantzs has assets that upon execution
IIB could sell and turn into cash which effort may be impaired by the Stay. But all the
assets have been sold and cashed out. With no remaining assets, there can be no possible
delay or impairment to collect on IIB’s judgment. Therefore, the stay will not impede
the sale or collection of the judgment. Also see EXHIBIT 11, the Declaration of
Lawrence Tepper legal opinion attesting that the fair market value of the District court’s
judgment order is $ -0- due to our “judgment proof” economic status.

Resultantly, IIB

will not be impaired in their collection of the judgment regardless if we lose on not on
the appeal.

Requiring a supersedeas bond for extending the Stay would be a

wasteful use of resources since there are no remaining assets to recover the balance
of the judgment.
4. Impecunious Financial Position - IIB shattered our 35 year profitable business and
completely broke us financially.

We have no other assets other than the clothes on our

backs and meager exempt personal belongings.

We are both over 65, have no

employment income and live off of social security. See attached EXHIBIT 11 copies of
our (2) checking accounts which we certify under oath (see page 2) are the only checking
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accounts we have which are true and correct copies. On February 17, 2018 those
checking accounts had a combined balance of less than $2,700. We furthermore certify
that our IRA Retirement and Health savings account have a combined balance less than
$7,000 and we have no non-exempt assets. Due to our impecunious financial condition,
we have no ability to borrow money or to qualify for any kind of credit or bond.
5. Litigation Between IIB and Frantz Not Over - The matter between IIB and Frantz is
not over. In addition to the District court continuing proceedings, Frantz has a pending
Motion to Unwind the Chpt 7 Estate asset sale in the Federal Court case #11-21337TLM.

This case alleges IIB improperly executed on the purchase of assets with

“Unclean hands” and is attached hereto as EXHIBIT 10 which is a true and correct
copy.
6. If Stay Is Not Granted - The evidence herein verifies there are no remaining assets to
collect. The judgment is uncollectable as attested to by the legal opinion in EXHIBIT 11
and therefore serves no purpose other than to harass and intimidate or usurp Frantz’s right
to defend. If the Court does not Stay the judgment, even though there are no remaining
assets to collect, collection agencies will continue to attempt to collect and IIB will
continue with judgment posturing during the appeal proceedings. It is conceivable that
IIB may attempt to usurp our right to this appeal which they have been doing in another
court action. See substitution of Appellee in EXHIBIT 12 which is a true and correct
copy.

These inappropriate legal maneuvers which, in effect, attempt to usurp basic

constitutional rights will only result in more heated litigation and delays that otherwise
will be avoided when an extension to the Stay is granted.
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CONCLUSION

Extending the Supreme Court 14-day automatic Stay to the pendency of the appeal is
within the Courts jurisdiction.

There are no assets or income left to collect or recover.

There is no material impairment to IIB by extending the Stay.
If the Stay is not extended, it will open the door to the expansion of the appeal with
regard to infringement which otherwise would be avoided. The public will be benefited by
extending the Stay since it will shorten the time, cost and resource use of the public court
system. Extending the Stay would set aside these concerns making these proceedings more
efficient and narrow the scope of the appeal.

WHEREFORE, we ask the Court to extend the 14 day automatic Stay during the pendency
of the appeal.

Respectfully submitted on this 19th day of February, 2018.
By:____________________________
Marty Frantz – Appellant
By:____________________________
Cindy Frantz- Appellant
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ENCLOSURES

EXHIBIT 1 $3.1m REIT sale, Lewiston HUD approval, $32m projects
EXHIBIT 2 -$3.1m Deposit To Frantz Eagle Ridge IIB checking account
EXHIBIT 3 -IIB Troubled Bank Ratings
EXHIBIT 4 -FDIC Governor’s & President’s speeches
EXHIBIT 5 – WWW.PREVENTINGCRISIS.COM Frantz Website
EXHIBIT 6 – IIB Loan Officer verifying no loan default & Expert OCC report
EXHIBIT 7– Declaration of Frantz subcontract that went out of business
EXHIBIT 8 - District court Monetary Judgment against Frantz
EXHIBIT 9- Federal court denial of Stay
EXHIBIT 10 - Federal court Motion To Unwind Sale (IIB – Unclean hands)
EXHIBIT 11 - Federal court transfer/sale of all Frantz assets to IIB
EXHIBIT 12 - IIB Substitution Of Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the 19th day of February, 2018, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to be delivered to Ms. Schwagger via Email and via mail at:
Hawley-Troxell, PO Box 1617, Boise, ID 83701-1617.

_____________________________
Marty D. Frantz
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Guardian Angel Homes - Lewiston

Transaction Detail by Payee
January • Oecember 2008
Date

Type

Num

Name

Memo/Description

Amount

Ownor • Cindy Frantz
07/0712008 General Journal 101665
10/07/2008 General Journal 101715

ACH Owner Return

Total for Owner - Cindy Frantz

(2,358.50)
(31,116.87)
$ (33,475.37)

Owner • Marty Frantz
07/07/2008General Journal 101865

09l26l2008 General Journal 101718

ACH Owner Retum
Marty Frantz Reinvestment

10/07/2008Genera1 Journal 101715
Total for Owner• Marty Frantz

(252.641.50)
174,813.85
(43,696.98)
$ (121,524.63)

Owner • Marty Frantz IRA
(10,000.00)
(100,000.00)

07/07/2008 Check
12856 Owner · Marty Frantz IRA
10/07/2008 Check
12827 Owner - Marty Frantz IRA
Tolal for Owner - Marty Frantz IRA

$ (110,000.00)

Not Speelfled

07108/2008 General Journal 101692
09f23/2008 General Journal 101823

Tronslerto Lew 1 Wells Fargo Account

(500.00)

JE • Close on Sale lo Lewiston Healthcare Investors (3,496.276.99)

Total for Not Specified

$ (3, ..96,776.99)

Thursday, Oct 29, 2009 03'.39·29 PM PDT GMT•7 • Accrual Basis

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 190 of 411

LEASE
Dated

~ [(

, 2008

Guardian Angel Homes
2221 and 2425 Vineyard Avenue
Lewiston , Idaho
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LEASE

[£::"

This Lease dated ~ I , .
2008, is by and between
Lewiston Healthcare Invetors LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company ("Landlord"), and Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston 1 LLC, an
Idaho limited liability company {"Tenant").
R E C I T A L S
This Lease is made and entered into with reference to the
following facts:
A.
Landlord is the owner of the "Guardian Angel Homes"
facility consisting of 82 assisted living units and eight
apartments facility on Vineyard Avenue in Lewiston, Idaho, more
particularly described in Exhibit A attached hereto, and the
personal property, equipment, business records, and supplies used
in connection therewith,
including, without limitation,
the
personal property and equipment listed in the schedule marked
Exhibit B attached hereto (the "Premises") .

B.
The Premises secure a first loan from CWCapital LLC in
the original principal amount of$ 8,751,700 insured by the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development {"HUDn).
C.
Landlord desires to lease to Tenant, and Tenant desires
to lease from Landlord, the Premises.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual recitals,
covenants, conditions and agreements set forth herein, Landlord
hereby lets the Premises to Tenant, and Tenant hereby hires the
Premises from Landlord, for the term and upon the conditions and
provisions hereinafter set forth.

1.

Term:

The term of this ~ e shall
~~' 2008, and shall end on
h..z,- 30
2.

Base Rent:

commence
, 2023.

on

2.1. Tenant shall pay to Landlord base rent in the amount
of $84,503.56 per month, subject to adjustment in accordance with
Section 2.2, below.
- 1 E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHomes-Draft#4-090508 Clean.doc
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2.2. On the second anniversary of the commencement of the
term of this Lease and on each anniversary thereafter during the
term of this Lease, the monthly base rent under this Lease shall be
increased by an amount equal to three percent of the then effective
monthly base rent.
2 . 3. Monthly base rent shall be paid in advance on the
first day of each and every calendar month during the term hereof.
The base rent for any fractional month shall be prorated . Payments
of base rent shall be made to Landlord at Landlord's address for
notices specified in Section 44.1, below, or at such other place as
Landlord may from time to time direct. Rent shall be deemed paid
when actually received by Landlord .
All rent hereunder shall be
due and payable without diminution or offset.
Checks shall be
deemed payment only if cleared in the ordinary course.
2.4. Landlord and Tenant acknowledge and agree that it
would be extremely difficult or impossible to determine the amount
of actual damages Landlord would suffer as a result of Tenant's
default in the timely payment of rent hereunder. Any rent required
to be paid by Tenant under this Lease not paid within ten days
after the date when due shall automatically and without notice bear
a late payment in an amount equal to six percent of the overdue
amount.
2.5 . All payments of money other than monthly base rent
required to be made by Tenant pursuant to the terms of this Lease
shall be deemed additional rent.
2 . 6 . This Lease is intended to be a net lease. It is the
intention of Landlord and Tenant that except as expressly provided
in this Lease the rent payable to Landlord shall not be reduced by
any cost or charge whatsoever, and that all expenses and charges,
whether for upkeep, maintenance, insurance , taxes, utilities ,
federal , state and municipal requirements and other charges of a
like nature or type or otherwise, shall be paid by Tenant.
This
provision is not in derogation of the specific provisions of this
Lease, but in expansion thereof and as an indication of the general
intentions of the parties .
3.

Taxes and Assessments:
- 2 E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHomes-Draft#4-090508 Clean.doc
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3.1 . Tenant shall pay before delinquency any and all real
and personal property taxes and assessments of every kind,
character, and description, general or special, ordinary or
extraordinary, levied or assessed against the Premises during the
term of this Lease.
If Tenant pays real and personal property
taxes and assessments directly, Tenant shall provide Landlord with
proof reasonably satisfactory to Landlord that all real and
personal property taxes and assessments have been timely paid.
3.2. At the end of the term of the Lease, all real and
personal property taxes and assessments shall be prorated .
3 . 3 . Tenant shall have the right to protest the amount or
payment of any real or personal property taxes or assessments which
it is required to pay pursuant to this Lease, provided that Tenant
adequately protects Landlord's interest in the Premises by bonding
or by providing other security required by the taxing authority to
prevent a tax sale or other enforcement proceedings. Tenant shall
hold Landlord harmless and defend Landlord from any and all claims,
loss or damages resulting from prosecution of such protest by
Tenant.
3.4. Landlord shall promptly forward to Tenant copies of
all tax bills relating to the Premises received by Landlord.
3.5. If at any time during the term hereof, the State of
Idaho or any political subdivision or agency thereof, including any
county, city, city and county, public corporation, district, or any
other political entity or agency, levies or assesses against
Landlord a tax, fee , or excise on rents, on the square footage of
the Premises, on the act of entering into this Lease, or on the
occupancy of Tenant, or any other tax, fee, or excise, however
described , including a bed tax and/or a value added tax, as a
substitution, in whole or in part, for, or in addition to, any real
or personal property taxes or assessments, Tenant shall pay the
same before delinquency, regardless of whether the same is
collectible by Landlord. Tenant's obligation to pay taxes levied
or charged against the Premises or improvements or against personal
property shall not include (i) general income or profits taxes
levied or assessed against Landlord by a federal, state or other
governmental agency measured by Landlord's income or (ii) estate,
succession, inheritance or transfer taxes of Landlord .

- 3 -
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4.

Insurance:

4.1. At all times during the term of this Lease, Tenant
shall keep and maintain, at its own cost and expense, the following
policies of insurance:
4 . 1.1.
Comprehensive general liability insurance,
including professional liability,
owned and non-owned motor
vehicle, with a combined single limit of at least $2,000,000 per
occurrence and $3,000,000 in the aggregate against bodily injury
and property damage,
insuring Landlord and Tenant and, at
Landlord's election, the mortgagee(s) of any mortgage(s) of the
Premises, against claims for bodily injuries and/or death and/or
damage to property incurred while on or about the Premises and/or
in connection with any act or omission by Tenant or Tenant's
members, agents, employees, officers, directors, guests, invitees
and licensees. Tenant shall either maintain an "occurrence" policy
or, if Tenant obtains a "claims made,, policy, also obtain "tail,,
coverage. Landlord and, at Landlord's election, the mortgagee(s) of
any mortgage (s) of the Premises shall be named as additional
insured(s)
on Tenant's policy(ies)
of liability insurance.
Tenant's liabi:Lity insurance shall include coverage for any of
Landlord's and Landlord's members, agents, and employees engaging
in or assisting Tenant in repairs or improvements to the Premises.
Tenant's public liability insurance policy shall be on an
"occurrence" basis if commercially available.
4.1.2.
Fire and extended peril insurance, with
"all risk" endorsement, covering the Premises, including personal
property, sprinkler leakage, earthquake, terrorism, windstorm and,
if the Premises is located in a flood plain, flood damage, in an
amount not less than the full replacement value thereof. Tenant's
insurance shall include coverage for changes in applicable
ordinances. At Landlord's election, which shall not be exercised
prior to the fifth anniversary of the commencement of the term of
this Lease, the full replacement value of the Premises shall be
determined by appraisal by a professional independent insurance
appraiser selected by Landlord, subject to Tenant's approval, which
shall not be unreasonably withheld, whose fee shall be paid by
Tenant.
Landlord shall be named as a loss payee and the
mortgagee{s) of any rnortgage(s) of the Premises shall be named as
mortgagee(s) on such policy of fire and extended peril insurance .
The net proceeds of any such fire and extended peril insurance
shall be expended only as set forth in Section 33, below.

- 4 -
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4.1 . 3 .
All
worker's
compensation
insurance
required under the worker's compensation law of the State of Jdaho.
4 . 1.4.
Business interruption insurance
amount equal to 18 months advance rent under this Lease.

in

an

4 . 1 . 5.
Any other and further insurance , if any,
if and as required by any mortgage(s) of the Premises .
4.2. Tenant shall provide Landlord with copies or
certificates or other evidence reasonably satisfactory to Landlord
establishing that Tenant has obtained and continues to hold the
policies of insurance required under Section 4.1, above. All such
policies shall be in such form and content, including, without
limitation , the amount of the deductible, and shall be issued by
such company or companies as are approved by Landlord, which shall
not be unreasonably withheld, and, at Landlord's election, by the
rnortgagee(s) of any mortgage(s) of the Premises .
4.2.1 . Subject to the requirements and limitations,
if any, imposed by Landlord's mortgagee ( s) , the policies of
insurance required hereunder may be provided under or by blanket or
umbrella policy(ies).
4.2.2 . All policies of insurance required hereunder
shall provide that they may not be canceled, lapse, expire , or be
materially altered except with 30 days prior written notice to
Landlord and, in the case of the insurance required under Sections
4.1.1, 4.1.2, and 4 . 1.5, above, to any mortgagee(s) of any
mortgage(s) of the Premises .
4.2 . 3 . All policies or certificates of the insurers
or of insurance agencies satisfactory to Landlord and to any
mortgagee ( s) of any mortgage ( s) of the Premises showing that
renewals of the policies required hereunder are in force shall be
delivered to Landlord and to any mortgagee(s) of any mortgage(s) of
the Premises prior to the expiration of the then outstanding
policies .
4. 3 Tenant and Landlord ea.ch hereby waive any and all
rights of recovery against the other, or against the officers,
- 5 E: \ J OHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHomes-Draft#4-090508 Clean.doc
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employees, agents and representatives of the other, for loss of or
damage to such waiving party or its property or the property 0£
others under its control to the extent that such loss or damage is
insured against and paid under any insurance policy. Tenant shall,
upon obtaining the policies of insurance required hereunder, give
written notice to the insurance carrier or carriers with a copy to
Landlord that the foregoing mutual waiver of subrogation is
contained in this Lease. Tenant shall cause such insurance policies
obtained by it to provide that the insurance company waives all
right of recovery by way of subrogation against either party in
connection with any damage covered by and paid under any policy.

4.4. If this Lease is terminated due to Tenant's default,
the insurance policies required hereunder and all rights thereunder
or to insurance proceeds shall be assigned to Landlord, at
Landlord's election.
5.

Indemnification:

5.1. As a material part of the consideration to Landlord,
Tenant hereby expressly waives any and all claims against Landlord
for damages or liability for injury to persons or property in, on
or about the Premises from any cause whatsoever.
5.2. Tenant shal l indemnify, defend and hold harmless
Landlord, its agents, members, employees, officers, and directors,
and any mortgagee(s) of any mortgage(s) of the Premises, against
each and every demand, claim, assertion, damages, actions, fees,
including, without limitation, attorneys' fees, court costs and
other expenses, paid, incurred or suffered arising or alleged to
have arisen out of any act or omission of Tenant, its agents,
members, employees, officers, directors, guests, invitees or
licensees, or in connection with the use or occupation of the
Premises, including, without limitation, injury, death or damage to
Tenant's residents or resulting from, or relating to the presence,
introduction, use, or remediation
of hazardous materials, as
defined in Section 54.4, below.
6.

Impound Account:

6.1. If and as required by Landlord's mortgagee, Tenant
shall pay to Landlord's mortgagee amounts necessary to create an
impound account sufficient to timely pay all real and personal
property taxes and assessments and insurance premiums required to
- 6 -

E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHornes-Draftlt4-090508 Clean.doc

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 197 of 411

be paid by Tenant hereunder.
If the impound account is
insufficient to timely pay all real and personal propert y taxes and
assessments and insurance premiums payable by Tenant, Tenant shall
pay the deficiency to Land l 0rd's mortgagee within ten days afte r
Landlord's written re uest . Landlo r d acknowledges that Tenant
deposited the $
37
7
balance in the tax r eserve and
the $
L/-0, C)/ / . 0
balance in the insurance premium reserve
held by Lartdlord's mortgagee.
6.2. Pr ovided that Tenant is not in default under this
Lease, the funds in any impound account held by Landlord's
mortgagee shall be used for the payment of the real and personal
property taxes and assessments and insurance premiums payable by
Tenant under this Lease.
7.
Use of Premises :
The Premises shall be used solely as
described in Recital A, above, and for no other purposes except
with Landlord's consent , which shall not be unreasonably withheld
or delayed, and the consent of Landlord' s mortgagee(s) .
8.

Maintenance:

8. 1. Tenant shall maintain the Premises in the same
condition, including, without l imitation, the roof, structural and
mechanical elements and systems of the Premises , exterior and
interior painting, gardening and landscaping, paving and striping
of driveways and parking areas, and personal property including
vehicles, in first class condition. The term "first class
condition" means the condition of the Premises as of June 16, 2008.
The Premises shall at all times be kept clean and sanitary and
free of deferred maintenance .
All maintenance and repair work
undertaken by Tenant shall be done in a workmanlike manner leaving
the Premises free of liens for labor and materials .
All
replacements of capital items shall be by items of like or better
quality .
8 . 2 . Tenant shall timely perform and comply with all
easements , covenants , restrictions, and road maintenance and other
agreements, to the extent applicable to Tenant, affecting the
Premises recorded as of the date of this Lease or recorded after
the date of this Lease and approved by Tenant, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld.
Tenant shal l also timely perform and
comply, to the extent applicable to Tenant , with the requirements
imposed by the mortgage(s) of the Premises relating to (i )
- 7 -
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operation and maintenance of the Premises, and (ii) providing
reports and other information relating to Tenant and/or the
operation of the Premises.
8 . 3. At Landlord's election,
the Premises may be
inspected by a licensed contractor or other individual with at
least five years experience in construction, whose fee shall be
paid by Landlord, for the purpose of ascertaining whether Tenant is
maintaining the Premises in accordance with the provisions of this
Lease . The inspector shall be selected by Landlord. The inspector
shall provide Landlord and Tenant with a written report on the
physical condition of the Premises, specifying in what respect, if
any, Tenant has failed to maintain the Premises in first class
condition, as required by this Lease . Tenant shall promptly
commence and thereafter diligently complete remedying within 30
days any deficiencies noted in the inspector's report.
Any
disputes between Landlord and Tenant regarding the accuracy of the
inspector' s report shall be submitted to binding arbitration to,
and in accordance with the commercial arbitration rules of, the
American Arbitration Association .
8 . 4. Tenant shall immediately remedy any "exigent health
and safety deficiencies" or equivalent deficiencies noted in any
HUD surveys . Tenant shall promptly commence and thereafter
diligently complete remedying within 30 days any other deficiencies
noted in any HUD surveys.
8.5. At all times during the term of this Lease, Landlord
shall have the right to employ a health care consultant to examine
and analyze Tenant's operation of the Premises.
Landlord's
consultant shall have the right during normal business hours to
inspect and observe the operation of the Premises, to examine any
of Tenant' s books and records relating to the Premises, and to talk
to Tenant's employees, consultants, and accountants. Tenant shall
direct Tenant ' s employees, consultants and accountants to cooperate
with Landlord's consultant.
The cost of Landlord's consultant
shall be paid by Landlord unless Tenant is in material default
under this Lease, in which case the consultant shall be paid for by
Tenant.
In the exercise of Landlord's rights under this Section
8. 4, Landlord shall comply with applicable confidentiality and
other laws and regulations and shall further use reasonable efforts
to mitigate any material adverse impact on Tenant's business in the
Premises.

- 8 -
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8 . 6. Tenant shall timely comply with the requirements of
Landlord's mortgage(s) for minimum annual or other expenditures for
capital improvements or repairs to the Premises and shall deposit
with Landlord ' s mortgagee any funds required as an improvement
and/or repair reserve due to Tenant's failure to spend the required
amount for improvements and/or repairs.
8 . 7 . Tenant shall deposit the amount of any repair,
replacement , and other reserves(s) required by any mortgage(s) of
the Premises,
including,
without limitation,
any subsequent
payments into reserves required by Landlord's mortgagee due to
Landlord's or Tenant's failure to comply with required debt service
coverage ratios. Provided t hat Tenant is not in default under this
Lease, reserve(s) held by Landlord's mortgagee(s) may be used by
Tenant to the extent the reserves(s) were provided by Tenant on the
terms specified in the mortgage(s) or other loan documents, and
Landlord shall reasonably cooperate with Tenant to enable Tenant to
use any reserve(s). Landlord acknowledges that Tenant deposited the
balance in the reserve held by Landlord's mortgagee as of the
commencement of the term of this Lease. The current balance in the
reserve shall be applied to repairs and replacements, respectively,
d11ring the term of t his Lease. Tenant ' s ob l igation to mainta1n the
Premises in first class condition is not limited by or to the
amount in the reserves held by Landlord's mortgagee.
8. 8 . HUD Reserves and Payments.
For
purposes
of
payments due under this Lease, all HOD-required reserves shall be
considered rent .
In addition to monthly base rent, Tenant shall
also pay on a monthly basis to Landlord an amount sufficient to pay
when due and payable the Landlord ' s mortgage insurance premium.
9.

Landlord Not to Maintain:

Landlord shall not be required to repair or maintain, or
pay for the repair or maintenance of, the Premises, or any part or
portion thereof , and Tenant hereby expressly waives the right to
make repairs at the expense of Landlord as provided by any statute
or law in effect at the time of the execution of this Lease, or any
other statute or law which may be hereafter enacted.
10.

Alterations:

10.1.
Tenant shall not reconstruct, remodel or alter
the Premises without the prior written consent of Landlord, which
-

9 -
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shall not be unreasonably withheld or delayed, and, if and to the
extent required by any mortgage ( s) of the Premises, of the
mortgagee(s) of the Premises. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Tenant
may,
without Landlord's prior written consent,
make minor
nonstructural, non.mechanical improvements that do not change the
appearance or aesthetics of the Premises and that do not materially
affect mechanical, sprinkler, electrical or other utility systems
of the Premises and that do not exceed $25,000 in cost on an
aggregate basis during any 12 month period.
10.2.
As a condition to Landlord's consent to any
repair, reconstruction, remodeling or alteration of the Premises
which is reasonably projected to cost $50,000 or more, Landlord may
require Tenant or Tenant's contractor to post a payment and
completion or other bond satisfactory to Landlord insuring the
proper and timely completion of such repair, reconstruction,
remodeling or alteration or to provide some other reasonably
satisfactory form of payment assurance device.
10.3.
Tenant shall fully pay and discharge all claims
for labor and materials furnished in connection with the repair,
reconstruction, remodeling or alteration of the Premises, to obtain
lien releases for labor or materials for which payment has been
made, and to take all other reasonable steps to forestall the
assertion of lien claims against the Premises.
10.4.
Tenant may in good faith contest the amount or
validity of claims for labor or materials, provided that Tenant
provides security reasonably acceptable to Landlord to protect
Landlord's interest in the Premises .
10.5.
All work done in connection with the repair,
reconstruction, remodeling or alteration of the Premises shall be
performed in compliance with all applicable laws, ordinances, rules
and regulations .
10.6.
The repair, reconstruction,
remodeling or
alteration of the Premises shall be performed in compliance with
the requirements of any mortgage(s) of the Premises of which Tenant
has been given copies or written notice.
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10.7.
No repair,
reconstruction,
remodeling or
alteration of the Premises shall be effected unless and until
Tenant has obtained all required permits and consents from all
governmental entities or agencies having jurisdiction over the
Premises .
10 . 8 .
All alterations and improvements constructed by
Tenant upon the Premises shall belong to Landlord upon the
expiration or termination of this Lease.
10.9.
Prior to commencement of any work, alteration
or repair to or of the Premises by anyone other than Tenant or the
employees of Tenant , Tenant shall give Landlord sufficient notice
thereof to permit Landlord to timely post or affix on or to the
Premises notices of nonresponsibility.
11.

Right to Replace Property:

11. 1 .
Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Lease to the contrary, Tenant shall have the right , subject to the
provisions of any mortgage(s) of the Premises, to replace any or
all of the personal property, equipment and supplies subject to
this Lease with personal property, equipment or supplies of like or
greater value. Tenant shall promptly repair or replace any worn ,
dilapidated, stained, faded, damaged, obsolete or nonfunctional
personal property, including floor coverings, window treatments,
and vehicles.
Nonfunctional personal property shall include
furniture which is broken, has torn upholstery, or emanates odors.
Replacement personal property and equipment, and any additional
personal property and equi pment purchased by Tenant legally
required to equip the Premises for the purposes permitted under
this Lease shall automatically become the p r oper ty of Landlord,
upon the expiration or termination of this Lease, subject to the
terms of any mortgage(s) of the Premises, and thereafter subject to
this Lease. Tenant shall be entitled to any salvage value from any
personal property, fixtures and equipment replaced by Tenant
pursuant to this Section 11.1.
11 . 2 .
Tenant may acquire or finance the acquisition
of any replacements of personal property and equipment owned by
Landlord by conditional sales agreements , leases , or lease/options ,
subject to the following:

-
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11. 2. 1.
Tenant
may
replace
leased
personal
property and equipment with other leased personal property and
equipment.
11.2 . 2.
The total amount of replacements of
personal property and equipment acquired or financed by conditional
sales agreements, leases, or lease/options shall not materially
impair Tenant's or Tenant's successors ' operation of the Premises
and in any event the total amount financed by conditional sales
agreements, leases , or lease option at any one time shall not
exceed $25 , 000 in the aggregate except with Landlord's consent ,
which may be granted or withheld in Landlord's sole discretion. At
Landlord's request, Tenant shall provide a summary of the terms and
conditions for all financed personal property and equipment ,
including, if requested by Landlord, copies of all applicable
documents.
11.2.3.
Tenant's financing of personal property
and equipment must comply with Landlord's mortgage ( s)
of the
Premises.
11. 2. 4 .
Tenant shall timely pay and perform any
requirements
of
Tenant's
financing
and,
with
respect
to
replacements of personal property and equipment owned by Landlord,
pay in full any balances due thereon at or prior to the expiration
or termination of this Lease.
11.3.
Title to any vehicles required to be registered
may be retained in the name of Tenant. The vehicles used with the
Premises at the commencement of the term of this Lease and any
replacement vehicles shall become the property of Landlord upon the
expiration or termination of this Lease.
11. 4 .
Upon the expiration or termination of this
Lease, Tenant shall provide Landlord with personal property,
equipment, and consumable supplies of at least equal quantity and
quality as that which existed on the Premises at the commencement
of the term of this Lease or subsequently provided or paid for by
Landlord, and of sufficient quantity to operate the Premises as
then operated required by· law. At Landlord's request, Tenant shall
provide an updated inventory of the personal property and equipment
subject to this Lease.
- 12 E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHomes-Draft#4-090508 Clean . doc

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 203 of 411

12.

Utilities, Etc. :

12 . 1 .
Tenant shall be solely responsible for and
shall promptly and before delinquency pay for all utilities,
including, without limitation, electricity, gas, water, garbage and
telephone, and any and all other labor, services, goods and
supplies which may be used or furnished to or for Tenant,
including,
without
limitation,
any payroll,
business
and
opportunities, withholding, employee, sales, excise and other taxes
incurred in connection therewith, incident to the use and
occupation of the Premises.
Any account payable to a vendor of
supplies to the Premises shall be conclusively deemed delinquent if
not paid in full within 120 days after Tenant's rece i pt of a bill
from the vendor, unless Tenant is in good faith contesting the
validity or the amount payable or has negotiated other terms with
the vendor .
12. 2 .
Tenant shall provide all security deposits ,
bonds and other collateral or requirements, if any, necessar y £or
all utilities and other services provided or supplied to, for or in
connection with the operation of the Premises.
12 . 3 .
At Landlord's request, Tenant shall provide
Landlord with proof reasonably satisfactory to Landlord, including,
at Landlord's request, copies of Tenant's Internal Revenue Service
form 941, that Tenant has complied with the provisions of Sections
12 . 1 and 12.2 , above.
13 . Laws and Regulations: Tenant shall at its sole cost and
expense comply with all laws, statutes, ordinances and regulations
of all governmental agencies having jurisdiction over t he Premises ,
specifically including , without limitation, any laws , rules and
regulations regarding hazardous materials .
The judgment of any
court of competent jurisdiction, or the admission of Tenant in any
action or proceeding against Tenant, that Tenant has by its acts or
omissions violated any such ordinance, statute , law or regulation
shall be conclusive of such fact as between Landlord and Tenant.
14.

Licensing Requirements:

14 . 1 .
Tenant shall maintain at all times during the
term hereof and any extensions or renewals hereof all governmental
licenses,
permits
and
authorizations
necessary
for
the
- 13 -
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establishment and operation of the Premises for the purposes
permitted under this Lease.
Tenant shall not, without the prior
written consent of Landlord, which shall not be unreasonably
withheld, permit or effect any reduction in the number of licensed
or certified beds in the Premises or change the license or
certification category or status of the Premises or any part
thereof .
Tenant shall not undertake any act or suffer or permit
any change in the configuration of the Premises which would reduce
the potential occupancy of the Premises .
14.2.
Tenant shall, at its own cost and expense,
promptly do and provide or perform each and every requirement of
any state or federal licensing or certification authority having
jurisdiction over the Premises, including, without limitation, the
timely filing of cost reports and other documents or information
required to be filed, delivered or submitted, and with the
requirements of any board of fire underwriters or other similar
body now or hereafter constituted relating to or affecting the
condition, use, or occupancy of the Premises .
Tenant shall have
the right to appeal or protest any such requirement, provided that
Tenant complies with the same at or prior to the time when such
requirement becomes final and binding and no longer subject to
appeal or protest.
14.3.
Provided that this Section 14.3 is subject to
HUD prior approval, if applicable, upon the expi ration or
termination of this Lease, Tenant shall fully cooperate with
Landlord in effecting a transfer of the Premises fully licensed and
certified for the purposes permitted under this Lease including, if
reasonably necessary, executing a management agreement reasonably
acceptable to the parties with and permitting Landlord or
Landlord's designee to use, to the extent permitted by applicable
laws and regulations, Tenant's license and/or Medicaid provider
agreement .
The form of Tenant's agreement with Landlord or
Landlord's designee shall contain reasonable provisions for
Landlord's or Landlord's designee to indemnify Tenant with respect
to the operation of the Premises after the expiration or
termination of this Lease.
14 . 4.
If and to the extent Idaho law is revised to
require a certificate of need or other rights to operate the
Premises, Tenant acknowledges that Landlord shall be the owner of
the certificate(s) of need and/or other rights, subject to
applicable laws and regulations.
Tenant shall not attempt or
purport
to
transfer,
assign,
or
otherwise
alienate
any
-
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certificate(s) of need or other rights to operate the Premises .
Tenant shall execute any and all documents reasonably requested by
Landlord to confirm that any and all rights to operate the Premises
are owned by Landlord .
14.5.
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this
Lease to the contrary, Tenant shall inform Landlord and Landlord' s
mortgagee immediately by telephone and by letter of any action or
proceeding instituted by any state or federal authority having
jurisdiction over the Premises to terminate or revoke any license
or certification of or to impose any stop placement order on Tenant
or receipt by Tenant of any inspection survey which includes one or
more deficiencies in the most serious category then used or
reported by the applicable regulatory agency . Such notice shall be
given to Landlord at the address(es) and telephone number(s) set
forth in Section 44, below .
15.

Reports:

15.1.
Tenant shall forward to Landlord legible copies
of all inspection surveys and reports, including HUD surveys,
relating to the Premises received from any state or federal
licensing or certification authorities having jurisdiction over the
Premises, including plans of correction. Such copies shall be so
forwarded forthwith within ten days after receipt of such
inspection surveys and reports by Tenant or ten days after Tenant's
submission of Tenant's plans of correction or other responses,
respectively.
15.2.
Tenant shall forward to Landlord immediately
upon receipt any and all notices (regardless of form) from any and
all licensing and/or certifying agencies that the Premises license
and/or the Medicaid certification is being downgraded to a
substandard category, revoked, or suspended, or that such action is
pending.
15.3 .
Tenant shall forward to Landlord within 30 days
following receipt copies of all lawsuits and demands for mediation
or arbitration filed against Tenant and/or relating to the
Premises . Upon Landlord's request, Tenant shall provide a summary
of requests pending litigation and mediation and arbitration
proceedings involving Tenant and/or the Premises.
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16 . Cost Reports: Tenant shall provide Landlord with legible
copies of Tenant ' s cost reports, if any, submitted for the
Premises, certified by Tenant to be true and correct in all
material respects.
Such copies shall be so forwarded concurrent
with the submission thereof by Tenant .
17 .

Income and Expense Statements:

17. 1.
Within 20 days after the end of each month
during the term of this Lease, Tenant shall provide Landlord with a
copy of an internally produced income and expense statement for the
Premises for the preceding monthr including staffing by department
if available, an occupancy report (with resident mix and average
monthly occupancy), a wage report, and an accounts payable aging
report, certified by Tenant to be true and correct in all material
respects.
17.2.
Within 90 days after the end of each calendar
year during the term of this Lease, Tenant shall provide Landlord
with an income and expense statement for the Premises for the
preceding year, including staffing by department if available, an
occupancy report (with resident mix and average monthly occupancy),
a wage report, and an accounts payable aging report, certified by
Tenant to be true and correct in all material respects. If Tenant
prepares or obtains audited annual financial information or
reports, Tenant shall provide Landlord with copies of Tenant's
audited information or reports. Otherwise, Tenant shall provide
Landlord with copies of its internally produced unaudited annual
financial information.
1 7 . 3.
The form and content of Tenant's income and
expense statements shall be subject to Landlord's approval , which
shall not be unreasonably withheld.
17.4.
Tenant shall furnish Landlord with a complete
and accurate copy of Tenant's federal income tax return within 30
days after filing the same with the Internal Revenue Service .
18. Financial Statements:
Within 90 days after the end of
each calendar year, and at Landlord's request at any other time in
connection with Landlord's refinancing or sale of the Premises, and
if and as required by Landlord's mortgage (s) of the Premises,
Tenant and any guarantor of this Lease shall provide Landlord with
- 16 -
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a copy of its current
prepared in form and
certified by Tenant or
be true and correct in

internally produced financial statement,
content reasonably required by Landlord,
the guarantor(s) hereof, as applicable, to
al l material respects .

19 . Reports to Mortgagee(s): Tenant shall timely provide any
reports or other information or documents required by any
rnortgagee(s) of the Premises. Tenant shall provide Landlord with
copies of any reports or other info r mation or documents given or
provided to any mortgagee(s) of the Premises. Tenant shall permit
the mortgagee ( s) of the Premises to inspect and audit Tenant's
books and records relating to the Premises if and as required by
the mortgage(s) of the Premises.
20.

Books and Records :

20 .1.
At all times during the term of this Lease,
Tenant shall keep and maintain complete, true and accurate books
and records of the operation of the Pr emises .
Tenant shall
maintain Tenant ' s books and records for at least fou r years after
the close of the accounting period to which the books and records
relate .
If Tenant is in default under this Lease beyond
20 . 2 .
any applicable grace or cure period, Landlord shall have the right,
during
normal
business
hours
and subject
to
applicable
confidentiality and other laws and regulations and to prior written
notice to Tenant, to audit Tenant' s books and records regarding the
Premises . Landlord' s a udit shall be at Landl ord's expense, unless
Tenant is in default under this Lease beyond any applicable grace
or cure periods in which case the cost of the audit shal l be paid
by Tenant. At Landlord's request Tenant shall provide appropriate
support ing documentation for any item .
21. Waste and Nuisance: Tenant shall not commit, or allow to
be committed , any waste upon the Premises, or any public or private
nuisance. Tenant shall not use, nor allow the Premises to be used,
for any improper, immoral, unlawful or objectionable purpose .
Tenant shall not allow objectionable odors or excessive noise to
emanate from the Premises .
22 . Continuous Operation:
Tenant shall at all times during
the entire term of this Lease continuously operate the Premises for
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the purposes permitted under this Lease . Tenant shall use Tenant's
best efforts to operate the Premises efficiently and profitably in
accordance with the highest business ethic s and concern for
resident welfare .
Tenant shall use Tenant ' s best efforts to
maximize the census at the Premises .
23 .

Events of Default :

23 .1.
The occurrence of any of the following shall be
deemed to constitute an event of default on the part of Tenant
hereunder:
23.1.1.
The failure to pay rent, real or personal
property taxes and assessments, utilities , premiums for insurance ,
reserves , and impounds for taxes and/or insurance u nder this Lease
within five days after the date when due ;
23 . 1.2 .
The
failure
obligations under this Lease within
written notice of default;

to
pay
other monetary
30 days after Landlord' s

23 . 1. 3.
The
fai l ure
to
remedy
governmental
inspection survey deficiencies within the time prescribed by law
which causes or results in the imminent loss of Tenant's license to
operate the Premises;
23 . 1 . 4.
The failure to perform or comply with any
other term or provision of this Lease including the failure to
timely p rovide the information or reports required by this Lease,
within 30 days after written notice of default , except for
defaults , other than the defaults specified in Section 23.1.3,
above, which cannot reasonably be cured within 30 days , provided
that Tenant commences to cure the default within 30 days after
written notice and thereafter diligently proceeds to cure the
default;
23 . 1 . 5.
An assignment by Tenant of its property
for the benefit of creditors ;
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23.1.6.
The appointment of a receiver, trustee or
liquidator for Tenant, or any of the property of Tenant, who or
which is not discharged within 60 days;
23.1.7 .
The levy of a writ of attachment against
this Lease which is not discharged within 60 days;
23.1.8 .
Tenant or any assignee of this Lease or
subtenant of the Premises files a voluntary petition under the
federal Bankruptcy Act or of the law of any state, to be
adjudicated a bankrupt or for any arrangement or other debtor's
relief, or any such petition is filed against Tenant by any other
party and not dismissed within 60 days after filing thereof; or
23.1.9 .
Tenant or any affiliate of Tenant defaults
beyond any applicable grace or cure period under any other lease
with Landlord or any affiliate of Landlord, or
23.1.10. Any financial statements provided to
Landlord by Tenant during the term of this Lease are known by
Tenant to be materially false or misleading.
23.2.
In the event of the occurrence of any event of
default mentioned in this Section 23, Landlord shall have the
right, at its election, by written notice to Tenant, in addition to
all other remedies, to terminate this Lease.
24 . Landlord's Recovery From Tenant:
Upon termination of
this Lease by Landlord under and in accordance with the provisions
of Section 23 . 2, above, Landlord shall be entitled to recover from
Tenant the unpaid rent that has been earned at the time of the
judgment, the discounted present value of the amount by which the
rent payable for the balance of the term of this Lease after the
time of judgment exceeds the amount of the loss of rent that Tenant
proves could be reasonably avoided, any other amount, and court
costs, reasonably necessary to compensate Landlord for all
detriment proximately caused by Tenant's default, including, but
not limited to, any costs or expenses incurred by Landlord in
maintaining or preserving the Premises after Tenant's default,
preparing the Premises for reletting to a new tenant, any repairs
or alterations to the Premises for such reletting, leasing
commissions, or any other costs necessary or appropriate to relet
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the Premises.

The present value of future rent shall be computed
the amount at the discount rate of the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco at the time of the judgment.

by discounting

25 . Right of Reentry :
In the event of Tenant's default
hereunder , Landlord may then, or any time thereafter, subject to
the provisions of applicable law, reenter the Premises, or any part
hereof, and expel or remove Tenant therefrom, and again repossess
and enjoy the Premises, with or without terminating this Lease, and
Tenant shall not interfere with or obstruct Landlord's or
Landlord's receiver's reentry and repossession of the Premises or
Landlord's receiver's collection of the revenues and accounts
receivable derived from the Premises.
26.

Tenant's Continuing Obligations:

26. 1.
In the event Landlord does not terminate this
Lease as a result of the default of Tenant, Tenant shall remain and
continue to be liable to Landlord under all of the terms of this
Lease . Landlord may evict Tenant and let or relet the Premises or
any or all parts thereof for the whole or any part of the remainder
of the term hereof , or for a period of time in excess of the
remainder of the term hereof, and out of any rent so collected or
received , Landlord shall:
26.1 . 1.
First, pay to itself the actual costs or
expenses of retaking and repossessing the Premises and removing all
persons and property therefrom;
26.1.2.
Second, shall pay itself any
or expenses sustained in securing any new tenant
including, without limitation, the cost of alterations
to the Premises and any leasing commissions incurred
and

actual costs
or tenants,
or additions
by Landlord;

26 .1. 3 .
Third, shall pay to itself any balance
remaining, and apply the whole thereof or so much thereof as may be
required toward payment of the liability of Tenant to Landlord then
or thereafter unpaid by Tenant.
26.2 .
Any entry or reentry by Landlord, whether under
summary proceedings or otherwise, if this Lease is not terminated
-
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pursuant to Section 23.2 hereof, shall not absolve or discharge
Tenant f r om liability hereunder. The words " reenter" and " reentry "
as used in this Lease are not restricted to their technical legal
meaning . The failure of Landlord to relet the Premises or any part
thereof shall not release or affect Tenant's liability hereunder .
Should any rent or other income so collected by Landlord after the
foregoing payments be insufficient to fully pay Landlord a sum
equal to all rent and other charges herein reserved, or should no
rents or other income be collected by Landlord, the deficiency
shall be calculated and paid by Tenant upon each of the dates for
the payment of rent as provided herein, and Tenant shall pay to
Landlord the amount of said deficiency then existing and shall
remain liable for any portion ther eof not so paid .
27 . Cure of Default:
Landlord, at any time after Tenant
commits a default hereunder beyond applicable grace or cure
periods, may cure the default at Tenant's cost .
If Landlord, at
any time, by reason of Tenant's default beyond applicable cure
periods, pays any sum or does any act that requires the payment of
any sum, the sum paid by Landlord shall be due immediately from
Tenant to Landlord, shall bear a late payment charge in an amount
equal to six percent of the sum paid by Landlord to cure Tenant's
default, and shall bear interest at the lesser of ten percent per
annum or the maximum rate permitted by law, reckoned from the date
the sum is paid until Landlord is reimbursed in full.
28 . Interest on Unpaid Rent: Any rent not paid within 30 days
after the date when due shall thereafter bear interest at the
lesser of ten percent per annum o r the maximum rate permitted by
law.
29.

Security Interest:

29 . 1.
Subject and subordinate to any grant of a
security interest to HUD or to Landlord' s lender, Tenant hereby
assigns and grants a security interest to Landlord in all of
Tenant's revenues, accounts receivable, and security deposits
derived f r om the Premises,
specifically including,
without
limitation, sublease rents and, to the extent permitted by law, all
Medicaid and other reimbursement payments to Tenant, as security
for performance of Tenant's obligations hereunder.
Tenant shall
execute all documents reasonably requested by Landlord to evidence
the same. Unless and until Tenant is in default under this Lease
beyond any applicable grace or cure period, Tenant shall have the
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right to collect and retain any revenues , accounts receivable, and
security deposits derived from the Premises .
29. 2.
Subject to applicable provisions of law, if
Tenant is in default under this Lease beyond any applicable grace
or cure period, Landlord shall have the absolute right, by receiver
duly appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction , to take
possession of the Premises, to conduct Tenant's business thereon ,
and to collect all revenues and accounts receivable due thereon to
Tenant both prior to and after the date of Tenant's default.
29.3.
Neither the filing of a petition for the
appointment of a receiver nor the appointment itself shall
constitute an election by Landlord to terminate this Lease.
29. 4 .
This Lease is a "security agreement" for
purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Tenant authorizes
Landlord to execute and file 0CC- l ' s to perfect Landlord's security
interest in the revenues and accounts receivable derived from the
Premises .
30. No Waiver :
No waiver by Landlord of any breach of the
covenants, conditions or agreements of this Lease shall be
construed to be a waiver of any succeeding breach of the same or of
any other covenants, condition or agreement hereof.
31 . Remedies Cumulative :
The remedies conferred by this
Lease upon Landlord are not intended to be exclusive, but are
cumulative and in addition to all other remedies provided by law .
32. Name :
The name of the Premises shall be determined by
Tenant , subject to Tenant's notice thereof to Landlord.
33.

Damage by Fire or Other Casualty:

33.1 .
Subject to Section 33 . 2, below, in the event of
the damage or destruction of the Premises, Tenant shall forthwith
repair or reconstruct the same to a like or better condition than
existed prior to such damage or destruction.
Subject to any
mortgage(s) of the Premises, the net insurance proceeds shall be
used for the repair or reconstruction of the Premises.
Landlord
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shall execute all documents reasonably necessary to make the net
insurance proceeds available to Tenant to repair or rebuild the
Premises.
33 . 2 .
Tenant's obligation to repair or rebuild the
Premises shall be abated if and to the extent that Landlord ' s
mortgagee(s) refuses to make insurance proceeds available to repair
or rebuild the Premises .
33.3.
The repair or reconstruction of the Premises
shall be effected in accordance with Section 10, above .
33 . 4.
In the event the damage or destruction of the
Premises is covered by the fire and extended peril insurance Tenant
is required to carry pursuant to Section 4.1.2 , above, Landlord or
Landlord's mortgagee(s) may , but shall not be required to,
negotiate the insurance settlement with the insurer if Tenant fails
to diligently process and negotiate Tenant's claim with the
insurer.
33.5.
Subject to the provisions of any mortgage(s) of
the Premises, at the election of Landlord, fire and extended peril
insurance proceeds shall not be payable to Tenant but shall instead
be deposited in escrow with a bank or other financial institution
selected by Landlord on terms and in accordance with procedures
reasonabl y satisfactory to Landlord and Tenant, with funds released
during
t he
course
and
at
completion
of
the
repair
or
reconstruction, upon inspection and approval by Landlord of the
completed portion of the repair or reconstruction , and receipt by
Landlord of lien waivers from the contractors, subcontractors , and
suppliers.
33.6.
proceeds after the
the Premises, such
subject, however,
mortgage(s) of the

If there remains any surplus of insurance
completion of the repair or reconstruction of
surpl us shall belong to and be paid to Tenant ,
to the rights of any mortgagee (s) under any
Premises.

33. 7.
In any event during any time that Tenant is
unable to use and occupy the Premises or any portion thereof as a
result of damage or destruction occurring without fault of Tenant,
or as a result of any repairs thereof, the rent hereunder shall be
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suspended to the extent, and only to the extent, of the proceeds of
Tenant's business interruption insurance made available to
Landlord.
33. 8.
Landlord shall have no liability whatsoever
with respect to any goods, fixtures, equipment or other personal
property of Tenant, nor shall Landlord have any liability for loss
of revenues or income resulting from fire or other casualty.
34.

Condemnation:

34.1.
If during the term of this Lease, the whole or
substantially all of the Premises is taken or condemned by any
competent public or quasi-public authority, this Lease shall, as
of the earlier of the date title vests in the condemning authority
or the condemning authority first has possession of the Premises,
terminate, and current rent shall be prorated as of the date of
such termination.
34.2 .
If during the term of this Lease, a portion of
the Premises is taken or condemned and it is not practical or
economical for Tenant to retain and operate the remainder in
accordance with this Lease, then Tenant may, at Tenant's election,
made within 30 days of such taking or condemnation, terminate this
Lease, and current rent shall be prorated as of the date of such
termination.
34 . 3.
All
compensation
upon
any
taking
or
condemnation of the Premises shall belong to Landlord, and Tenant
shall have no claim thereto.
Notwithstanding the foregoing,
provided that the award to Landlord is not diminished, Tenant shall
be entitled to compensation paid under the condemnation for the
taking of any improvements made to the Premises by Tenant and/or
Tenant's personal property which remains the property of Tenant,
moving expenses, and for any damage to or interruption of the
business of Tenant.
34.4.
Except as provided above, this Lease shall not
terminate and shall remain in full force and effect in the event of
a taking or condemnation of the Premises, or any portion thereof;
provided, however, that the rent hereunder shall be adj usted for
the remainder of the term of this Lease proportionately to the
- 24 E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHoroes-Draft#4-090508 Clean.doc

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 215 of 411

resulting reduction in the number of licensed beds permitted in the
Premises.
35.

Assigning and Subletting :

35.1.
Tenant may not assign this Lease or any portion
of the term hereof, or sublet the Premises , or any portion thereof,
except as provided in Section 35 . 3 , below, or with the prior
written consent of Landlord, which shall not be unreasonably
withheld or delayed, and , if and to the extent required by any
mortgage(s) of the Premises, of the mortgagee(s) of the Premises .
Tenant's written request for Landlord's consent to the assignment
of this Lease or the subletting of the Premises must be given at
least 30 days prior to the proposed effective date of the
assignment or subletting.
35.2 .
Notwithstanding any assignment of this Lease or
subletting of the Premises, Tenant and Tenant's guarantor(s) shall
remain liable for the full, faithful and complete performance of
this Lease as provided herein or in any separately executed
guarantee(s), unless and until Landlord approves an assignee of
this Lease and releases Tenant and/or Tenant ' s guarantor(s).
35.3 .
Tenant may sublease rooms in the Premises to
individual residents in the ordinary course of Tenant's business
without Landlord's consent. In addition, Tenant may, without the
prior consent of Landlord, license space within the Premises to
individuals or entities for the purpose of providing amenities to
residents incidental to the operation of Tenant's business, such as
a beauty sal on or a gift and sundry store .
35 . 4 .
As a condition to Landlord' s consent to the
assignment of this Lease or the subletting of the Premises,
Landlord may require Tenant's proposed assignee or subtenant to
provide such financial and other information as Landlord reasonably
deems appropriate, including, without limitation, copies of any
agreements between Tenant and Tenant's proposed assignee or
subtenant, resumes of the key officers and employees of Tenant ' s
proposed assignee or subtenant, federal income tax returns for the
proposed assignee or subtenant and its principals ,
and a
comprehensive description of the operational experience of Tenant's
proposed assignee or subtenant. Any financial information provided
by the proposed assignee, subtenant and/or guarantor(s) shall be
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certified as true and correct in all material respects and subject
to reasonable verification by Landlord .
35 . 5.
As a condition to Landlord' s consent to the
assignment of this Lease or subletting of the Premises , Landlord
may also require the principals, if any, of any assignee of this
Lease or subtenant of the Premises which is not publicly traded to
assume personal liability for compliance with each and every
provision hereof.
35.6.
If Tenant or Tenant's approved management
company is a corporation, partnership or other business entity then
the following shall be deemed an assignment of this Lease:
35 . 6.1.
The sale of a majority of the shares of
any class of stock or other equity interest in Tenant or in an
approved management company of the Premises, other than to
revocable living trusts for the benefit of existing shareholders or
in an initial public offering registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission or registered or qualified with applicable
state securities agency(ies);
35.6.2.

The dissolution or merger of Tenant;

35.6.3 .
The sale of all or substantially all of
the assets of Tenant; or
35 . 6.4.
Any other transaction entered into for the
purpose of avoiding the applicability of t he foregoing provisions.

35 . 7.
The execution or termination of a management or
other agreement giving control of the day- to-day operation of the
Premises to any person or party other than Tenant shall be deemed
an assignment of this Lease which shall require Landlord's prior
written consent, which shall not be unreasonably withheld .
35. 8.
Any sublease of the entire Premises shall
provide that the subtenant shall assume each and all of Tenant' s
obligations under this Lease, except for the obligation to pay base
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rent, during the term of the sublease, and that all of the
obligations under this Lease assumed the subtenant may be enforced
by Landlord directly against the subtenant, with or without joining
Tenant.
35.9.
Any subtenant of the Premises shall execute a
subordination agreement with and in a form reasonably required by
Landlord's mortgagee(s) .
35.10.
Consent to an assignment or subletting shall
not be deemed consent to any other or subsequent assignment or
subletting.
35.11.
Any purported assignment or subletting in
violation of this Section 35 shall be null and void and of no force
or effect whatsoever .
35.12.
Tenant shall pay
Landlord's attorney's review of all
proposed assignment or subletting.
36.

the reasonable cost of
documents relating to a

Covenants Against Liens:

36 .1.
Except as expressly provided in this Lease,
Tenant shall not, during the term hereof, suffer or permit any
lien, including, without limitation, any mechanic's or judgment
lien or conditional sales agreement, to be attached to or upon the
Premises or any part thereof by reason of any act or omission on
the part of Tenant, and hereby agrees to save and hold harmless
Landlord from or against any such lien or claim of lien.
36.2 .
Tenant and any guarantors of Tenant shall not
suffer or permit any federal or state tax lien to attach to the
Premises or any other property of Tenant.
36.3.
In the event that any lien attaches in
violation of Section 36 .1 or Section 36. 2, above, and is not
released within 60 days thereafter, Landlord,
in its sole
discretion, may pay and/or discharge the same, and Tenant agrees to
repay and reimburse Landlord upon demand for the amount so paid by
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Landlord, together with interest thereon at the maximum rate
permitted by law, from the date the sum is paid by Landlord until
Landlord is reimbursed in full.
37.

Subordination:

37.1.
This Lease shall be subordinate to mortgage(s)
of the Premises, and to any and all advances made on the security
thereof and to all renewals, modifications,
consolidations,
replacements and extensions thereof.
Tenant shall from time to
time on request from Landlord execute and deliver any documents or
instruments that may be required to effectuate any such documents
or instruments within ten days after any such request by Landlord.
37. 2.
In
the
event Landlord defaults
on any
obligations to its mortgagee(s) including Landlord's default in the
payment of principal, interest and other impounds owed the
mortgagee, Tenant shall have the right, subject to reasonable
notice to Landlord, to cure such default and reduce the amount of
rent it owes Landlord commensurately.
38. Relationship of Parties: Nothing contained in this Lease
shall be deemed to constitute Landlord and Tenant as partners or
joint venturers, or any other relationship other than that of
landlord and tenant.
39. Further Assurances: Landlord and Tenant shall execute
such further documents and instruments as shall be necessary or
appropriate to carry out the provisions of this Lease.
40. Joint and Several Liability:
If more than one (1) person
or party is named as Tenant herein, the obligations of Tenant are
joint and several.
41. Attornment:
Tenant agrees to attorn to any successor
in interest to Landlord entitled to possession of the Premises
including a purchaser at a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.
The provisions of this Section 41 shall inure to the benefit 0£ any
such successor in interest, shall be self-operative upon any demand
by any such successor in interest, and no further instrument shall
be required to effect such attornment. Any successor in interest
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to Landlord shall be bound by all of the terms and provisions of
this Lease .
42. Estoppel Certificates:
Landlord and
Tenant shall,
within ten days after written request from the other, execute and
deliver to the other, in recordable form, a certificate stating, to
the extent true, that this Lease is unmodified and in full force
and effect, or in full force and effect as modified, and stating
the modifications, and that the other party is not in default
hereunder, or is in default and specifying the nature and extent of
the alleged default.
Failure to deliver the certificate within
said ten days shall be conclusive upon the party to whom the
request has been given that this Lease is in full force and effect
and has not been modified except as may be represented by the
requesting party and that the requesting party is not in default
hereunder .
43. Surrender of Possession : Tenant shall, on or before the
last day of the term of this Lease, or any renewals hereof,
surrender to Landlord the Premises (including all resident records,
subject, however, to appropriate resident consents , if required,
and except as prohibited by applicable law or regulation) in good
condition and repair, ordinary wear and tear excepted . Within the
last six months prior to the expiration of the Lease term, Tenant
shall not transfer residents to other facilities owned or operated
by Tenant, Tenant's management company, if any, or any affiliates
of Tenant unless requested by the resident or the resident's
family, for medical necessity, or as required by law.
Tenant,
Tenant's management company, if any, and Tenant's affiliates shall
not offer employment to any employees at the Premises except for
the administrator for at least one year after the expiration or
termination of this Lease and shall not compete in the ownership or
operation of assisted living facilities in the Lewiston and
Clarkston market area for three years after the expiration or
termination of this Lease. Upon the expiration or termination of
this Lease , Tenant shall deliver to Landlord copies of all resident
and employee records and all manuals , policies, and programs then
used, operated or in effect at the Premises. At the expiration of
the term of this Lease, Tenant shall be entitled to retain all
outstanding accounts receivable and shall remain responsible for
all accounts payable in connection with Tenant's operation of the
Premises. Provided that Tenant has met its obligations to maintain
the Premises, Landlord shall pay to the Tenant a sum equal to the
amounts in any reserve accounts required by Landlord's mortgagee or
HOD which were funded by Tenant.
If there remains any deferred
maintenance on the termination of this Lease, Landlord shall obtain
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an estimate thereof from a qualified third party and shall be
entitled to deduct the amount of the estimate from the payment to
Tenant.
44.

Notices:

44 .1.
All notices or other documents required or
permitted to be given hereunder shall be personally delivered, sent
by private overnight courier, or sent by registered or certified
mail, postage prepaid, return receipt requested, addressed to the
parties as follows:
Landlord:

Monica R. Salusky
1990 North California Boulevard
Suite 650
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone:
(925) 279-3456

Copy to:

John K. Sutherland
1990 North California Boulevard
Suite 650
Walnut Creek, CA 94596
Telephone :
(925) 279-3457

Tenant:

Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston 1 LLC
Attn: Marty D. Frantz
20555 North Gunning Road
Twin Lakes, ID 83858

44.2.
Notices sent by registered or certified mail
shall be deemed received the third business day after posting and
notices sent by private overnight courier shall be deemed received
the first business day after delivering the same to the private
overnight courier during regular business hours.
44.3.
Landlord and Tenant may change their addresses
and/or telephone numbers for purposes of this Lease by giving
notice thereof in accordance with the provisions of Section 44.1,
above .
4.5.

Quiet Enjoyment:

45.1 .
Provided that Tenant is not in default under
this Lease, Landlord shall not interfere with the peaceful and
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quiet occupation and enj oyment of the Premises
Tenant's assignees, subtenants, or residents.

by

Tenant

or

45 . 2.
Provided that Tenant is not in default under
this Lease, Landlord shall timely pay all amounts due on Landlord's
mortgage(s) of the Premi ses.
4 6. Authority :
If applicable, Tenant shall deliver
Landlord upon execution of this Lease a certified copy of
resolution of its board of directors authorizing the execution
this Lease and naming the person (s) who is/are authorized
execute this Lease on its behalf.
47 .

to
a
of
to

Inspection:

47 . 1.
Landlord shall have the right to go upon and
inspect the Premises, to post any notice that may be required or
permitted by any law relating to or affecting the liability of
Landlord for labor performed or materials furnished i n or for the
Premises, and to show the Premises to prospective purchasers and
lenders.
Landlord shall have the right to show the Premises to
prospective tenants during the last six months of the term of this
Lease subject to two days prior notice to Tenant or at any time
Tenant is in default o r if Landlord reasonably believes that
Tenant's default under this Lease is imminent. Landlord shall use
reasonable efforts not to disrupt Tenant's operation of the
Premises or intrude upon the privacy of Tenant's residents.

47 . 2.

The mortgagee(s) of the Premises shall have the
right to inspect the Premises if and to the extent set forth in any
mortgage(s) of the Premises .
48 . No Constructive Eviction:
The exercise of any right
reserved to Landlord pursuant to Section 47 hereof shall not
constitute an actual or constructive eviction, in whole or in part,
or entitle Tenant to any abatement or diminution of rent, or
relieve Tenant from any of i ts obligations under this Lease , or
impose any liability upon Landlord.
49.

No Representations:

-
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49.1 .
Tenant acknowledges that Landlord has made no
representations or warranties whatsoever, express or implied,
regarding the physical condition of the Premises except those
contained in this Lease .
49.2 .
Except that the Premises comply with applicable
nursing home licensing and certification standards at the
commencement of this Lease, Landlord further hereby specifically
disclaims any representations or warranties, both express and
implied,
with
respect to the condition,
habitability,
or
suitability of the Premises, or any part thereof, for the use and
purposes permitted hereunder or for any other purpose, and Landlord
does not represent or warrant that the Premises or any part thereof
complies with any laws, ordinances or regulations relating to the
use and occupancy thereof .
49. 3.
Tenant fully understands that there may be
certain repairs and alterations required for the continued
licensing and/or certification of the Premises, and Tenant shall be
fully responsible for the cost of and for effectuating any and all
alterations, maintenance, repair and replacements required to be
made for the continued licensing and certification of the Premises
and for any alterations, maintenance, repair and replacements
required to maintain and preserve the Premises in the condition
provided for herein.
50. Applicable Law :
This Lease shall be governed by, and
construed in accordance with, the laws of the State of Idaho.
51 . Headings: The descriptive headings used in this Lease are
for convenience only and shall not control or affect the meaning or
construction of any of its provisions .
52 . Attorneys ' Fees:
If Landlord or Tenant brings any
action to interpret or enforce this Lease, or for damages for any
alleged breach hereof, the prevailing party in any such action or
arbitration shall be entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees as
awarded by the court in addition to all other recoverable damages
and costs.

53. Exhibits : All exhibits attached hereto are incorporated
herein by reference as though set forth in full.
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54.
Definitions:
defined as follows:

As used in this Lease, following terms are

54 . 1 .
The term "mortgage"
deed of trust,
a contract of sale or
insurer of any mortgage including the
CWCapital LLC (" Lender") insured by the
Housing and Urban Development ( "HUD'') .

shall include a mortgage, a
contract for deed, and the
FHA loan ("FHA Loan") from
United States Depart ment of

54 . 2.
The term "mortgagee" shall include a mortgagee
under a mortgage , a beneficiary under a deed of trust, a vendor
under a contract of sale or contract for deed, and the insurer of a
mortgage of the Premises.
54 . 3.
The term "days" shall refer to calendar days
unless otherwise specified.
54.4.
The term "hazardous materials" as used in this
Lease shall mean any substance, material , or waste which has been
or becomes regulated by any local governmental authority, the State
of Idaho , or the United States government , including, but not
limited to, toxic mold , "petroleum" as defined in 42 U.S . C. Section
6991(8),
asbestos ,
lead
paint,
polychlorinated
biphenyls ,
designated as a "hazardous substance" pur suant to Sect i on 311 or
listed pursuant to Section 307 of the Clean Water Act , d efined as a
"hazardous waste,, pursuant to Section 1004 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, defined as a "hazardous substance"
pursuant to Section 101 of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response,
Compensation,
and Liability Act,
or defined as
"underground storage tank" under 42 U. S.C. Section 6991 .
54. 5.
The term "affiliate" shall mean a person or
entity controlled by, controlling, or under common control of,
directly or indirectly, another person or entity, an officer,
director or employee or another person or entity, any entity which
employs another person or of which a person is a director or
officer , and any person or entity which owns or controls 10 percent
of the securities of an entity .
54 . 6.
The term "principal" shall mean an individual
or entity who or which directly or indirectly owns or controls ten
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percent or more of the shares of any class of stock or other equity
interest in an entity which is not publicly traded.
55.

Security Deposit:

55.1.
At or prior to the commencement of the term of
this Lease, Tenant shall deliver to Landlord the sum of $137,343.32
as security for the full and faithful performance of each and every
provision of this Lease.
55 . 2 .
Within 30 days of the expiration of the term of
this Lease, provided that Tenant is not then in default, Landlord
shall refund Tenant's security deposit, or such portion thereof as
then remains, to Tenant.
55.3.
Tenant's security deposit shall be paid
directly to Landlord.
Tenant's security deposit shall bear no
interest.
The Landlord is not the trustee of Tenant's security
deposit, and Tenant's security deposit may be commingled with
Landlord's general funds .
55.4.
Upon any sale or other transfer of the Premises
by Landlord, Landlord shall assign and deliver Tenant's security
deposit to Landlord ' s purchaser or other transferee, who or which
shall assume Landlord's obligations to Tenant with respect to
Tenant's security deposit.
The written assumption by Landlord's
purchaser or other transferee of Landlord's obligations to Tenant
under this Lease shall relieve Landlord of all obligations with
respect thereto.
5 6. Option to Purchase: Tenant
shall
have
the
option,
exercisable between the sixth and seventh anniversaries of the
commencement of the term of this Lease to purchase the Premises for
the price and on the terms and conditions set forth as follows:
56.1 The purchase price for the Premises shall be the sum
of (i) $5,700,000, and (ii) the then principal balance of the HUD
loan secured by the Premises, or, if the HUD loan has been
refinanced, then what the principal balance of the HUD loan would
have been if the HUD loan had not been refinanced.
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56.2 Tenant may assume, and be credited with, the
principal balance of the mortgage secured by the Premises, provided
that Landlord is released from all further liability thereon .
Payments on any mortgage ( s) secured by the Premlses assumed by
Tenant shall be current as of close of escrow . Tenant shall be
responsible for obtaining any necessary consents to assume
mortgage(s) secured by the Premises . Any assumption fees shall be
paid by Tenant. The balance of the purchase price for the Premises
shall be paid in cash at close of escrow . If Tenant does not assume
the financing secured by the Premises, or if Tenant is unable to
obtain the release of Landlord from personal liability thereon,
then the entire purchase price for the Premises shall be paid in
cash at close of escrow. Tenant shall pay any prepayment penalties
imposed by any mortgagee of the Premises . Landlord shall assign any
replacement or reserve account , including any interest thereon,
required by Landlord's mortgagee to Tenant . Tenant's security
deposit shall be retained by the Landlord and applied toward the
purchase price of the Premises.
56 . 3 The purchase price for the Premises shall be in
addition to any rent paid by Tenant hereunder. In no event shall
any rent paid hereunder be credited or applied to the purchase
price for the Premises. Tenant shall be credited with the amount of
any reserve(s) held by Landlord' s mortgagee(s) that was provided by
Tenant.
56 . 4 Tenant shall use Tenant ' s best efforts to give
Landlord at least six months advance notice that Tenant intends to
exercise Tenant ' s option to purchase the Premises. Tenant' s notice
of Tenant's intention to exercise Tenant ' s option to purchase shall
not be binding upon Tenant .
56 . 5 Tenant's option to purchase the Premises shall be
exercised only by delivery of a written notice of exercise in the
manner specified in Section 44 , above. Tenant's exercise of
Tenant's option to purchase the Premises shall be irrevocable. Upon
Tenant' s exercise of the option to purchase the Premises, Tenant
shall make a deposit on account of the purchase price of the
Premises, in the amount of $200,000 which shall be delivered to the
escrow holder selected under Section 55.7, below . Tenant's deposit
shall be placed in an interest bearing account, and, provided that
Tenant does not default in Tenant ' s purchase of the Premises,
interest shall be credited to Tenant. Landlord and Tenant
acknowledge and agree that it would be extremely difficult or
impossible to determine the amount of actual damages Landlord would
suffer as a result of Tenant's default in Tenant ' s purchase of the
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Premises, and the amount of Tenant's deposit is a reasonable
approximation thereof, and shall be and are liquidated damages and
shall be released to and retained by Landlord in the event of
Tenant's failure to complete the purchase of the Premises after
exercising Tenant's option to purchase.

Landlord's initial s :

VY\J1:-

Tenant's initials: ~

56 . 6 Notwithstanding
the
foregoing ,
any
purported
exercise of Tenant's option to purchase the Premises shall be null
and void and of no force or effect whatsoever if Tenant is then in
material default under this Lease, Tenant has at any time
materially defaulted under this Lease, if Tenant is in material
default under this Lease as of the scheduled close of escrow for
Tenant ' s purchase of the Premises .
56.7 Escrow for Tenant's purchase of the Premises shall
close
180 days after Landlord's receipt of Tenant's notice of
exercise of option . The date for close of escrow may, however, be
extended by Landlord or Tenant by no more than 90 days by written
notice not less than 30 days prior to the originally scheduled
close of escrow.
56 . 8 The escrow holder for Tenant's purchase of the
Premises shall be any licensed title or escrow company selected by
Landlord, subject to Tenant's approval, which shall not be
unreasonably withheld.
56.9 Title to the Premises shall be conveyed to Tenant
free and clear of all liens and encumbrances except for real and
personal property taxes not yet due and payable, any mortgage(s)
assumed by Tenant, any liens or encumbrances caused or permitted by
Tenant during the term of this Lease, any liens and encumbrances
approved by Tenant, and any other liens or encumbrances which do
not materially affect the value or use of the Premises .
56 . l0Rent under this Lease shall be prorated as of close
of escrow.
56.11
Title to the Premises shall be insured by a
standard owner's t itle insurance policy, the premium for which
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shall be paid by Tenant . The cost of any survey required for
Tenant ' s title insurance policy shall be paid for by Tenant .
56 .12
All transfer taxes shall be paid by Tenant.
Escrow costs shall be paid by Tenant .
56.13
Tenant shall fully cooperate with Landlord in
effecting a tax-deferred exchange of the Premises, including the
execution of an exchange agreement and other documents and
instruments as may be reasonably necessary, provided that the total
monetary obligation or Tenant does not exceed that specified
herein.
56 . 14
Tenant's option to purchase the Premises may
not be assigned separate from this Lease except to an affiliate of
Tenant.

56 . 15
Landlord and Tenant acknowledge that any
t ransfer of the Premises or any portion thereof or interest therein
shall be subject to the transfers of physical assets procedures of
HUD.

57. Guaranty : Marty Frantz and Tyson Frantz and their spouses
shall guarantee this Lease by a separate form of guaranty
acceptable to Landlord.
58 . Severability: In the event any part or provision of this
Lease shall be determi ned to be invalid or unenforceable under the
laws of the State of Washington, the remaining portion of this
Lease shall, nevertheless , continue in full force and effect.
59 . Time:
Time
provision of this Lease .

is

of

the

essence

of

each and every

60 . Counterparts: This Lease may be executed in any number
of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, but all
of which shall constitute one and the same agreement .
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61.

Amendments:

61.1 No amendment to this Lease shall be effective unless
it is in writing and signed by both Landlord and Tenant.
61 . 2 Landlord and Tenant shall amend this Lease if and to
the extent required by HUD, provided that the amendment does not
materially adversely affect Landlord's or Tenant's rights or
obligations under this Lease.
62 . HUD-Required Provisions: For so long as HUD is the holder
or insurer of the FHA Loan, the following provisions shall apply to
this Lease, notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary. This
section shall not be amended without the prior written consent of
HUD and the Lender.
62.1 This Lease shall not be assigned, in whole or in
part (including any transfer of title or right to possession and
control of the Premises, or of any right to collect fees or rents),
without the prior approva l of HUD . Landlord and Tenant acknowledge
that any proposed assignee will be required to execute a Regulatory
Agreement Nursing Homes (Form HUD-92466-NHL) with HUD as a
prerequisite to any such approval.
62.2 In the event of any conflict between the terms and
provisions of this Lease and the requirements of Section 232 of the
National Housing Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, the requirements of Section 232 of the
National Housing Act, as amended, and all rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder shall control in all respects. In the event
of any conflict between the terms and provisions of this Lease and
the terms and provisions of
(i)
the Regulatory Agreement
Multifamily Housing Projects between Landlord and HUD or (ii) the
Regulatory Agreement Nursing Homes between Tenant and HUD
(collectively,
the "Regulatory Agreements"),
the terms and
provisions of the Regulatory Agreements, as applicable, shall
control in all respects .
Landlord and Tenant agree that no
provision of this Lease shall modify any obligation of Landlord or
Tenant under the FHA Loan and the Regulatory Agreements. Landlord
and Tenant acknowledge that HUD ' s acceptance of this Lease shall in
no way constitute HUD's consent to arrangements which are
inconsistent with the rules, regulations and requirements of
Section 232 of the National Housing Act, as amended. This Lease is
subordinate and subject to the FHA Loan, all loan documents
executed in connection therewith, and all rules, regulations and
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requirements
amended.

of

Section

232

of

the

National

Housing Act ,

as

62 . 3 Tenant
agrees
to
comply
with
all
HUD
regulations and requirements that are applicable to the Premises .
Tenant agrees that it will not take any action that would violate
any applicable provision of the FHA Loan, Regulatory Agreements ,
Security Agreement or other documents executed by Landlord in
connection with the FHA Loan .
62. 4 Landlord and Tenant hereby represent and warrant
that the rent payable by Tenant under this Lease (including rent
and all other sums payable under this Lease) is sufficient to
properly maintain the Premises and to enable Landlord to meet its
debt service obligations and related expenses including , but not
limited tor reserve for replacements, mortgage insu r ance premiums,
and property tax and insurance impounds in connection with the FHA
Loan.
62 . 5 Landlord and Tenant agree not to undertake or
acquiesce to any modification to the state license with respect to
the Premises without the prior written approval of HOD .
62 . 6 Tenant shall furnish HUD copies of its certified
annual financial statements within sixt y days after the close of
Tenant ' s fiscal year.
62.7 Tenant shall be responsible for obtaining and
maintaining all necessary licensure and provider agreements
including for Medicaid and Medicare. Tenant shall, upon request ,
furnish HUD with copies of all such provider agreements .
62 . 8 Tenant shall ensure that the Premises meets all
state licensure requirements and standards at all times.
62.9 Landlord and Tenant certify that that to the best of
their knowledge, information and belief, this Lease complies with
applicable requirements of Section 3.9.G of the Multifamily
Accelerated Processing Gui de dated May 17, 2000, as revised March
15, 2002 and promulga t ed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
for Housing - FHA Commissioner which terms and requirements are
included herein.
62 . 10
Landlord and Tenant hereby agree that the terms
of this Lease, as well as any Memorandum of Lease executed in
connection herewith, are and shall be subordinate to the terms and
conditions as set forth in : i) that Mortgage or Deed of Trust
assumed by Landlord in favor of Lender, ii) that UCC Financing
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Statement naming Landlord as Debtor and Lender as Secured Party,
iii) that Regulatory Agreement for Multifamily Housing Projects
executed by Landlord and HUD, and iv) that Nursing Home Regulatory
Agreement executed by Tenant and HUD.
62.11
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary
in this Lease, to the extent that rent is insufficient to cover
Landlord's real estate taxes, general and special assessments,
personal property taxes, audit costs, FHA mortgage payments,
replacement reserves, insurance, mortgage insurance premiums, or
any other amounts required under the Landlord's FHA loan documents,
Tenant shall pay as additional rent such amounts that will allow
Landlord to make the aforementioned payments.
63.
Binding, Etc.:
This Lease shall be binding upon, and
inure to the benefit of, Landlord and Tenant, and their respective
heirs,
personal representatives,
successors in interest and
assigns.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Landlord and 'Tenant have executed this
Lease the day and year first above written.
Landlord:

Lewiston Healthcare Investors LLC

By:
Monica
Sal usky
Managing Member

Tenant:

Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston 1 LLC

By:

~\cj~
Marty D. Frantz
Member

- 40 E:\JOHN\AGRMTS\Lease-GuardianAngelHomes-Draft#4-090508 Clean.doc
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Exhibit"A"

Real property in the County of Ne2 Perce, State of Idaho, described as follows:
PARCEL 1 .
{PHASE I)
A parcel of land situate in the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW'/4NW¼) of
Section 7, Township 35 North, Range S West of the Boise Meridian, Nez Perce County, State
of Idaho, more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
(NW¼NW¼) of said Section 7, Township 35 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian,
thence South 87°54144" West along the North llne of Section 7 a distance of 249.46 feet to
the Northeast corner of the Vassar Rawls property; as described in Warranty Deed recorded
as Instrument No. 380847; thence South 0°28'50" East along the East line of Vassar-Rawls
property a distance of 347.89 feet; thence South 87°55'42" West along the South line of the
Vassar-Rawls property a distance of 249.89 feet; thence South 2°17' 31" East a distance of
487.66 feet to the Former North ri ght-of-way line of 24th Avenue (now vacated); thence
along said former right-of-way line North 87° 46'25" East a distance of 189.80 feet; thence
along a curve concave to the Southwest having a central angle of 57°50' and a radius of
174.82 feet, an arc distance of 176.46 feet; thence South 34°23'35" East a distance of 51.80
feet; thence along a curve concave to the Northeast having a central angle of 76° 29' and a
radius of 33.44 feet and arc distance of 44.64 feet; thence North 69°07'25" East a distance
of 80.68 feet to the East line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
(NW¼NW¼), Section 1; thence North 0°29'35" West a distance of 948.26 feet along said
East line to THE POINT OF BEGINNING.
EXCEPTING THEREFROM
That portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW¼NW¼} of Section 7,
Township 35 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho,
described as follows:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
(NW¼NW1/4) of said Section 7; thence South 87°54'44" West along the North line of Section
7 at a distance of 249.46 feet; thence South 0°28' 50" East along the East line of the VassarRawls property a distance of 347,89 feet; thence North 87° 55'42" East a distance of 250
feet, more or less, to the East line of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of safd
Section 7; thence North along said East line a distance of 348 feet, more or less, to THE
POINT OF BEGINNING.
ALSO EXCEPTING THEREFROM
That portion of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW¼NW¼) of Section 7,
Township 35 North, Range 5 West of t he Boise Meridian, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho,
described as follows:
Beginning at the Northeast corner of the Northwest quarter of the Northwest Quarter
(NW¼NW¼) of said Section 7; thence South 87°54'44" West along the North line of said
Section 7 a distance of 249.46 feet; thence South 0°28' 50" East along the East line of the
Vassar•Rawls pr operty a distance of 347.89 feet to THE POINT OF BEGINNI NG; thence
continue South 0°28' So• East a distance of 500 feet, more or less, to the intersection with
the former North right-of-way line of 24th Avenue (now vacated); thence Southeasterly
along the former North right-of-way llne to the Intersection w ith the East line of the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW¼NW1'4) of Section 7; thence North
0°29'35" West a distance of 600 feet, more or less, to a point which is the Southeast corner
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of parcel No. 1 described in War ranty Deed recorded as Instrument No. 557292, said point is
South 348 feet, more or less, from the Northeast cor ner of the Northwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter (NW¼NW¼) of said Section 7; thence South 87°55'42' West a distance
of 250 feet to THE POINT OF BEGINNING.

PARCEL 2:
(PHASE JI)
A Portion of Lots 2 and 3, Block 13, LEWISTON VINEYARDS TRACT NO. 2, lying in the
Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter (NW¼NW¼) of Section 7, Township 35 North,
Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian, Nez Perce County, State of Idaho, being more
particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the Northeast comer of the Northwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter
(NW¼ NW¼) of Section 7, Township 35 North, Range 5 West of the Boise Meridian; thence
South 87° 54'44" West, along the North line of said Section 7, a distance of 249.46 feet to t he
Northeast corner of the Vassar- Rawls property; thehce South 00°28'50" East along the East
line of said Vassar-Rawls property a distance of 347.89 feet to the Southeast corner of said
Vassar•Rawls property; thence continui ng South 0° 28'50" East a di stance of 492.98 feet to
the former North right of way line of 24th Avenue (now vacated), said point being the TRUE
POINT OF BEGINNING; thence South 35°19'02" West a distance of 39.92 feet; thence South
29°59'49" East a distance of 204.69 feet to a non-tangent curve, the center of which bears
South 56°35'07" East; thence along said curve through a central angle of 04°10'48", a radius
of 230.00 feet, and an arc length of 16.78 feet; thence South 29° 14'05" West a distance of
5.11 feet; thence South 60°00'11'' West a distance of 74.10 feet; thence South 87°58'53"
West a distance of 130.74 feet; thence North 02°17'31" West a distance of 76.74 feet;
thence South 88°10"36" West a distance of 102.54 feet to the East right of way tine of
Vineyard Avenue; thence North 00°19'57" West along said East right of way line of Vineyard
Avenue a distance of 134.41 feet to the Northwest comer of Lot 3, Block 13, Lewiston
Vineyards Tract No. 2; thence continuing along said East right of way line of Vineyard
Avenue to the former North right of way line of 24th Avenue {now vacated); thence Easterly
along said former North r ight of w ay line to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Parcel 3:
Together with a Landscape, Fence, and Parki ng Easement dated July 24, 2007 and recorded
July 30, 2007 as Instrument No. 746966, and a Fence and Sidewalk Easement dated July 31,
2007 and recorded August 8, 2007 as Instrument No. 747336, each of Official Records of
Nez Perce county, Idaho.
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LEWISTON, IDAHO GAH PHASE III
HEALTHCARE PROJECT BROKE GROUND
BUT WAS SHELVED FOR 7 YEARS
AS A RESULT OF IIB ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
ATTACHED HERETO
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U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
Federal Housing Commissioner
Office of Insured Health Care Facilities
Commitment for Insurance of Advances
(Section 232)
FHA Project No.: 124-43017
Guardian Angel Homes
Project Name:
Lewiston, The Ranch House
2435 Vineyard Avenue
Project Address: Lewiston, ID 83501

------------

CWCapital LLC
(Mortgagee)
One Charles River Place
63 Kendrick Street
(Address)

20555 N. Gunning Road
(Address)

Needham, MA 02494
(City, State and Zip Code)

Rathdrum, ID 82858
(City, State and Zip Code)

GAH Lewiston 2 LLC
(Name of Mortgagor)

We understand that you, as Mortgagee, have agreed to make a loan to GAH Lewiston 2
LLC (hereinafter called the "Mortgagor"), in an amount not exceeding the sum of
$1,904,000 and no/100 Dollars ($1,904,000) to be secured by a credit instrument and
security instrument (hereinafter jointly called the "Mortgage") covering real property with
existing building(s) (if any) thereon identified above (hereinafter called the "Project"), as
shown on the legal description of the property attached hereto as Exhibit A.
It is your intention to present the said Mortgage to the Federal Housing Commissi oner
acting herein on behalf of the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development (the
"Secretary") for mortgage insurance under the provisions of Section 232 of the National
Housing Act (the "NHA") and the Regulations thereunder now in effect (the
"Regulations").
The Secretary hereby agrees to insure said Mortgage under the provisions of the NHA
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and the Regulations upon the following conditions:
1.(a) The Mortgage shall bear interest at the rate of six and one-half percent (6.5 %) per
annum [during the construction period and at the rate of six and one-half percent
(6.5 %) per annum thereafter. As used herein, construction period means the
period beginning on the date of Initial Endorsement and ending on the cost-cut off
date approved by the Secretary (or such other date as may be approved by the
Secretary)]. Note: Any change in the interest rate will require reprocessing of the
mortgage insurance application and amendment of this Commitment prior to Initial
Endorsement.
(b) Payments of interest only on the outstanding principal balance shall be due and
payable on the first day of each month, commencing not later than the first day of
the month following initial endorsement of the Mortgage for insurance ("Initial
Endorsement") and continuing through the first day of the month immediately prior
to the date on which the first monthly payment of principal is due.
(c) The first payment to principal (commencement of amortization) shall be due on the
first day of the 13th month following the month in which Initial Endorsement occurs.
The Mortgage shall be payable on a level annuity basis by 480 monthly payments
of principal and interest in the amount of $11,147.10 each. Monthly principal and
interest payments due prior to, or on the first day of the month after, final
endorsement of the Mortgage ("Final Endorsement") shall be adjusted to the extent
that the full principal amount of the Mortgage has not yet been advanced in order
for such payments to equal the sum of (i) interest on the outstanding principal
balance plus (ii) the regularly scheduled principal amortization payments due on
the Mortgage assuming that the full amount thereof has been advanced. The
maturity and final payment date shall be 39 years and 11 months following the due
date of the first payment to principal (commencement of amortization).
2.(a) A project shall be constructed (which term shall be deemed to include substantially
rehabilitated, if applicable) on the mortgaged property in accordance with a
construction contract approved by the Secretary and with the Drawings and
Specifications filed with the Secretary and designated as Guardian Angel Homes
Lewiston, The Ranch House , FHA Project No.124-43017, dated September 1,
2009 and identified in the Index attached hereto as Exhibit B. The Drawings and
Specifications, which include "General Conditions of the Contract for Construction"
(AIA Document A201) and "Supplementary Conditions of the Contract for
Construction" (HUD-2554), shall be identified in a manner acceptable to the
Secretary by the following parties or their authorized agents: Mortgagor, design
architect, architect administering the construction contract, contractor and, if
applicable, the contractor's surety. The Secretary encourages mortgagors to
utilize energy saving devices and methods.
(b) At or prior to Initial Endorsement, there shall be submitted to the Secretary
assurance of completion of the Project in the form of (i) payment and performance
bonds, each in the amount of 100% of the construction contract amount, in form
Revision Date: 12/29/08
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and substance satisfactory to the Secretary and issued by a surety acceptable to
the Secretary, or (ii) a completion assurance agreement reflecting a deposit
thereunder of not less than 15% [15% or 25%, as applicable] of the construction
contract amount, in form and substance satisfactory to the Secretary.
(c) The Mortgagor shall cause the Project to be equipped in order for the Project to
operate in accordance with applicable laws, such equipment to include, but not be
limited to, the major moveable equipment listed in Exhibit C attached hereto.
3.

The credit instrument and the security instrument to be insured shall be in the
forms prescribed by the Secretary for use in connection with loans insured under
Section 232 of the NHA in the locality in which the property is situated. In addition,
the Mortgagor (and, if applicable, the lessee/operator of the Project) shall provide a
security agreement and UCC financing statements granting a first lien security
interest in such tangible and intangible personal property related to the Project as
may be required by the Secretary (subject only to liens for taxes and assessments
which are not delinquent and such other liens as may be approved by the
Secretary).

4.(a) Prior to Initial Endorsement, the Mortgagor shall present to the Secretary a title
policy in conformity with the Regulations which shall show that title to the property
(or, if approved by the Secretary, a leasehold estate therein) on the date of
Endorsement is vested in the Mortgagor free of all exceptions to title (either junior
or prior to said Mortgage), except said Mortgage and such other exceptions to title
as are specifically determined to be acceptable by the Secretary. Said title policy
shall (i) by its terms inure to the benefit of the Mortgagee and/or the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development, as their interests may appear and (ii) unless
otherwise approved by the Secretary, be on the ALTA Loan Policy 2006 Form and
include ALTA Form 8.1-06, 9-06 (or 9.3-06), ALTA 17-06 and ALTA 22-06
endorsements and an endorsement deleting the arbitration clause. Said policy
may contain a pending disbursements clause if customary in the area in which the
Project is located.
(b) If required by the Secretary, prior to Initial Endorsement, and again prior to Final
Endorsement, the Mortgagor shall present to the Secretary a survey of the Project
in form and substance satisfactory to the Secretary. At the request of the
Secretary or the Mortgagee, such survey will be updated from time to time during
construction to show that the improvements on the site have been erected solely
upon the mortgaged property and within applicable building restriction lines, if any,
and do not encroach upon or overhang any land not covered by the Mortgage or
any easement or right-of-way.
5.

The Mortgagor must possess the powers necessary for operating the Project and
meeting all the requirements of the Secretary for insurance of the Mortgage. Prior
to Initial Endorsement, there shall be delivered to the Secretary and the Mortgagee
(a) copies of ownership entity documentation that complies with applicable
requirements of the Secretary, including a copy of the instrument under which the

Revision Date: 12/29/08

Page 3 oflO

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 237 of 411

Mortgagor entity is created (unless the Mortgagor is an individual), together with
copies of all instruments or agreements necessary under the laws of the applicable
jurisdiction to authorize execution of the Mortgage and the other closing
documents, and (b) a Regulatory Agreement in the form prescribed by the
Secretary for use in connection with loans insured under Section 232 of the NHA
(the "Regulatory Agreement"). Such Regulatory Agreement shall provide, among
other things, for the establishment of a Reserve Fund for Replacements (the
"Reserve Fund for Replacements") under the control of the Mortgagee by payment
of $13,006 per annum, to be accumulated monthly at the rate of $1,084 per month
(rounded to the nearest dollar), commencing on the date of the first payment to
principal as established in the Mortgage unless a later date is agreed upon by the
Secretary. In addition to the per annum amount required to be accumulated
monthly under the control of the Mortgagee for the Reserve Fund for
Replacements, there shall be an initial deposit in the amount of not less than $0
made to the Reserve Fund for Replacements by the Mortgagor at the time of Initial
Endorsement.
The amount of the annual deposits to the Reserve Fund for Replacements shall be
subject to change in accordance with the requirements of the Secretary. In
connection therewith, every ten years the Mortgagee shall obtain a new Project
Capital Needs Assessment ("PCNA") for the Secretary to evaluate. The cost of
each such PCNA report may be paid from the Reserve Fund for Replacements.
The Mortgagee's Certificate to be delivered prior to Initial Endorsement and the
Regulatory Agreement shall each include a statement confirming the requirement
for such periodic PCNA reports.
6.

At or before Initial Endorsement, the Mortgagee or its nominee shall collect the
following escrows (in the form of cash and/or, except with respect to clause (c)
below, one or more unconditional and irrevocable letters of credit) to be applied to
the following items:
(a)

Funds for application to taxes, mortgage insurance premiums, property
insurance premiums and assessments required by the terms of the Mortgage
accruing subsequent to Initial Endorsement, and not included in the proceeds
of the Mortgage in the amount of $38,080.

(b)

Funds for application to the cost of purchasing minor moveable equipment for
use in Project operations in the amount of $20,000.

(c)

Funds required over and above Mortgage proceeds for completion of the
Project in the amount of $381,282. This sum represents the difference
between the Secretary's estimate of the total cash required for carrying
charges, financing, and for construction of the Project, including contractor's
fees and overhead, architect's fees, and other fees, and the maximum
amount of the Mortgage to be insured. These funds may be reduced by (i) so
much of the contractor's fees up to a maximum of $0, as the closing
documents show are not to be paid in cash and (ii) amounts that have been
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prepaid by or on behalf of the Mortgagor, as evidenced by a certification of
the Mortgagor.
(d)

Funds for application to the costs of off-site improvements in the amount of
$18,000, and demolition in the amount of $3,000.

(e)

Funds in the amount of $125,000 for application to the expenses of the
Project beginning on the later of (i) the date on which all or part of the Project
has received a certificate of occupancy or (ii) the date on which residents are
first occupying units/beds in the Project and ending on the later of ( 1) 12
months after the date of Final Endorsement or (2) a determination by the
Secretary that the Project has achieved sustaining occupancy and positive
cash flows for a period of at least 90 days.

At Initial Endorsement, the Mortgagee shall deliver to the Secretary a Mortgagee's
Certification evidencing the collection of the amounts set forth in this paragraph.
All funds deposited with the Mortgagee or its nominee under this paragraph shall
be held and disbursed by the Mortgagee or its nominee in accordance with the
applicable requirements of the Secretary.
7.(a)Approval of advances of Mortgage proceeds in accordance with the Building Loan
Agreement (Form HUD-92441) must be obtained on a form prescribed by the
Secretary prior to the date of each advance to be insured. A Contractor's
Prevailing Wage Certificate shall be filed with the request for approval of each
advance which includes a payment for construction costs. The Secretary's
execution of applications for insurance of advances of mortgage proceeds (Form
HUD-92403) shall be required only for advances made at Initial Endorsement or
Final Endorsement and for advances of all or part of the contractor's retainage,
and the Mortgagee shall have the authority to approve all other advances of
Mortgage proceeds on behalf of the Secretary.
(b) During the course of construction, the Secretary and his representatives shall at
times have access to the property and the right to inspect the progress
construction, and an inspection fee in the amount of $9,520 shall be paid at
before Initial Endorsement. The inspection of construction by a representative
the Secretary shall be only for the benefit and protection of the Secretary.

all
of
or
of

(c) Upon completion of the Project in accordance with the Drawings and
Specifications, the credit instrument will be finally endorsed for insurance to the
extent of the advances of Mortgage proceeds approved by the Secretary, subject
to reduction as provided in the Regulations.
8.

Any change in the Drawings and Specifications or in the conditions upon which this
Commitment is based, which may occur after the date hereof, shall be explained in
writing, or in a supplementary application if required by the Secretary, and must be
approved by the Secretary prior to Initial Endorsement. Any such change occurring
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subsequent to Initial Endorsement that requires the Secretary's approval under this
paragraph must be brought to the attention of the Secretary immediately upon
occurrence, and must be approved by the Secretary prior to the date on which the
Secretary is requested to approve any further advance for insurance. Changes in
the Drawings and Specifications which result in any net construction cost increase,
or will, change the design concept, or will result in a net cumulative construction
cost decrease of more than 2% of the contract amount may be effected only with
the prior written approval of the Mortgagee and the Secretary. The Secretary's
approval of any change described above may be subject to such conditions and
qualifications as the Secretary in his/her discretion may prescribe.
9.

It is a condition of this Commitment that any change in ownership upon which this
Commitment was predicated must be indicated in writing by the Mortgagor and
such request must be approved in writing by the Secretary. Any principals of the
Mortgagor or lessee/operator which are added prior to Initial Endorsement and
which were not disclosed in the mortgage insurance application shall be subject to
the Secretary's credit review and previous participation clearance before Initial
Endorsement. Project principals have been identified to be relied on for financial
capacity. Withdrawal of any individual/firm relied on for financial capacity requires
prior approval by the Secretary. In addition, withdrawal of such individual/firm prior
to Initial Endorsement could result in the Secretary declaring this Commitment null
and void.

10. Upon Initial Endorsement, the Mortgagee shall pay to the Secretary in advance, a
mortgage insurance premium equal to 0.57% of the principal amount of the
Mortgage to cover the first mortgage insurance premium and shall continue to
make payments thereafter as required by the aforesaid Regulations.
11. This Commitment shall expire 60 days from the date hereof unless extended by
the Secretary. Upon such expiration, all rights and obligations of the respective
parties shall cease. Prior to any extension of this Commitment, the Secretary may,
at his/her option, reexamine this Commitment to determine whether it shall be
extended, shall be extended in the same amount, or shall be amended to include a
lesser amount.
12. A request for the reopening of this Commitment received within 90 days of its
expiration must be accompanied by the reopening fee prescribed by the
Regulations.
13. The Mortgagor, lessee/operator and/or management agent, as applicable, shall
maintain professional liability insurance in accordance with the requirements
established by the Secretary. The Mortgagor shall annually provide, or cause to
be provided, to the Secretary a certification of compliance with the Secretary's
professional liability insurance requirements. The Regulatory Agreement executed
by the Mortgagor must require compliance with these requirements.
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14. If the Project is subject to an operating lease, such lease must (a) incorporate
subordination language approved by the Secretary, (b) provide for lease payments
sufficient to cover monthly principal and interest payments under the Mortgage,
escrows required under the Mortgage and deposits to the Reserve Fund for
Replacements required by the Regulatory Agreement, and (c) otherwise comply
with applicable requirements of the Secretary. In addition, the lessee/operator
must execute and deliver an Operator Regulatory Agreement in the form specified
by the Secretary.
15. Any accounts receivable financing obtained by the Mortgagor or lessee/operator
with respect to the Project will be subject to approval by the Secretary and the
Mortgagee.
16. All financing arrangements (other than the Mortgage and any other mortgage
insured by the Secretary), including repayment obligations and other secondary
financing, and occupancy restrictions must be fully disclosed to, and approved by,
the Secretary and must comply with the Secretary's requirements applicable to
loans insured under the Section of the NHA applicable to the Mortgage.
17. Any interest savings resulting purely from a differential between the processed
interest rate and the actual final interest rate may not be construed as excess
funds offsetting costs in other categories at the time of cost certification. To the
extent that the amount of the Mortgage set forth in this Commitment has been
determined based upon replacement cost, any such savings must be applied as a
reduction in the amount of the Mortgage.
18. Pursuant to Form HUD-2880, this Commitment is based on Mortgagor
certifications regarding the absence or use of Tax Credits or Other Government
Assistance. If the Mortgagor's intentions subsequently change, and Tax Credits or
Other Government Assistance is applied for or eliminated, Form HUD-2880 must
be updated, and the Secretary reserves the right to unilaterally alter any and all of
his/her underwriting determinations, or revise the terms of the mortgage insurance
commitment or regulatory agreement accordingly.
19. This Commitment is conditioned upon and shall not be enforceable against the
Secretary until and unless all conditions to the endorsement stated herein have
been satisfied or waived by the Secretary.
20. The Secretary reserves the right to examine the Mortgagee's file materials related
to the underwriting of the Mortgage at any time during the ten-year period following
Initial Endorsement. If there is evidence of fraud or misrepresentation by the
Mortgagee, the Secretary reserves his/her legal rights under the contract of
mortgage insurance and Mortgagee Review Board requirements. The Mortgagee
agrees to retain, in accessible files, all materials related to the underwriting of the
Mortgage for a period of ten years, even though the Mortgage itself may be sold to
another entity.
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21. To the extent that the Mortgagor has not done so prior to Initial Endorsement, the
Mortgagor must provide to the Secretary evidence/documentation from the
appropriate local/state licensing authorities showing approval or conditional
approval for the operation of the Project (or applicable portions thereof) prior to
occupancy of the Project (or applicable portion thereof).
22. At least 10 calendar days prior to Initial Endorsement, an Estimated Progress
Schedule of Work must be submitted by the general contractor for review and
approval by the Secretary. The progress schedule is required by Article 3.10.1 of
the AIA General Conditions, which is an integral part of the FHA Construction
Contract, Form HUD-92442 or 92442A.
23. Should any asbestos containing materials (ACMs) or environmental contaminants
be encountered in the course of demolition or construction, they are to be handled
in accordance with all applicable federal, state, and local requirements.
24. Prior to Initial Endorsement, both the design architect and supervising architect
shall provide evidence of errors and omissions (liability) insurance and shall agree
to maintain errors and omissions through acceptance of the 12-month warranty
inspection.
25. Attention is directed to the Regulations covering the assignment or the transfer of
the insured mortgage, in whole or in part, and the transfer of the rights, privileges,
and obligations under the contract of mortgage insurance.
26. This Commitment is subject to the conclusions stated on the attached forms:
HUO-92264-HCF, Health Care Facility Summary Appraisal Report; HUD-92264A,
Supplement to Project Analysis; HUD-92447, Property Insurance Requirements;
HUD-92329, Property Insurance Schedule, HUD-2328, Contractors' and/or
Mortgagor's Cost Breakdown, and HUD-92438, Underwriting Summary.
27. The mortgagor(s), its contractors and subcontractors, shall comply with all
applicable Federal labor standards provisions as expressed in the Supplementary
Conditions of the Contract for Construction (HUD-2554), in connection with the
construction of said Project.
28. This Commitment is
x

Subject to Special Conditions numbered 1 through 11, attached hereto.

D

Not subject to any Special Conditions.

Attached to this Commitment is a form closing checklist identifying documents required
for loans insured under Section 232 of the NHA. The Mortgagee or its counsel shall
revise the form closing checklist to conform to the requirements of this Commitment.
Draft closing documents, conforming to the terms of this Commitment, must be
submitted not less than 15 business days prior to Initial Endorsement.
This
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Commitment and exhibits referred to herein together with the applicable Regulations
constitute the entire agreement among the parties, and acceptance of the terms hereof
is evidenced by the signature of the Mortgagor and Mortgagee upon the lines provided
below. Please return one original of this Commitment signed by the Mortgagee and the
Mortgagor within 1O business days of the date of the Secretary's execution of this
Commitment.

SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
BY: FEDERAL HOUSING COMMISSIONER

By:
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The above Commitment for Insurance of Advances, including Special Conditions (if
applicable), is hereby accepted by the undersigned, and we hereby agree to be bound
by the terms hereof.

Date:

-------

MORTGAGOR

By:------------Name:

-----------Ti tie:
------------Date: - - - - - - -

MORTGAGEE

By:------------Name:
TitIe:

------------------------

Attachments:
• Special Conditions, if applicable
• Exhibit A: Legal Description
• Exhibit B: Index to Drawings and Specifications
• Exhibit C: List of Major Moveables (if applicable)
• HUD 2328, Contractor's and/or Mortgagor's Cost Breakdown
• Form HUD-92264-HCF and Form HUD-92264A
• Form HUD-92329 and Form HUD-92447
• Form HUD-92438
• Closing Checklist
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$32,000,000 OF HEALTHCARE PROJECTS
SHELVED DUE TO IIB ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
CHARTS AND RECORDS CREATED
AND CERTIFIED BY MARTY FRANTZ
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HISTORY OF UNDERWRITING

& CREDIT EXTENDED TO MARTY FRANTZ
2002 THRU 2011
The following charts demonstrate that when 118 froze Frantz's credit, it blocked $32m in GAH
health care projects from being completed, even a project that had final HUD financing
commitment and had broken ground was shelved due to the continued 118 credit freeze during
the following 7 years. The chart also demonstrates that during the same 118 credit freeze
period, GAH was a viable going concern proven by the fact that other GAH projects were
developed, built and completed by other parties, that Frantz's project could have been built if
not for the 118 7 year credit freeze.

2002 THRU 2007
FRANTZ PROJECT LOAN CLOSINGS PRIOR TO CREDIT FREEEZE »
1) POST FALLS, ID GAH HEALTHCARE FACILITIES
2) LEWISTON, ID GAH HEALTHCARE FACILITIES
3) RICHLAND, WA GAH HEALTHCARE FACILITIES
4) LIBERTY LAKE,WA GAH HEALTHCARE FACILITIES

$4,500,000
$7,000,000
$4,500,000
$5,000,000

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED

FRNATZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS PRIOR TO CREDIT FREEZE »
1) UNSECURED CREDIT LINE - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK & WELLS FARGO
2) REFINANCE JUNE, 2008- GAH PF HEALTHCARE FACILITY
3) TWIN LAKES EAGLE RIDGE LOAN RENEWAL - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK

$ 600,000
$4,500,000
$4.500,000

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED

PROJECTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT WHERE MARTY IS PARNTER PRIOR TO
CREDIT FREEZE »
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, Montana
2) GAH Phase I North Spokane, Wa shington
3) GAH Phase Ill Lewiston, Idaho
4) Twin Lakes, Idaho

Total Partner Cash Invested To Date

$21,000,000

$9,600,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$40,000
$35,000
$120,000
$2,900,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000
$2,200,000
$8,000,000

$3,510,000

----

Total Projects In Development Cost

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS PRIOR TO CREDIT FREEZE »
1) UNSECURED CREDIT LINE - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK & WELLS FARGO
2) JANUARY BALANCE IN FRANTZ PERSONAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT FROM LEW LEASE-BACK CREDIT
3) 758/755/ 767 CREDIT SCORE - SEPT, 2009
4) EAGLE RIDGE ON TWIN LAKES CONSERVATION EASEMENT
5) NOVEMBER, REFINANCE HOME - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
6) TWIN LAKES EAGLE RIDGE LOAN RENEWAL - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED

$25,200,000

$ 600,000
$ 817,000

--$2,000,000
$360,000
$4.500,000

$8,277,000
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PROJECTS UNDER DEVELOPMENT WHERE MARTY IS PARTNER PRIOR TO
CREDIT FREEZE »
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, Montana
2) GAH Phase I North Spokane, Washington
3) GAH Phase Ill Lewiston, Idaho
4) Twin Lakes, Idaho
Total Partner Cash Invested To Date

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000
$240,000
$2,900,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000
$2,200,000
$8,000,000

$3,510,000

GAH UNDER DEVELOPMENT WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase II Liberty Lake - Dev 80% done (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA - Dev 50% done (Geddes)

----

$25,000,000

Total Projects In Development Cost
Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

N/A

$3,000,000
$5,000,000

N/A

$8,000,000

Total Projects Development Cost

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»

$357,000

1) JANUARY REFINANCE HOME - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK

2) 792 CREDIT SCORE - MAY, 2010
$4.297,000

3) APRIL TWIN LAKES EAGLE RIDGE RENEWAL - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK

**************************************************************
JUNE, 2010 CREDIT FREEZE ECONOMIC WARFARE BEGINS

**************************************************************
4) UNSECURED CREDIT LINE - WELLS FARGO

5) JUNE 24 UNSECURED CREDIT LINE - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
6) NOV GAH LEW HEALTHCARE FACILITY COMMITMENT CW CAPITAL- Ready to break ground

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED
SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED {CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED- Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED {CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED {CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase II Liberty Lake - Bro ke ground (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA - Broke ground (Geddes)

$300,000
$290,000
$2,200,000

$7,444,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000
$240,000
$40,000
$2,900,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000
$2,200,000
$7,000,000
$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

N/A

$3,000,000
$5,000,000

N/A

Total Projects Development Cost

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»
1) UNSECURED CREDIT LINE DUE JUNE, 2011 - IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
2) 2010 UNSECURED CREDIT LINE -WELLS FARGO
3) APRIL, 2011 SOFT REFINANCE COMMITMENT - PALISADES PARK

$8,000,000

$290,000
$300,000
$2,018,000

******************************************************************
FILED CHAPTER 11 RE-ORGANIZATION OCT, 2011- CREDIT FREEZE

N/A

*******************************************************************

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED

$2,608,000
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SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED - Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase 11 Liberty Lake - Under Construction (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA -Under Construction (Geddes)

Partner Cash
$260,000
$110,000

Total Dev Cost
$8,000,000
$7,000,000

$240,000

$2,200,000

$40,000
$2,900,000

$7,000,000
$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost
$3,000,000
$5,000,000

N/A
N/A

$8,000,000

Total Projects Development Cost

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»

$ -0-

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED

SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED - Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER
1) GAH
2) GAH
3) GAH

GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
Phase II Liberty Lake - Completed (Geddes)
Phase II Richland, WA- Under Construction(Geddes)
Hermiston, OR - Acquisition (Tyson Frantz)

$-0-

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000

$240,000

$2,200,000

$40,000
$2,900,000

$7,000,000
$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

N/A

$3,000,000
$5,000,000
$2,600,000

N/A
N/A

Total Projects Development Cost

$10,600,000

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»

$ -0TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED
SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED - Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase II Liberty Lake - Complete (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA -Complete (Geddes)

$-0-

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000

$240,000

$2,200,000

$40,000
$2,900,000

$7,000,000
$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost
$3,000,000
$5,000,000

N/A
N/A
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3) GAH Hermiston, OR - Acquisition (Tyson Frantz)
4) GAH Hermiston, OR - Phase II (Tyson Frantz)

N/A
N/A

$2,600,000
$3,000,000

$13,600,000

Total Projects Development Cost

2014
FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»

$ -0-

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED
SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED - Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase II Liberty Lake - Complete (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA-Complete (Geddes)
3) GAH Hermiston, OR - Acquisition (Tyson Frantz)
4) GAH Hermiston, OR - Phase II (Tyson Frantz)

$-0-

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000

$240,000

$2,200,000

$40,000
$2,900,000

$7,000,000
$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost
$3,000,000
$5,000,000
$2,600,000
$3,000,000

N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A

$13,600,000

Total Projects Development Cost

FRANTZ UNDERWRITING & LOAN CLOSINGS AFTER CREDIT FREEZE»

$ -0-

TOTAL CREDIT EXTENDED
SHELVED FRANTZ PROJECTS DUE TO CREDIT FREEZE»
1) GAH Phase I Missoula, MT SHELVED {CREDIT FREEZE) Dev 75% done
2) GAH North Spokane, WA SHELVED - Dev 80% done
3) GAH Ill Lewiston, ID SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE) Ready to break ground
4) GAH Phase I Kalispel, MT SHELVED Dev 25% done
5) Twin Lakes, ID, Dev 70% done SHELVED (CREDIT FREEZE)
Total Shelved Projects Loss Due To Credit Freeze

OTHER GAH PROJECTS WHERE MARTY IS NOT PARTNER»
1) GAH Phase II Liberty Lake - Complete (Geddes)
2) GAH Phase II Richland, WA-Complete (Geddes)
3) GAH Hermiston, OR - Phase II Ground Breaking (Tyson Frantz)
Total Projects Development Cost

$-0-

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

$260,000
$110,000

$8,000,000
$7,000,000

$240,000

$2,200,000

$40,000

$7,000,000

$2,900,000

$8,000,000

$3,550,000

$32,200,000

Partner Cash

Total Dev Cost

N/A
N/A
N/A

$3,000,000
$5,000,000
$3,000,000

$11,000,000

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 249 of 411

DEFENDANT'S
EXHl~.IT

I , \{o::).

LEWISTON GAH SALE-LEASE-BACK CASH DEPOSIT

4J,t, WAffO"INDEPF.NDENf ~ •

=-Sm~

Credit-Memo

__
cl-..,

a..

ful2~

. - \ : : CRl:l)!TRJ 'Pl 8CCOCJl'lt

~;'le

amoi.n, thN,r; below.

-...-1-w,t.;;~<f~D.r..J,l...:.CDCO.
...........,..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 250 of 411

INVESTIGATIVE

Reporting Workshop

HOM E ABOUT STAFF INVESTIGATIONS ILAB BLOG CONTACT WORKSHOP NEWS

IH~

HOINHE.AI..THY IS THIS BANK?

Idaho Independent Bank
HEADQUARTERED I N COEUR O ALE N E , 10

THE TROUBLED ~ET RATIO
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1. A"troubled asset ratio" compares the sum orlrOubled assets with the sum of Tier 1 Capital plus Loan Loss
Reserws. Generally speaking, higher values in this ratio indicate that a bank is under more stress caused by loans
lhal are not pa',ing as scheduled. Each b,mk graphic Is

on It's own scale: use caution Wilen comparing two bankS.

2. The graphs are for comparing this bank to the national median troubled asset ratio. Because the ratio varies so
widely among banks across the nation, the scale is not consistent from bank to bank and the graphs should not be
used to compare banks to one another.

FINANCIAL DETAILS FOR IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
Line Item

Assets
Deposits
Loans
Loan loss provision
Profit
'--Capital
Reserves
Loans 90 days or more past due
Non-accruing loans
Other real estate ow,ed
Capital plus reserves
Total troubled assets

Sept. 30, 2013

Sept. 30, 2014

$505,964,000
$418,839,000
$226,226,000

$500,761 ,000
$409,489,000
$247,554,000

$265,000
$1 ,808,000
$52,826,000
$5,818,000
$0
$6,923,000
$2,430,000
$58,644,000
$9,353,000

- $4,000
-----------r
$1 ,170,000
$53,791,000
$6,501 ,000
$0
$1 ,582,000
$1 ,988,000
$60,292,000

----------------- - $3,570,000

Note: The Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. insures deposit accounts up to $250,000. The "troubled asset ratio" Is
• not an FDIC statistic:. II is derivad by adding the amounts ofloans past due 90 days or more, loans in non-acetual
status and other real estate owned (primarily properties obtained through foreclosure) and dilAding that amount by
the bank's capital and loan loss resen.es. It ls reported as a percentage. For example, a bank with $100,000 In
"troubled assets· and S1 .000,000 in capital would ha~ a "troubled asset ratio" of 10 percent For a fuller
elq'.)lanation. see our methodology.
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0 Copyright 2008-2015
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The Weiss Weakest List
Weakest Banks and Thrifts in the U.S.
Name City State Total Assets ($000) Weiss Financial Strength Rating
Alaska Pacific Bank Juneau AK $179,085 D
Alabama Trust Bank, National Association Sylacauga AL $71 ,650 DAliant Bank AJexander City AL $980,770 DBank of Evergreen Evergreen AL $49,830 D+
Bank of Tuscaloosa Tuscaloosa AL $51 1,210 D+
Bank of Vernon Vernon AL $187,170 DBankTrust Mobile AL $1 ,942,850 DBay Bank Mobile AL $89,960 DBryant Bank Tuscaloosa AL $83 1,060 D
CB&S Bank Russellville AL $1,353,640 D
C itizens Bank Enterprise AL $95,200 D+
C itizens' Bank, Inc. Robertsdale AL $1 l I ,840 D
Community Bank & Trust- Alabama Union Spri ngs AL$ I04,230 E
Community Bank & Trust of Southeast Alabama Dothan AL $539,290 D+
Compass Bank Binningham AL $64,61 1,560 DEscambia County Bank Flomaton AL $96,290 D
EvaBank Cullman AL $419,490 EExchange Bank of Alabama Altoona AL $246,580 D
Farmers Exchange Bank Louisville AL $193, 110 DFirst Bank of the South Rainsville AL $81 ,760 D
First Commercial Bank B irmingham AL $ 1,985,420 D
First Federal Bank, A Federal Savings Bank Tuscaloosa AL $ 157,437 D+
First Financial Bank Bessemer AL $223,080 DFirst Jackson Bank Stevenson AL $192,970 D+
First Lowndes Bank Fort Deposit AL $137,180 F
First National Bank of Baldwin County Foley AL $264,300 DFirst Tuskegee Bank Tuskegee AL $73,020 DFirst United Security Bank Thomasville AL $690,610 D+
Heritage First Bank Orange Beach AL $56,380 DMerchants Bank of Alabama Cullman AL $244,490 DNexity Bank Birmingham AL $965,860 ENorth Alabama Bank Hazel Green AL $ 156,630 DPeoples Bank of Alabama Cullman AL $496,080 D+
Peoples Independent Bank Boaz AL $ 175,350 D+
Red Mountain Bank, National Association Birmingham AL $37 1,2 JO DRegions Bank Birmingham AL $138,006,760 D
Reliance Bank Athens AL $ 145,860 DSouthBank, A Federal Savings Bank Huntsville AL $260,551 DSouthem lndependent Bank Opp AL $121,740 D+
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Manson State Bank Manson IA $36,220 D+
Manufacturers Bank & Trust Company Forest City IA $231 , 180 D+
MetaBank Storm Lake IA $916,477 DMidWestOne Bank fowa City LA $ 1,527,870 D+
Northwest Bank and Trust Company Davenport l A $ 197,676 D+
Patriot Bank Brooklyn IA $95,610 EPeoples Trust & Savings Bank Clive IA $268,170 D+
Polk County Bank Johnston IA $121 ,630 EPremier Bank Dubuque IA $312,860 DSecurity State Bank New Hampton TA $17 1,790 D+
Security State Bank Radcliffe lA $45,120 D+
Security State Bank Hubbard IA $56,030 D
South Ottumwa Savings Bank Ottumwa IA $236,980 D+
State Central Bank Keokuk IA $252,720 0 Un ion State Bank Winterset TA $70,500 D+
V isionBank of Iowa West Des Moines fA $93,060 DWest Liberty State Bank West Liberty IA $83,380 D+
Bank of Idaho Idaho Falls ID $253,440 D+
bankcda Coeur d'Alene ID $93,600 D+
D. L. Evans Bank Burley ID $890,770 D+
Farmers National Bank of Buhl Buhl ID $389,440 Dldaho Banking Company Boise ID $228,390 E+
Idaho First Bank McCall ID $74,080 E[daho Independent Bank Coeur D'Alene ID $495.570 D+
Panhandle State Bank Sandpoint ID $1 ,081 ,040 D
Syringa Bank Boise ID $279,710 EA J Smith Federal Savings Bank (MHC) Midlothian IL $250,919 D+
Advantage National Bank Elk Grove Vil lage TL $453,420 D
Algonquin State Bank, National Association Algonquin IL $ 133,710 D+
All American Bank Des Plaines CL $39,270 £.
A llegiance Community Bank Tin ley Park lL $I 78,360 DAii ied First Bank, SB Oswego 1L $I64,910 E+
Amalgamated Bank of Chicago Chicago TL $767,950 D+
AMCOR£ Bank, NA Rockford IL $3,769,180 F
American Chartered Bank Schaumburg 1L $2,738,850 D
American Enterprise Bank Buffalo Grove IL $350,290 E
American Heartland Bank and Trust Sugar Grove IL $99,750 DAmerican Metro Bank Chicago IL $98,870 EAmericaUnited Bank and Trust Company USA Schaum burg IL $330, 150 D
Anchor State Bank Anchor IL $1 3,320 DArcher Bank Ch icago IL $510,400 D
Austin Bank of Chicago Chicago IL $311 ,470 D+
AztecAmerica Bank Berwyn IL $87,200 OBank of Commerce Wood Dale lL $209,820 EBank of IIJinois Normal lL $211 ,710 F
Bank of Montgomery Montgomery lL $33,990 D+
17
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Exhibit 99.1
CONTACT:
Jack W. Gustavel, Chairman & CEO
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
1260 W. Riverstone Drive
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83814
(208) 292-1902
Kurt R. Gustavel, President & COO
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
401 W. Front Street
Boise, Idaho 83702
(208) 388-8002

PRESS RELEASE
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 5, 2011

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK ANNOUNCES
COMPLETION OF ITS COMMON STOCK OFFERING
Coeur d' Alene, Idaho - Jack W. Gustave!, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Idaho Independent
Bank ("TIB" or the "Bank") (OTC BB: HBK.OB), announced that on November 30, 2011 , 1TB
successfu lly completed its previously announced common stock offering.

The offering commenced on September 6, 2011 , and consisted of a rights offering to eXJstmg
shareholders as well as an opportunity for the public to purchase any remaining shares. Mr. Gustavel
reported that the Bank raised $6.0 million, less offering expenses, in new capital through the sale of
1,765, 174 shares of common stock. All of llB's directors and executive officers participated in the
offering, and in aggregate, purchased approximately 18% of the shares sold. Subsequent to completion
of the offering, the Bank sold an additional 58,823 shares, raising $199,998.
Mr. Gustave! commented, "The positive response from existing and new shareholders demonstrates the

confidence they have in the future of the Bank. IlB has solid capital and reserves, substantial Hquidity,
good markets, and great people, so this additional capital is expected to allow us to build on that strong
foundation and help the Bank to more quickly implement its growth plans."
About IIB

TIB was established in 1993 as an Idaho state-chartered, commercial bank and currently operates three
branches in Boise, as we11 as branches in Meridian, Coeur d' Alene, Nampa, Mountain Home, Hayden,
Caldwell, Star, Eagle, and Sun Valley/Ketchum, Idaho. JIB has approximately 200 employees
throughout the Stale of Idaho. To learn more about JIB. visit us online al www.lheidahobank.com.

Stateme111s co111ained herein concerning future performa1u:e, de11elopme111s or evems, expecratio1is for eamings, growth a1uf marker forecasrs.
and any other starem,mts that are not historical facts Oll fonvard•looking sratemenrs rhar are intended to be covered by the safe harbor for
"fon vard-looking statements• provided by the Private Securities litigation Refonn Act of /995. and as such. are subjeCI to a number of risks
and uncenainties that might cause acwal results to differ rru.uerit,1/y f rom expectations or our stated objectives. Factors that could cause actual
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
Washington D.C. 20429
FORMS-K

CURRENT REPORT
Pursuant to Section 13 or lS(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Date of Report (Date of earliest event reported): November 30, 2011
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK
(Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)
Idaho
(State or otber jurisdiction of
incorporation or organization)

82-0454590
(I.RS. Employer
Identification No.)

1260 West Riverstone Drive
Coeur d 'Alene, Idaho
(Address of principal executive offices)

83814
(Zip Code)

208•765•3619
(Registrant's telephone number, including area code)
(not applicable)
(Former name or former address if changed since last report)

Check the appropriate box below if the Form 8-K filing is intended to simultaneously satisfy the
filing obligation of the registrant under any of the following provisions.
[ ] Wrinen communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act ( 17 CFR 230.425)
[ ] Soliciting material pursuantd to Rule J 4a- l 2 under the Exchange Act ( 17 CFR 240. I 4a- l 2)
[ ] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule I 4d-2(b) under the Exchange Act ( 17 CFR
240.J4d-2(b))
] Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR
240. 13e-4(c))
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Item 3.02 Unregistered Sales of Equity Securities

On November 30, 2011, Idaho Independent Bank completed its previously announced common
stock offering. Following the saJe of the shares of Idaho Independent Bank common stock
previously disclosed in the Bank's report on Form 8-K dated October 5, 2011 , incorporate<! by
reference herein, the Bank sold an additional 354,427 shares as part of its public offering, aJI at the
same purchase price of $3.40 per share. The offering commenced on September 6, 201 1, and
expired on November 30, 2011. Subsequent to the completion of the offering, the Bank sold an
additional 58,823 shares of its common stock on December 2, 2011, at a purchase price of $3.40 per
share pursuant to a private placement.
An aggregate totaJ of 1,823,997 shares have been sold since September 6, 2011 , raising a total of
approximately $6.2 million of additional capital before offering expenses.

The shares of common stock issued by the Bank are exempt from registration under the Securities
Act of I 933, as amended, pursuant to Section 3(a)(2) thereunder.

Item 8.01 Other Events

On December 5, 2011 , Idaho Independent Bank issued a press release announcing the completion
and results of its previously announced offering of its common stock. A copy of the press release is
attached as Exhibit 99.1 and incorporated herein by reference.

Item 9.01 Financial Statements and Exhibits
(d) Exhibits

99.1 Press release of Idaho Independent Bank dated December 5, 2011
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SIGNATURES

Pursuant to the requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, tbe registrant has duly caused
this report to be signed on its behalf by tbe undersigned hereunto duly authorized.

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK

Date: December 5, 2011

By: Isl Paul H. Montreuil
Paul Montreuil
Senior Vice President and Cashier
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The Spokesman-Review
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2012, 2:11 P.M.

Idaho Independent Bank to deregister stock
Idaho Independent Bank announced Wednesday it plans to "go dark," or voluntarily deregister
its common stock.
The Coeur d' Alene-based bank said it is taking the step to save money. When deregistration is
effective, which should take place within 90 days, Idaho Independent Bank will no longer have
to file the many reports it' s currently required to file with the FDIC.
According to a news release, the bank is eligible to take that step because it has fewer than 1,200
shareholders of its common stock.
The ban.k's shares are traded on the OTC Bulletin Board, which should continue following
deregistration, and it will continue to be audited annually and to file quarterly financial "call
reports" with the FDIC according to the news release.
Idaho lndependent Bank opened in 1993 and has a dozen branches throughout Idaho. The bank
lost $486,000, or 6 cents a share, in the first quarter, which ended March 3 1, compared with a
loss of $956,000, or 15 cents a share, in the year-earlier period. lts assets were $451.5 mill ion as
of that date.

Posted June 27, 2012, 2 :1 l p.m. in: Idaho Independent Bank
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Restoring Credit to Communities
Governor Elizabeth A. Duke
At the Fifty-third Annual Western Independent Bankers Conference, Scottsdale, Arizona
Good Morning. I am pleased to be here today to address the Western Independent Bankers Annual
Conference. As many of you know, I spent most of my career as a community banker. What you
may not know is that I first became CEO of a community bank under an unusual set of
circumstances. I found myself in the CEO's seat unexpectedly, after the sudden death of my mentor,
the man who had taught me banking and with whom I had started and built that bank carefully over
the years. In addition, it was August 1991, which I'm sure you will recognize as the peak of the last
credit crisis.
It was a typical community bank. We loaned inside our market to customers who had been with us
for many years. As the economy weakened in the early 1990s, those customers struggled and the
value of their collateral dropped. Neither we nor our customers had caused the crisis, but we still had
to face it and deal with it. Throughout those challenging years, we had some successful workouts
and some that were not so successful. Sound familiar?
So, I have experienced banking crises from different perspectives throughout my career. Having
dealt with the last banking crisis as a banker, I understand the stress many of you and many of your
customers feel today. I also know firsthand the importance of recognizing problems early and
tackling them head on. Having experienced the more recent crisis at the Fed, I can assure you that
this environment is every bit as stressful for your regulators.
Even in the best of times, lending involves judgment. So does bank supervision. During times of
stress, the judgment calls get more difficult and more critical. An economy and its financial system
are inextricably intertwined and bank supervisors are charged with maintaining the safety and
soundness of the system without impeding the flow of loans to creditworthy borrowers. The linkages
that connect community banks, the communities they serve, and their bank supervisors, are
especially interwoven and essential.
Now I am happy to report that our bank and, for the most part, our customers pulled through that
crisis in the early 1990s. And I continued to lend to many of those same customers for another 15
years. I am pleased to see that you have chosen as the theme for this conference "Solutions for the
Changing Environment" as it indicates confidence that you too will continue to thrive and support
your communities. For it is critical that you do so: Our economy needs strong community banks that
are able to meet the financial needs of their communities and their customers.
In my remarks today, I intend to focus on your role as lenders. First, I will discuss commercial real
estate, the loan category that for most community banks is causing the most stress and receiving the
most attention. Then I would like to talk about credit availability for small businesses, a key customer
segment for community banks. Finally, I will offer some thoughts about the role of supervisors in
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encouraging the flow of loans to creditworthy borrowers. Throughout the discussion, I will focus on
recent loan guidance issued by the Federal Reserve along with our fellow banking regulators and
the steps we at the Fed are taking to ensure that the policies we set in Washington make it into the
field to the examiners you see in your banks.
Before I begin, I would like to make one point of clarification: When I reference community bank
statistics, I will refer to the segment of banks with less than $10 billion in total assets.
Banking and Financial Conditions
While conditions in some financial markets have improved markedly in recent months,
conditions in the banking sector continue to be weak. The largest banks were modestly
profitable during 2009, but community banks as a group reported a loss of $4.1 billion and
showed a negative return on assets of 0.17 percent. Community bank losses were driven
primarily by large loan loss provision expenses, as well as a decline in net interest margins
related in part to a substantial increase in nonperforming assets.
There are signs that these problems might be reaching a plateau in some loan categories, but
delinquencies and charge-off rates grew steadily last year and the nonperforming assets ratio for
community banks is now approaching five percent, a level considerably higher than the
previous highs reached in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In addition, although capital ratios
at many banks have improved substantially since the start of the crisis, other institutions
continue to face serious questions about capital adequacy due to weak loan quality, subpar
earnings, and uncertainty about future conditions. Together, these developments have led to
an increase in the number of problem banks to the highest level since the early 1990s. The
rate of bank failures has accelerated and appears likely to remain elevated for some time.
While most banks remain sound, appropriately capitalized, and profitable, this can be difficult to
remember in the midst of strained banking conditions and weekly bank failures.
The coordinated efforts and initiatives of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury Department, and
other government agencies have contributed to the progress we have achieved in stabilizing the
financial markets and the banking system. I think it is important to note that most of these efforts
were directed at the system as a whole and were made available to banks of all sizes.
For example, in September 2008, when a prominent money market fund "broke the buck" (that is, its
net asset value fell below one dollar), the Treasury Department initiated a temporary guarantee
program to avert a run on other money market mutual funds. Then, in response to bankers' concerns
about the adverse impact that unlimited guarantees for money market funds would have on bank
deposits, the Treasury adjusted the guarantee to cover only balances in place on the date the
guarantee was issued. That is, funds that were already in the money market mutual fund accounts
were guaranteed so they would not run out, but no guarantee was offered for new investments that
might cause runs out of depository institutions and into the funds. A few weeks later, the deposit
insurance limit was temporarily increased to $250,000, an increase that had long been sought by
community banks.
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In addition, under the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP), the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) made available unlimited insurance for demand deposits. Later the
program was modified to also cover Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts (IOLTAs) and low-interest
Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts. These initiatives proved tremendously beneficial
to community banks and their small business customers during the crisis and have been
instrumental in returning some measure of stability to deposit markets.
Other efforts to calm markets were also designed to directly assist banks of all sizes. For example,
more than three-fourths of the companies that received funds from the Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP) capital purchase program were, in fact, community banks. In addition, the Debt
Guarantee Program put in place by the FDIC under the TLGP has also been available to community
banks, helping to support market confidence. And the Federal Reserve's discount window lending as
well as the Term Auction Facility, which offered discount window funding through auctions, were
available to banks regardless of size and benefited community as well as larger banking
organizations.
Looking back over the past two years, I have reached the conclusion that these programs, taken as
a whole and combined with other steps taken by policymakers and bankers themselves, have had a
dramatically positive effect on financial conditions and have brought us far beyond the near panic
that we experienced in the latter half of 2008. Importantly, these initiatives were in many cases
tailored to ensure that they were available to, and supportive of, community banks. So although I
understand that there will be significant additional challenges ahead to improve the condition and
performance of community banks, you can take some comfort in knowing that policymakers are
aware of the importance of your institutions and are sensitive to the unique challenges that you face.
Improving Lending Conditions
All of these measures have helped foster stability in the financial system. However, banks still
have significant delinquencies in their loan portfolios and some small businesses and
consumers still report trouble obtaining credit. In addition, although loan balances at the
smallest banks--those with total assets of $1 billion or less--in the aggregate fell only modestly
during 2009, loans outstanding for all other banks dropped more sharply. Some observers attribute
this decline in loans outstanding to overzealous bank examiners, but I believe the causes are
numerous and more complicated. Regardless of the cause, the decline is of great concern and we
must work together to reverse the trend. As the financial crisis unfolded, the Federal Reserve, in
collaboration with the other banking regulators, issued lending guidance on three occasions,
stressing the need for balance in the approaches used by bankers to approve loans and by bank
examiners in reviewing loans:




in November 2008, regulators issued guidance stressing the importance of continuing to
make prudent loans to creditworthy customers;1
in October 2009, the agencies issued guidance covering commercial real estate (CRE) loans
and workouts;2 and
in February of this year, we issued guidance regarding loans to small businesses. 3
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Commercial Real Estate Loans and Workouts
The ongoing deterioration in commercial real estate loans is perhaps of greatest concern for
community bankers. These loans make up more than 30 percent of community bank assets and
have deteriorated sharply as fundamentals in property markets have weakened. Performance
problems have been most striking in construction and development loans, especially for those that
finance residential development, but have been significant in other loan segments as well.
Altogether, CRE loans seriously delinquent, on nonaccrual status, or held as other real estate owned
(OREO)--including all construction loans, loans secured by nonfarm nonresidential properties, and
loans secured by multifamily properties--represented nearly eight percent of commercial real estate
loans and related OREO at year-end 2009, and almost one-quarter of the total risk-based capital at
community banks.
Given the risks associated with CRE lending, banking agencies have for the past several years
focused on assessing community bank exposures to commercial real estate and pushing institutions
to enhance their risk-management processes for this segment of their portfolios. As problems
surfaced we recognized that loan restructurings are often in the best interest of both the bank and
the borrower and encouraged banks to explore opportunities to work with their borrowers to
appropriately restructure problem loans.
My recent conversations with bankers have been heavily focused on concerns about loan
classification standards. Some of you have told me that you feel that examiners are not always
taking a balanced approach to the assessment of commercial real estate loan restructurings. On the
other side of the table, I hear from examiners that they feel some banks have been slow to
acknowledge declines in commercial real estate project cash flows and collateral values. The new
guidance is intended to bridge this apparent gap in perceptions and to promote both prudent
commercial real estate loan workouts by banks and balanced and consistent reviews of these loans
by the supervisory agencies.
The October 2009 CRE guidance includes a number of examples drawn from common loan
situations and specifies classification treatment for alternate scenarios that depend on actions taken
by the bank and the borrower. As we were finalizing the guidance, I sat down with our supervision
staff and went through each of the examples as if we were in a loan closing conference. Based on
what was discussed during those conversations and my close reading of the guidance, I think the
best way to bridge the gap in perception is through well-documented facts. For example, to support
the value of a construction project, the bank would need current information on the project status,
including an estimate of the cost to complete. It would also need documentation of the method of
realizing value for the completed project. For instance, if the borrower has a take-out permanent loan
commitment, the file should include an update on the status of the commitment including any
conditions to closing. If the property is under a sales contract, the bank should document the buyers'
continued willingness and ability to close. If the bank is relying on other resources of borrowers or
guarantors for repayment, it should have global cash flow information to be able to assess their
ability to continue to carry the loan until conditions improve. The fact that the loan has a good
payment history and is performing is important, but not sufficient to make the case that resources
are available to keep it current in the future. Finally, the bank should have either a current appraisal

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 263 of 411
or sufficient current market information to credibly update the assumptions in the most recent
appraisal. If market conditions are changing rapidly, "current information" may need to be more upto-date than is usually the case. Examiners generally are not expected to challenge the underlying
valuation assumptions, including discount rates and capitalization rates, used in appraisals or
evaluations when these assumptions differ only in a limited way from norms that would generally be
associated with the collateral under review.
Loans will be classified and valued on the basis of cash flow first, and collateral value second.
Assessments of cash flow and valuation will be much more reliable if based on solid documentation.
In the absence of documentation, examiners will have to make assumptions. Most loans should fall
into one of three categories:






First, if available cash flow, including the willingness and ability of any guarantors to provide
cash support, is sufficient to carry a construction project to completion or to amortize a
completed project on reasonable terms at a market rate of interest, the loan should not be
classified;
If, on the other hand, there is no available cash flow to carry the loan and repayment can
only come from the sale of the collateral, an amount equal to the value of the collateral less
selling expenses will be classified and any remaining amount charged off; and
Finally, if cash flow is sufficient to partially amortize the loan, the bank may be able to
restructure the loan into two parts, one of which is supported by cash flow and therefore a
pass, and the second of which is less supported and so would be classified.

This guidance is designed to address workouts and restructurings of problem credit, but the
clarification of loan classification standards should also give bankers some confidence in evaluating
new loans for both credit risk and risk of classification. Overall, the guidance urges both lenders and
examiners to take a balanced approach in assessing borrowers' debt servicing capacity and to make
realistic assessments of collateral valuations.
Importantly, at the Federal Reserve we have complemented these issuances with training programs
for examiners and outreach to the banking industry to underscore the importance of sound lending
practices. In January, Federal Reserve staff instituted a System-wide examiner training initiative that
will reach Federal Reserve and state examiners all across the United States. Additionally, an
interagency training program has been developed specifically for examiners reviewing CRE loans as
part of the interagency Shared National Credit Program, which includes the largest commercial real
estate loans in the nation.
We are working hard to track the progress and effectiveness of this guidance. Before issuing the
guidance, Federal Reserve staff surveyed examiners to gain a better understanding of the banks'
workout practices. Going forward, the information that we collected will serve as a baseline for
assessing the impact of the supervisory guidance. We also are asking examiners to capture, where
possible, information on troubled debt restructurings and other types of loan workouts and
dispositions as part of the ongoing examination process. In addition, we are exploring the feasibility
of more formal statistical approaches for measuring and evaluating the effectiveness of the October
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2009 interagency CRE workout and restructuring policy statement. We continue to receive and
evaluate comments and feedback from supervised banks and I can assure you we will consider the
need for adjustments if feedback suggests they are needed.
Small Business Lending
Now I would like to turn to small business lending. Small businesses are, in many cases, the most
important customer segment for community banks. And because community banks are an important
source of credit for small businesses, their challenges and their fates are closely linked. Despite the
best efforts of bankers and regulators, we continue to hear of the difficulties experienced by small
businesses in obtaining credit. A recent study conducted by the National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) found that of small employers who attempted to borrow in 2009, about half received
all the credit they wanted. But nearly one-quarter received no credit at all. A similar study in 2005
found nearly 90 percent of small employers had most or all their credit needs met and only eight
percent obtained no credit.
Even though conditions in financial markets have continued to improve in 2010, access to
credit remains restricted for many smaller businesses, who largely depend on banks for
credit. Risk spreads on small business loans at banks have continued to rise, and the decline in
loans outstanding has been stark.
A number of factors are contributing to the reduced supply of bank loans. For instance, in response
to an increase in the number of delinquent and nonperforming loans, many banks have reduced
existing lines of credit sharply and have tightened their standards and terms for new credit. In other
cases, banks with capital positions that have been eroded by losses or those with limited access to
capital markets may be reducing risk assets to improve their capital positions, especially amid
continued uncertainty about the economic outlook and possible future loan losses.
A number of government programs intended to increase the supply of credit are currently in place or
under consideration and a variety of approaches may be needed to address the different barriers to
bank lending. For example, to offset bank concerns about the level of credit risk, increases in the
availability of Small Business Administration (SBA) guarantees and streamlining of the SBA
application process may be helping to increase bank lending to small businesses. Indeed, in recent
testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, the SBA reported significant growth in
the number of banks using its programs.
If, on the other hand, community bank lending is restricted by concern about capital positions, the
Treasury proposal to transfer $30 billion from TARP to establish a Small Business Lending Fund
(SBLF) could stimulate lending by providing capital without the perceived stigma or conditions of
TARP and at a lower cost to community banks that increase small business lending. If approved, the
program would also allow community banks that received capital in the original TARP program to
convert to SBLF and lower their interest payments by increasing loans to small businesses,
something many are already doing.
The reduction in the availability of credit, however, is not the whole story. There is also less
demand for credit by sound firms. As businesses reduced inventory levels and capital spending, they
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tended to pay down debt and build cash positions. Indeed, in the most recent NFIB study, 34 percent
of businesses reported lower sales as their biggest problem while only 3 percent cited lack of credit.
And while some potential borrowers seek less credit, others are no longer qualified to borrow.
Weakened balance sheets, reduced income, falling real estate collateral values, and in some cases,
a recent history of payment problems, have made it difficult for some businesses and consumers to
qualify for loans, especially under the current stricter standards.
Other factors unique to the current financial environment may also be weighing on the ability of small
businesses to borrow. A significant fraction of small businesses rely upon personal assets and
consumer credit to fund their operations. Thus, small businesses are affected by tight conditions for
consumer credit in addition to those for business credit. Many small businesspeople rely on their
homes or business real estate to secure their business loans. As collateral values have declined,
their borrowing capacity has been reduced. Finally, small business lending often is based on
relationships that are solidified over time. Sometimes those relationships are broken as a result
of the bank's inability to lend, such as when banks fail or when they reduce lending due to
strains or concentrations in their own portfolios. In those circumstances, small businesses
may find it quite difficult to establish similar arrangements with a new bank.
Improvements in a number of the conditions that depressed lending in 2009, however, lead me to be
somewhat optimistic that we will begin to see an increase in bank loans later this year. Economic
conditions, the most important determinant of the demand for and availability of small business
lending, have improved considerably since the early and middle part of last year. In response, bank
attitudes toward lending, including small business lending, may be shifting. In the Federal Reserve's
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey conducted in January, the number of banks that reported having
eased credit standards for small business lending over the previous three months about matched the
number that reported having tightened lending standards for the first time since before the crisis
began, in the summer of 2007.
Restoring the Flow of Credit in the Economy
Ultimately, the most important step policymakers can take to support community banks and improve
credit availability to small businesses, as well as other businesses and households, is to achieve a
sustainable economic recovery. Over the course of the past two years, the Federal Reserve has
taken aggressive action in response to the financial crisis to help improve financial market conditions
and to promote the flow of credit to households and businesses. We have acted on multiple fronts by
instituting accommodative monetary policy, expanding existing liquidity programs for depository
institutions, and establishing new liquidity facilities to support market functioning. Throughout this
period, the Federal Reserve has placed particular emphasis on ensuring that its supervision and
examination policies do not inadvertently impede sound lending to businesses, both large and small,
and we will continue to do so. Actions taken to stabilize the largest banks during the crisis have
received a lot of attention. However, I think it is equally important to note the degree to which banks
of all sizes were offered access to the same loan, guarantee, and capital facilities. We should never
forget that the objective was to save the system as a whole, not just a handful of large institutions.
As attention turns from saving the financial system to strengthening it, any proposed solution must
address the assignment of responsibility for regulation and supervision. During the financial crisis, I
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saw firsthand how important it was that the Fed have a complete view of the financial landscape and
how successful was the interaction among the Fed's divisions in crafting solutions to the many
different problems we confronted.
As of the end of 2009, the Federal Reserve supervised 4,974 top-tier bank holding companies, 844
state member banks and 177 foreign banking organizations operating in the United States. State
member banks range from very small community banks to banks with assets of more than $100
billion. Bank holding companies vary similarly in size and now include a number of companies with
more of their financial business outside of bank subsidiaries than inside them. I believe that having a
window into such varied parts of our financial system is important and that it would be a mistake to
focus Fed supervision on only the largest companies.
Our strengths as a supervisor include our experience in supervision, knowledge of the markets, and
understanding of the economy. And our role in supervision strengthens our performance in other
roles. Lending issues have been central to our discussions of monetary policy, at least in my time
with the Fed. If you look at the maximum amount reached by each of our lending facilities, we loaned
almost $2 trillion in a very short time as we worked to stabilize financial markets. Those loans are
now paid down to less than $100 billion. We never could have done that as quickly, as smoothly, or
with zero loss without an extensive knowledge of the industry and institutions as well as staff across
the country with banking expertise.
Conclusion
In summary, the recent financial crisis has underscored the importance of community banking,
especially the role you play in providing credit to the local businesses in your community. Even
though the environment is challenging and some community banks face significant stress, most
community banks are fundamentally sound and will remain so. It is encouraging to see in your
conference agenda that you are looking forward to returning to a more stable model of community
banking, one focused on prudent underwriting, risk-appropriate pricing, portfolio diversification, and
stable deposit funding.
At the Federal Reserve we will continue to work to strengthen the economy and to ensure that our
supervision and examination policies do not inadvertently impede sound lending by community
banks. As we do so, it is important that we hear from you about the economic conditions in your
communities and any problems you face in meeting the needs of creditworthy borrowers.
I thank you again for the invitation to join you today and look forward to your questions or comments.
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washingtonpost.com

President Obama Addresses Joint Session of Congress
Tuesday, Feburary 24, 2009

Madame Speaker, Mr. Vice President, Members of Congress, and the First Lady of the
United States:
I've come here tonight not only to address the distinguished men and women in this great
chamber, but to speak frankly and directly to the men and women who sent us here.
I know that for many Americans watching right now, the state of our economy is a
concern that rises above all others. And rightly so. If you haven't been personally affected
by this recession, you probably know someone who has - a friend; a neighbor; a member
of your family. You don't need to hear another list of statistics to know that our economy
is in crisis, because you live it every day. It's the worry you wake up with and the source
of sleepless nights. It's the job you thought you'd retire from but now have lost; the
business you built your dreams upon that's now hanging by a thread; the college
acceptance letter your child had to put back in the envelope. The impact of this recession
is real, and it is everywhere.
But while our economy may be weakened and our confidence shaken; though we are
living through difficult and uncertain times, tonight I want every American to know this:
We will rebuild, we will recover, and the United States of America will emerge stronger
than before.
The weight of this crisis will not determine the destiny of this nation. The answers to our
problems don't lie beyond our reach. They exist in our laboratories and universities; in
our fields and our factories; in the imaginations of our entrepreneurs and the pride of the
hardest-working people on Earth. Those qualities that have made America the greatest
force of progress and prosperity in human history we still possess in ample measure.
What is required now is for this country to pull together, confront boldly the challenges
we face, and take responsibility for our future once more.
Now, if we're honest with ourselves, we'll admit that for too long, we have not always
met these responsibilities - as a government or as a people. I say this not to lay blame or
look backwards, but because it is only by understanding how we arrived at this moment
that we'll be able to lift ourselves out of this predicament.
The fact is, our economy did not fall into decline overnight. Nor did all of our problems
begin when the housing market collapsed or the stock market sank. We have known for
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decades that our survival depends on finding new sources of energy. Yet we import more
oil today than ever before. The cost of health care eats up more and more of our savings
each year, yet we keep delaying reform. Our children will compete for jobs in a global
economy that too many of our schools do not prepare them for. And though all these
challenges went unsolved, we still managed to spend more money and pile up more debt,
both as individuals and through our government, than ever before.
In other words, we have lived through an era where too often, short-term gains were
prized over long-term prosperity; where we failed to look beyond the next payment, the
next quarter, or the next election. A surplus became an excuse to transfer wealth to the
wealthy instead of an opportunity to invest in our future. Regulations were gutted for the
sake of a quick profit at the expense of a healthy market. People bought homes they knew
they couldn't afford from banks and lenders who pushed those bad loans anyway. And all
the while, critical debates and difficult decisions were put off for some other time on
some other day.
Well that day of reckoning has arrived, and the time to take charge of our future is here.
Now is the time to act boldly and wisely - to not only revive this economy, but to build a
new foundation for lasting prosperity. Now is the time to jumpstart job creation, re-start
lending, and invest in areas like energy, health care, and education that will grow our
economy, even as we make hard choices to bring our deficit down. That is what my
economic agenda is designed to do, and that's what I'd like to talk to you about tonight.
It's an agenda that begins with jobs.
As soon as I took office, I asked this Congress to send me a recovery plan by President's
Day that would put people back to work and put money in their pockets. Not because I
believe in bigger government - I don't. Not because I'm not mindful of the massive debt
we've inherited - I am. I called for action because the failure to do so would have cost
more jobs and caused more hardships. In fact, a failure to act would have worsened our
long-term deficit by assuring weak economic growth for years. That's why I pushed for
quick action. And tonight, I am grateful that this Congress delivered, and pleased to say
that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act is now law.
Over the next two years, this plan will save or create 3.5 million jobs. More than 90% of
these jobs will be in the private sector - jobs rebuilding our roads and bridges;
constructing wind turbines and solar panels; laying broadband and expanding mass
transit.
Because of this plan, there are teachers who can now keep their jobs and educate our
kids. Health care professionals can continue caring for our sick. There are 57 police
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officers who are still on the streets of Minneapolis tonight because this plan prevented the
layoffs their department was about to make.
Because of this plan, 95% of the working households in America will receive a tax cut - a
tax cut that you will see in your paychecks beginning on April 1st.
Because of this plan, families who are struggling to pay tuition costs will receive a
$2,500 tax credit for all four years of college. And Americans who have lost their jobs in
this recession will be able to receive extended unemployment benefits and continued
health care coverage to help them weather this storm.
I know there are some in this chamber and watching at home who are skeptical of
whether this plan will work. I understand that skepticism. Here in Washington, we've all
seen how quickly good intentions can turn into broken promises and wasteful spending.
And with a plan of this scale comes enormous responsibility to get it right.
That is why I have asked Vice President Biden to lead a tough, unprecedented oversight
effort - because nobody messes with Joe. I have told each member of my Cabinet as well
as mayors and governors across the country that they will be held accountable by me and
the American people for every dollar they spend. I have appointed a proven and
aggressive Inspector General to ferret out any and all cases of waste and fraud. And we
have created a new website called recovery.gov so that every American can find out how
and where their money is being spent.
So the recovery plan we passed is the first step in getting our economy back on track. But
it is just the first step. Because even if we manage this plan flawlessly, there will be no
real recovery unless we clean up the credit crisis that has severely weakened our financial
system.
I want to speak plainly and candidly about this issue tonight, because every American
should know that it directly affects you and your family's well-being. You should also
know that the money you've deposited in banks across the country is safe; your insurance
is secure; and you can rely on the continued operation of our financial system. That is not
the source of concern.
The concern is that if we do not re-start lending in this country, our recovery will be
choked off before it even begins.
You see, the flow of credit is the lifeblood of our economy. The ability to get a loan is
how you finance the purchase of everything from a home to a car to a college education;
how stores stock their shelves, farms buy equipment, and businesses make payroll.
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But credit has stopped flowing the way it should. Too many bad loans from the housing
crisis have made their way onto the books of too many banks. With so much debt and so
little confidence, these banks are now fearful of lending out any more money to
households, to businesses, or to each other. When there is no lending, families can't
afford to buy homes or cars. So businesses are forced to make layoffs. Our economy
suffers even more, and credit dries up even further.
That is why this administration is moving swiftly and aggressively to break this
destructive cycle, restore confidence, and re-start lending.
We will do so in several ways. First, we are creating a new lending fund that represents
the largest effort ever to help provide auto loans, college loans, and small business loans
to the consumers and entrepreneurs who keep this economy running.
Second, we have launched a housing plan that will help responsible families facing the
threat of foreclosure lower their monthly payments and re-finance their mortgages. It's a
plan that won't help speculators or that neighbor down the street who bought a house he
could never hope to afford, but it will help millions of Americans who are struggling with
declining home values - Americans who will now be able to take advantage of the lower
interest rates that this plan has already helped bring about. In fact, the average family
who re-finances today can save nearly $2000 per year on their mortgage.
Third, we will act with the full force of the federal government to ensure that the
major banks that Americans depend on have enough confidence and enough money
to lend even in more difficult times. And when we learn that a major bank has
serious problems, we will hold accountable those responsible, force the necessary
adjustments, provide the support to clean up their balance sheets, and assure the
continuity of a strong, viable institution that can serve our people and our economy.
I understand that on any given day, Wall Street may be more comforted by an approach
that gives banks bailouts with no strings attached, and that holds nobody accountable for
their reckless decisions. But such an approach won't solve the problem. And our goal is
to quicken the day when we re-start lending to the American people and American
business and end this crisis once and for all.
I intend to hold these banks fully accountable for the assistance they receive, and this
time, they will have to clearly demonstrate how taxpayer dollars result in more
lending for the American taxpayer. This time, CEOs won't be able to use taxpayer
money to pad their paychecks or buy fancy drapes or disappear on a private jet. Those
days are over.
Still, this plan will require significant resources from the federal government - and yes,
probably more than we've already set aside. But while the cost of action will be great, I
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can assure you that the cost of inaction will be far greater, for it could result in an
economy that sputters along for not months or years, but perhaps a decade. That would be
worse for our deficit, worse for business, worse for you, and worse for the next
generation. And I refuse to let that happen.
I understand that when the last administration asked this Congress to provide assistance
for struggling banks, Democrats and Republicans alike were infuriated by the
mismanagement and results that followed. So were the American taxpayers. So was I.
So I know how unpopular it is to be seen as helping banks right now, especially when
everyone is suffering in part from their bad decisions. I promise you - I get it.
But I also know that in a time of crisis, we cannot afford to govern out of anger, or yield
to the politics of the moment. My job - our job - is to solve the problem. Our job is to
govern with a sense of responsibility. I will not spend a single penny for the purpose of
rewarding a single Wall Street executive, but I will do whatever it takes to help the small
business that can't pay its workers or the family that has saved and still can't get a
mortgage.
That's what this is about. It's not about helping banks - it's about helping people. Because
when credit is available again, that young family can finally buy a new home. And then
some company will hire workers to build it. And then those workers will have money to
spend, and if they can get a loan too, maybe they'll finally buy that car, or open their own
business. Investors will return to the market, and American families will see their
retirement secured once more. Slowly, but surely, confidence will return, and our
economy will recover.
So I ask this Congress to join me in doing whatever proves necessary. Because we cannot
consign our nation to an open-ended recession. And to ensure that a crisis of this
magnitude never happens again, I ask Congress to move quickly on legislation that will
finally reform our outdated regulatory system. It is time to put in place tough, new
common-sense rules of the road so that our financial market rewards drive and
innovation, and punishes short-cuts and abuse.
The recovery plan and the financial stability plan are the immediate steps we're taking to
revive our economy in the short-term. But the only way to fully restore America's
economic strength is to make the long-term investments that will lead to new jobs, new
industries, and a renewed ability to compete with the rest of the world. The only way this
century will be another American century is if we confront at last the price of our
dependence on oil and the high cost of health care; the schools that aren't preparing our
children and the mountain of debt they stand to inherit. That is our responsibility.

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 272 of 411
In the next few days, I will submit a budget to Congress. So often, we have come to view
these documents as simply numbers on a page or laundry lists of programs. I see this
document differently. I see it as a vision for America - as a blueprint for our future.
My budget does not attempt to solve every problem or address every issue. It reflects the
stark reality of what we've inherited - a trillion dollar deficit, a financial crisis, and a
costly recession.
Given these realities, everyone in this chamber - Democrats and Republicans - will have
to sacrifice some worthy priorities for which there are no dollars. And that includes me.
But that does not mean we can afford to ignore our long-term challenges. I reject the
view that says our problems will simply take care of themselves; that says government
has no role in laying the foundation for our common prosperity.
For history tells a different story. History reminds us that at every moment of economic
upheaval and transformation, this nation has responded with bold action and big ideas. In
the midst of civil war, we laid railroad tracks from one coast to another that spurred
commerce and industry. From the turmoil of the Industrial Revolution came a system of
public high schools that prepared our citizens for a new age. In the wake of war and
depression, the GI Bill sent a generation to college and created the largest middle-class in
history. And a twilight struggle for freedom led to a nation of highways, an American on
the moon, and an explosion of technology that still shapes our world.
In each case, government didn't supplant private enterprise; it catalyzed private
enterprise. It created the conditions for thousands of entrepreneurs and new businesses to
adapt and to thrive.
We are a nation that has seen promise amid peril, and claimed opportunity from ordeal.
Now we must be that nation again. That is why, even as it cuts back on the programs we
don't need, the budget I submit will invest in the three areas that are absolutely critical to
our economic future: energy, health care, and education.
It begins with energy.
We know the country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable energy will lead the
21st century. And yet, it is China that has launched the largest effort in history to make
their economy energy efficient. We invented solar technology, but we've fallen behind
countries like Germany and Japan in producing it. New plug-in hybrids roll off our
assembly lines, but they will run on batteries made in Korea.
Well I do not accept a future where the jobs and industries of tomorrow take root beyond
our borders - and I know you don't either. It is time for America to lead again.
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Thanks to our recovery plan, we will double this nation's supply of renewable energy in
the next three years. We have also made the largest investment in basic research funding
in American history - an investment that will spur not only new discoveries in energy, but
breakthroughs in medicine, science, and technology.
We will soon lay down thousands of miles of power lines that can carry new energy to
cities and towns across this country. And we will put Americans to work making our
homes and buildings more efficient so that we can save billions of dollars on our energy
bills.
But to truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the
ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the
profitable kind of energy. So I ask this Congress to send me legislation that places a
market-based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable
energy in America. And to support that innovation, we will invest fifteen billion dollars a
year to develop technologies like wind power and solar power; advanced biofuels, clean
coal, and more fuel-efficient cars and trucks built right here in America.
As for our auto industry, everyone recognizes that years of bad decision-making and a
global recession have pushed our automakers to the brink. We should not, and will not,
protect them from their own bad practices. But we are committed to the goal of a retooled, re-imagined auto industry that can compete and win. Millions of jobs depend on
it. Scores of communities depend on it. And I believe the nation that invented the
automobile cannot walk away from it.
None of this will come without cost, nor will it be easy. But this is America. We don't do
what's easy. We do what is necessary to move this country forward.
For that same reason, we must also address the crushing cost of health care.
This is a cost that now causes a bankruptcy in America every thirty seconds. By the end
of the year, it could cause 1.5 million Americans to lose their homes. In the last eight
years, premiums have grown four times faster than wages. And in each of these years,
one million more Americans have lost their health insurance. It is one of the major
reasons why small businesses close their doors and corporations ship jobs overseas. And
it's one of the largest and fastest-growing parts of our budget.
Given these facts, we can no longer afford to put health care reform on hold.
Already, we have done more to advance the cause of health care reform in the last thirty
days than we have in the last decade. When it was days old, this Congress passed a law to
provide and protect health insurance for eleven million American children whose parents
work full-time. Our recovery plan will invest in electronic health records and new
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technology that will reduce errors, bring down costs, ensure privacy, and save lives. It
will launch a new effort to conquer a disease that has touched the life of nearly every
American by seeking a cure for cancer in our time. And it makes the largest investment
ever in preventive care, because that is one of the best ways to keep our people healthy
and our costs under control.
This budget builds on these reforms. It includes an historic commitment to
comprehensive health care reform - a down-payment on the principle that we must have
quality, affordable health care for every American. It's a commitment that's paid for in
part by efficiencies in our system that are long overdue. And it's a step we must take if we
hope to bring down our deficit in the years to come.
Now, there will be many different opinions and ideas about how to achieve reform, and
that is why I'm bringing together businesses and workers, doctors and health care
providers, Democrats and Republicans to begin work on this issue next week.
I suffer no illusions that this will be an easy process. It will be hard. But I also know that
nearly a century after Teddy Roosevelt first called for reform, the cost of our health care
has weighed down our economy and the conscience of our nation long enough. So let
there be no doubt: health care reform cannot wait, it must not wait, and it will not wait
another year.
The third challenge we must address is the urgent need to expand the promise of
education in America.
In a global economy where the most valuable skill you can sell is your knowledge, a
good education is no longer just a pathway to opportunity - it is a pre-requisite.
Right now, three-quarters of the fastest-growing occupations require more than a high
school diploma. And yet, just over half of our citizens have that level of education. We
have one of the highest high school dropout rates of any industrialized nation. And half of
the students who begin college never finish.
This is a prescription for economic decline, because we know the countries that out-teach
us today will out-compete us tomorrow. That is why it will be the goal of this
administration to ensure that every child has access to a complete and competitive
education - from the day they are born to the day they begin a career.
Already, we have made an historic investment in education through the economic
recovery plan. We have dramatically expanded early childhood education and will
continue to improve its quality, because we know that the most formative learning comes
in those first years of life. We have made college affordable for nearly seven million
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more students. And we have provided the resources necessary to prevent painful cuts and
teacher layoffs that would set back our children's progress.
But we know that our schools don't just need more resources. They need more reform.
That is why this budget creates new incentives for teacher performance; pathways for
advancement, and rewards for success. We'll invest in innovative programs that are
already helping schools meet high standards and close achievement gaps. And we will
expand our commitment to charter schools.
It is our responsibility as lawmakers and educators to make this system work. But it is the
responsibility of every citizen to participate in it. And so tonight, I ask every American to
commit to at least one year or more of higher education or career training. This can be
community college or a four-year school; vocational training or an apprenticeship. But
whatever the training may be, every American will need to get more than a high school
diploma. And dropping out of high school is no longer an option. It's not just quitting on
yourself, it's quitting on your country - and this country needs and values the talents of
every American. That is why we will provide the support necessary for you to complete
college and meet a new goal: by 2020, America will once again have the highest
proportion of college graduates in the world.
I know that the price of tuition is higher than ever, which is why if you are willing to
volunteer in your neighborhood or give back to your community or serve your country,
we will make sure that you can afford a higher education. And to encourage a renewed
spirit of national service for this and future generations, I ask this Congress to send me
the bipartisan legislation that bears the name of Senator Orrin Hatch as well as an
American who has never stopped asking what he can do for his country - Senator Edward
Kennedy.
These education policies will open the doors of opportunity for our children. But it is up
to us to ensure they walk through them. In the end, there is no program or policy that can
substitute for a mother or father who will attend those parent/teacher conferences, or help
with homework after dinner, or turn off the TV, put away the video games, and read to
their child. I speak to you not just as a President, but as a father when I say that
responsibility for our children's education must begin at home.
There is, of course, another responsibility we have to our children. And that is the
responsibility to ensure that we do not pass on to them a debt they cannot pay. With the
deficit we inherited, the cost of the crisis we face, and the long-term challenges we must
meet, it has never been more important to ensure that as our economy recovers, we do
what it takes to bring this deficit down.
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I'm proud that we passed the recovery plan free of earmarks, and I want to pass a budget
next year that ensures that each dollar we spend reflects only our most important national
priorities.
Yesterday, I held a fiscal summit where I pledged to cut the deficit in half by the end of
my first term in office. My administration has also begun to go line by line through the
federal budget in order to eliminate wasteful and ineffective programs. As you can
imagine, this is a process that will take some time. But we're starting with the biggest
lines. We have already identified two trillion dollars in savings over the next decade.
In this budget, we will end education programs that don't work and end direct payments
to large agribusinesses that don't need them. We'll eliminate the no-bid contracts that
have wasted billions in Iraq, and reform our defense budget so that we're not paying for
Cold War-era weapons systems we don't use. We will root out the waste, fraud, and
abuse in our Medicare program that doesn't make our seniors any healthier, and we will
restore a sense of fairness and balance to our tax code by finally ending the tax breaks for
corporations that ship our jobs overseas.
In order to save our children from a future of debt, we will also end the tax breaks for the
wealthiest 2% of Americans. But let me perfectly clear, because I know you'll hear the
same old claims that rolling back these tax breaks means a massive tax increase on the
American people: if your family earns less than $250,000 a year, you will not see your
taxes increased a single dime. I repeat: not one single dime. In fact, the recovery plan
provides a tax cut - that's right, a tax cut - for 95% of working families. And these checks
are on the way.
To preserve our long-term fiscal health, we must also address the growing costs in
Medicare and Social Security. Comprehensive health care reform is the best way to
strengthen Medicare for years to come. And we must also begin a conversation on how to
do the same for Social Security, while creating tax-free universal savings accounts for all
Americans.
Finally, because we're also suffering from a deficit of trust, I am committed to restoring a
sense of honesty and accountability to our budget. That is why this budget looks ahead
ten years and accounts for spending that was left out under the old rules - and for the first
time, that includes the full cost of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. For seven years, we
have been a nation at war. No longer will we hide its price.
We are now carefully reviewing our policies in both wars, and I will soon announce a
way forward in Iraq that leaves Iraq to its people and responsibly ends this war.
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And with our friends and allies, we will forge a new and comprehensive strategy for
Afghanistan and Pakistan to defeat al Qaeda and combat extremism. Because I will not
allow terrorists to plot against the American people from safe havens half a world away.
As we meet here tonight, our men and women in uniform stand watch abroad and more
are readying to deploy. To each and every one of them, and to the families who bear the
quiet burden of their absence, Americans are united in sending one message: we honor
your service, we are inspired by your sacrifice, and you have our unyielding support. To
relieve the strain on our forces, my budget increases the number of our soldiers and
Marines. And to keep our sacred trust with those who serve, we will raise their pay, and
give our veterans the expanded health care and benefits that they have earned.
To overcome extremism, we must also be vigilant in upholding the values our troops
defend - because there is no force in the world more powerful than the example of
America. That is why I have ordered the closing of the detention center at Guantanamo
Bay, and will seek swift and certain justice for captured terrorists - because living our
values doesn't make us weaker, it makes us safer and it makes us stronger. And that is
why I can stand here tonight and say without exception or equivocation that the United
States of America does not torture.
In words and deeds, we are showing the world that a new era of engagement has begun.
For we know that America cannot meet the threats of this century alone, but the world
cannot meet them without America. We cannot shun the negotiating table, nor ignore the
foes or forces that could do us harm. We are instead called to move forward with the
sense of confidence and candor that serious times demand.
To seek progress toward a secure and lasting peace between Israel and her neighbors, we
have appointed an envoy to sustain our effort. To meet the challenges of the 21st century
- from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from pandemic disease to cyber threats to
crushing poverty - we will strengthen old alliances, forge new ones, and use all elements
of our national power.
And to respond to an economic crisis that is global in scope, we are working with the
nations of the G-20 to restore confidence in our financial system, avoid the possibility of
escalating protectionism, and spur demand for American goods in markets across the
globe. For the world depends on us to have a strong economy, just as our economy
depends on the strength of the world's.
As we stand at this crossroads of history, the eyes of all people in all nations are once
again upon us - watching to see what we do with this moment; waiting for us to lead.
Those of us gathered here tonight have been called to govern in extraordinary times. It is
a tremendous burden, but also a great privilege - one that has been entrusted to few
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generations of Americans. For in our hands lies the ability to shape our world for good or
for ill.
I know that it is easy to lose sight of this truth - to become cynical and doubtful;
consumed with the petty and the trivial.
But in my life, I have also learned that hope is found in unlikely places; that inspiration
often comes not from those with the most power or celebrity, but from the dreams and
aspirations of Americans who are anything but ordinary.
I think about Leonard Abess, the bank president from Miami who reportedly cashed out
of his company, took a $60 million bonus, and gave it out to all 399 people who worked
for him, plus another 72 who used to work for him. He didn't tell anyone, but when the
local newspaper found out, he simply said, ''I knew some of these people since I was 7
years old. I didn't feel right getting the money myself."
I think about Greensburg, Kansas, a town that was completely destroyed by a tornado,
but is being rebuilt by its residents as a global example of how clean energy can power an
entire community - how it can bring jobs and businesses to a place where piles of bricks
and rubble once lay. "The tragedy was terrible," said one of the men who helped them
rebuild. "But the folks here know that it also provided an incredible opportunity."
And I think about Ty'Sheoma Bethea, the young girl from that school I visited in Dillon,
South Carolina - a place where the ceilings leak, the paint peels off the walls, and they
have to stop teaching six times a day because the train barrels by their classroom. She has
been told that her school is hopeless, but the other day after class she went to the public
library and typed up a letter to the people sitting in this room. She even asked her
principal for the money to buy a stamp. The letter asks us for help, and says, "We are just
students trying to become lawyers, doctors, congressmen like yourself and one day
president, so we can make a change to not just the state of South Carolina but also the
world. We are not quitters."
We are not quitters.
These words and these stories tell us something about the spirit of the people who sent us
here. They tell us that even in the most trying times, amid the most difficult
circumstances, there is a generosity, a resilience, a decency, and a determination that
perseveres; a willingness to take responsibility for our future and for posterity.
Their resolve must be our inspiration. Their concerns must be our cause. And we must
show them and all our people that we are equal to the task before us.
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I know that we haven't agreed on every issue thus far, and there are surely times in the
future when we will part ways. But I also know that every American who is sitting here
tonight loves this country and wants it to succeed. That must be the starting point for
every debate we have in the coming months, and where we return after those debates are
done. That is the foundation on which the American people expect us to build common
ground.
And if we do - if we come together and lift this nation from the depths of this crisis; if we
put our people back to work and restart the engine of our prosperity; if we confront
without fear the challenges of our time and summon that enduring spirit of an America
that does not quit, then someday years from now our children can tell their children that
this was the time when we performed, in the words that are carved into this very
chamber, "something worthy to be remembered." Thank you, God Bless you, and may
God Bless the United States of America.
END
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State of the Union: President Obama's Speech
BY ABC NEWS

Jan. 27, 2010

President Obama's State of the Union Address - remarks as prepared for delivery. The
State of the Union takes place at the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C. on Jan. 27,
2010 at 9:00 p.m. ET.
Madame Speaker, Vice President Biden, Members of Congress, distinguished guests,
and fellow Americans:
Our Constitution declares that from time to time, the President shall give to Congress
information about the state of our union. For two hundred and twenty years, our
leaders have fulfilled this duty. They have done so during periods of prosperity and
tranquility. And they have done so in the midst of war and depression; at moments of
great strife and great struggle.
It's tempting to look back on these moments and assume that our progress was inevitable – that
America was always destined to succeed. But when the Union was turned back at Bull Run and
the Allies first landed at Omaha Beach, victory was very much in doubt. When the market
crashed on Black Tuesday and civil rights marchers were beaten on Bloody Sunday, the future
was anything but certain. These were times that tested the courage of our convictions, and the
strength of our union. And despite all our divisions and disagreements; our hesitations and our
fears; America prevailed because we chose to move forward as one nation, and one people.

Again, we are tested. And again, we must answer history's call.

One year ago, I took office amid two wars, an economy rocked by severe recession, a
financial system on the verge of collapse, and a government deeply in debt. Experts
from across the political spectrum warned that if we did not act, we might face a
second depression. So we acted – immediately and aggressively. And one year later,
the worst of the storm has passed.
But the devastation remains. One in ten Americans still cannot find work. Many
businesses have shuttered. Home values have declined. Small towns and rural
communities have been hit especially hard. For those who had already known poverty,
life has become that much harder.
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This recession has also compounded the burdens that America's families have been
dealing with for decades – the burden of working harder and longer for less; of being
unable to save enough to retire or help kids with college.
So I know the anxieties that are out there right now. They're not new. These struggles
are the reason I ran for President. These struggles are what I've witnessed for years in
places like Elkhart, Indiana and Galesburg, Illinois. I hear about them in the letters
that I read each night. The toughest to read are those written by children – asking why
they have to move from their home, or when their mom or dad will be able to go back
to work.
For these Americans and so many others, change has not come fast enough. Some are
frustrated; some are angry. They don't understand why it seems like bad behavior on
Wall Street is rewarded but hard work on Main Street isn't; or why Washington has
been unable or unwilling to solve any of our problems. They are tired of the
partisanship and the shouting and the pettiness. They know we can't afford it. Not
now.
So we face big and difficult challenges. And what the American people hope – what
they deserve – is for all of us, Democrats and Republicans, to work through our
differences; to overcome the numbing weight of our politics. For while the people
who sent us here have different backgrounds, different stories and different beliefs,
the anxieties they face are the same. The aspirations they hold are shared. A job that
pays the bills. A chance to get ahead. Most of all, the ability to give their children a
better life.
You know what else they share? They share a stubborn resilience in the face of
adversity. After one of the most difficult years in our history, they remain busy
building cars and teaching kids; starting businesses and going back to school. They're
coaching little league and helping their neighbors. As one woman wrote me, "We are
strained but hopeful, struggling but encouraged."
It is because of this spirit – this great decency and great strength – that I have never
been more hopeful about America's future than I am tonight. Despite our hardships,
our union is strong. We do not give up. We do not quit. We do not allow fear or
division to break our spirit. In this new decade, it's time the American people get a
government that matches their decency; that embodies their strength.

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 282 of 411
And tonight, I'd like to talk about how together, we can deliver on that promise.
It begins with our economy.
Our most urgent task upon taking office was to shore up the same banks that helped
cause this crisis. It was not easy to do. And if there's one thing that has unified
Democrats and Republicans, it's that we all hated the bank bailout. I hated it. You
hated it. It was about as popular as a root canal.
But when I ran for President, I promised I wouldn't just do what was popular – I
would do what was necessary. And if we had allowed the meltdown of the financial
system, unemployment might be double what it is today. More businesses would
certainly have closed. More homes would have surely been lost.
So I supported the last administration's efforts to create the financial rescue program.
And when we took the program over, we made it more transparent and accountable.
As a result, the markets are now stabilized, and we have recovered most of the money
we spent on the banks.
To recover the rest, I have proposed a fee on the biggest banks. I know Wall Street
isn't keen on this idea, but if these firms can afford to hand out big bonuses again, they
can afford a modest fee to pay back the taxpayers who rescued them in their time of
need.
As we stabilized the financial system, we also took steps to get our economy growing
again, save as many jobs as possible, and help Americans who had become
unemployed.
That's why we extended or increased unemployment benefits for more than 18 million
Americans; made health insurance 65% cheaper for families who get their coverage
through COBRA; and passed 25 different tax cuts.
Let me repeat: we cut taxes. We cut taxes for 95% of working families. We cut taxes
for small businesses. We cut taxes for first-time homebuyers. We cut taxes for parents
trying to care for their children. We cut taxes for 8 million Americans paying for
college. As a result, millions of Americans had more to spend on gas, and food, and
other necessities, all of which helped businesses keep more workers. And we haven't
raised income taxes by a single dime on a single person. Not a single dime.
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Because of the steps we took, there are about two million Americans working right
now who would otherwise be unemployed. 200,000 work in construction and clean
energy. 300,000 are teachers and other education workers. Tens of thousands are cops,
firefighters, correctional officers, and first responders. And we are on track to add
another one and a half million jobs to this total by the end of the year.
The plan that has made all of this possible, from the tax cuts to the jobs, is the
Recovery Act. That's right – the Recovery Act, also known as the Stimulus Bill.
Economists on the left and the right say that this bill has helped saved jobs and avert
disaster. But you don't have to take their word for it.
Talk to the small business in Phoenix that will triple its workforce because of the
Recovery Act.
Talk to the window manufacturer in Philadelphia who said he used to be skeptical
about the Recovery Act, until he had to add two more work shifts just because of the
business it created.
Talk to the single teacher raising two kids who was told by her principal in the last
week of school that because of the Recovery Act, she wouldn't be laid off after all.
There are stories like this all across America. And after two years of recession, the
economy is growing again. Retirement funds have started to gain back some of their
value. Businesses are beginning to invest again, and slowly some are starting to hire
again.
But I realize that for every success story, there are other stories, of men and women
who wake up with the anguish of not knowing where their next paycheck will come
from; who send out resumes week after week and hear nothing in response. That is
why jobs must be our number one focus in 2010, and that is why I am calling for a
new jobs bill tonight.
Now, the true engine of job creation in this country will always be America's
businesses. But government can create the conditions necessary for businesses to
expand and hire more workers.
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We should start where most new jobs do – in small businesses, companies that
begin when an entrepreneur takes a chance on a dream, or a worker decides its
time she became her own boss.
Through sheer grit and determination, these companies have weathered the recession
and are ready to grow. But when you talk to small business owners in places like
Allentown, Pennsylvania or Elyria, Ohio, you find out that even though banks on
Wall Street are lending again, they are mostly lending to bigger companies. But
financing remains difficult for small business owners across the country.
So tonight, I'm proposing that we take $30 billion of the money Wall Street
banks have repaid and use it to help community banks give small businesses the
credit they need to stay afloat. I am also proposing a new small business tax credit –
one that will go to over one million small businesses who hire new workers or raise
wages. While we're at it, let's also eliminate all capital gains taxes on small business
investment; and provide a tax incentive for all businesses, large and small, to invest in
new plants and equipment.
Next, we can put Americans to work today building the infrastructure of tomorrow.
From the first railroads to the interstate highway system, our nation has always been
built to compete. There's no reason Europe or China should have the fastest trains, or
the new factories that manufacture clean energy products.
Tomorrow, I'll visit Tampa, Florida, where workers will soon break ground on a new
high-speed railroad funded by the Recovery Act. There are projects like that all across
this country that will create jobs and help our nation move goods, services, and
information. We should put more Americans to work building clean energy facilities,
and give rebates to Americans who make their homes more energy efficient, which
supports clean energy jobs. And to encourage these and other businesses to stay
within our borders, it's time to finally slash the tax breaks for companies that ship our
jobs overseas and give those tax breaks to companies that create jobs in the United
States of America.
The House has passed a jobs bill that includes some of these steps. As the first order
of business this year, I urge the Senate to do the same. People are out of work. They
are hurting. They need our help. And I want a jobs bill on my desk without
delay.
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But the truth is, these steps still won't make up for the seven million jobs we've
lost over the last two years. The only way to move to full employment is to lay a
new foundation for long-term economic growth, and finally address the problems that
America's families have confronted for years.
We cannot afford another so-called economic "expansion" like the one from last
decade – what some call the "lost decade" – where jobs grew more slowly than during
any prior expansion; where the income of the average American household declined
while the cost of health care and tuition reached record highs; where prosperity was
built on a housing bubble and financial speculation.
From the day I took office, I have been told that addressing our larger challenges is
too ambitious – that such efforts would be too contentious, that our political system is
too gridlocked, and that we should just put things on hold for awhile.
For those who make these claims, I have one simple question:
How long should we wait? How long should America put its future on hold?
You see, Washington has been telling us to wait for decades, even as the problems
have grown worse. Meanwhile, China's not waiting to revamp its economy.
Germany's not waiting. India's not waiting. These nations aren't standing still. These
nations aren't playing for second place. They're putting more emphasis on math and
science. They're rebuilding their infrastructure. They are making serious investments
in clean energy because they want those jobs.
Well I do not accept second-place for the United States of America. As hard as it may
be, as uncomfortable and contentious as the debates may be, it's time to get serious
about fixing the problems that are hampering our growth.
One place to start is serious financial reform. Look, I am not interested in
punishing banks, I'm interested in protecting our economy. A strong, healthy
financial market makes it possible for businesses to access credit and create new
jobs. It channels the savings of families into investments that raise incomes. But that
can only happen if we guard against the same recklessness that nearly brought down
our entire economy.
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We need to make sure consumers and middle-class families have the information they
need to make financial decisions. We can't allow financial institutions, including those
that take your deposits, to take risks that threaten the whole economy.
The House has already passed financial reform with many of these changes. And the
lobbyists are already trying to kill it. Well, we cannot let them win this fight. And if
the bill that ends up on my desk does not meet the test of real reform, I will send it
back.
Next, we need to encourage American innovation. Last year, we made the largest
investment in basic research funding in history – an investment that could lead to the
world's cheapest solar cells or treatment that kills cancer cells but leaves healthy ones
untouched. And no area is more ripe for such innovation than energy. You can see the
results of last year's investment in clean energy – in the North Carolina company that
will create 1200 jobs nationwide helping to make advanced batteries; or in the
California business that will put 1,000 people to work making solar panels.
But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more
efficiency, more incentives. That means building a new generation of safe, clean
nuclear power plants in this country. It means making tough decisions about opening
new offshore areas for oil and gas development. It means continued investment in
advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies. And yes, it means passing a
comprehensive energy and climate bill with incentives that will finally make clean
energy the profitable kind of energy in America.
I am grateful to the House for passing such a bill last year. This year, I am eager to
help advance the bipartisan effort in the Senate. I know there have been questions
about whether we can afford such changes in a tough economy; and I know that there
are those who disagree with the overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change.
But even if you doubt the evidence, providing incentives for energy efficiency and
clean energy are the right thing to do for our future – because the nation that leads the
clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And America
must be that nation.
Third, we need to export more of our goods. Because the more products we make and
sell to other countries, the more jobs we support right here in America. So tonight, we
set a new goal: We will double our exports over the next five years, an increase that
will support two million jobs in America. To help meet this goal, we're launching a
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National Export Initiative that will help farmers and small businesses increase their
exports, and reform export controls consistent with national security.
We have to seek new markets aggressively, just as our competitors are. If America sits
on the sidelines while other nations sign trade deals, we will lose the chance to create
jobs on our shores. But realizing those benefits also means enforcing those
agreements so our trading partners play by the rules. And that's why we will continue
to shape a Doha trade agreement that opens global markets, and why we will
strengthen our trade relations in Asia and with key partners like South Korea, Panama,
and Colombia.
Fourth, we need to invest in the skills and education of our people.
This year, we have broken through the stalemate between left and right by launching a
national competition to improve our schools. The idea here is simple: instead of
rewarding failure, we only reward success. Instead of funding the status quo, we only
invest in reform – reform that raises student achievement, inspires students to excel in
math and science, and turns around failing schools that steal the future of too many
young Americans, from rural communities to inner-cities. In the 21st century, one of
the best anti-poverty programs is a world-class education. In this country, the success
of our children cannot depend more on where they live than their potential.
When we renew the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, we will work with
Congress to expand these reforms to all fifty states. Still, in this economy, a high
school diploma no longer guarantees a good job. I urge the Senate to follow the House
and pass a bill that will revitalize our community colleges, which are a career pathway
to the children of so many working families. To make college more affordable, this
bill will finally end the unwarranted taxpayer-subsidies that go to banks for student
loans. Instead, let's take that money and give families a $10,000 tax credit for four
years of college and increase Pell Grants. And let's tell another one million students
that when they graduate, they will be required to pay only ten percent of their income
on student loans, and all of their debt will be forgiven after twenty years – and
forgiven after ten years if they choose a career in public service. Because in the
United States of America, no one should go broke because they chose to go to college.
And it's time for colleges and universities to get serious about cutting their own costs
– because they too have a responsibility to help solve this problem.
Now, the price of college tuition is just one of the burdens facing the middle-class.
That's why last year I asked Vice President Biden to chair a task force on Middle-

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 288 of 411
Class Families. That's why we're nearly doubling the child care tax credit, and making
it easier to save for retirement by giving every worker access to a retirement account
and expanding the tax credit for those who start a nest egg. That's why we're working
to lift the value of a family's single largest investment – their home. The steps we took
last year to shore up the housing market have allowed millions of Americans to take
out new loans and save an average of $1,500 on mortgage payments. This year, we
will step up re-financing so that homeowners can move into more affordable
mortgages. And it is precisely to relieve the burden on middle-class families that we
still need health insurance reform.
Now let's be clear – I did not choose to tackle this issue to get some legislative victory
under my belt. And by now it should be fairly obvious that I didn't take on health care
because it was good politics.
I took on health care because of the stories I've heard from Americans with preexisting conditions whose lives depend on getting coverage; patients who've been
denied coverage; and families – even those with insurance – who are just one illness
away from financial ruin.
After nearly a century of trying, we are closer than ever to bringing more security to
the lives of so many Americans. The approach we've taken would protect every
American from the worst practices of the insurance industry. It would give small
businesses and uninsured Americans a chance to choose an affordable health care plan
in a competitive market. It would require every insurance plan to cover preventive
care. And by the way, I want to acknowledge our First Lady, Michelle Obama, who
this year is creating a national movement to tackle the epidemic of childhood obesity
and make our kids healthier.
Our approach would preserve the right of Americans who have insurance to keep their
doctor and their plan. It would reduce costs and premiums for millions of families and
businesses. And according to the Congressional Budget Office – the independent
organization that both parties have cited as the official scorekeeper for Congress – our
approach would bring down the deficit by as much as $1 trillion over the next two
decades.
Still, this is a complex issue, and the longer it was debated, the more skeptical people
became. I take my share of the blame for not explaining it more clearly to the
American people. And I know that with all the lobbying and horse-trading, this
process left most Americans wondering what's in it for them.
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But I also know this problem is not going away. By the time I'm finished speaking
tonight, more Americans will have lost their health insurance. Millions will lose it this
year. Our deficit will grow. Premiums will go up. Patients will be denied the care they
need. Small business owners will continue to drop coverage altogether. I will not walk
away from these Americans, and neither should the people in this chamber.
As temperatures cool, I want everyone to take another look at the plan we've
proposed. There's a reason why many doctors, nurses, and health care experts who
know our system best consider this approach a vast improvement over the status quo.
But if anyone from either party has a better approach that will bring down premiums,
bring down the deficit, cover the uninsured, strengthen Medicare for seniors, and stop
insurance company abuses, let me know. Here's what I ask of Congress, though: Do
not walk away from reform. Not now. Not when we are so close. Let us find a way to
come together and finish the job for the American people.
Now, even as health care reform would reduce our deficit, it's not enough to dig us out
of a massive fiscal hole in which we find ourselves. It's a challenge that makes all
others that much harder to solve, and one that's been subject to a lot of political
posturing.
So let me start the discussion of government spending by setting the record straight.
At the beginning of the last decade, America had a budget surplus of over $200
billion. By the time I took office, we had a one year deficit of over $1 trillion and
projected deficits of $8 trillion over the next decade. Most of this was the result of not
paying for two wars, two tax cuts, and an expensive prescription drug program. On
top of that, the effects of the recession put a $3 trillion hole in our budget. That was
before I walked in the door.
Now if we had taken office in ordinary times, I would have liked nothing more than to
start bringing down the deficit. But we took office amid a crisis, and our efforts to
prevent a second Depression have added another $1 trillion to our national debt.
I am absolutely convinced that was the right thing to do. But families across the
country are tightening their belts and making tough decisions. The federal government
should do the same. So tonight, I'm proposing specific steps to pay for the $1 trillion
that it took to rescue the economy last year.
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Starting in 2011, we are prepared to freeze government spending for three years.
Spending related to our national security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security
will not be affected. But all other discretionary government programs will. Like any
cash-strapped family, we will work within a budget to invest in what we need and
sacrifice what we don't. And if I have to enforce this discipline by veto, I will.
We will continue to go through the budget line by line to eliminate programs that we
can't afford and don't work. We've already identified $20 billion in savings for next
year. To help working families, we will extend our middle-class tax cuts. But at a time
of record deficits, we will not continue tax cuts for oil companies, investment fund
managers, and those making over $250,000 a year. We just can't afford it.
Now, even after paying for what we spent on my watch, we will still face the massive
deficit we had when I took office. More importantly, the cost of Medicare, Medicaid,
and Social Security will continue to skyrocket. That's why I've called for a bipartisan,
Fiscal Commission, modeled on a proposal by Republican Judd Gregg and Democrat
Kent Conrad. This can't be one of those Washington gimmicks that lets us pretend we
solved a problem. The Commission will have to provide a specific set of solutions by
a certain deadline. Yesterday, the Senate blocked a bill that would have created this
commission. So I will issue an executive order that will allow us to go forward,
because I refuse to pass this problem on to another generation of Americans. And
when the vote comes tomorrow, the Senate should restore the pay-as-you-go law that
was a big reason why we had record surpluses in the 1990s.
I know that some in my own party will argue that we cannot address the deficit or
freeze government spending when so many are still hurting. I agree, which is why this
freeze will not take effect until next year, when the economy is stronger. But
understand – if we do not take meaningful steps to rein in our debt, it could damage
our markets, increase the cost of borrowing, and jeopardize our recovery – all of
which could have an even worse effect on our job growth and family incomes.
From some on the right, I expect we'll hear a different argument – that if we just make
fewer investments in our people, extend tax cuts for wealthier Americans, eliminate
more regulations, and maintain the status quo on health care, our deficits will go
away. The problem is, that's what we did for eight years. That's what helped lead us
into this crisis. It's what helped lead to these deficits. And we cannot do it again.
Rather than fight the same tired battles that have dominated Washington for decades,
it's time to try something new. Let's invest in our people without leaving them a
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mountain of debt. Let's meet our responsibility to the citizens who sent us here. Let's
try common sense.
To do that, we have to recognize that we face more than a deficit of dollars right now.
We face a deficit of trust – deep and corrosive doubts about how Washington works
that have been growing for years. To close that credibility gap we must take action on
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to end the outsized influence of lobbyists; to do
our work openly; and to give our people the government they deserve.
That's what I came to Washington to do. That's why – for the first time in history – my
Administration posts our White House visitors online. And that's why we've excluded
lobbyists from policy-making jobs or seats on federal boards and commissions.
But we can't stop there. It's time to require lobbyists to disclose each contact they
make on behalf of a client with my Administration or Congress. And it's time to put
strict limits on the contributions that lobbyists give to candidates for federal office.
Last week, the Supreme Court reversed a century of law to open the floodgates for
special interests – including foreign corporations – to spend without limit in our
elections. Well I don't think American elections should be bankrolled by America's
most powerful interests, or worse, by foreign entities. They should be decided by the
American people, and that's why I'm urging Democrats and Republicans to pass a bill
that helps to right this wrong.
I'm also calling on Congress to continue down the path of earmark reform. You have
trimmed some of this spending and embraced some meaningful change. But restoring
the public trust demands more. For example, some members of Congress post some
earmark requests online. Tonight, I'm calling on Congress to publish all earmark
requests on a single website before there's a vote so that the American people can see
how their money is being spent.
Of course, none of these reforms will even happen if we don't also reform how we
work with one another.
Now, I am not nave. I never thought the mere fact of my election would usher in
peace, harmony, and some post-partisan era. I knew that both parties have fed
divisions that are deeply entrenched. And on some issues, there are simply
philosophical differences that will always cause us to part ways. These disagreements,
about the role of government in our lives, about our national priorities and our
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national security, have been taking place for over two hundred years. They are the
very essence of our democracy.
But what frustrates the American people is a Washington where every day is Election
Day. We cannot wage a perpetual campaign where the only goal is to see who can get
the most embarrassing headlines about their opponent – a belief that if you lose, I win.
Neither party should delay or obstruct every single bill just because they can. The
confirmation of well-qualified public servants should not be held hostage to the pet
projects or grudges of a few individual Senators. Washington may think that saying
anything about the other side, no matter how false, is just part of the game. But it is
precisely such politics that has stopped either party from helping the American
people. Worse yet, it is sowing further division among our citizens and further distrust
in our government.
So no, I will not give up on changing the tone of our politics. I know it's an election
year. And after last week, it is clear that campaign fever has come even earlier than
usual. But we still need to govern. To Democrats, I would remind you that we still
have the largest majority in decades, and the people expect us to solve some problems,
not run for the hills. And if the Republican leadership is going to insist that sixty votes
in the Senate are required to do any business at all in this town, then the responsibility
to govern is now yours as well. Just saying no to everything may be good short-term
politics, but it's not leadership. We were sent here to serve our citizens, not our
ambitions. So let's show the American people that we can do it together. This week,
I'll be addressing a meeting of the House Republicans. And I would like to begin
monthly meetings with both the Democratic and Republican leadership. I know you
can't wait.
Throughout our history, no issue has united this country more than our security.
Sadly, some of the unity we felt after 9/11 has dissipated. We can argue all we want
about who's to blame for this, but I am not interested in re-litigating the past. I know
that all of us love this country. All of us are committed to its defense. So let's put
aside the schoolyard taunts about who is tough. Let's reject the false choice between
protecting our people and upholding our values. Let's leave behind the fear and
division, and do what it takes to defend our nation and forge a more hopeful future –
for America and the world.
That is the work we began last year. Since the day I took office, we have renewed our
focus on the terrorists who threaten our nation. We have made substantial investments
in our homeland security and disrupted plots that threatened to take American lives.
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We are filling unacceptable gaps revealed by the failed Christmas attack, with better
airline security, and swifter action on our intelligence. We have prohibited torture and
strengthened partnerships from the Pacific to South Asia to the Arabian Peninsula.
And in the last year, hundreds of Al Qaeda's fighters and affiliates, including many
senior leaders, have been captured or killed – far more than in 2008.
In Afghanistan, we are increasing our troops and training Afghan Security Forces so
they can begin to take the lead in July of 2011, and our troops can begin to come
home. We will reward good governance, reduce corruption, and support the rights of
all Afghans – men and women alike. We are joined by allies and partners who have
increased their own commitment, and who will come together tomorrow in London to
reaffirm our common purpose. There will be difficult days ahead. But I am confident
we will succeed.
As we take the fight to al Qaeda, we are responsibly leaving Iraq to its people. As a
candidate, I promised that I would end this war, and that is what I am doing as
President. We will have all of our combat troops out of Iraq by the end of this August.
We will support the Iraqi government as they hold elections, and continue to partner
with the Iraqi people to promote regional peace and prosperity. But make no mistake:
this war is ending, and all of our troops are coming home.
Tonight, all of our men and women in uniform -- in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the
world – must know that they have our respect, our gratitude, and our full support. And
just as they must have the resources they need in war, we all have a responsibility to
support them when they come home. That is why we made the largest increase in
investments for veterans in decades. That is why we are building a 21st century VA.
And that is why Michelle has joined with Jill Biden to forge a national commitment to
support military families.
Even as we prosecute two wars, we are also confronting perhaps the greatest danger to
the American people – the threat of nuclear weapons. I have embraced the vision of
John F. Kennedy and Ronald Reagan through a strategy that reverses the spread of
these weapons, and seeks a world without them. To reduce our stockpiles and
launchers, while ensuring our deterrent, the United States and Russia are completing
negotiations on the farthest-reaching arms control treaty in nearly two decades. And at
April's Nuclear Security Summit, we will bring forty-four nations together behind a
clear goal: securing all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years, so
that they never fall into the hands of terrorists.
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These diplomatic efforts have also strengthened our hand in dealing with those nations
that insist on violating international agreements in pursuit of these weapons. That is
why North Korea now faces increased isolation, and stronger sanctions – sanctions
that are being vigorously enforced. That is why the international community is more
united, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated. And as Iran's leaders
continue to ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: they, too, will face
growing consequences.
That is the leadership that we are providing – engagement that advances the common
security and prosperity of all people. We are working through the G-20 to sustain a
lasting global recovery. We are working with Muslim communities around the world
to promote science, education and innovation. We have gone from a bystander to a
leader in the fight against climate change. We are helping developing countries to feed
themselves, and continuing the fight against HIV/AIDS. And we are launching a new
initiative that will give us the capacity to respond faster and more effectively to bioterrorism or an infectious disease – a plan that will counter threats at home, and
strengthen public health abroad.
As we have for over sixty years, America takes these actions because our destiny is
connected to those beyond our shores. But we also do it because it is right. That is
why, as we meet here tonight, over 10,000 Americans are working with many nations
to help the people of Haiti recover and rebuild. That is why we stand with the girl who
yearns to go to school in Afghanistan; we support the human rights of the women
marching through the streets of Iran; and we advocate for the young man denied a job
by corruption in Guinea. For America must always stand on the side of freedom and
human dignity.
Abroad, America's greatest source of strength has always been our ideals. The same is
true at home. We find unity in our incredible diversity, drawing on the promise
enshrined in our Constitution: the notion that we are all created equal, that no matter
who you are or what you look like, if you abide by the law you should be protected by
it; that if you adhere to our common values you should be treated no different than
anyone else.
We must continually renew this promise. My Administration has a Civil Rights
Division that is once again prosecuting civil rights violations and employment
discrimination. We finally strengthened our laws to protect against crimes driven by
hate. This year, I will work with Congress and our military to finally repeal the law
that denies gay Americans the right to serve the country they love because of who

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 295 of 411
they are. We are going to crack down on violations of equal pay laws – so that women
get equal pay for an equal day's work. And we should continue the work of fixing our
broken immigration system – to secure our borders, enforce our laws, and ensure that
everyone who plays by the rules can contribute to our economy and enrich our
nations.
In the end, it is our ideals, our values, that built America – values that allowed us to
forge a nation made up of immigrants from every corner of the globe; values that
drive our citizens still. Every day, Americans meet their responsibilities to their
families and their employers. Time and again, they lend a hand to their neighbors and
give back to their country. They take pride in their labor, and are generous in spirit.
These aren't Republican values or Democratic values they're living by; business
values or labor values. They are American values.
Unfortunately, too many of our citizens have lost faith that our biggest institutions –
our corporations, our media, and yes, our government – still reflect these same values.
Each of these institutions are full of honorable men and women doing important work
that helps our country prosper. But each time a CEO rewards himself for failure, or a
banker puts the rest of us at risk for his own selfish gain, people's doubts grow. Each
time lobbyists game the system or politicians tear each other down instead of lifting
this country up, we lose faith. The more that TV pundits reduce serious debates into
silly arguments, and big issues into sound bites, our citizens turn away.
No wonder there's so much cynicism out there.
No wonder there's so much disappointment.
I campaigned on the promise of change – change we can believe in, the slogan went.
And right now, I know there are many Americans who aren't sure if they still believe
we can change – or at least, that I can deliver it.
But remember this – I never suggested that change would be easy, or that I can do it
alone. Democracy in a nation of three hundred million people can be noisy and messy
and complicated. And when you try to do big things and make big changes, it stirs
passions and controversy. That's just how it is.
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Those of us in public office can respond to this reality by playing it safe and avoid
telling hard truths. We can do what's necessary to keep our poll numbers high, and get
through the next election instead of doing what's best for the next generation.
But I also know this: if people had made that decision fifty years ago or one hundred
years ago or two hundred years ago, we wouldn't be here tonight. The only reason we
are is because generations of Americans were unafraid to do what was hard; to do
what was needed even when success was uncertain; to do what it took to keep the
dream of this nation alive for their children and grandchildren.
Our administration has had some political setbacks this year, and some of them were
deserved. But I wake up every day knowing that they are nothing compared to the
setbacks that families all across this country have faced this year. And what keeps me
going – what keeps me fighting – is that despite all these setbacks, that spirit of
determination and optimism – that fundamental decency that has always been at the
core of the American people – lives on.
It lives on in the struggling small business owner who wrote to me of his company,
"None of us," he said, "…are willing to consider, even slightly, that we might fail."
It lives on in the woman who said that even though she and her neighbors have felt the
pain of recession, "We are strong. We are resilient. We are American."
It lives on in the 8-year old boy in Louisiana, who just sent me his allowance and
asked if I would give it to the people of Haiti. And it lives on in all the Americans
who've dropped everything to go some place they've never been and pull people
they've never known from rubble, prompting chants of "U.S.A.! U.S.A.! U.S.A!"
when another life was saved.
The spirit that has sustained this nation for more than two centuries lives on in you, its
people.
We have finished a difficult year. We have come through a difficult decade. But a
new year has come. A new decade stretches before us. We don't quit. I don't quit. Let's
seize this moment – to start anew, to carry the dream forward, and to strengthen our
union once more.
Thank you. God Bless You. And God Bless the United States of America.
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Barack Obama
Speech Proposing Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee
delivered 14 January 2010
Thank you, everybody, for being here.
As we all know, our country has endured the deepest recession we've faced in
generations. And much of the turmoil was caused by irresponsibility on the part of banks
and financial institutions. Firms took reckless risks in pursuit of short-term profits and
soaring bonuses, triggering a financial crisis that nearly pulled the economy into a second
Great Depression.
It was little more than a year ago that we stood on that precipice. Several of the world's
largest financial institutions had already failed. Credit markets froze and banks refused to
lend. Trillions of dollars in household savings evaporated as stocks, pensions, and home
values plummeted. And we were losing hundreds of thousands of jobs each month. It was
at this time that many large financial firms -- those left standing -- teetered on the brink of
collapse, overwhelmed by the consequences of their irresponsible decisions.
Now, even though these firms were largely facing a crisis of their own making, their failure
could have led to an even greater calamity for the country. So the Federal Reserve and
other agencies took emergency measures to prevent that outcome. And the previous
Administration started a program -- the Troubled Asset Relief Program, or TARP -- to
provide these financial institutions with funds to survive the turmoil that they had helped
unleash. It was a distasteful but necessary thing to do.
Now, we've worked over the last year to manage this program effectively, to hold firms
accountable, and to recoup as much tax money as possible. Many originally feared that
most of the 700 billion dollars in TARP money would be lost. But because of the
management of this program by Secretary Geithner and my economic team, we've now
recovered the majority of the funds provided to banks.
As far as I'm concerned, however, that's not good enough. My commitment is to the
taxpayer. My commitment is to recover every single dime the American people are
owed. And my determination to achieve this goal is only heightened when I see reports of
massive profits and obscene bonuses at some of the very firms who owe their continued
existence to the American people -- folks who have not been made whole, and who continue
to face real hardship in this recession.
We want our money back. And we're going to get it.
And that's why I'm proposing a "Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee" to be imposed on major
financial firms until the American people are fully compensated for the extraordinary
assistance they provided to Wall Street. If these companies are in good enough shape to
afford massive bonuses, they are surely in good enough shape to afford paying back every
penny to taxpayers.
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Now, our estimate is that the TARP program will end up costing taxpayers around 117
billion dollars -- obviously a lot less than the 700 billion that people had feared, but still a
lot of money. The fee will be in place for 10 years, or as long as it takes to raise the full
amount necessary to cover all taxpayer losses. This will not be a cost borne by community
banks or small financial firms. Only the largest firms with more than 50 billion dollars in
assets will be affected. And the size of the fee each bank owes will be based on its size and
exposure to debt, so that we are recovering tax dollars while promoting reform of the
banking practices that contributed to this crisis.
Now, the fact is these financial institutions are essential to our economy. They provide
capital and credit to families purchasing homes, students attending college, businesses
seeking to start up or expand. And that's why the rescue program was as necessary as it
was unfortunate. And that is why, through this fee and broader reforms that we seek, our
goal is not to punish Wall Street firms, but rather to prevent the abuse and excess that
nearly caused the collapse of many of these firms and the financial system itself.
We cannot go back to "business as usual." And when we see reports of firms once again
engaging in risky bets to reap quick rewards, when we see a return to compensation
practices that seem not to reflect what the country has been through, all that looks like
business as usual to me. The financial industry has even launched a massive lobbying
campaign, locking arms with the opposition Party, to stand in the way of reforms to prevent
another crisis. That, too, unfortunately, is business as usual. And we're already hearing a
hue and cry from Wall Street suggesting that this proposed fee is not only unwelcome but
unfair -- that by some twisted logic it is more appropriate for the American people to bear
the costs of the bailout, rather than the industry that benefited from it, even though these
executives are out there giving themselves huge bonuses.
What I'd say to these executives is this: Instead of sending a phalanx of lobbyists to fight
this proposal, or employing an army of lawyers and accountants to help evade the fee, I
suggest you might want to consider simply meeting your responsibilities. And I'd urge you
to cover the costs of the rescue not by sticking it to your shareholders or your customers or
fellow citizens with the bill, but by rolling back bonuses for top earners and executives. And
more broadly, I am continuing to call on these firms to put greater effort into helping
families stay in their homes, to provide small businesses with needed loans, and to embrace
-- rather than fight -- serious financial reform.
Ultimately, it is by taking responsibility -- on Wall Street, here in Washington, all the way to
Main Street -- that we're going to move past this period of turmoil. That's how we're going
to avoid the cycles of boom and bust that have caused so much havoc. That's how we're
going to promote vibrant markets that reward innovation and entrepreneurship and hard
work. That's how we're going to create sustained growth without the looming threat of
another costly crisis. That's not only in the best interests of the economy as a whole; it's
actually in the interest of these large banks.
So, I'm going to be working closely with Congress on this proposal.
And on behalf of the American people, I look forward to signing it into law.
Thank you very much.
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ALTERNATE WEB LINK TO:
FRANTZ 15 MINUTE VIDEO STORY
AND WEB-SITE >>>

www.preventingcrisis.com
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Frantz Story
(June 2nd, 2017 Supreme Court Live Hearing Video Links)

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 1 - SEND EMAIL TO: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com
and request one-click link to Supreme Court Video hearing. You will
be sent the same links as described below in hyperlink format;
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 2 - SHORT VERSION OF FRANTZ HEARING COPY/PASTE THIS LINK
TO YOUR BROWSER;
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KBpT7NWNa6U&feature=youtu.be

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------OPTION 3 - 52 MINUTE ENTIRE VERSION OF HEARING COPY/PASTE THIS
LINK TO YOUR BROWSER;
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B7KfrBgn1tQ0OEFUaVdGTERjM00/view
OR;
1) IN YOUR BROWSER SEARCH BOX TYPE: Idaho Supreme Court Video Archive
2) CLICK ON THE LINK THAT SAYS: Idaho Supreme Court Hearings - Video Archive
3) UNDER Hearing Date, SCROLL DOWN TO June 2, 2017 and look for: Idaho
Independent Bank v. Frantz
4) On the right side of the page next to Idaho Independent Bank v. Frantz, click on
the Video link #44252

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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BANK (IIB) FOUNDER/CEO
FABRICATED FALSE LOAN DEFAULT
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

SEE ATTACHED EMAIL, THE COMPELLING EVIDENCE THAT THE BANK FOUNDER/CEO
FABRICATED A FALSE LOAN DEFAULT. THE BANK LOAN OFFICER, MR. DOLEZAL, HAD
CALCULATED ALL MY FEES AND NEXT PAYMENT IN ONE LUMP SUM TO BE PAID UPON
CLOSING THE RENEWAL LOAN.

I WAS INSTRUCTED BY MR. DOLEZAL NOT TO MAKE

ANY INTERIM PAYMENTS UNTIL CLOSING BECAUSE THE PAYMENTS WERE ALREADY
CALCULATED INTO THE RENEWAL LOAN AGREEMENT DOCUMENTS. MR. DOLEZAL
ATTACHED EMAIL STATES:

“We will want these paid on the date we finalize the closing of the renewal.
Should you have any questions please don’t hesitate to contact me. Thanks.”
THIS PAYMENT STRUCTURE IS TYPICAL OF LOAN RENEWALS. MY SENIOR LOAN
OFFICER, V.P. ROD COLDWELL, TOLD ME A COUPLE DAYS BEFORE THE FALSE
DEFAULT THAT THE BANK WAS WORKING OUT FINAL DETAILS FOR THE LOAN
RENEWAL TERMS. IN THE MEANTIME, NO PAYMENTS WERE REQUIRED UNDER MR.
DOLEZALS EMAIL LOAN MODIFICATION TERMS. MR DOLEZAL’S EMAIL IS DATED MAY
26, 2010 AND THE FALSE LOAN DEFAULT WAS LODGED TWO WEEKS LATER. IT IS
ALSO NOTABLE THAT FRANTZ’S SENIOR LOAN OFFICER, V.P. ROD COLDWELL, WAS
FIRED FROM HIS JOB THE FOLLOWING WEEK.
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Eagle Ridge
1 message

Michael H. Dolezal <Michael.Dolezal@iibk.net>
Wed, May 26, 2010 at 9:03 AM
To: Marty Frantz <martyfrantzcda@gmail.com>
Cc: "Rod B. Colwell" <Rod.Colwell@iibk.net>, "Kyle J. Hendricks" <Kyle.Hendricks@iibk.net>
Marty – Rod has suggested that we get a payment from you now in order to keep interest paid
current. However, that may cause problems with our existing documentation that you have.
Therefore, I would like you to be prepared to pay all fees and charges as outlined in the
Disbursement Request and Authorization document as well as the “first” scheduled payment of
~$31,560.46 that would have been due on or around 5/15/10 had the renewal been completed last
month as anticipated. We will want these paid on the date we finalize the closing of the renewal.
Should you have any questions please don’t hesitate to contact me. Thanks.
Mike

Michael H. Dolezal
Commercial Loan Officer
Idaho Independent Bank
(208)765-3619 Phone
(208)292-1839 Direct Line
(208)765-6091 Fax

NOTICE:
Idaho Independent Bank (“IIB”) is not able to provide binding loan commitments, rate
locks, or any other commitments via e-mail or verbally. No prior or future course of
dealing, no usage of trade, or no oral statements or comments by IIB or its employees or
other agents will be deemed to be a commitment by IIB to lend money or lock in rates,
unless the same is reduced to writing and signed by an authorized representative of
IIB. Information contained in this e-mail is not considered an official record of your
account and does not supersede any written loan or deposit agreements with IIB or
account statements. This electronic message transmission contains information which
may be confidential or privileged. The information is intended to be for the use of the
individual or entity named above. If you are not the intended recipient, please be aware that
any disclosure, copying, distribution or use of the contents of this information is prohibited. If
you receive this electronic transmission in error, please notify the sender and delete the
copy you received. Information received or sent from this system is subject to review by
supervisory personnel, may be retained, and may be produced to regulatory or legal
authorities or others with a legal right to the information.
Disclaimer added by CodeTwo Exchange Rules
www.codetwo.com
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QUICK SUMMARY OF SCOTT GIBSON EXPERT CEO BANKER REPORT
THE FULL DECLARATION IS ATTACHED TO THIS PAGE

Three banking expert witnesses independently evaluated Idaho Independent Bank
documents, mortgages and correspondence. They came to similar conclusions. Under oath
Scott Gibson CEO Expert Banker testified and said;
“As a former CEO of a similar bank and having been in the same recessionary situation, it is
my opinion that the behavior and strategy of the bank Frantz did business with was most likely
influenced by; the stressed banking climate at the time; the bank’s stock declining 90%;
regulatory and stockholder pressures; and most likely other related issues of the time. I find it
very odd and would appear that the bank’s subsequent economic sanctions over the past 5
years have been motivated out of justifying and attempting to mask a mistake made when the
dispute began. Such actions have suppressed Frantz financially so that he is limited in ability
to properly defend himself. I do not believe it was reasonable and prudent for the bank to
have sued Frantz personally, shutting down his profitable healthcare business activities…
The fact that the bank continues spending what appears to be significant dollars in legal
theories to justify their action to sue Frantz personally after all these years, and knowingly
doing so while sanctioning his ability to produce additional jobs in his healthcare business, is
questionable. It is difficult for me to understand what the bank’s strategy might be and what
they hope to accomplish. This situation and many more like it have made the Great Recession
far worse than it needs to be and are contributing factors to our current national debt. It is
my hope that necessary changes will occur in the banking and regulatory arena’s to avoid
these types of scenarios prior to the next recession. In the meantime, would it not be best to put
the hundreds of small profitable business owners, like Frantz, back to work as soon as possible
and to give the rest of us a hand to pay down the nation’s mounting debt?”
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REDAL & RED AL
JOHN E. REDAL/L. DIANE RED AL
Attorneys At Law
5431 N. Gov ernm ent Way , Suite 101 A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
(208) 676 -999 9
Phone:
(208) 676 -868 0
Fax:
484 6/50 78
ISBN#
Attorney for Defe nda nts
Marty D. Frantz and Cind y M. Frantz

JUD ICIA L DISTRICT
IN THE DIS TRIC T COURT OF THE FIRST
KOO TEN AI COU NTY
IN AND FOR THE STA TE OF IDAHO AND

IDAHO IND EPE NDE NT BANK, an Idaho
Corporation,
Plaintiff,
V.

NO. CV 10-6088
SCOTT GIBSON'S
DECLARATION IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANTS MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MAR TY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.
MAR TY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual
Counter-claimants
V.

IDA HO IND EPE NDE NT BANK, an Idaho
Corporation,
Counter-defendants.
MAR TY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,

Declaration of Jim Miller
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Third Party Plaintiff,
V.

EAGLE RIDGE ON TWIN LAKES, INC., an
Idaho Corporation,

Third Party Defendants.

I, SCOTT GIBSON. certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State
of Idaho that the foregoing is true and

correct:

I am a citizen of the United S1ates; I am over the age of 18; I have personal knowledge

of the matters contained herein: and testify as foRows:

Attached he(eto and incorporated herein as if set out in full is a true and correct copy
of my Statement and Report in support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Dated this/,✓dayof~r 2015 in

1c.,-., _

Signed)

r"lff

l ~,,/

.-

Signed: SCOTT GIBSON

AddfeSS:

:3tJ le

l)edaratiOn of Jim Miller

v/,-.1 Jh?'?J?

Page2
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ _ day of October, 2015, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the
following:

Sheila R. Schwager

D

U.S. Mail

D

Hand Delivered

D

Overnight Mail

D

Telecopy (FAX)

Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5261
Email: sschwager@hawteytroxett.com

BY:

Declaration of Jim Miller

Page 3
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October 11, 2015
Re: Expert Witness Report Preparation, Opinion' s & Conclusions

To Whom It May Concern,

When I prepared the Frantz Expert Report and drew my opinions and conclusions, I did not have
or read any other expert reports and did not talk to any other expert witnesses prior to
formulating my opinions and conclusions. In order to create autonomy and a non-bias report,
my opinions and conclusions were based upon my own independent analysis of the discovery
documents. Only after I completed the report did Mr. Frantz provide viewing of the other expert
witness reports.

~

ll"y~
"' •_,__ _
Scott Gibson
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EXPERT REPORT
SCOTT GIBSON

October 7, 2015
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EXPERT REPORT

1. Scope of Engagement
I was retain ed by the law firm of Frantz Law, PLLC and Redal
& Redal to evaluate and provid e an
opinio n with regard to Idaho Indep enden t Bank's ("11B")
actions in dealing with Eagle Ridge on
Twin Lakes, Inc. ("Eagle Ridge") and Marty and Cindy Frantz
(''The Frantz's") A brief summ ary of
my experience is as follow s;
CAREER SUMMARY QUALIFICATIONS- I am a retire d banki
ng executive with nearly thirty years'
experience in all phases of the banking sector. I have had
extensive executive experience in
portfo lio management, credit under writin g, special assets
, business devel opme nt, profit cente r
management, personnel management, strate gic planning.
fiscal budgeting, execu tive/b oard
repor ting, regul atory examinations {state & fed.), comp
liance mana geme nt, change
management, media and comm unity relations. I have over
25 years of banking experience in
Idaho. I attached a forma l resume of my experience. {Pleas
e reference resume' found as
Attac hmen t-A) No statem ents herein should be construed
as a legal opinio n rathe r as my
opinio n and perspective as a forme r Bank President and
CEO.

l'

~--. ·~
-"'~)

flt( :

_/

L--l- -t,.J ' /.

Scot t Gibson

2. Documents Reviewed:
I have review ed the follow ing applicable docum ents:
1. The Comp laint Eagle Ridge (Plain tiff) vs. 11B dated 6-27-1
4.
2. 118 loan memo randu ms, emails, and other corresponde
nce
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3. Promissory notes to Eagle Ridge: 12-14-06 $3,750,000; 7-11-07 $4,500,000; 4-17-08
renewal
4.

6-18-08 renewal for $4,500,000; 1-21-09 $4,500,000; 3-11-10 $4,307,243

5.

Commercial guarantees of the Frantz's

6. The Complaint for Breach of Guaranty dated 7-16-10
7. Mediation Settlement Agreement dated 7-14-11
8. The First Amended Answer, Affirmative Defenses, and Counterclaims dated 3-11-11
9. The Answer dated February 18, 2015
10. IIB's Quarterly financial reports from 2009 thru 2014.
11. IIB stock price chart 2007 to 2014
12. Banktracker Investigative Reporting Workshop, Weiss report, ECHO report, Newspaper
13. Appraisals dated March 20, 2006, March 11, 2008, and addendum September 28, 2000
14. Copy of the $20,000 cashier checks dated April 8, 2013 and May 15, 2013
15. Real Estate Mortgage dated 12-14-06

3. Assumptions of Facts
From my review of the aforementioned documents and my experience as a CEO of a similar
Community Bank during the same recessionary period when these documents were
memorialized, I have reached some tentative assumption of facts that form the factual basis for
my preliminary opinions as follows;

1. Background: Community Banks Roles in America - Mid size and small Community Banks have
always been an integral part of the financial fabric of our country. Community Banks play a
critical role in our society with approximately 20% of total bank assets being held in Community
Banks, while providing approximately 50% of all small business loans across America. It should
be noted that many a community bank culture includes being an active and vigorous economic
contributor to the local economies they serve. According to the SBA online report, about 64% of
the jobs created since the Great Recession were created by 5.6 million small businesses in

2
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America (20 to 499 employees). Small business is a critical component to a recovering
economy and the primary target market of Community Banks.
When U.S. economic conditions commenced to deteriorate in 2007, many of the Community
Bank customers were long-time entrepreneurs from the baby-boomer generation, like Marty
Frantz. Many of these borrowers had the history, resiliency, determination and financial
resources to weather the recessionary period. Congress took action by bailing out large
corporate business touted as "To big to fail".

One of the measures Congress used to help

small business was through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) which provided added
equity to government approved banks to assist them through the recessionary period, allowing
continued lending and support to occur with their customers. It was at the discretion of the
approved bank as to whether or not to participate in the program. IIB elected to not
participate.
During this same period of time, increased regulatory pressure was being placed upon Bank
Executives regarding enhanced loan quality and stricter management of loan portfolio
concentrations, real estate related credits being of highest scrutiny. Regulatory pressures often
drove banks to deal with their customers in new and unconventional ways. The aftermath was
the worst market disaster since the great depression. Tens of thousands of the millions of
small business owners ended up being forced to disrupt or close down their businesses and
liquidate their assets at distressed sale prices causing an even worse downward spiral of the
US economy.
Encouraging a policy of quick liquidation of assets, enhanced panic and fear ensued which
artificially drove down the market and significantly increased adverse conditions for small
business entrepreneurs that otherwise operated profitable and stable businesses. Real estate
related loans were hit especially hard by the distressed comparable properties that were
utilized to establish collateral values through formal appraisals. Post mortem assessment of
this recent recession has caused many in this country to pause as to a better means to manage
through such future fiscal downturns. Other countries have experimented with instituting a
more orderly recovery process, being careful to salvage viable small business to help bolster

3
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the economy and minimize the effects of a recession. They did this by requiring that a certain
percentage of the banking defaulted inventory could only be sold at auction in any one period
and placed restrictions on selling assets below market prices. This brought a more orderly
deflationary adjustment to the market place that better protected viable small middle-class
businesses.
The US on the other hand, inadvertently lent a policy which in many cases "threw out the baby
with the bath water" in the name of improved loan portfolio quality, unintentionally bringing
down tens of thousands of US small businesses which in-turn caused the Community Banks that
lent to them to fail. Many of the entrepreneurs were driven into insolvency for no other reason
other than panic and fear, not dissimilar to what happened during the Great Depression.
To compound the problem, the cumbersome 30 year old bankruptcy code did not work to protect
small business or provide business entrepreneurs a reasonable fresh start. According to a
recent American Bankruptcy Association (ABA) report, most business owners chose other
venues, other than the antiquated bankruptcy system in attempt to resolve their circumstances.

As a result, the ABA is currently working with congress to create a new more effective
bankruptcy code that will promote small business entrepreneurs that have successful
businesses to stay in business, instead of closing down their doors during the next recession
which in the most recent recession contributed to the 18 trillion US debt.
The documented facts in this case indicate the Frantz healthcare business was in a very stable
financial condition and in fact reflected reasonable growth during the recessionary period.
Based upon the documents reviewed, limited reason existed for the operation to cease if it
were not for what appeared to be stringent economic sanctions imposed by 118. Frantz
attempted to get relief from the bankruptcy court to provide a platform to negotiate a
settlement. It would appear that Frantz had no real intention to discharge the debt but rather
settle and then dismiss from bankruptcy so he could reinstate business operations. In fact,
Frantz never filed a waiver of discharge. However, like many other small businesses as
reported by the ABA, it would appear his legal counsel's posture was limited by the existing
bankruptcy code which did not allow the core issue of economic sanctions to be adjudicated.

4
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After residing approximately four years in the system, Frantz business still remains under the
same economic sanctions imposed by 11B that most likely has had a very adverse effect in local
community jobs and revenues.
2. Enhanced Regulatory Oversight - Prior to the recessionary period, general economic
conditions were robust in the banking industry. The financing landscape was very active with
real estate related lending being a staple of many bank portfolios. Values within the real estate
sector reflected impressive appreciation and Acquisition and Development (A&D) lending was
very popular. However, economic conditions changed rapidly with real estate valuations
plummeting. As the economic erosion commenced, collateral values eroded which in tum
increased the perceived risk analysis process. As this occurred the regulatory environment
became increasingly concerned with real estate related lending, especially those of significant
dollar amount. Real estate concentrations were under tremendous scrutiny. Allowance for Loan
and Lease Losses (ALLL) models were being commonly adjusted which equated to enhanced
pressure on the bank's capital. Loan write downs and expedited write-offs were of common
occurrence which again placed added pressure on capital.
3. Executive Management and Stockholders- During the recession, it was not uncommon for
regulators to demand enhanced capital levels to avoid formal regulatory sanctions. As such,
executive management was in a quandary of conserving, if not enhancing capital all the while
aggressively sanitizing loan portfolios and relieving portfolios of concentrations and those
credits with stress by pay-offs, write-downs, write-offs, and increasing Loan Loss Reserves.
Real estate related loans were of extreme concern due to the continued devaluing that was
occurring within that loan sector. Significant concern was upon A&D related loans, especially
those of significant size or specialty of purpose. Executive Management was likewise under
pressure and demands of stockholders to minimize losses and stop depletion of capital.
Stockholders were very concerned as to their bank investment and wanted to assure that proper
duty was being done to protect their investment.
4. Analysis and Opinion

5
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11B Bank Financial Condition - After reviewing 11B's financial history, the data reflects that IIB's
most challenging period peaked during the same time in 2010 when sanctions were instituted
against Frantz and 11B made the decision to sue him personally. It is my opinion that when the
IIB CEO emailed Frantz during this same period and wrote "By the way, 1/8 is not "desperate."

Our capital, reserves and liquidity are near the best in the industry. I would suggest you worry
more about your situation." It would appear the CEO was responding in a defensive posture
and attempting to discount the significant issues IIB was encountering. The Weiss Banking
report during this same time period reported 11B on their "Weakest Banks and Thrifts in the US"
and was also rated on the ECHO Report as a "2", among the weakest banks in the nation. IIB's
stock declined over 90% from approximately $33/share to under $3/share again during the
same period that IIB decided to place economic sanctions on Frantz by suing him personally.
The following year, IIB issued a stock offering to raise approximately $6m in added capital and
later de-registered its OTC stock. The peak year of the Great Recession for the banking industry
was 2010; this was the worst year in decades for the industry with over 900 problem banks and
157 banks which failed. This particular year was fraught with incredible angst by bankers
nationwide and was indeed a desperate time of resolve for many banks.
Troubled Asset Relief Program - In Oct, 2008, congress rushed to approve funds to assist
government approved banks to enhance institutional capitalization to allow lending to continue
and concessions to work with existing client's needs, referred to as TARP funds. This was
congresses answer to helping small business. The purpose, among other things, was to
encourage banks to keep lending to their viable customers to keep them from closing their
doors and also to lend a helping hand to businesses that were having a hard time but were
salvageable, just like they had done for the large businesses that were "to large to fail". Many
of these businesses, like Frantz, were in stable financial condition and did not require the
assistance, what Frantz did need was IIB to continue servicing prior loans and not overreacting
to economic and regulatory angst that was rampant within the industry at that time. Congress
and the President made a passionate request to banks publically to continue lending to viable
businesses, hence one of the main reasons why TARP was quickly pushed through congress.
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However, government branches did not appear to be in lock step with the intent of the Treasury
generated TARP Funds. While Congress and the President were strongly encouraging banks to
continue lending and working with viable businesses, the regulators were making demands on
banks that encouraged them otherwise. None-the-less, I believe it was prudent and the right
thing to do for approved troubled banks to obtain TARP funding, thereby allowing more latitude
to continue supporting their viable business customers. The majority of approved troubled
Banks did afford themselves of the TARP program even knowing all the conditions that were
attached to program. According to 11B's public reports, it elected not to engage the program and
rejected TARP funding. By not affording the institution with added capital adequacy during that
very difficult time, more limited options would have most likely existed in working with existing
and gaining new customers. It appears that near this same period of time, 118 proceeded to
make immediate demand upon Frantz without allowing reasonable time to find replacement
financing and avoid a stable businesses having to liquidate assets in an extremely de-valued
marketplace. Unfortunately, this process or strategy was not uncommon and drove the US
economy into an even darker economic abyss. The resulting factor was that many businesses
became insolvent for unreasonable purpose other than a bank's desire to placate the regulatory
demands and avoid the threat of closure.
Significant apprehension was prevalent in many if not all community bank executive and board
rooms regarding regulatory authority and over-sight. Unfortunately, my Board and I lost the
battle with the regulatory authorities and my bank was closed and subsequently sold to a larger
California based bank. The bank was a small Idaho based community bank that was very
similar in size and market share with 11B. It was our strategy to work closely with our stable
business customers and seek immediate demands once all other reasonable avenues had been
exhausted even in light of regulatory liquidity pressures. The bank I worked for participated in
TARP in effort to more effectively manage bank lending operations with regulatory demands.
The added capital layer provided enhanced flexibility regarding our degree of ability to work
with our profitable/stable business customers in effort to mitigate immediate demands and
pushing the local economies we served deeper into the recessions grasp. TARP funds helped
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our bank keep a number of small businesses from closing, unfortunately, given the length and
depth of the recessionary period, the regulatory scrutiny and conditions prevailed.
In 2014, the FDIC took our bank into receivership and sold it to a larger bank, headquartered in
California. None-the-less, as a bank, we had done the right thing for our customers,
stockholders, local community and country. We did all possible to prudently assist our
viable/profitable business customer's to remain operating. We sought to prudently work with
many and attempted to not seek immediate pay off and otherwise forcing them into insolvency,
making the recession even worse than it needed to be. We did what congress and the
President asked us to do. However, other banks took another strategy of not extending credit to
stable businesses and utilized immediate demand repayment clauses which created many
business's to fully liquidate in a devalued environment; contributing to the national debt
elevation of approximately $18 trillion today.
Frantz clearly had ample funds to service his loans and to pay the loan off within 36 months as
was noted in 11B's internal underwriting memos. Based on the documentation reviewed, I would
not have demanded immediate payoff, rather I would have supported offering Frantz the same
loan that 11B offered him using the 104 acres plus the lakefront dock/community center but
without the SO acres, which appears to be what Frantz agreed to; or I would have agreed to the
10 year term using the 104 acres plus the lakefront dock/community center and the additional
SO acres as collateral as Frantz also agreed. Either way, based upon the internal bank
underwriting at the time, I would have been satisfied with the credit and terms Frantz offered.
After reviewing the documents, it appears that 11B conveyed a willingness to provide a three
year term; however, the suggested collateral terms seemed so restrictive that the offer for
practical purposes made the offer unreasonable. I would conclude that the offer was
composed in an effort to enhance the likelihood to motivate Frantz to paying the loan off and
thereby relieving regulatory concerns of the real estate based credit. I would assume that the
Frantz credit had generated many points of regulatory discussion with 11B. In light of 11B's
liquidly level during this same period of time in conjunction with their election to not increase
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capital through TARP, the bank was most likely motivated by regulatory observations and their
liquidity level to aggressively gain payoff of the Frantz loans.
Frantz Suit and Dissolution of Business - I cannot understand why 11B would not have embraced
at least one of the proposals Frantz agreed to, even if I couldn't have extended the renewal loan
for some other reason, I believe that it would have been prudent to not have placed economic
sanctions on him by suing him personally as documents reflect that he offered both the 104
acres and SO acres in a deed in lieu which even in a de-valued market had appraised values to
satisfy the loan balance. Additionally, the community I would assume was gaining several
million dollars per year in local commerce through the Frantz operations. Suing Frantz would
immediately freeze what appears to be a good credit profile and dissolve his profitable 30 year
business venture. Frantz's records indicate that he had in excess of $30 million in back-log of
healthcare projects in the pipeline. Suing Frantz personally would not only immediately shut
down his business, but would cost the local community a significant loss of jobs and millions in
local revenues that otherwise would have been generated for market based individuals. It
seems questionable as to the reasoning to sue Frantz personally and applying economic
sanctions against his healthcare business. I would not have taken action against Frantz which
would cut off my source of repayment in the event there was a collateral short-fall with regard
to the 104 & SO acres, not to mention the adverse effect on the local community. It seems
apparent in evaluating correspondence between Frantz and 11B that the 11B CEO believed that
Frantz had the financial capacity to pay off the loan immediately. Likewise, it appears that the
118 loan structure was based upon strategy to promote pay-off by Frantz so he would not have to
contend with the threat of shutting down his business and losing his job and primary source of
income. Frantz had raised over $3.lm in cash after the economic contraction in late 2008 in a
sale-lease-back of one of his healthcare projects. This would indicate that he was in solid
financial condition with very good sources of income. This conclusion is likewise supported in
2010 internal bank memos by his 11B loan officer. While Frantz, the year prior, had over $3.lm
in ready cash available and may have been able to pay off the loan at that time, it is my opinion
that if Frantz had paid it off when demanded by 11B in mid-2010, Frantz would have had to
liquidate a large amount of assets in an undervalued marketplace. His financial statements in
9
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conjunction with bank correspondence reflects that Frantz had invested a substantial amount of
his $3.lm in ready cash into off-setting the market decline in Eagle Ridge and in expanding his
other healthcare businesses. Records also indicate that 11B had consented to this plan a year
earlier, inducing Frantz to invest his $3.lm ready cash instead of paying down the loan.
Unfortunately, it would appear that 11B's course of action regarding this matter comes short of
the scope of normal standard banking practices.
It is my opinion that the 3 year term 11B offered and which Frantz accepted was reasonable. It
did not appear to constitute a "favor" or "work-out" with special terms, rather normal lending
underwriting terms. I do not believe Frantz had duty to pay off the loan immediately, for that
reason alone, I do not believe 11B elected the most reasonable and logical remedy to the
situation. Even though Frantz did not appear to be asking for special terms or favors, it appears
Frantz could have asked for them given the context of prior noted conversations and actions
regarding the funding to completion of his project. But even if not, 11B the year prior, had
consented to Frantz investing his $3.lm in ready cash into the project to offset the market
decline which directly benefited 11B's collateral. 11B's consent induced Frantz to use his $3.lm
for these purposes, which are documented in email correspondence instead of substantially
paying down the loan. It should also be noted that this activity occurred after the recession
commenced. In other words, Frantz did offer to substantially pay down the loan in mid-2008
after the recession begun, had the resources to do so but 11B agreed not to be paid down and
completed the 2009 annual review process without a pay down requirement in January, 2009.
The change in course 12 months later and demand for immediate pay-off without continuing the
loan for a reasonable time, entrapped Frantz, giving the bank an unfair advantage.

I believe it

important to note Frantz's correspondence dated June 12, 2010:
"I never would have proceeded investing our last $3.1m if I hadn't had assurances from JIB. If you

truly thought at the time that it made more sense, as you claiming now, to have used the $3. lm to pay
down the JIB loan, why in heaven didn't you say anything at that time?"
Frantz was willing to accept the 3 year term using appropriate collateral and offered to soft
pledge his $3m cash in numerous 11B accounts for a longer term mortgage on what appeared to
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be fully conforming terms.

Furthermore, after the renewal loan was approved, Frantz's loan

officer instructed him to stop making payments because the bank had approved the 3 year loan
and closing was imminent. 11B states it had already calculated interest fees in the closing
transaction.

It is not uncommon practice to include such fees in closing when renewing such a

loan. Whether Frantz were to have paid the loan off immediately or a year later seems
irrelevant given the lack of compelling reason under the circumstances reviewed for requiring
Frantz to make immediate pay-off. It would seem that other contributing 11B related factors
must have been involved for 11B to engage such a strategy of immediacy to resolve.
It appears Frantz stood resolute in spite of the demands being made from 11B and remained in a
viable and stable financial position. Frantz elected to react in a sensible matter by refusing to
liquidate his assets in the under-valued market which scenario would been harmful to him and
the local economy as well. 11B's immediate demand for pay-off was likely driven by many of the
unusual contributing factors of the industry and Regulators at the time. It is my opinion that
11B's actions and demands were not prudent in promoting a reasonable resolution to the issues
encountered. I certainly understand and appreciate the regulatory landscape at the time where
liquidity was the king and real estate related credits were the bastards' child. As such, I
experienced firsthand how atypical the banking credit market had become regarding portfolio
management during this same period of time.
Frantz had ample opportunity to have immediately rushed to withdrawing his $3m in long-term
deposits from 11B. However, correspondence with the CEO reflects that Frantz demonstrated
loyal tendencies towards 11B and did not attempt to rush elsewhere and demonstrated best
efforts to continue supporting 11B. Frantz offered to keep his $3m in accounts at 11B as a
condition of the loan and offered in correspondence to bring in more deposits to assist the bank
with added depositories. As documented, the 11B CEO did not accept Frantz' offer for reasons
unknown, one possible explanation was the extreme pressure all bank CEO's were under at that
time.
In an email dated June 2, 2010, Frantz tells the 11B CEO to "tone down your demeanor".

The

emails indicate Frantz felt he was helping the 11B CEO by not pursuing the failure to complete
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funding of his project and also bringing more cash deposits to 11B. Contrary to normal course of
the banking business, cash deposits were not actively sought due to costing and management
factors which in the traditional course of banking would have been unthinkable. It also seemed
apparent that Frantz's use of the word "desperate" in his remarks was not received well and
most likely were found offensive to the 11B CEO.

As a former banker, I would have been quite pleased to have the relationship that Frantz
brought to 11B. This sentiment was likewise expressed by the Frantz 11B loan officer, shortly
before 11B sued him. As noted in a Feb 3, 2010 internal bank memo " ... Marty has been

instrumental in bringing over $2.SMM in deposits to the branch and has referred many other
accounts that currently number well into the 50s. I can't think of another borrower that provides
a better combination of strengths that we can work with on a significant project like Eagle
Ridge. 11 It is my understanding according to Frantz, that after the 11B CEO gave the ultimatum
to Frantz to sign the loan renewal "as is" or pay off the loan in cash within 24 business hours,
Frantz walked out of the board room with the 11B VP Senior Credit Manager. It is also my
understanding that contrary to the CEO's demands, the Senior Credit Manager assured Frantz
that the bank would come up with loan terms that would work for both parties. I also
understand from Frantz, that the 11B Senior Credit Manager was terminated shortly thereafter.
According to Frantz, the 11B CEO told his Senior VP Credit Manager to either voluntarily resign or
that he was fired. The Senior Credit Manager then left the bank.
The Frantz loan appeared to be a high quality loan. It would be my opinion that 11B should have
allowed Frantz the 3 year maturity using the 104 acres and extra waterfront collateral that he
proposed (and not the extra 50 acres 11B demanded that Frantz had recently purchased for
increased construction loan funding). If for whatever reason 11B could not accept this proposal,
more effort and discussion should have occurred pertaining Frantz's other proposals using his
$3m in cash deposits. Cash and liquidity was "King" during the recession and Frantz had
adequate amounts to entertain other options. It appears in late 2008, long after the crash,
Frantz had $3.lm in sale-lease-back ready cash and $3m in numerous bank accounts. The $3.lm
was available to be used for any purpose and the other $3m could have been soft pledged. In
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total, Frantz controlled over $Gm in cash during the recession. In any event, I find no reason 118
should have employed economic sanctions by suing Frantz personally, causing his profitable
business to immediately cease operation. It appears that Frantz was fully willing and able to
service the loan until it was paid off. Nevertheless, when the bank demanded stringent
collateral terms to motivate him to pay off the loan immediately, Frantz then offered the bank
not only the 104 acre collateral but an additional 50 acres he owned free and clear in a deed in
lieu which appraised value exceeded the loan balance. The fact that 118 sued Frantz personally
with never pursuing the collateral offered in over 5 years is questionable. Perhaps a potential
explanation could be the conditions 118 and the regulatory environment at the time promoted a
poor decision that was not actually in the best interest of 118, local community jobs, Frantz or
our national economy. At this writing, 118 still has a pending personal suit against Frantz.
Frantz remains under economic sanctions and cannot access credit and proceed with his
back-log of projects, creating an estimated loss of 100 jobs annually to the local community and
further contribution to the escalating $18 trillion US debt.
It is not only my opinion but many others that Fear and Panic were critical factors that hurt the
US economy the most, during the Great Recession. If officials had remained calm, thousands
of viable businesses, like Frantz's, could have continued generating thousands of jobs and
commerce. The recession would have still been harmful, but the depth and breadth of the
recessionary period would not have created the financial catastrophe that it had on so many
individuals, business owners and our country which nearly doubled its debt during this
recessionary period.
Timing and Collateral Type -

It is my opinion that Frantz is a classic example of a profitable

and growing business during the Great Recession which for no good reason other than the type
of collateral that existed, was forced into insolvency due to no fault of Frantz. Frantz found
himself doing business at the wrong time with a troubled bank. He was in the viable industry of
healthcare real estate which did weather the recession quite well, but had a ranch property that
was most likely considered by 118 to be an elevated risk based relationship merely because of
its collateral type.
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5. "Workout Loan" Special Terms Not Needed
Typically, "work-out loans" include special terms that would not be offered to customers under
normal market circumstances. However, during recessions, work-out loans typically use special
terms like, reduced fees, lower interest rates, extended pay-off dates and increased loan
amounts and/or reduced collateral requirements. The borrower generally receives
concessions they otherwise would not be offered during good times. However, documents
indicate Frantz was not asking for any special work-out terms or concessions from 11B. Frantz
initiated the offering to 11B of additional collateral so that the renewal loan could be approved
and 11B could strengthen their secondary repayment source. It appeared to be a fairly straight
forward deal. In correspondence with 11B, Frantz indicated he was interested in terms that were
"fully performing", in other words not asking for concessions. Frantz appeared to be a devoted
and loyal customer of 11B, and documents state that he wanted to assist 11B during the difficult
times and appear he was in good financial condition with a solid reputation. It does appear
that 11B did come back during final negotiations and offered special very low interest rate terms,
which Frantz rejected because he was not interested in any special terms which were
contingent upon him offering further collateral (the 50 acres). While low interest rates are
always attractive to borrowers, I cannot find where Frantz actually requested such a concession.
Frantz was very concerned with keeping the 50 acres he had recently purchased out of the 11B
collateral position.
When the initial dispute broke out, some correspondence makes it appear as though 11B may
have been characterizing Frantz's renewal loan as if it were a troubled loan when in fact I could
not find evidence as such. In previous loan renewals, I noticed that correspondence reflected
that 11B, due to its own internal delays, was often behind in processing the paperwork.

Even

though loans were technically past due, as a result of the bank's own internal delays, the
renewal dates were back-dated, a common practice.

Due to bank delays, Frantz's loan officer

indicated in emails that Frantz should not pay interest or make payments because 11B had
calculated and embedded those in the loan closing which was imminent. Back-dating loans are
not uncommon when the banks are running behind and as such are not viewed or reported as in
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default. Frantz's loan officer indicated in internal bank memo's in 2010 the likelihood of a
Frantz default was extremely small because Frantz had such a strong repayment source, his
healthcare business. As such, I find limited reason why 11B claimed Frantz's loan was in default.
Frantz appeared to be simply following instructions of his loan officer as was noted in writing
to Franz's. It appears suspect that 11B called the note due when in fact it was in negotiations
and expected to be settled which closing was imminent. It appears 11B may have panicked and
made an "emotional" decision to call it due, giving Frantz approximately 24 business hours,
when it was not in default but rather under pending closing instructions from Frantz's loan
officer.
It appears 11B denied that it owed Frantz any duty for failure to lend. However, they did have
exposure in my opinion. It would only make sense for 11B to structure renewal terms that
relieved them of any potential obligations or liability they may have had to complete funding of
the Frantz project regardless of the merits of such, at least as a precaution. Frantz was not
asking for any accommodation for 11B's inability to lend. Frantz agreed to a market interest rate
of 5.75% according to the 3 year loan renewal note. The terms appeared fully "performing"
which allowed 11B an exit whereby it did not have to increase funding and furthermore could
extinguish the loan from their books within 36 months. Frantz furthermore was willing to retain
his $3 million dollars in cash deposits in 11B to help off-set the bank's falling depositories.
Emails would indicate he was even willing to bring in more cash deposits. I believe Frantz
offered 11B terms that appeared attractive to help 11B overcome their challenges in a way that
did not impair the bank. Frantz offered a normal renewal loan that had no elements of a
"work-out plan" or concessions and desired normal business terms as provided historically. It
would appear that many of the difficulties encountered were compounded by the loan type (real
estate), the recessionary period, regulatory scrutiny and the challenges 11B was experiencing.
From the materials reviewed, I found no evidence of Frantz asking for special concessions, but
did find his retainage of significant deposits at 11B as a loyalty indicator that must have existed
in light of the publicly known challenges 11B was encountering.
6. Guarantors and Anti-deficiency
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Documents indicate that Marty & Cindy Frantz purchased the property as their 160 acre
retirement ranch which they intended to live while selling off a portion of it. Records indicate
Frantz also made inquiries to 11B for financing their retirement home on the same. Marty &
Cindy Frantz were the sole parties in title of the collateralized 104 acres off and on during the
loan period while various lot line adjustments were made at which time title transactions were
noted and approved by 11B. They were the sole parties on title for the SO acres when the
dispute began and have always remained on title. Personal families' ranches/estates often
use a corporation or trust, especially during significant construction activities, to minimize
liability and tax planning issues; it is often recommended by counsel and preferred by banks
protecting both the bank and the borrower as a matter of convenience. While prudent, it does
not reflect the true nature of the land ownership. It would be common to not subjugate the fact
that this was "Marty & Cindy Frantz's" ranch property that they desired to retire on for the rest
of their life. It would not be common to take a position that these temporary commercial
measures somehow subjugated their rights as the primary borrowers the bank was solely
relying on for repayment of the loan. At the December, 2008 11B meeting, it appears the
Frantz's and loan officers in a friendly exchange joked about the fact that Cindy Frantz didn't
want to develop or sale off any portion of the property, desiring to keep it all to herself. It
appears the Frantz's were financially stable enough to retain the property for themselves and
not have need to sell off any of it. Correspondence supports that for practical purposes, Marty
& Cindy Frantz treated the property as their "own" and not the corporations from the inception
of its purchase with signs at the lakefront that say "The Frantz Family". Internal bank
correspondence only focused on Marty & Cindy Frantz and not any of the other family members
in the corporation, rarely if ever focusing on the corporation, which assets were virtually
non-existent other than the property itself which was already encumbered by the bank. It
appears as soon as they completed the construction improvements and sold off a portion of the
property, there would be no continuing purpose for the corporation. The corporation appeared
to be used as a temporary convenience.
When analyzing the transactions, the fact that they were personally on title on the 104 acres
from time to time and in title on the SO acres all the time after the purchase indicates Marty &
16
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Cindy Frantz were not only the sole guarantors but also the "actual" borrowers entitled to the
same protection given any owner of a family ranch in Idaho. It is my opinion that for
underwriting purposes, 11B exclusively relied upon Marty & Cindy Frantz as the borrowers and
not the corporation. In fact 11B never sued the corporation or any other minority corporation
family members. I find it unconventional that 11B treated the Frantz as borrowers for purposes
of loan underwriting, allowing them at the same time to be in title to the land personally, but
then take the opposite position against Frantz's Corporation that was occasionally used in part
of the transaction for convenience. It would seem reasonable that it must be either one way or
the other and in this case it appears this property is the Frantz's ranch personally. It is common
in this situation that the borrower be entitled to antideficiency protection. If the bank intended
that the corporation was the "actual" borrower, then they should not have focused on the
Frantz's in their underwriting and should not have given them permission to transfer the title in
their name personally.

It is difficult to understand why economic sanctions were elected at

the juncture they were other than to motivate Frantz to pay off the loan right away. I would not
have subjugated their rights to antideficiency protection and would not have sued them
personally prior to foreclosing or coming up with some other more reasonable solution.
It is my non-legal opinion that 11B made an error in failing to grant Marty & Cindy Frantz Idaho
anti-deficiency protection afforded all other borrowers or real estate similar to Frantz. The
compelling precedent for antideficiency is further evidenced when 11B signed the July, 2011
mediation agreement whereby they agreed to the Idaho anti-deficiency protocol.

I would

believe that a more prudent plan would have been not to have sued them personally, but would
have granted them the loan the Frantz's agreed to and in the unlikely event of default, would
have foreclosed on the collateral first. Even if the collateral did not cover the loan balance, it
would have been prudent to exhaust all other avenues and negotiations to avoid the economic
sanctions and shutting down Frantz's business for purpose of preserving a repayment source
and not to mention the ancillary jobs lost within the community served. It appears that suing
the Frantz's personally was an extraordinary action that may likely have been motivated by
other 11B related factors in hope to convince Frantz to pay the loan off immediately.
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7. Accord & Satisfaction
Regardless of speculating where or how the $20k funds for the cashier's check were originated,
the cashier's check was a valid instrument and a separate issue. It is my opinion that 118 had
(2) options, either to return the $20,000 cashier's check to Frantz or negotiate the check and
accept the accord and satisfaction. It is noted that 118 endorsed the check in an unconventional
manner, but at the same time refused to release the guarantees, which would seem
unreasonable and perhaps related to other 118 related factors.
Conclusion

As a former CEO of a similar bank and having been in the same recessionary situation, it is my
opinion that the behavior and strategy of 118 was most likely influenced by the stressed banking
climate at the time, 11B stock declining nearly 90%, regulatory and stockholder pressures, and
most likely other 118 related issues of the time. I find it very odd and would appear that 118's
subsequent economic sanctions over the past 5 years have been motivated out of justifying and
attempting to mask a mistake made when the dispute began. Such actions have suppressed
Frantz financially so that he is limited in ability to properly defend himself. I do not believe it
was reasonable and prudent for 118 to have sued Frantz personally, shutting down his profitable
healthcare business activities. I believe a more prudent action of resolution would have been
instead of offering a 3 year renewal loan with unreasonable collateral terms; 118 should have
modified the collateral description in the renewal loan documents that were already prepared
approved and ready to sign. Removal of the SO acres as collateral would have had minimal
impact on IIB's over-all underwriting criteria and retained the important opportunity for Frantz to
find replacement financing or REIT investors to pay off the loan within a reasonable time period
that Frantz had agreed.
The fact that 118 continues spending what appears to be significant dollars in legal theories to
justify their action to sue Frantz personally after all these years, and knowingly doing so while
sanctioning his ability to produce and producing additional employment jobs for many annually
in his healthcare business, is questionable. It is difficult for me to understand what 11B's
strategy might be and what they hope to accomplish. This situation and many more like it have

18

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 327 of 411
made the Great Recession far worse than it needed to be and are contributing factors to our
current national debt. It is my hope that necessary changes will occur in the banking and
regulatory arena's to avoid these types of scenarios prior to the next recession, in the
meantime, would it not be best to put the hundreds of small profitable business owners, like
Frantz, back to work as soon as possible and to give the rest of us a hand to pay down the
nation's mounting debt.

ATTACHMENT-A
As noted prior, no statements herein should be construed as a legal opinion but rather as my
opinion and perspective as a former Bank President and CEO.

CAREER SUMMARY
Retired Banking Executive with experience in all phases of the banking sector.
Extensive experience in portfolio management, credit underwriting, business
development, profit center management, personnel management, strategic planning,
fiscal budgeting, executive/board reporting, regulatory examinations (state & fed.),
compliance management, change management, media and community relations.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

2010-2014

Syringa Bank & Bancorporation

Boise, Idaho

President and Chief Executive Officer with oversight of a $200mm commercial
bank with six branches, two mortgage offices and a residential construction loan office.
Primary duties included management of Profit/Loss and Balance Sheet Statements,
Budget, Legal, Accounting, Regulatory, Board and Stakeholders. Member of the Syringa
Bank and Syringa Bancorp Board of Directors.

2001-2010

Syringa Bank

Boise, Idaho
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EVP and Chief Credit Officer with lending, special assets, collection, policy and
procedures, training and executive managerial duties. A voting Board Committee
member on Loan, ALCO, Audit, Pricing, Marketing and Personnel committees.

1996-2001

Wells Fargo Bank

Boise, Idaho

Regional Wholesale Lending Manager with lending, training and management of lenders
for mid to upper tier business and commercial relationships for California, Washington,
Oregon, Idaho, Nevada, Montana, Wyoming, North and South Dakota. Managed a
$373mm regional credit portfolio with a $3mm personal loan approval authority.

1986-1996

First Security Bank

Boise, Idaho

Commenced employ directly upon graduating from college. Completed the banks formal
Management Training Program and served in various capacities to include: Consumer,
Agriculture and Commercial Lending, Manager of the Idaho Credit Analysis Department,
Corporate Trainer, Credit Manager of Budget Administration for the Idaho Head Office
Credit Division, Manager of the Idaho Mortgage Administration Department.

EDUCATION

1983-1986
Brigham Young University
Bachelor of Science Degree in Finance with an Extra Major in Statistics

Provo, Utah

SPECIALIZED SCHOOLS
1998-2000
Washington

Pacific Coast Banking School

1994-1995

National Mortgage Lending School

Seattle,

Houston,

Texas
1992-1993
1986

Northwest Commercial Lending School
First Security Consumer Lending School

Portland, Oregon
Salt Lake City,

Utah
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PRIOR AFFILIATIONS
American Bankers Association - Idaho State Representative on the National Counsel
American Institute of Banking - Instructor (Finance/Marketing/Business Management)
Boy Scouts of America - Personal Finance Counselor
RMA- Committee Member for National Financial Statement Studies
RMA- Author of Article, LIFO vs. FIFO- Return to the Basics
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Thomas Storey
2108 N Houk Road Apt #2
Spokane, WA 99216

TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDE NT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. CV-10-6088

DECLARATION OF THOMAS
STOREY

MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual,
and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Defendants.

I, Thomas Storey, declare under the penalty of perjury as follows:

I am a part-time resident of Spokane County, Washington and I am over the age of
18 and competent to testify to the facts stated herein of my own personal knowledge.

1) I have been a landscape contractor business owner in Idaho for over 20 years.

I have

won several regional contests for my landscape work.
2) I became Marty Frantzs landscape contractor over 15 years ago. I did dozens of projects
for him.

His work represented about a third of my over-all client base during this

period.
3) In about mid 2010, Marty Frantz told me that he got into a dispute with his banker

which resulted having to shut down his healthcare business. He told me that a number

Declaration of Thomas Storey
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of projects I had planned in my work schedule, would be delayed.
4) I had planted hundreds of shrubs and trees in my nursery anticipating to use them in his
projects.

After waiting for over a year, he reported that he was still in a dispute with

his banker and could not proceed with the projects which I was relying on.
5) Due to the recession and slow down, I was not able to replace Marty Frantz's work with
new clients.

As a result in 2012, I had to close down my landscape business and sell

the nursery plants for a substantial loss that were scheduled for his projects and
permanently lay off all my full-time and part-time employees .

.::14m eia7~

Thomas Storey
Declarant

Declaration of Thomas Storey
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CLERK DISTRICT COURT
Sheila R. Schwager, ISB No. 50S9
Beth Coonts, ISB No. 7700
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701•1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5261
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com
bcoonts@hawleytroxell.com

~

___

,- - .

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Counterdefendant Idaho Independent Bank

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TifE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
MARTY D. FRANTZ, and individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

)
)

MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,

)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
corporation,
Counterdefendant.

JUDGMENT

)
)

Defendants.

Counterclaimants,

Case No. CV-10-6088

)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT- I

•01188.0211 .71138486.1
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MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual, and
CINDY M. FRANTZ, an individual,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

)
)
)
)
)

)
)
vs.
)
EAGLE RIDGE ON TWIN LAKES, INC., an )

Idaho corporation,

)
)

______________
Third Party Defendant.

)
)

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Judgment jn favor of Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank ("JIB'') and against

Defendants Marty D. Frantz and Cindy M. Frantz (coJlectively, the "Defendants"), jointly
and severally, in the amount of S9,193,S46.S0, plus pre-judgm~nt intere..llt at the rate of
$2,475.02 per diem from September 16, 2015, until the date this Judgment is entered;

2.

Judgment against the Defendants in favor of 118 for its costs and reasonable

attorneys' fees in an amount to be determined upon the filing of a timely Memorandum of
Costs, Disbursements, and Attorneys' Fees; and
3.

Interest on the Judgment at the ~egal rate from the date of Judgmeot until

118 is paid in full.

DATED THIS

7

Tl

day of January, 2016.

JUDGMENT - 2
40$8e.0211 .7~

1ll- tl 8000/ 9000d 609-1
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RULE S4(b) CERTIFICATE

With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment it is hereby CERTIFIED, in
accordance with Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P., that the Court has determined that there is no just reason
for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby direct that the
above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may issue and an
appeal may be taken as provided by the Idaho Appellate Rules.

DATED THIS _ _ day of January, 2016.

By _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Hon. Rich Christensen
District Judge

JUDGMENT-3
'4098e.0211 .793MOIS.1
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

_K day of January, 2016, I caused to be served a true

copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the

following:

Sheila R. Schwager
Beth Coonts
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP

877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617

D U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid

•
•
•

Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
E-mail

~lecopy c!J.})

t -q54-5J(P/

[Attorneys for Plaintiff Idaho Independent Bank]

•
•
•

John E. Redal
L. Diane Redal
5431 N. Government Way #l0lA
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
[Attorneys for Defendants Marty D. & Cindy M. Frantz]

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Hand Delivered
Overnight Mail
Qp -mail
A
~lecopy &l)o-l..PlU- ~ g'u

JUVI BRANNON
CLERK OF THE COURT

JUDGMENT-4
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LOWER COURT STAY DENIAL
In an oral decision, the attached Stay request was denied.
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Marty & Cindy Frantz

304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcd a@gmail.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUTP CYCOURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Inre:

CaseNo. 11-21337-TLM

MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA M.
FRANTZ,

Chapter 7

Debtor

MOTION TO ORDER A STAY AND/OR ARIZONA HOME LIS PENDENS
TO REMAIN RECORDED FOR AN ADDITIONA L 90 DAYS
Marty & Cindy Frantz, Pro Se, hereby moves this Court to order a 90 day Stay and/or order the

Arizona Home Lis Pendens to remain recorded for an additional 90 days (Reference Dkt #388)
pursuant to USCS Bankruptcy R 8007.
The Frantzs have a "stake" in the bankruptcy Estate as a result of the court's approval of their
waiver of discharge.
If Frantz prevails in the Arizona home action, the Estate will benefit by
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receiving a higher sale price of the property and in turn, Frantzs debts under the waiver of discharge,
will be reduced.

BACK-GRO UND IDSTORY

1.

In the Spring of 2015, a related family member of the Frantzs was the highest bidder on their
Arizona home. The Trustee refused to sell to the related party. Frantz then filed a BAP appeal to
reverse the sale to the second highest bidder. See attached EXHIBIT A declaration of Cindy Frantz
which is a true and correct copy.

2.

March, 2015, Frantz filed the attached EXHIBIT B Lis Pendens on the Arizona Home property
pending the BAP appeal of the transfer/sale which is a true and correct copy. The Federal Court
ordered the Lis Pendens to be temporarily removed to accommodate the disputed transfer. Castle
Property Investment, LLLP (Castle), a Colorado company which flips homes, then took possession
of the AZ home. They did so with full knowledge and acceptance of the proceedings in Federal
Court and the Lis Pendens filed before and after the sale for accommodating the Federal Court
proceedings. In the transfer/sale history, Castle relied upon the seller (Trustee Gardner) to resolve
the disputed sale and Lis Pendens over the following years. After the transfer/sale, Castle did not
join Gardner's case nor object to the dispute nor the Lis Pendens for over two years while the
Federal Court and related State Court case moved through proceedings.

3.

For two plus years (March, 2015 to September, 2017),

the Federal Court proceedings have

advanced with various briefings with over 400 pages of discovery and arguments which related
matters have also been fully briefed and argued in Idaho State District Court and are currently
pending decisions which are expected within 90 days. During the same two plus year period,
Gardner and Frantz expended substantial effort and time on these AZ home Federal BAP and Idaho
State Court proceedings with regard to the Lis Pendens litigation relying on Castle's representations
at the sale/transfer to wait for the Federal Court decision.
4.

During the same two plus year period, Castle profited from renting the home. Additionally the
home has appreciated in value by approximately $150,000. Castle has profited by the passage of
time and continues to profit, conveniently without legal expenses, while the matters have been
proceeding in the Federal Court and Idaho State Court.

5.

In June, 2017 Frantz sent an email to Castle agreeing to remove the Lis Pendends if the current
pending BAP appeal, affecting the Lis Pendens, was denied stating; "The 9rl' Circuit Court
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decision on the Lis Pendens is supposed to be given any day ... Trnstee Gardner believes the Lis
Pendens matter will be granted in his favor. If Gardner is correct, we will release the Lis Pendens.
If you would like to prepare an agreement to that affect for us to sign... we would do so. " See
EXHIBIT C which is a true and correct copy. However, Frantz prevailed on the BAP appeal

which order was issued that same month. Therefore Frantz was not obligated to release the Lis
Pendens to Castle. See EXHIBIT D which is a true and correct copy of the BAP order to remand.
6.

Shortly after the Frantz win in the BAP, in August, 2017 Castle engaged in a vexatious strategy to
avoid the Federal Court proceedings and Frantzs recent successful appeal. Castle filed a complaint
in AZ state court to remove the Lis Pendens, the same Lis Pendens being litigated in Federal and
Idaho State Court for the past two years. See EXIDBIT E Castle vs Frantz case No. CV2017011980 which is a true and correct copy. In effect, due to Frantzs win in the BAP, Castle is
avoiding the Federal Court and is "forum shopping" in a new court to render those Federal Court
actions over the prior two plus years in the Federal and Idaho State Court meaningless with regard
to the Lis Pendens in hopes to get a more favorable re-hearing and decision from the Arizona Court.
DURATION OF STAY AND/OR LIS PENDENS

Frantz requests the stay action and/or the existing Lis Pendens recording to remain in place for 90 days
while the 9th Circuit BAP makes its decisions/order expected to be rendered within this time period. All
briefings and discovery are completed and a decision from the BAP is expected within 90 days.
ARGUMENT

Application of case law in this matter considers (7) test factors to determine if exceptional circumstances
exist to warrant the same proceedings to be litigated in yet a second or in this case a third separate court
jurisdiction.
The question is not purely academic. "In abstention cases, discretion must be exercised within the
narrow and specific limits prescribed by the particular abstention doctrine involved." Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Madonna, 914 F.2d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both the
Landis and Colorado River allow federal courts to stay a case out of concern for "wise Judicial
administration," Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818; Landis, 299 U.S. at 254.

The Court recognized in
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both cases that resolution of another case "may not settle every question of fact and law" in the existing
cases. Id. at 256; see also CMAX, Inc. v. Hall, 300 F.2d 265,269 (9th Cir. 1962) See Landis, 299 U.S.
at 256. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983); see id. at 28.
"When a district court decides to litigate under Colorado River, it presumably concludes that the parallel
court litigation will be an adequate vehicle for the complete and prompt resolution of the issues between
the parties."); Smith v. Cent. Ariz. Water Conservation Dist., 418 F.3d 1028, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2005);
Holder v. Holder, 305 F.3d 854, 868 (9th Cir. 2002) (reversing a stay "because there was substantial
doubt that a final determination in the [state] custody proceeding [would] resolve all of the issues in [the
federal suit]"). Given the narrowness of the Colorado River doctrine, federal courts have insisted that the
"relevant standard prescribed by [the] Court" be met. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19; Scotts Co. LLC v.
Seeds, Inc., 688 F.3d 1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) ("The federal district courts ordinarily must apply the
test outlined in Colorado River . . . in determining whether to stay federal proceedings in favor of
pending state court proceedings concerning the same subject matter.") (quoting 40235 Wash. St. Corp. v.
Lusardi, 976 F.2d 587, 588 (9th Cir. 1992)); Travelers, 914 Case 1:14-cv-00186-BLW Document 17
Filed 10/13/14 Page 5 of 20 MEMORAND UM DECISION AND ORDER - 6 F.2d at 1367 ("[T]he
district court's discretion here must have been exercised within the 'exceptional circumstances' limits of
the Colorado River doctrine."). Castle is in effect asking the AZ court to ignore and/or re-hear the
Federal Court proceedings over the past two years. Courts consider several nonexclusive factors under
the Colorado River test to determine if exceptional circumstances exist to warrant invitation for an
additional court (4th additional court as in this case) to get involved with the pending litigation. Those
(7) factors are as follows;

(1) Whether the Arizona state court first assumed iurisdiction over property - Arizona State
Court did not first assume jurisdiction over the home. Rather the Federal Court first assumed
jurisdiction March, 2015, over two years ago.
(2) Inconvenience of the iurisdiction forum -

All the parties headquarters,

Castle, Trustee

Gardner,

11B and Frantz are not located in Arizona, rather Idaho and Colorado and are
inconvenienced by the AZ State forum. Most parties are located in Idaho where the Federal
forum is rooted except Castle whose main office and business is located in Colorado.
(3) The desirability of avoiding piecemeal litigation - There is desirability in avoiding yet more
piecemeal litigation to a 4 th court jurisdiction since the Lis Pendens is already being litigated in
Federal Court, BAP and Idaho State Court.
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(4) The order in which jurisdiction was - The Lis Pendens matter began with the Federal Court,
then BAP and then the Idaho State Court. The Arizona court is the 4th and last court to become
involved and is over two years late to the proceedings. Over the past two years, the Federal and
Idaho state courts have litigated over 400 pages of briefs and discovery and have made
substantial progress and currently have two pending decisions expected in the next 90 days.
(5) Whether federal law or state law provides the rule of decision on the merits - The Lis
Pendens was a result of Federal Court Code violation, not AZ state code (Issue regarding Federal

Bankruptcy Court Trustee selling Estate assets).

There are no novel issues to be found in a

Arizona jurisdiction that cannot be appropriately litigated in Federal or Idaho State court.
Federal law will provide the code and rules of decision.
(6) Whether the state court proceedings are inadequate to protect the federal litigant's rights The AZ state court is not familiar with and typically does not litigate Federal bankruptcy estate

matters nor does it typically litigate and protect the interests of Federal Court Debtors and their
rights.
(7) Whether exercising jurisdiction would promote forum shopping. Holder, 305 F.3d at 870.
"[T]he decision whether to dismiss, side-step or dealy a federal action because of parallel state-

court litigation does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of the
important factors as they apply in a given case, with the balance heavily weighted in favor of the
exercise of jurisdiction - Castle did not take action in AZ court for over 2 years and only did so
right after Frantz won the BAP appeal. The Ninth Circuit has "held that forum shopping weighs
in favor of a stay when the party opposing the stay seeks to avoid adverse rulings made by other
courts or to gain a tactical advantage from the application of federal court rules." Travelers, 914
F.2d at 1371.

CONCLUSIO N
For the past two plus years, Castle did not file any court objection to the Lis Pendens, allowing Frantz
and the Trustee to spend substantial time, effort and costs for the BAP and other proceedings. Castle
solely relied upon the Trustee to resolve the Lis Pendens. Castle furthermore did not have to bear the
expense of joining the Trustee litigation action.

Rather Castle laid back and burdened the Trustee and

Frantz with the entire expense of proceedings for over two years. Yet Castle communicated and was in
agreement with the Trustee to carry out the BAP Lis Pendens proceedings to resolve the matter. During
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the same period Castle has profited from renting the home and additionally the home has substantially
appreciated in value. Due to Frantzs recent BAP win, Castle is now demanding the Lis Pendens is
removed by the AZ court without a detennination from the BAP even though Castle agreed to the
Trustee plan during the prior two years. Castle is "forum shopping' in attempt to preserve their rights
since the BAP proceedings are not going the way they hoped.
WHEREFORE, the Frantzs respectfully requests that the Court orders a 90 day Stay and/or order the
Arizona Home Lis Pendens to remain recorded for another 90 days while the 9th Circuit BAP makes
its decisions expected to be rendered within this time period.
DATED THIS 14th day of September, 2017.

'::-?t

o=x?t--

MARTY D. FRANTZ - Defendant

/!:::~1~~~
ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT AEXHIBIT B EXHIBIT C EXHIBIT D EXHIBIT E -

Declaration of Cindy Frantz (AZ home story)
Lis Pendens filing two plus years
Frantz/Castle email to release Lis Pendens
BAP Frantz win and order to remand
Forum shopping - Castle vs Frantz case No. CV2017-011980
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 15th day of September, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be served upon the following in the manner indicated below.
David Eash

deash@ewinganderson. com

David P. Gardner

Trustee@win stoncashatt.co m

David Wayne Newman

ustp.region18. bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Gary W. Dyer

gary.w.dyer@ usdoj.gov

J Ford Elsaesser

ford@ejame.c om

Kelly Greene McConnell

litigation@givenspursley.com

Lindsey Renee Simon

lsimon@lukin s.com

Michael J. Paukert

mpaukert@pt-law.com

U.S. Trustee

ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Matthew K Shriver

ecfid@rcoleg al.com

John D Munding

munding@crumb-munding.com

April Linscott

alinscott@omllaw.com

Mary P Kimmel

ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Corey J Quinn

cjq@winstoncashatt.com

Derrick J O'Neill
Peter John Smith,

doneill@rcolegal.com
peter@smith malek.com

AND, I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served the foregoing document to the
following Participants via U.S. Mail (list names and addresses):
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Recovery Management Systems
25 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 1120
Miami,FL 33131
Jillian Roderick
904 North A Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Caribou Reach, Inc.
clo Dirk Roell er, President 1314 N Maverick Ln
Post Falls, ID 83854
Linda Salkow
28190 North Alma School Rd # 111
Scottsdale, AZ 85262oe Dobson
Coldwell Banker Sclmeidmille r Realty
1924 No 1thwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 814
Maggie Lyons & Tes M. Strunk
Resolve Financial Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 598
Hayden, ID 83 83 5
Troy Black
Black & Associates
1650 E. Lancaster Road
Hayden, ID 83835
JeffKavadias
1124 W Riverside #215
Spokane, WA 99201
Thomas Development Co
413 W Idaho St, Ste 200
Boise, ID 83 702

MARTYD. FRANTZ
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Marty & Cindy Frantz
304 N Lincoln Street, Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
Telephone: 208-661-9350
Facsimile: 888-666-3539
Email: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

UNITED STATES BANKRUTPCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
(Boise)

In re:
MARTIN
D.
FRANTZ
CYNTHIA M. FRANTZ,

and

Case No. 11-21337-TLM
Chapter 7

Debtor
)

MOTION TO UNWIND/VACATE OVERBID SALE AND
ORDER FOR MEDIATED SETTLEMENT & SANCTIONS
COMES NOW the Defendants, MARTY D. FRANTZ and CINDY M. FRANTZ hereby Motion
the Court to Unwind/Vacate the overbid sale docket #645 regarding the sale of Frantzs Estate
assets including but not limited to the U.S. government financed and regulated assisted living
and affordable housing projects and order for a mediated settlement and Sanctions.
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I.

A. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT;
B. OBJECTIONS, TIMING & PLACE

A. Statement of Jurisdiction
This motion, requesting Unwinding/Vacating Overbid Sale of Estate Property (“Motion”)
AND an Order for a Mediated Settlement, is before the Court as a core proceeding. The Court
has jurisdiction to enter a final Order pursuant to Idaho Rules of IC 80507, Title 8 Rule 60(b)(2)
and (3) as follows:
1.

60(b)(2) Frantz discovered an unauthorized sale contract which was intentionally

hidden from USDA Government regulators. This new evidence could not have been discovered
in time to object to the over-bid sale due to the surreptitious nature of the un-dated sale contract
between Trustee Gardner, IIB and Brad Elg which had an effective date of March, 2017, (4)
months after the overbid sale/transfer;
2.

60(b)(3) There is intrinsic and extrinsic fraud inducement regarding intentional

false representation to the Federal Court, intentional circumvention of U.S. government USDA
RD 7 CFR 3560.405 regulations depriving docket 654 sale of its proper legal status, and; using
deceptive means of keeping Estate parties of interest from discovering and/or enforcing their
legal rights in the sale proceedings of Estate assets under 363(b).
Rule 60(b) grants courts broad authority to relieve a party from a final court order "upon
such terms as are just". The Rule provides courts with authority adequate to enable them to
vacate judgments, orders and other rulings whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish.
See Klapprott v.United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614-615 (1949),

We conclude that in

determining whether an order for the sale of property should be Unwound, it is important to
consider the injustice to the parties which has occurred and the risk that the denial of relief will
produce injustice. Also the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process
is a paramount factor in deciding the use of this remedy.

In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136

(1955) the court determined we must continuously bear in mind that to perform its high
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function in the best way, justice must satisfy the appearance of justice. Rule 60(b) authorizes a
court, on motion and upon such terms as are just, to relieve a party from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for any "reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

B. Objections To Unwinding Sale, Timing, Place and Purpose Statement
1. Timing & Place - Frantz’s Motion To Unwind shall be called on for hearing which
date shall be January 30, 2017 @ 9:30am PST which will be held before the Honorable Judge
Meyers in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court room Federal Building located at 6450 N Mineral Dr.
Coeur D’Alene, ID 83851.
2. Purpose Statement - Frantz seeks by way of the Motion an Order by this court to
Unwind the sale in all aspects as if there were no sale and secondly to Order Mediation to
immediately proceed between Gardner, IIB and Frantz. Frantz shall request at the hearing that
the transfer/sale of the Subject Property is Unwound, and;
Frantz’s Estate, Ken Frantz,

that the partners, Marty & Cindy

Tyson Frantz, Matt Frantz and/or their designated respective

entities and any other partners prior to the transfer/sale interests shall be reinstated while Brad
Elg (NWRECC) and Kurt Gustavel (IIB) interests are thereby extinguished.
3. Opportunity to Object to Unwinding the Transfer/Sale - Any creditor or party of
interest which opposes the Unwinding of the transfer/sale of the Subject Property must file an
objection within twenty-one (21) days of services of this notice. File the original with the Clerk,
U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Federal Building, 6450 N Mineral Dr. Coeur D’Alene, ID 83851 and
provide a copy to Marty Frantz at email address: martyfrantzcda@gmail.com.

The objection

shall set out the legal, factual basis and grounds for the objection. A copy of the objection shall
be served on the movant. Any objecting party shall follow the deadlines for briefing, submission
of witness list, and exhibits.
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II. CASE LAW REFERENCES
1.

Court Authority - Klapprott v. United States, 335 U. S. 601, 614-615 (1949)

2.

Justice considerations - Re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955)

3.

11th Cir. Ordered requiring bankruptcy court to vacate a final section 363 sale
entered (4) years earlier because newly discovered evidence indicated that
insiders acted in bad faith (No. 13-11666, (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014).US
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Global Energies, LLC v.
Chrispus Venture Capital, LLC (In re Global Energies, LLC),

4.

Fraud - See IDJI 4.60. Also see Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz,
Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000).

5.

Non-debtor counterparty subject to the risk of liability to the debtor See 11
U.S.C. §548; see also In re Roco Corp., 701 F.2d 978, 981 (1st Cir. 1983).

III.
1.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Motion for Estate Sale to IIB (bank) - On September 27, 2016, Gardner

motioned the Court requesting an order authorizing the sale/transfer of the Frantz Estate property
to IIB (bank) for $600,000. This action vacated Gardner’s prior motion to the court for approval
of the Gardner/Frantz Mediated Settlement Agreement which otherwise would have removed the
Trustee’s claim on the interests and allowed the Frantzs to keep the assets.
The alternate Gardner/IIB (bank) overbid sale, if approved, would trigger significant IRS
taxes on the sale/disposition of the Estate assets. LeMaster & Daniel CPA firm in Spokane, WA
was engaged to do a Financial Statement, which was provided to IIB (bank) and the Trustee prior
to the sale, estimating $13,876,536 in recapture taxes resulting in a $2,250,000 payment to the
IRS and other taxing authorities [Ref. Le Master & Daniels CPA Financial Statement Note 9,
December 31, 2008]. On face value, prior to the sale closing date, the Gardner/IIB sale would
result in a loss to the Estate of <$1,650,000> ($2.250,000 taxes - $600,000 gain). On the other
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hand, the Gardner/Frantz transaction would simply remove the Estate’s claim to the assets,
allowing them to remain with the Frantzs, resulting in no $13,876,536 recapture taxes and a
significant profit to the Estate.

2.

Court Approval Of Sale to IIB (bank) - On November 17, 2016, what we

now know was an erroneous representation from Trustee Gardner that no taxes would be due on
a sale, without a tax opinion; without an IRS ruling letter; without any Estate taxes having been
filed for the prior 6 years, the court approved the Gardner/IIB (bank) overbid sale. The Order
authorized the sale of the Frantz Estate Property to IIB (bank). After taxes, the sale exposed the
Estate to a potential loss of <$1,650,000>. IIB (bank) would not disclose their secondary buyer
of the assets wherein they also asserted no taxes were due. Not knowing anything about the
secondary transaction details nor what the bank was doing, the Frantzs were left with no
evidence to object to the sale November, 2016.

Trustee Gardner had other choices he could

have made to avoid the problematic sale. He could have proceeded with the Gardner/Frantz
Mediated settlement agreement allowing Frantz to keep the assets resulting in no recapture taxes
nor the need/risk for the Estate to employ tax strategies and with significant benefit to the Estate.

3. Erroneous Sale Contract Documents & Unauthorized Secondary Sale
Of Estate Assets - On April 20, 2017, (5) months after the November, 2017 sale to IIB, by
chance Frantz discovered a concealed unauthorized sale agreement [See Annette Wood emails
EXHIBIT C] dated March, 2017 between Trustee Gardner, IIB bank (Kurt Gustavel) and

Northwest Real Estate Capital Corp (Brad Elg) hereinafter referred to as the “Trio sale
Contract”. Upon review, the document transferred Frantz’s government housing projects from
the Estate and IIB to Brad Elg which we will refer to as the 2nd sale. Upon a closer reading, it
contained a “concealment” clause so that it would not be known to any other persons. It was
structured with the intent to “boot strap” Elg into a superior position to where he could later
coerce the U.S. government to approve Elg as the new owner of the government housing projects
without compliance to USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406 government transfer/sale regulations. It
allowed artificial inflated sale price of the government housing projects and therein defrauding
the U.S. Government, USDA affordable housing program.
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4. Frantz U.S. Government Notification - Upon discovery of the sale document,
in April, 2017, Frantz became aware that the secondary buyer, Brad Elg had links to Idaho’s
largest Real Estate Fraud case in its history which was still on-going in the courts.

Frantz

promptly notified the US Government, USDA housing division of the unauthorized Trio sale
contract.

The U.S. Government then immediately seized control of the housing projects

operations via Frantz’s management company, NPM. The seizure/control has continued from
April, 2017 to present, over 9 months. Frantz reported the matter to the Idaho Department of
Finance fraud division who regulates state chartered banks. Their policies do not allow them to
intervene during pending Frantz/IIB litigation.

5. Attempted Unwind Settlement - With IDF hands tied due to the litigation, May
Thru December 2017, efforts were pursued by Frantz’s family to resolve the matter with the
secondary buyer, Brad Elg (2nd sale) to unwind the transaction and therein avoiding litigation.
Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) also made offers to Frantz to settle which are not admissible under FRE
408/ IRE 408. Ultimately, these efforts were unsatisfactory.

6.

Current Motion To Unwind & Mediation Settlement -

After the

unsatisfactory resolution efforts, December, 2017, Frantz filed this Motion to Unwind.

The

Motion will return ownership of the assets to their respective original parties as if there were no
sale. It requests the court to Order a Mediated settlement with Gardner/IIB to resolve the dispute
and to call for Sanctions to compensate the U.S. Government USDA for their costs and damages.

IV. ANALYSIS
1. Gardner/Gustavel (IIB bank) Misrepresentation In Federal Court And
Intent To Deceive The U.S. Government:
a. Boot-strapping - David Gardner and Kurt Gustavel (IIB) over-stepped their bounds in
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proceeding with erroneous profiteering strategies, attempting to “boot strap” themselves into a
superior position in the assets without Government consent.

John Kurtz (IIB), physically

assisted Brad Elg in what appeared to be preparatory attempts to execute on approximately
$1,000,000 in U.S. Government controlled housing bank accounts. Under false pretense, they
attempted to over-throw the Government housing.
b. Gardner/Gustavel (IIB bank) Misconduct - In deciding this matter, the court is to
consider Gardner’s, Brad Elg’s and Kurt Gustavel’s (IIB) misconduct actions in these proceedings
and the resultant injustice.

In the application of 60(b)(2), new evidence was discovered 5

months after the Nov 17, 2016 IIB overbid sale Order.
was lucky to discover the unauthorized sale.

Frantz had exercised due diligence and

Frantz stopped the potential execution of assets

before approximately $1,000,000 in government housing cash accounts could have been
misused and/or scuttled. USDA had no knowledge of these events.
c.

Kurt Gustavel (Bank) Culpability - The requirements under USDA RD 7 CFR

3560.406 for transfer/sale of Federal housing projects were fully known by Kurt Gustavel
(Idaho Independent Bank – President).

Those requirements were spelled out in the

unauthorized Trio side agreement that he and the other parties signed, effective as of March,
2017, entitled Assignment And Assumption Agreement. The document was executed by David P
Gardner, Trustee, Kurt Gustavel – Idaho Independent Bank (IIB) and Brad Elg – Northwest
Real Estate Capital Corp (NWRECC). These (3) parties are hereinafter referred to as the “Trio”
and the Assignment and Assumption Agreement as the “Trio” transaction, which true and
correct copy is attached hereto as EXHIBIT A.

The Trio sale document referenced U.S.

Government code regulation in (5.) and (6) 6.1.11.and clearly stated in that contract as follows:
“5. USDA Consent. Pursuant to the requirement of 7 CFR 3560.405, Chapter 5:
Ownership and Organization Changes, as to the general partnership interests being
transferred as part of the Partnership Interest, this Agreement shall become
recordable the earlier of 180 days from the Closing Date or receipt of written USDA
Consent, incorporated herein by reference.”
“(6) 6.1.11 NWRECC is aware of and is acquiring the Partnership Interest with full
knowledge of each of any regulatory restrictions that encumber each of the projects
that are the subject of each of the Partnership (“Projects”), including but not limited to
those imposed by USDA-RD and Section 42 of the Code, if any, and to the extent
required, the Projects shall continue to satisfy the income limitations and rent
restrictions imposed by Section 42 of the Code, the State tax credit agency and all
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applicable regulatory agreements.”
“(6) 6.1.10 Except as otherwise set forth herein, NWRECC represents it will obtain
all approvals and/or consents (the “Approvals,” both in its behalf and on behalf of the
Estate, that are or may be deemed to be necessary to effectuate the transaction
contemplated herein, including any required approval of any tax credit agency and
any lenders or agency and neither the Estate nor IIB shall have liability to the
Partnerships, the General Partner(s), or NWRECC for the failure to obtain such
approvals.”
There can be no doubt that the government regulations were thoroughly researched and
understood in great detail by the Trio parties attorney’s since the success of their scheme solely
relied upon intimate understanding of U.S. code in order to navigate the complex regulations and
make a case for circumventing “seller profit equity” restrictions.
The Trio parties appear to have attempted a safe harbor for the Trio sale to Elg under 11
U.S. Code § 363 ordinary course of business. However regulation §363 prohibits the sale of
property where an entity in the collateral (i.e. USDA and HUD) has NOT consented or there has
NOT been a notice and hearing authorizing the sale before the court. [Note USDA is a signer on the
housing cash bank accounts that were sold/transferred without their knowledge]

“11 U.S. Code § 363 If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under
section 721, 1108, 1203, 1204, or 1304 of this title and unless the court orders
otherwise, the trustee may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of
property of the estate, in the ordinary course of business, without notice or a hearing,
and may use property of the estate in the ordinary course of business without notice or
a hearing.
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of this
subsection unless—
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in
accordance with the provisions of this section.

2.

Code Violations -

Kurt Gustavel, David Gardner and Brad Elg knowingly

violated the code for the clear purpose of inflating the costs of U.S. housing projects so they
could receive excessive profiteering which otherwise is strictly PROHIBITED under 7 CFR
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§3560.406 U.S. code. They blatantly and intentionally violated these codes listed in their signed
agreements. I quote from the Trio Contract as follows;
“7 CFR §3560.406 (b) Agency consent requirements. Agency consent must be obtained
prior to an ownership transfer or sale and Agency consent will only be given when the
transfer or sale is in the best interest of the Federal Government. Any ownership
transfer or sale without the consent of the Agency will be considered a default and will
be handled in accordance with subpart J of this part.”
“7 CFR §3560.406 (c) Borrower [referring to the Frantz Estate - Trustee Gardner, not
the buyer, Brad Elg, as erroneously asserted in the Trio agreement] must submit written
requests for Agency consent to an ownership transfer of sale of a housing project to
the Agency at least 45 days prior to proposed ownership transfer or sale date. The
consent request must document that the proposed transfer or sale meets the
requirement of paragraph (d) of this section and must include the following items:
…”
a) Gardner and Gustavel did want anyone to know about the Trio agreement
because for among other violations, it did not comply with the 45 day USDA notice 7 CFR
§3560.406;
b) Gardner and Gustavel intentionally structured the Trio agreement with a
“concealment” clause so that it was not discoverable and intentionally withheld from the
U.S. Government because they did not want the government to know their plan to “bootstrapping” ownership of the government housing interests. They were forcing their way into
a superior position intending to coerce the U.S. government to approve Brad Elg as the new
owner after the fact of the sale without having to comply with USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406
government transfer/sale regulations. This intention was clearly to circumvent EXIBIT B “seller
profit equity” which protects the U.S. housing program from excessive developer and private
banker profiteering.
The Trio parties relied upon the adage that “possession is 9/10th of the law”. Excessive
profiteering of Government housing places an unjust burden on the American tax payer.
Program costs have recently sky-rocketed over 65% reportedly as a result of profiteering by
developers and bankers who were taking advantage of the system. See attached news articles in
EXHIBIT E which are true and correct copies.
c) When Frantz, inadvertently discovered the Trio contract in April, 2017, he
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immediately reported it to the U.S. Government. He recognized that Gardner and Kurt
Gustavel unfortunately triggered multiple loan defaults in the millions of dollars per 7 CFR
§3560.406 (b) “default” regulation. As a result, the U.S. Government immediately seized
control of Frantz’s management company (NPM) to protect its housing program interests.
Frantz then reported the violation to Idaho Department of Finance fraud division who
regulates the bank. DOF unfortunately cannot intervene during pending litigation.

3. USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.405 Vs USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406 CODE
Perversion - After the Trio closed the purchase of the projects in March, 2017 and Frantz
blew the whistle on the Trio, April, 2017, Brad Elg backed off and then applied for U.S.
Government approval/consent to own/control the projects. However, the scheme was not over.
He then made application under USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.405 as written and agreed to in the Trio
document. It’s important to note USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.40 5 is a “a change in partners”
which is a relatively quick application process, usually taking the U.S. Government 6 to 8
months to approve or deny.

However, under USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.40 6 “sale/transfer”,

the government regulations are extensive, requiring lengthy USDA reviews, template analysis,
seller equity restriction rulings, seller experience qualifications, conflict of interest
representations, environmental studies, consent from LP’s or special limited partners, a legal
opinion prior to closing demonstrating compliance with Federal regulatory agencies and many
other onerous provisions listed in EXHIBIT F 118 page sale/transfer guide.
Under USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406, Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) would not qualify as a
temporary holder of GP interests in government housing projects based upon their experience
and intent nor likely under Volcker rule banking regulations either, due to Real Estate
speculation banking restrictions.

Instead of taking 6 to 8 months, a USDA RD 7 CFR

3560.406 sale/transfer transaction typically takes one or two years. In a number of Frantz’s prior
sale/transfer’s, they have taken more than 3 years. Most importantly, under a USDA RD 7 CFR
3560.406 sale/transfer, the Government restricts the selling price according to their Agency’s
Analytical template [See EXHIBIT B]. Kurt Gustavel and Trustee Gardner received Frantz’s prior
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housing sale documents in Adversarial discovery documents including EXHIBIT B attached
hereto which is a typical representation and example of the complexity of a 7 CFR 3560.406
sale/transfer process and the restrictive “seller profit equity”. The Trio parties knew what they
were doing.

In typical past sales of Frantzs same housing projects (RD 515), the U.S.

Government limited Frantz’s owner equity sale proceeds to an average of approximately $4,000
per project x 11 = $44,000, the value which Frantz reported on his Chpt 11 court filings.
Gustavel/Gardner Trio sale reportedly generated over $1,000,000 owner profit proceeds from the
Brad Elg sale #2. If they had complied with 7 CFR 3560.406 sale/transfer, “seller profit equity”
would have been approved by the U.S. Government for about $44,000 instead of over
$1,000,000 based upon Frantz’s prior 7 CFR 3560.406 sale/transfer sales of the same housing
interests, which IIB knew about in discovery.
The purpose of USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406 owner equity restrictions is to keep a lid on
inflating housing costs for the Government’s housing programs and maintaining the integrity of
the Section 42 IRS affordable housing tax credit program. Also it is intended to quell runaway
Real Estate speculation which reportedly was a factor contributing to the Great Recession.
Hence, the Volcker Rule regulation was implemented under Dodd Frank, restricting banker Real
Estate speculation. Attached hereto are news articles explaining developer abuse of artificially
inflating housing costs in EXHIBIT E with regard to IRS Section 42 tax credit housing which is
a true and correct copy.
In the case of most of the Trio contract assets, 100% of the borrower entity’s ownership
interest was transferred within a 12-month period. In all cases, there was a clear change in
controlling interests from the Frantz Estate to Kurt Gustavel (bank) and then to Brad Elg
triggering the onerous 118 pages of requirements under U.S. Government USDA RD 7 CFR
3560.406 “sale/transfer” attached hereto as EXHIBIT F. See below regulation:
§ 3560.405 Borrower organizational structure or ownership interest changes.
(a) General. The requirements of this section apply to changes in a borrower entity's
organizational structure or to a change in a borrower entity's controlling interest.
If 100 percent of a borrower entity's ownership interest is transferred, within a
12-month period, the change will be considered a housing project transfer and
the provisions of § 3560.406, which covers transfers or sales of housing projects,
will apply.
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It is furthermore important that the 1 st sale from Trustee Gardner to Kurt Gustavel (IIB)
were also subject to the provisions of §3560.406 sale/transfer as a result of a change in the
borrower’s entity controlling interests under §3560.405.

Both sales were required to proceed

under the 118 pages of regulatory provisions in EXHIBIT F.

4.

U.S. Government Seizure/Control -

Frantz relied upon Gardner’s

representation under oath to the Federal court that he had contacted the U.S. housing
regulators and obtained their consent for the sale/transfers. Upon accidental discovery of
the Trio contract, Frantz began investigating. He found out that Mr. Elg used to work for
DBSI, split off and then managed and/or acquired DBSI USDA housing, the same housing
subject of this Motion. DBSI ended up in the largest fraud case in Idaho history, which is
still on-going today. (4) officers of DBSI went to jail (see enclosed news article). It is
common knowledge among developers that DBSI principles have been in litigation with the
U.S. Government USDA on significant housing cases in Oregon and Idaho for years.
While the developer, Brad Elg, was not charged with any of the crimes, his prior associates
were charged and served jail time.

Those due diligence articles are attached hereto as

EXHIBIT L which are true and correct copies.
Frantz was concerned for the housing projects. His family and other partners are
members in them. Frantz also has a stake in the Estate. When he realized that the U.S.
Government officials had not given their consent and had never even been contacted,
triggering $14,000,000 in U.S. Government technical loan defaults, Frantz was shocked
and dismayed. Due to these troubling discoveries, to protect his partners and the Estate’s
interests, Frantz immediately reported the violations to Government housing regulators.
The unauthorized Trio sale was material. It resulted in the U.S. Government seizing
control of the Estate assets (NPM management company) in order to protect the government’s
housing interests, program and cash accounts. If these discoveries were known at the time of
the original sale Order or even if the March, 2017 Trio sale contract had been Motioned
before the court, it would have produced an entirely different result.
Had the U.S. Government project housing regulators been contracted, they would
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have objected and required compliance to USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406 regulations prior to
authorizing a sale, a procedure which would have taken one or two years instead of six to eight
months. Had the U.S. housing regulators received application from Gardner to obtain preapproval/consent to sell the government housing interests to Brad Elg, the inflated sale
price would have been rejected. The 1st sale for $600,000 to the Estate and the 2nd sale for
over $1,000,000 equity cash payments to IIB for churning and/or flipping the government
housing interests would have been reduced to about $45,000, the average price the U.S.
Government approved for selling interest in prior Frantz family housing projects. See
attached prior U.S. government sale approval of one of Frantzs housing project sales in
EXHIBIT B.
Secondly, USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406, IIB would not have been approved as a
holder and temporary operator of affordable housing interests due to their intent, lack of
experience and non-qualifications in government housing business.

[Ref. EXHIBIT F].

5. $14,000,000 Resultant Liability To Estate - Kurt Gustavel, Dave Gardner
and Brad Elg’s scheme perverted U.S. code regulations and damaged the Estate in the amount of
about $14,000,000. Since Gustavel and Elg failed to pay off the government loans at either sale
#1 on November, 2016 or #2 on March, 2017 it resulted in the Estate becoming liable for about
$14,000,000 of housing technical loan defaults. Gardner failed to recognize these liabilities in
his representation to the Federal court when he sought approval for the overbid sale docket (645)
because according to USDA, he never bothered to contact them and obtain consent which
automatically triggered the loan defaults. See below regulation. Frantz nor the Federal Court
knew this Nov, 2016, because Gardner represented under oath to the court in his over-bid sale
Motion that he had met all applicable government regulations.

The Federal Court and Frantz

reasonably relied upon Gardner’s representations that he had received consent from the U.S.
Government USDA and other regulatory bodies. See below U.S. code;
“7 CFR §3560.406 (k)(3) If all of a borrower's outstanding Agency debt is not assumed or paid
off at the time of the transfer or sale, the Agency will not release a borrower from liability
unless the Agency determines that the borrower is unable to pay the remaining debt from assets
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taken as security through the debt settlement procedure in accordance with § 3560.457.”
Since the Estate is not able to pay the $14,000,000, it will instead be forced to accept a
debt forgiveness of $14,000,000 in accordance with § 3560.457. Because these projects are fully
depreciated [Ref. EXIBIT H], there will be little off-set to mitigate the resulting $5,544,000 in
IRS tax assessment to the Estate $14,000,000 debt forgiveness ordinary income x 39.6% tax
bracket),

6. Gardner Intentional Misrepresentation To Court - Gardner represented
to the Federal Court in his “Motion To Authorize Sale Of Estate Assets” that all applicable
Federal and State regulations were fully complied with. Both bankruptcy court regulation §363
and U.S. Government housing regulations sighted in this paragraph require the Trustee to obtain
consent from lien holders/lenders. Certainly Kurt Gustavel, as a banker, knows that. Gardner
knew or certainly should have known his representation to the court fell flat. He was fully
aware but intentionally did not notify the U.S. Government housing regulator lien holders nor
did he seek their pre-approval/consent. Due to the “concealment” clause in the Trio agreement,
he withheld disclosing the Trio sale agreement so it would not become public until the Trio
scheme was out of the woods. He hoped to evade government regulation which would
otherwise result in delaying his sale by about one or two years and restrict “seller profit equity”
to a meager amount due to the 118 pages of regulation.

He knew if he had notified the U.S

Government of the Trio agreement, it would not only hold up the sale, but the “seller profit
equity” payment would have been severely restricted, eroding the intent of the Trio agreement
to receive windfall profits for churning the assets.
Gardner intentionally failed to obtain consent under §363(n) from mortgage holders for
both sale #1 and #2, nor did he contact USDA, FHA & HUD. §363(n)(2)(a) requires that
“each entity that has an interest in the cash collateral of the assets must consent to the sale”.
Additionally, in 7 CFR §3560.406 (c) (See Pg 8 2. Code Violations) Gardner is
required under code to notify the mortgage holder of the sale and to obtain their consent 45 days
prior to closing a sale. If NOT, the sale will result in an automatic technical Loan default and
importantly, the Estate will NOT be released of its liability for the $14,000,000 in loans even
though the projects were sold to a new owner who also has to sign on the project’s loan.
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7.

Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) & Anti-kickback & Anti-Profiteering

Regulations -

Idaho Independent Bank (IIB), acting as temporary holder of the rights to

control and operate the government project (with intent to resell the rights to a third party), does
not receive special treatment under USDA RD 7 CFR 3560.406 regulations. They must prequalify as a holder of government project ownership rights just like anyone else before acting as
a middleman for the transfer/sale of the public housing, and disclose all details obtaining the
same pre-approval/consent as others. Anti-kickback Identity of Interest statutes also apply
prohibiting undisclosed “Side Deals” like the “concealed” Trio contract under 7CFR 3560.102
(g) as follows;

Identity-of-Interest. A relationship between applicants, borrowers, grantees,
management agents, or suppliers of materials or services described under, but not
limited to, any of the following conditions 7CFR 3560.102 (g):…
8. There exists or come into being any side deals, agreements, contracts or
understandings entered into thereby altering, amending, or canceling any of the
management plan, management agreement documents, organization documents, or
other legal documents pertaining to the property by the Agency. See 7 CFR
3560.11.
Mr. Elg requested John Bell (NPM) to provide them with information about the $1,000,000 in
USDA project cash deposit account deposits and also Elg said he had an obligations to make
deposits in the seller’s (IIB) bank. See declaration EXHIBIT I which is a true and correct copy.
However that kind of relationship between Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) and Brad Elg would create
an Identity of Interest, violating government anti kick-back regulations which regulations
without USDA consent and are as follows.
Identity-of-Interest. A relationship between applicants, borrowers, grantees, management
agents, or suppliers of materials or services described under, but not limited to, any of the
following conditions (7CFR 3560.102 (g)):

1. There is a financial interest between the applicant, borrower, grantee and a
management agent or the supplying entity;
2. One or more of the officers, directors, stockholders, or partners of the applicant, borrower, or
management agent is also an officer, director, stockholder, or partner of the supplying entity;
3. An officer, director, stockholder, or partner of the applicant, borrower, or management agent
has a 10 percent or more financial interest in the supplying entity;
4. The supplying entity has or will advance funds to an applicant, borrower, or
management agent;
5. The supplying entity provides or pays on behalf of the applicant, borrower, or
management agent the cost of any materials or services in connection with obligations
under the management plan or management agreement;
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6. The supplying entity takes stock or a financial interest in the applicant, borrower, or
management agent as part of the consideration to be paid them; or
7. There exists or come into being any side deals, agreements, contracts or understandings
entered into thereby altering, amending, or canceling any of the management plan,
management agreement documents, organization documents, or other legal documents
pertaining to the property by the Agency. See 7 CFR 3560.11.

8.

Fall Guy/Scape Goat -

It is important when evaluating these complex

transactions to take note that in the Trio provision No. (6) 6.1.10,

Trustee Gardner, Kurt

Gustavel and the bank’s attorneys, John Kurtz and Sheila Schwager put all the onus on Brad
Elg in the event of wrong doing, making him the scape goat to absolve the bank and Trustee
with impunity. Yet the Trustee and bank were key players with Brad Elg in perverting the intent
of U.S. code and defrauding the U.S. Government housing program of over $2,600,000 in
unauthorized bank profit and Trustee Gardner profit to the Estate. While we don’t know for
sure, it appears the erroneous document was drafted by Kurt Gustavel’s attorneys, John Kurtz
and Sheila Schwager, who represented IIB bank as seller agent attorneys when reaching out to
Brad Elg to purchase the housing interests.
The Trio’s unauthorized sale closed March, 2017.

Brad Elg, with assistance from IIB

bank’s attorney (John Kurtz), immediately began “boot-strapping” physical control of the
projects and “grooming” the $1,000,000 cash accounts without U.S. Government knowledge or
consent, the same bank accounts which the U.S. Government is physically an authorized signer.
After Frantz blew the whistle on IIB/Elg scheme, April, 2017 closing, to legitimize their
erroneous actions, Brad Elg then applied to the U.S. Government to obtain their consent for the
sale, but even then to only change partners under 7 CFR 3560.405 (note: not under .406). Part
of the complex scheme was to assert to the Government that the sale/transfer was NOT A
SALE/TRANSFER, rather only a “PARTNER CHANGE”. The Trio participants had full and
convincing knowledge that a “partner change”, under certain circumstances, is not subject to 7
CFR 3560.406(b). Otherwise seller equity payments are restricted, among other onerous
requirements quelling their scheme to inflate the price of the Government housing projects. See
EXHIBIT B actual 7 CFR 3560.406(b) housing sale compliance letter dated August 27, 2013 Pg
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2 item (2) restricting seller equity profit/payments AND 7 CFR 3560.406(b) EXHIBIT F onerous
sale/transfer regulation that were intentionally perverted and ignored by Kurt Gustavel (IIB
bank);
EXHIBIT B (U.S. Government “SELLER PROFIT EQUITY” limitations);

“2. 7 CFR 3560.3560.406 (e) - Equity payment at time of transfer. The
seller is to receive not more than $1,474 of equity based on the Agency’s
analytical template.”
If the “boot-strapping” scheme had been successful and the Trio was granted U.S.
Government approval for the erroneous “partner change”, under 7 CFR 3560.405 instead of the
actual “sale/transfer” which can only be authorized under 7 CFR 3560.406(b), the “concealed”
Trio agreement would only then become discoverable “recordable” public information (180
days from the Closing Date or receipt of written USDA Consent) to avoid discovery and the
fact that it among other things violated the 45 day USDA pre-approval required before a
sale/transfers closing can occur.

9. Wrongful Execution On Government Housing Assets Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) and Brad Elg are strictly prohibited under USDA RD 7 CFR
3560.406 and related regulations from taking possession or receiving any information,
documents or taking over accounts without consent from USDA Government housing officials,
regardless of their alleged Civil ownership claims. The U.S. Government mortgage lien interests
and subsequent public housing program recorded regulations on the properties supersede other
authorities. Any Civil claims on their housing projects program without USDA 45 day preapproval and express consent are invalid and are not recognized.
In spite of this fact, Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) and Brad Elg, with assistance from John
Kurtz (Attorney), began executing on the Government’s housing tenant confidential records and
grooming cash accounts.

Those confidential records and $1,000,000 of cash accounts are
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operated and controlled by Nationwide Property Management (NPM).

NPM ownership is

controlled and regulated by the U.S. Government. Frantz is the only authorized person by the
U.S. Government to own and operate NPM. Any other parties who claim to own NPM, but do
not have pre-approval or consent from USDA, are not recognized regardless of their civil
standing in NPM or the projects. An arduous application process must be completed first and the
new owner pre-approved prior to taking possession.

Brad Elg and John Kurtz met with and

directed NPM’s manager, John Bell in violation of U.S. Government USDA regulations. They
solicited Bell’s cooperation by misrepresenting and inferring that they had approval and sought
to prepare for the transfer of NPM and the project housing bank accounts with combined
balances of about $1,000,000 in cash. See attached EXHIBIT I Declaration which is a true and
correct copy.

10. Judge David P. Gardner -

Trustee Gardner was referred to as “Judge”

Gardner in Brad Elg’s written correspondence when he proceeded with unauthorized execution
of government housing assets.

This appears to be put forth to establish credibility in order to

convince these parties to cooperate with his erroneous execution on the Docket (645) assets
without USDA government consent. We don’t know if Gardner told Elg he was a Judge or if Elg
made up the judicial impersonation story himself. Other correspondence evidence demonstrating
wrongful execution without USDA consent is also included.

A true and correct copy of that

correspondence is attached hereto as EXHIBIT G.

11. No-Insider - Arms Length Sale: In the November 17, 2016 court “Order
Authorizing Transfer/Sale Of Estate Property”, Docket No. (645) (“Court Order”) on page 8 (I.)
of sale docket (645), it states:
“Idaho Independent Bank is not an “insider” of the Chapter 7 Trustee as that term is defined by
Section 101 (31) of the Bankruptcy Code.”
However, with respect to 11 U.S. Code §101 – Definitions. (2) Affiliates, IIB is defined
as a insider due to its 100 acre association with the Estate’s adjacent 50 acres which share
common roadways, utilities, infrastructure, park areas, docks and community center.
See 11 U.S. Code §101 – Definitions. (2) Affiliates, meaning that if IIB directly or
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indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting
in a corporation which the debtor is a controlling member that there they meet the definition of
“Insider”
IIB has more than a 20% voting right (a 25% voting right with 11 parcels – 1 vote per parcel)
in Twin Lakes Heights Home Owners Association, Inc.

This corporation controls the Debtors

roadway access, utilities, parks, docks, community center and other commonly shared Eagle Ridge
property improvements. IIB also owns title to and control over half the commonly shared access land,
parks and entrance to the debtors property. Conversely, the debtor has title to and owns less than half
of the commonly shared access land and parks to IIB’s property. None-the-less, the debtor has a
majority of the voting rights (75% voting rights with 34 parcels – 1 vote per parcel) in Twin Lakes
Heights Home Owners Association, Inc. There are no other voting members. Frantz has previously
put forth that it is this affiliate relationship which inspired IIB to make an offer on the 50 acres, as a
take-over attempt to gain majority control of the corporation. The debtor currently enjoys majority
control. Frantz hereby incorporates Frantzs December 4, 2017 “Objection to Gardner’s Method of
Sale & $600,000 Sale Price To IIB” and all attachments therein which include the HOA corporation
CC&R’s as part of this Motion to Unwind in addition to those documents automatically included
under Rule 28 I.A.R.

12.

Gardner/IIB Adversarial Proceedings -

At the December 5th, 2017

Gardner hearing and in the original sale order request, to obtain approval for the sale of the 50
acres to Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank), both Gardner and IIB insisted that the Frantz Estate DOES
NOT owe any IRS taxes. However, in the adversarial proceeds, to diminish Frantzs character,
they took the exact opposite position and alleged Frantz’s tax planning was deceptive and that
he did owe significant IRS taxes that he was dodging. Gardner and IIB’s Dec 5th statements
are a complete departure and reversal from their adversary proceedings claims. Based upon the
departure, it appears those original accusations against Frantz have now been re-canted by
Gardner and IIB.
In another core Adversarial proceeding matter, Dirk Roeller’s allegations have recently
been re-canted and his $183,683.65 claim against the Estate dismissed as put forth in Frantzs
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November 27th, 2017 court filing objection. Also the representation of valuation of assets was
resolved by the testimony of Bill Truax in the adversarial proceedings hearings.

He verified

that the real value of the Government housing projects is in a General Partner resyndicating the project who can receive significant profit selling Tax Credits tied to the
projects. Otherwise the GP interests without re-syndication and selling tax credits are
worth very little under 7 CFR 3560.406 “seller profit equity” restrictions. Bill Truax’s
testimony proved Frantzs assets were not over-stated on his financial statement, rather
appreciably understated.
The above allegations by Gardner and IIB in the adversarial proceedings have
proven to be frivolous harassment strategies put forth under vexatious and false pretenses.
Any misconduct in the filing of the adversarial proceedings are hereby reserved for these core
proceedings.

13. Bad Faith and Fraud- The 1st sale and 2nd sale referred to herein were carried
out in bad faith, which actions also meets the statute definition of fraud. Those transactions and
their subsequent series of other transfers of partnership interests/assets in the multi-layered
transactions, attempted to over-throw the Marty Frantz Estate, Ken Frantz, Tyson Frantz and
their respective legal entities without the government’s consent nor knowledge. These irregular
transactions resulted in harm to the U.S. Government, putting the Federal housing projects and
their occupants in jeopardy, persuading the U.S. Government to seize control of NPM in order to
protect its interests.
Therefore, this is a fraud case.

In a fraud case a party must prove the following by

clear and convincing evidence. See IDJI 4.60. Also see Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester &
Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 996 P.2d 303 (2000).
1.
2.
3.
4.

That Gardner and Kurt Gustavel stated a fact to Frantz;
The statement was false;
The statement was material;
Gardner & Gustavel either knew the statement was false or was unaware of whether the
statement was true at the time the statement was made;
5. Frantz did not know the statement was false;
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6. Gardner and Gustavel intended for Frantz to rely upon the statement and act upon it in a
manner reasonably contemplated as a party of interest to the Estate;
7. Frantz did rely upon the truth of the statement;
8. Frantz’s reliance was reasonable under all the circumstances;
9. Frantz suffered damages proximately caused by reliance on the false statement;
10. The nature and extent of the damages and the amount thereof.
Gardner and Gustavel (IIB or their representatives) both stated in their Motion documents
to this court docket (645) and in their signed Trio sale agreement the following;
a)

IIB or their rep stated; That all regulatory agencies requirements were properly
satisfied upon closing the Nov 17, 2017 sale/transfer. However, neither Gardner nor
Gustavel contacted the government housing agencies as required under 7 CFR
3560.406.

The statement was material because without U.S. Government pre-

approval, about $14,000,000 of defaulted loans liabilities would fall upon the Estate.
Qualification items 4-8 apply.

Frantz, a guarantor of the Estate via his waiver of

discharge now is burdened with about $14,000,000 of loans in default.
b) IIB or their rep stated; That there were no taxes due on the sale because they were
using other tax strategies i.e. IIB losses for tax off-sets. However there has been no tax
strategy put forth to mitigate taxes and now taxes are due. The statement was material.
Qualification items 4-8 apply.

Frantz, a guarantor of the Estate via his waiver of

discharge now is burdened with the IRS taxes.
c) IIB or their rep stated; That the relationship between Gustavel and Gardner DID NOT
constitute an “insider” transaction and was arm’s-length within the meaning of 11 U.S.
Code

§101 – Definitions.

(2) Affiliates,

363(m) and 101(31).

However, the

relationship between Gustavel and Gardner does indeed constitute an “insider”
relationship under the meaning of that code. Turn to page 18 (Paragraph 11.) of this
document; “Arms Length Sale, No-Insider” analysis 11 U.S. Code § 363(n) - Use,
sale, or lease of property with regard to Kurt Gustavel (IIB) Insider trading and his
relationship to Trustee Gardner. The statement was material because the sale would
fall under more restrictive procedures significantly changing the method of selling
and/or buying assets from the Estate which also significantly affects the pricing
available in asset disposition. Qualification items 4-8 apply. Frantz, a guarantor of the
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Estate via his waiver of discharge now is burdened with greater debt in the Estate in the
amount of the above estimates.
d) IIB or their rep stated; That the purchase price constitutes fair consideration under the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act and any
other applicable laws.

However Gustavel retained about $2,000,000 profit of the

purchase price as an unauthorized middleman in the Trio sale which funds failed to
pass through to the benefit of the Estate.

The statement was material because

$2,000,000 of profit was denied to the Estate. Qualification items 4-8 apply. Frantz, a
guarantor of the Estate via his waiver of discharge now is burdened with about
$14,000,000 that he otherwise would not have.
e) IIB or their rep stated; That no other person or entity has offered to purchase the assets
for an amount that would provide greater value to the Chapter 7 Estate than IIB.
However, when adjusting for IRS taxes,
Trustee was the highest and best offer.

the Frantz family offer approved by the
Qualification items 4-8 apply.

Frantz, a

guarantor of the Estate via his waiver of discharge now is burdened with about
$14,000,000 of loans in default due to Gardner rejection the prior approved Frantz
family offer.
The evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching.

The unauthorized document

was signed by the Estate Trustee Gardner who intentionally, with full knowledge of U.S. housing
regulations, transferred government assets (Docket No. 645) to Elg without the Federal Court’s
knowledge,

without

U.S. Government consent nor knowledge from any of these parties.

Secondly, the discovered Trio document with the “concealment” clause was intentionally hidden
from the court, Estate parties of interest and hidden from the U.S. Government housing regulators
in violation of code. The purpose of hiding the document was clear. As long as no one knew
about it, the Trio could circumvent the Government’s pre-approval/consent “sale/transfer”
regulations so that they could then execute on the housing projects pretending to be a
“PARTNER CHANGE” without ever having to go through the 118 page government
approval process and without having to be subject to seller owner equity restrictions. The
approval process can be found in the example USDA housing EXHBIT B sale. Had Kurt
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Gustavel’s (IIB bank) complied with these regulations, he would have, at best, received an
estimated $45,000 instead of $2,000,000 as a seller/owner of Government housing project
interests. Gardner also would have only received at best $45,000 instead of the $600,000 he
received in the sale to Gustavel.

14.

U.S. Government Housing Program Damaged - All the USDA and

HUD U.S. Government housing assets listed in docket #645, accounting for the majority of the
value and price given therein at the overbid sale, were subject to Government housing
regulators, rules and regulations.

These government interests were intentionally and

unscrupulously perverted causing both financial and reputation damage to the U.S. Government
housing program, compromising its purpose and function.

The U.S. government housing

programs exist among a relatively small group of developers. If Kurt Gustavel, Trustee Gardner
and Brad Elg are allowed to get away with perverting the regulations set forth under these public
housing programs, developers across the country will quickly hear of their windfall.

The

practice of excessive profiteering from artificially inflating Real Estate prices by taking
advantage of these housing programs is unconscionable. Brazenly “churning” government
assets, under the safe harbor of providing affordable housing for U.S. citizens, cannot be
tolerated. There’s already high concern at the Federal Attorney General’s office with regard to
schemes by developer/bankers to profiteer form artificially inflating housing costs [Ref. EXHIBIT
E].

Another angle used by developer/bankers is inflating “Cost Basis” which sets the project up

to later obtain increased IRS Section 42 Tax Credits. With Section 42 Tax Credits often selling
for $1 or more for every $1 of Section 42 Tax Credit, there is little incentive for buyers to
negotiate market value pricing as suspected in the Trio contract motivation for Brad Elg. Hence
7 CFR 3560.3560.406 “seller equity payments” restrictions are imposed to control public
housing costs. Kurt Gustavel, Trustee Gardner and Brad Elg are presumably intimately familiar
with “seller equity” issues and IRS section 42 housing Tax Credits through their attorney John
Kurtz and Sheila Schwager. They are master-minds who appear to be clever at figuring out
complicated schemes like this to defraud the U.S. Government housing program.
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15. $2,600,000 Kurt Gustavel Bank Profiteering and Trustee Gardner
Subject To Disgorgement Of The U.S. Government USDA first, and then the
Estate –

In 7 CFR 3560.457 - Negotiated debt settlement regulations, Kurt Gustavel’s (IIB

bank) $2,600,000 profit from sale #1 & #2 is subject to priority lien disgorgement by U.S.
Government USDA. See following regulation:
7 CFR 3560.457 (e) Disposition of security prior to offer. Borrowers are not required
to dispose of security prior to making a debt settlement offer. However, if
a borrower has disposed of security prior to making a debt settlement offer, the
proceeds from the disposed security must be applied to the borrower's account
prior to any negotiations on the debt settlement offer.
Had sale #2 not defrauded the U.S. Government which caused the $14,000,000 in debt
technical defaults, the estimated $1,000,000+ Sale profit Gardner/Gustavel (IIB bank) made
from selling the properties to Brad Elg and any other sales would be income properly turned
over to the Estate. The Estate was a signatory party to Sale #2. Trustee Gardner’s signature is
on the Trio sale document.

However, the Estate received $ -0- compensation for Sale #2 to

Brad Elg or any other secondary sales we may not know about. See 11 U.S. Code § 363(n) and
related codes regarding selling Estate assets for “bargain pricing” and “sweetheart” deals when
other higher prices are pending in the wings outside the court auction room in secondary sale
transaction.
“11 U.S. Code § 363(n)… if the sale price was controlled by an agreement among
potential bidders at such sale, or may recover from a party to such agreement any
amount by which the value of the property sold exceeds the price at which such sale
was consummated, and may recover any costs, attorneys’ fees, or expenses incurred in
avoiding such sale or recovering such amount. In addition to any recovery under the
preceding sentence, the court may grant judgment for punitive damages in favor of the
estate and against any such party that entered into such an agreement in willful
disregard of this subsection.”
Also see Dodd-Frank Volcker Rule § 619 (12 U.S.C. § 1851) limiting banks Real Estate
speculation transactions with provisions that could compel the bank to turn over their profit to
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the Estate.
Finally, turn to page 18 (Paragraph 11.) of this Motion; “Arms Length Sale, NoInsider” analysis 11 U.S. Code § 363(n) - Use, sale, or lease of property with regard to Kurt
Gustavel (IIB) Insider trading and his relationship to Trustee Gardner, imposing further
rules and restrictions that may subjugate sale #2 to the benefit of the Estate.
We have not gone into great detail since it is evident that the U.S. Government’s priority
lien against Elg and other sale proceeds far exceeds any recover that would be remaining for the
Estate. However, these regulations do demonstrate just how far Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank)
will go to profiteer $2,000,000 through taking advantage of the U.S. Government housing
programs and how emboldened the Estate Trustee Judge Gardner is to assist and go along with
the bank for what appears as only a slightly larger Trustee fees compared to other sale/transfers
he could have chosen. One must wonder what is motivating Gardner’s actions.

V. “BREIF” ARGUMENT
Reference Case Law No. 13-11666, (11th Cir. Aug. 15, 2014). US Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Global Energies, LLC v. Chrispus Venture
Capital, LLC (In re Global Energies, LLC)
1. The 11th Circuit in 2014 ordered the unwinding of a 11 U.S. Code § 363 sale after finding
bad faith about 4 years after the sale. The case is a grim warning to creditors and their counsel who
might consider pushing out other equity holders or taking control of the debtor’s businesses or assets
like Kurt Gustavel (IIB) did to the Frantz family businesses.

The case also serves as a stark

reminder that purchasers of assets (particularly insiders) from a bankruptcy estate cannot always rely
on the provisions of 363(m), which generally provides that the validity of a sale under 363 to a good
faith purchaser is not affected by the eventual reversal or modification of the sale order on appeal.

2. In the case reference, Wortley, suspecting bad faith between two other parties of
interest, sought to dismiss the case. At the time, however, Wortley did not have the emails
between the other parties because the emails had not been produced to him. Frantz didn’t have
the Trio agreement and didn’t know Gardner failed to obtain U.S. Government consent.
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motion was denied due to lack of supporting evidence.

Over a year later, Wortley obtained the

emails in a separate case between the parties and sought reconsideration of his motion. The
bankruptcy court and the district court both denied the motion to reconsider under Rule 60(b).
The 11th Circuit, however, found that the bankruptcy court made clear errors of judgment in
denying the motion to reconsider because the emails were “direct evidence of bad faith...”
Frantz discovered new evidence, the Trio sale contract. It would be a clear error to interpret the
emails as showing anything other than the other parties conspiring in bad faith, no different than
in the Gardner/Gustavel (IIB) actions which resulted in $14,000,000 in loan defaults and
$5,540,00 IRS taxes to the Estate. The Court then held that the emails satisfied any of three
recognized tests for bad faith: (1) the improper purpose test, (2) the improper use test, and (3)
the test modeled on Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy with is the case with the Trio
contract.
3. The Court first stated that under the improper purpose test, “bad faith” exists where an
action (like the Trio sale/transfer) was motivated by intimidating and/or harassing the debtor.
The execution of assets without Government housing regulator consent was deliberately done to
gain advantage over the Frantzs businesses through intimidation and harassment in order to take
control of a corporation or its assets. The court found this to be considered an improper purpose.
The U.S. Government had to step into Frantz’s business and seize control to remedy the
intimidation and harassment and o protect its interests.

The Court found that the new evidence

indicated that in the Chrispus case, the parties had both purposes in mind like in the Frantz
subject case.
4. Second, the Court found that under the improper use test, “bad faith exists when a
creditor uses a bankruptcy proceeding to accomplish objectives not intended by the Bankruptcy
Code, such as “taking over a debtor corporation and its assets,” and that the emails showed
Chrispus used the Bankruptcy Code in that very way, just like Gardner and Kurt Gustavel
(bank) were doing, particularly in the 1st sale to Gustavel (IIB) when Gustavel scuttled as many
of Frantzs partners as he could and also in the 2nd sale to Brad Elg where the same type of
interference and “take over” attempt continued without USDA consent.
5. Third, under the Rule 9011 test, “bad faith exists when a party fails to make a
reasonable inquiry into the facts of the law before filing as in the case of Gardner and the 363
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sale filing. Gardner never did put forth mitigating tax strategies. The Court held that the first
prong is objective, and that “Chrispus did not make an objectively reasonable inquiry into the
law and facts before filing. In Gardner’s case, he failed to do his regulation research, or if he
did, he blatantly ignored the known regulation in favor of profiteering.

A reasonable party

would not believe that the Bankruptcy Code permits it to use a bankruptcy proceeding to rid
itself of business partners as in the case of Gustavel in ridding other partners in Frantzs Estate
housing properties after sale # 1 to gain sole control of the assets. The second prong, failing to
make reasonable inquiry, was satisfied for the same reasons set forth above under the improper
purpose test.
6. In sum, the Court ordered that the bankruptcy court on remand grant Wortley’s motion
to dismiss and vacate the order approving the sale of Global’s assets to Chrispus. The Court had
no trouble in vacating the sale to Chrispus once finding bad faith.

Recognizing that innocent

third parties may be impacted by vacating the sale, (as in the Frantzs case with a number of third
party partners in those same projects) the Court held that its order should be without prejudice
to such parties “whose rights and interests are derived and dependent upon the sale”. The
Court fashioned its relief to ensure that the participants in the bad faith transactions did not
profit and that the remaining parties were made whole.
7. Global Energies is a cautionary tale. Creditors considering buying the debtor’s assets
or seeking a strategic advantage over the debtor will need to consider Global Energies before
embarking on such a strategy.

Finally, purchasers of estate assets, in this case Kurt Gustavel

(IIB) and Brad Elg, must be aware that Section 363(m) does not render every 363 sale
bulletproof.

VI U.S. GOVERNMENT JOINDER RESERVATION

The United States USDA Rural Development (RD), mortgagee holder of public housing
projects, who seized control of the management company as a result of docket (645) sale and
who have directed management company operations since April, 2017 to present,
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reserves reservations to a Joinder Motion in support of this motion to Unwind/vacate the (645)
sale. See attached declaration of Deborah Davis, USDA state director in EXHIBIT D, which is
a true and correct copy.

VII. RELIEF REQUESTED

Reversing Harm To Estate and the U.S. Government -

1.

The U.S.

Government has been damaged by the fraudulent activity of Gustavel (IIB)/Gardner overbid and
Trio sale and subsequent legal fees, administrative expense and seizure control operation costs.
As a result of Kurt Gustavel’s and Dave Gardner’s scheme to profiteer, the U.S. Government
does not have authority under § 3560.457 to settle the Estate’s housing project liabilities of
$14,000,000 in USDA technical loan defaults until either a cash or bond for the estimated
$2,600,000 excess profiteering IIB and Gardner made from sale #1 and #2 has been posted in
good faith.
The U.S. Government agency has the procedural ability to consider forgiving the
$14,000,000 debt for those who cannot pay in accordance with § 3560.457.

However, in that

scenario $14,000,000 in debt forgiveness would pass through to the Estate and result in about
$5,544,000 in IRS tax assessment to the Estate ($14,000,000 x 39.6%), an unattractive option.
USDA has expressed that that they are troubled by Kurt Gustavel’s (IIB bank) and Dave
Gardner’s intentional abuse of their code 7 CFR 3560.406 and 7 CFR 3560.405 and the broader
implications for the government’s housing programs throughout the country. The last thing the
Government housing program needs is other developers/bankers to get “wind” of how to get
around “seller equity profit limitations” and duplicate the fraudulent transactions in other
Government housing projects causing U.S. housing prices to artificially skyrocket out of control.
Due to the $14,000,000 technical loan defaults, the U.S. Government USDA is in an
exemplary position to receive the courts most cordial consideration in these troubling matters.
To address their concern, a bold message should be sent to future sellers and buyers of U.S.
housing projects, regardless of where they acquire them, that schemes of this nature are viewed
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as acts against the U.S. Government and will not be tolerated. These sophisticated transactions
orchestrated by very smart attorneys are the kinds of financial derivatives which led to the Great
Recession and the subsequent enactment of Dodd-Frank and the Volcker rule to stop artificial
Real Estate profiteering speculation in the finance housing sector.

2. Sanctions & Disgorgement - We request the court to use its inherent powers
and order compulsory sanctions upon Kurt Gustavel (IIB) and their Attorney, John Kurtz and
Gardner to be paid to the U.S. Government USDA in an amount to be determined by this court at
its discretion, to mitigate the approximate $14,000,000 in technical loan defaults as a result of
Gustavel (IIB) and Gardner actions, and more importantly to deter abuse of the U.S.
Government housing program at large.
Federal courts have the inherent power to manage their own proceedings and to control the
conduct of those who appear before them. In invoking the inherent power to punish conduct
which abuses the judicial process, a court must exercise discretion in fashioning an appropriate
sanction. Although the "American Rule" prohibits the shifting of attorney's fees in most
cases, see Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 421 U. S. 259, an
exception allows federal courts to exercise their inherent power to assess such fees as a sanction
when a party has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons, id. at 421
U. S. 258-259, 421 U. S. 260, as when the party practices a fraud upon the court, Universal Oil
Products Co. v. Root Refining Co., 328 U. S. 575, 328 U. S. 580, or delays or disrupts the
litigation or hampers a court order's enforcement, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U. S. 678,437 U. S. 689,
n. 14. Pp. 501 U. S. 43-46.

3. Unwinding Docket No. (645) sale - Unwinding the sale will reverse the technical
defaults and is the first step in reinstating the housing projects to their former status. The Frantz
family and Trustee already have an existing Trustee approved alternate agreement for Docket
(645) assets that was motioned before this court but then vacated in favor of the overbid sale.
They have reviewed the IRS positions on unwinding sales and the rulings are favorable in cases
where the entire transaction (not part of the transactions) was unwound [Ref. EXHIBIT J]. The
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Frantz transaction would remove all the Estate’s claim to Docket (645) housing projects. It is
anticipated a one day mediation would result in a settlement to carry out a similar transaction
which would be the last step to curing the U.S. Government housing project technical default
concerns.
The Frantz family transaction would not trigger IRS recapture taxes and would absolve the
$14,000,000 in Estate loan defaults and subsequent loan forgiveness tax.

It would remove all

the Estate interest in Docket (645) assets then putting the Estate in a position to pay ancillary
expenses. Otherwise the Estate cannot pay any ancillary expenses due to recapture and loan
forgiveness taxes and corresponding IRS priority payments, not to mention disgorgement
payments for prior Estate distributions.
With regard to this proposal, the Estate may sell assets outside of a plan of reorganization
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363(b) if there is a sound business reason for doing so.
See, e.g., Meyers v. Martin (In re Martin), 91 F.3d 389, 395 (3d Cir. 1996); In re Montgomery
Ward Holding Corp., 242 B.R. 147, 153 (Bankr. D. Del. 1999); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry.
Co., 124 B.R. 169, 175 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991); In re Trans World Airlines, Inc., No. 01- 00056,
2001 Bankr. LEXIS 980, at *29 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2001). The paramount goal in any
proposed sale of estate property is to maximize the proceeds received by the estate. See, e.g.,
In re Mushroom Transp. Co., Inc., 382 F.3d 325, 339 (3d Cir. 2004) (debtor-in-possession has
fiduciary duty to protect and maximize the estate’s assets); Official Comm. of Unsecured
Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 573 (3d Cir. 2003) (same); Four B.
Corp. v. Food Barn Stores, Inc. (In re Food Barn Stores, Inc.), 107 F.3d 558, 564–65 (8th Cir.
1997) (in bankruptcy sales, a primary objective of the Code [is] to enhance the value of the
estate at hand). See In re Abbotts Dairies of Penn., Inc., 788 F.2d 143 (3d Cir. 1986).

3. Withhold Refund To Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) - At present, refunding $600,000
to Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank) would use up all the cash reserves in the Estate. Therefore until
a replacement buyer transaction is closed and the matter of Sanctions is determined for
Docket No. 645, we request as part of the order to withhold the refund payment to (IIB
bank) until a new buyer is closed and the matter of Sanctions and USDA disgorgement is
finalized.

We would also suggest that IIB off-set the $600,000 they will be owed by
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posting it as part of the $2,600,000 cash or bond required in order for USDA to have the
authority to begin negotiations to settle the technical loan default (see conclusion).

CONCLUSION
Benjamin Franklin said the only sure thing in life is death and taxes. Recapture and debt
forgiveness tax are only triggered upon disposition of assets. As long as the Docket No. (645)
remains with the Frantz family, and no one dies in the meantime, there will be no taxes.
Disgorgement payments for previous distribution would be avoided and Estate ancillary
expenses and distributions to creditors could resume.
Wherefore, Frantz respectfully requests;
1) An Order unwinding/vacating the transfer/sales without prejudice to third parties including
secondary and other subsequent transfer/sales of all the assets listed in the overbid sale
Docket No. (645) as if there had been no sale (see Pg 26; Paragraph # 6. explaining: US
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in Global Energies, LLC v. Chrispus Venture
Capital, LLC, wherein the court granted relief to third parties i.e. housing project other
partners);

2) An Order for Settlement Mediation between IIB/Gardner& Frantz paid for by the Estate with
Chuck Lempesis, or other Mediator as agreed; and sanctions upon Kurt Gustavel (IIB bank)
and David Gardner to be promptly paid to the U.S. Government USDA; and withholding
Estate distributions to IIB until a replacement sale is closed and USDA disgorgement is
settled.
If the court reserves either order 1 or 2 for trial,

to avoid irreparable harm to the U.S.

Government USDA and the $14,000,000 of debt forced upon the Estate by the IIB and Trio sale,
and considering the nature and weight of the intentional violations and unauthorized profiteering,
we hereby request an Order demanding IIB to; Post cash or a bond with the court for the
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estimated $2,000,000 that Kurt Gustavel - IIB bank made in unauthorized excessive profit;
Monies which are subject to disgorgement by USDA under CFR 3560.457 (e) priority lien.
Upon posting the security, 7 CFR 3560.457 allows USDA to begin negotiating on a debt
settlement offer.

For example, USDA could decide to set aside the $14,000,000 default if

Docket (645) sale/transfer is unwound and a deal worked out to allow the housing projects to
remain with the Frantz family unencumbered by the Estate.

However, without a bond or cash

payment of the $2,000,000, USDA has no authority to proceed with negotiations per CFR
3560.457 (e). See code reference;
[ 7 CFR 3560.457 (e) Disposition of security prior to offer. …if a borrower has disposed of
security prior to making a debt settlement offer, the proceeds from the disposed security
must be applied to the borrower's account prior to any negotiations on the debt settlement
offer.”]
DATED THIS 27 day of December, 2017.

______________________________

MARTY D. FRANTZ
______________________________

CINDY M. FRANTZ

ENCLOSURES
EXHIBIT A - Unauthorized Sale Contract (Trio Agmt)
EXHIBIT B - Example U.S. Government housing Seller Equity Pre-approval Letter
EXHIBIT C - Judge David Gardner & Other Brad Elg Correspondence
EXHIBIT D - LeMaster & Daniels Financial Statement $2.250,000 Estimated Taxes Owed
EXHIBIT E - Tax Credit Housing Abuse News Articles
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EXHIBIT F - U.S. Government Housing Sale/Transfer Process (118 pages)
EXHIBIT G - Abuse Of Tax Credit Housing Program News Articles
EXHIBIT H - Declaration of U.S. Government housing Director
EXHIBIT I - Declaration of John Bell (Manager NPM)
EXHIBIT J - Declaration of Marty Frantz
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of December, 2017, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to be served upon the following in the manner indicated below.
David Eash

deash@ewinganderson. com

David P. Gardner

Trustee@winstoncashatt.com

David Wayne Newman

ustp.regionl8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Gary W. Dyer

gary.w.dyer@usdoj. gov

J Ford Elsaesser

ford@ejame.com

Kelly Greene McConnell

litigation@givenspursley.com

Lindsey Renee Simon

lsimon@lukins.com

Michael J. Paukert

mpaukert@pt-law.com

U.S. Trustee

ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Matthew K Shriver

ecfid@rcolegal.com

John D Munding

munding@crumb-munding.com

April Linscott

alinscott@omllaw.com

Mary P Kimmel

ustp.regionl 8.bs.ecf@usdoj.gov

Corey J Quinn

cjq@winstoncashatt.com

Derrick J O'Neill

doneill@rcolegal.com

Peter John Smith,

peter@smithmalek.com
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AND, I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served the foregoing document to the
following Participants via U.S. Mail (list names and addresses):
Recovery Management Systems
25 SE 2nd Avenue, Suite 1120
Miami, FL 33131
Jillian Roderick
904 North A Street
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Linda Salkow
28190 North Alma School Rd #111
Scottsdale, AZ 85262oe Dobson
Coldwell Banker Sclmeidmiller Realty
1924 No1thwest Blvd.
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Maggie Lyons & Tes M. Strunk
Resolve Financial Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 598
Hayden, ID 83835
Troy Black
Black & Associates
1650 E. Lancaster Road
Hayden, ID 83835
Jeff Kavadias
1124 W Riverside #215
Spokane, WA 99201
Thomas Development Co
413 W Idaho St, Ste 200
Boise, ID 83702

MARTY D. FRANTZ
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EXHIBIT 11
 Still under oath (see page 2 of this Motion) Frantz declares; Lawrence
Temper expert legal opinion attached hereto as EXHIBIT 11 states the
appraised market value of the $9m judgment found in EXHIBIT 8 is $ -0-.
This is due to the fact that all of my assets were transferred to the Chpt 7
Estate and sold to the bank (IIB) leaving me with no assets nor non-exempt
income. Therefore I offered IIB $20,000 to extinguish the $9m judgment
which they constructively accepted but also contested. The $20,000
proceedings to extinguish the judgment are part of the District’s court
records in this matter.

 The attached (2) Federal court sale orders behind the Lawrence Temper legal
opinion represent the sale of all my assets in the Chpt 7 Estate. All the
assets were either transferred or sold to the bank (IIB). The bank received
all of my assets.
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Jonathon Frantz
FRANTZ LAW, PLLC
307 N. Lincoln St. Suite A
Post Falls, Idaho 83854
(208) 262-3893 I FAX (208) 262-3894
Email: jonathon@cdalegal.com
Attorney For Defendants
Marty D. Frantz and Cindy M. Frantz

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FffiST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO AND KOOTENAI COUNTY

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho
Corporation,

MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual,
and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an
individual,

Plaintiff,
Third Party Plaintiffs,

v.
V.

MARTY D. FRANTZ, an individual,
and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an
individual,

EAGLE RIDGE ON TWIN LAKES, INC. an
Idaho Corporation,

MARTY D . FRANTZ, an individual,
and CINDY M. FRANTZ, an
individual,
Case No.: CV-10-6088
Counterclaimants,
V.

Declaration of Lawrence Tepper

IDAHO INDEPENDENT BANK, an Idaho

Corporation

STATE OF IDAHO )
)ss.
County of Kootenai )
I,

Lawrence Tepper, hereby certify and declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the

State ofldaho, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge:
Lawrence Tepper - Declaration
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I am a citizen of the United States; I am over the age of eighteen; I have personal
knowledge of the matters contained herein, and testify as follows;
Attached hereto and incorporated herein as if set out in full is a true and correct copy of my
Statement and Report in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this 5 day of November, 2015 in Lone Tree (city in which Signed), Colorado, (state in
which signed).

Address:10211 Bluffmont Drive
Lone Tree, Colorado
80124-5559

Lawrence Tepper- Declaration
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RIDGE GATE
Financial, L LC
Vauation Servi::es Consulting Servi:es

October 30,2015

Expert Report
Value of Personal Guarantees

Frantz lllldertook this e~gement in good faith and I have analyzed the facts and
documents thoroughly. Iwasdirected to valuethe personal guarantees "monetary
worth" which were granted to Idaho Independent Bank (IIB) through notes
referenced on the $20,000 Cashiers check" and to determine if the payment was
more or less than the "monetary worth".

Experience
I received my Law Degree with a minor in Accounting from the University of
Denver. I am an expert at Mortgage Note Appraisals, buying, selling,
originating and appraising promissory notes secured by real estate for over 45
years. My resume is enclosed at the end of this report.

I have studied the following documents for purposes of this evaluation;

1. Eagle Ridge Mortgage/Note & Frantz Promissory Note
2. Commercial & Personal guarantees of Frantz
3. Appraisals before and after the recession
4. Mediated Signed Settlement Agreement dated 7-14-11
5. Summary Judgment Civil Court filing CASE NO. CV-10-6088

Lawrence Tepper - Declaration
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These are the facts as I understand them;

1. The collateral for the loans (104 acres), was appraised before and after the recession. The
property's appraised value was more than the outstanding loan balance.
2. A cashier's check in the amount of $20,000 was tendered to the Bank in satisfaction of the
guarantees in 2013 and the check was endorsed by the bank.
3. Frantz filed Chpt 11 in around October, 2011. About a year and a halflater, April, 2013,
Frantz converted to Chpt 7. Frantz was in Chpt 11 when they tendered the $20,000 check to
the bank several weeks before the Chpt 7 conversion was approved.
4. Frantz had previously turned over their non-exempt personal assets to the Chpt 11 Estate
and their exempt income was from IRA and Social Security as of April, 2013, the same
time the $20,000 check was tendered.
5. Frantz signed a waiver of discharge to all its creditors in around 2015 about two years
after they tendered the $20,000 check to the bank.

Methology Of Valuation
Value is defined as the estimate ofthe monetary worth ofsomething. Market value
is defined as the price an asset would fetch in the marketplace.

There is not a

"market" where personal guarantees are bought and sold. So I have based my
approach and conclusions on the monetary worth of the personal guarantees.

Monetary Worth Analysis

Based upon the facts presented, as of April, 2013 when the $20,000 cashier check
was tendered to IIB, Frantzs had previously turned over all of their non-exempt
personal assets to the Chpt 11 Estate and their income was from IRA and Social
Security. The waiver of discharge was granted about two years later. The waiver is
of no value to creditors because Frantz had no non-exempt assets or income that
would benefit a creditor having surrendered them to the bankruptcy. Due to the
Chpt 11 filing and subsequent Chpt 7 conversion, Frantz was "Judgment Proof'.
Therefore there was no monetary value for IIB to pursue the Frantzs under the
personal guarantees.
Lawrence Tepper - Declaration
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Conclusion
Based upon these presumed facts, my opinion is that the monetary worth of the
personal guarantees is$ -0- at the time the bank received the $20,000 payment.
The bank therefore received $20,000 more than the monetary worth of the personal
guarantees.
Sincerely,

Lawrence Tepper - Declarat ion

SI
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RIDGE GATE
Financial, LLC
Valuation Services ·ConsLting Services

Appraisal and Marketing of Promissory Notes. Mortgage Notes,
and other Cash-Flow Assets Nationally

IRA Accounts and LLC's Appraised
Expert Consulting & Expert Witness Services
About Lawrence (Larry} Tepper:
Practical Experience
My knowledge was gained through practical experience, not textbook theory. Over 35 years of national

experience in all facets the private mortgage note,private promissory note, and debt instruments
industry.
Appraised and valued over 400 private mortgage notes and private promissory notes
Purchased over 100 private mortgage notes and promissory notes for own account
Serviced notes-collected payments, handled collections, intiated foreclosures, etc.
Brokered private mortgage notes and private promissory notes natbnally
Used private promissory notes and mortgage notes for real estate purchases and exchanges
Invested in private promissory notes and mortgage notes since 1971.

Promissory and Mortgage Note Valuations and Marketing: Appraisals and Valuat ion Reports are

provided nationally to Tax Attorneys , Family Law Attorneys, Private Investors, C PAs, Financial
Planners, Estate Attorneys,Realtors, and Litigation Attorneys. Professional appra isal valuation reports
that conform to IRS regulations are provided. These appraisal reports satsfy IRS standards as "Qua lified
Appraisals" by a "Qualified Appraiser" . Expert consulting and expert witness services provided
nationally. Promissory Notes Marketed Nationally.
EDUCATION AND TRAINING: Law Degree /Accounting Minor--University of Denver
Colorado Real Estate Broker Specializing in Private Promissory Notes
Certified Commercial Investment Member Designation (CCIM)
f.ROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: AppraisersAssociati on of America (affiliate); National Association of
Certified Valuation Analysts; American Bar Association (affiliate).

Phone:303-779-6996

Lawrence.Tepper@comcast.net

www .PromissoryNoteAppraisers.com

Declaration of Lawrence Tepper - Pg. 6
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
Case No. 11-21337-TLM

In re:
MARTIN D. FRANTZ and CYNTHIA
M. FRANTZ

Chapter 7

Debtors.
ORDER AUTHORIZING TRANSFER/SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY
Upon consideration of the Chapter 7 Trustee’s Motion to Approve Settlements
Between Plaintiff Chapter 7 Trustee and All Defendants (Dkt. No. 568) and Motion
Requesting Order Authorizing Transfer / Sale of Estate Property (Dkt. No. 630), as
well as the Notice of Receipt of Offer to Purchase Estate Property (Dkt. No. 636),
Pre-Trial Brief of Chapter 7 Trustee David P. Gardner (Dkt. No. 638),
Memorandum in Support of Notice Filed by Creditor Idaho Independent Bank (Dkt.
No. 639), Creditor Idaho Independent Banks Objection to Chapter 7 Trustee’s
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Motion to Approve Settlements Between Plaintiff Chapter 7 Trustee and All
Defendants (Dkt. No. 640), Interested Parties Jonathon Franz, Matthew Frantz,
Tyson Frantz, and Tailored Management Services, LLC’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Notice (Dkt. No. 641), Notice of Overbid (Dkt. No. 644), Notice of
Overbid (Dkt. No. 645), and Withdrawal of Opposition to Notice of Receipt of Offer
to Purchase Estate Property (Dkt. No. 653); and the Court have conducted a
hearing concerning such matters on October 31, 2016, and the Chapter 7 Trustee
having appeared at the hearing through counsel John D. Munding of Munding, P.S.;
interested party Idaho Independent Bank having appeared through John Kurtz of
Hawley Troxell; and interested parties Jonathon Frantz, Matthew Frantz, Tyson
Frantz, and Tailored Management Services, LLC, having appeared through their
counsel April Linscott of Owens, McCrea & Linscott, PLLC; and all parties and
interested parties having been heard or having had the opportunity to be heard; and
the Court having reviewed and considered the motion, related pleadings,
declarations, offers of proof, presentations through counsel, and the evidence
adduced at hearing, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby:
FOUND AND DETERMINED THAT:
A. Jurisdiction. The Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Motions and to
grant the relief in the Motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(b)(1) and 1334(b).

Case 11-21337-TLM
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B. Venue. Venue of the Chapter 7 case and the Motions in this district is proper
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409. This is a core proceeding within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2).
C. Statutory Predicates. The statutory predicates for relief requested in the Motions
are Sections 105 and 363 of the United States Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy
Rules 2002, 6004, 9014, and 9019.
D. Notice. As evidenced by the certificates of service appearing at docket numbers
570, 632, 637, and 652, among other things, the Motions and Notices related to
hearing and overbids, have been served on all creditors and parties in interest.
Notice of the Motions, hearings, and sale / transfer of bankruptcy estate assets
was adequate and sufficient under the circumstances of this Chapter 7 case and
these proceedings. Reasonable opportunity to object, be heard, and opportunity
for overbid was afforded to all interested persons and entities.
E. Acquired Assets: The assets being acquired by Idaho Independent Bank or its
designee[s] by way of Idaho Independent Bank’s approved bid and purchase
offer and this Order shall include all of the property in which the Debtors and/or
the bankruptcy estate of the Debtors has an interest, except for the bankruptcy
estate’s interest in the approximately fifty (50) acres titled in the Debtors’ name
in the development known as Eagle Ridge located near Twin Lakes, Idaho (“50
Acres”), the interests in the Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, Inc., Twin Lakes Eagle

Case 11-21337-TLM
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View Estates, LLC, and Eagle Ridge on Twin Lakes, as well as any related home
owner associations (collectively “Eagle Ridge”) and that certain scheduled claim
against Idaho Independent Bank in Schedule B, item 21 of the Debtors’
schedules (Dkt. No. 167) (“Acquired Assets”). The Acquired Assets include all
of the Debtors’ and/or the bankruptcy estates’ interests, including any claims that
may exist in favor of the owner of those interests, in the following assets:
1.

The membership interest in the Frantz Family Investment Group, LLC

(“FIG”), which includes the $50,000 per year Priority Distribution granted to
the Debtors Martin D. Frantz and/ or Cynthia M. Frantz beginning in 2015
and any claims relating to or arising from those interests, including all claims
of the Debtors and/or the bankruptcy estate for monies owed or that should
have been paid to the bankruptcy estate and/or Debtors based on the interest in
FIG.
2.

The membership interests in Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston 1, LLC

and Guardian Angel Homes Lewiston 2, LLC, including all claims of the
Debtors and/or the bankruptcy estate for monies owed or that should have
been paid to the bankruptcy estate and/or Debtors based on the above
referenced interests.
3.

The membership interests in Guardian Angel Homes Post Falls I, LLC

and Post Falls Ops, LLC, including all claims of the Debtors and/or the

Case 11-21337-TLM
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bankruptcy estate for monies owed or that should have been paid to the
bankruptcy estate and/or Debtors based on the above referenced interests.
4.

The stock and/or other ownership interests in Human Resource

Property Management, Inc., doing business as Nationwide Property
Management Company, Human Resource Construction Company, Inc.,
Frantz Construction Company, and Human Resource Investment
Corporation, including all claims of the Debtors and/or the bankruptcy
estate for monies owed or that should have been paid to the bankruptcy
estate and/or Debtors based on the above referenced interests.
5.

The partnership and/or other ownership interests in Harry Frantz

Family, LP, including all claims of the Debtors and/or the bankruptcy estate
for monies owed or that should have been paid to the bankruptcy estate and/or
Debtors based on the above referenced interests.
6.

All of the rights and interests in the general partnership and limited

partnership interests, whether fixed, contingent, known, or unknown, and any
other interests, including claims relating to or arising from those interests in
“Ammon Associates,” an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as
“Palisades Park;” "Appletree Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also
referred to as “Appletree;" Admiralty Associates, an Idaho limited
partnership, also referred to as “Spruce Grove II;" "Bigfork Associates," an

Case 11-21337-TLM
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Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as "Little Jon;" "Blanding
Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as "Baus Butte;"
"Bonners Ferry Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as
"Jenni Lane;" "Pine Terrace;" "Channel Terrace;" "Glacier Park;" "Haines
Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as "Dusty Trails;"
“Louise Gardens Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as
"Louise Gardens;" "North Idaho Associates," an Idaho limited partnership,
also referred to as "Matthews;" "Hayden Lake III Associates," an Idaho
limited partnership, also referred to as "Sarah Sr. Center;" "Hyrum
Associates," an Idaho limited partnership, also referred to as “Country Side;"
"Archway Village Associates of Moab,” an Arizona limited partnership, also
known as “Moab Associates Limited Partnership" and/or "Archway;"
“Hayden Lake Association,” an Arizona limited partnership, also known as
"Lakeview Village Apartments" and/or "Hayden Lake Associates Limited
Partnership;" "Seward Associates” an Idaho limited partnership, also known
as "Kimberly Court;" "Sitka Associates,” an Arizona limited partnership, also
known as "Spruce Grove I;" "Sitka III Associates," an Idaho limited
partnership, also known as "Tyson Terrace;" "Soldotna Associates" an Idaho
limited partnership, also known as "Northwood;" "Wasilla Associates,” an
Idaho limited partnership," also known as "Chinook Villa;" "Orca Point

Case 11-21337-TLM
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Associates,” an Idaho limited partnership," also known as "Orca Point;" and
"Hurricane Associates,” an Idaho limited partnership, also known as
"Hurricane;" including all claims of the Debtors and/or the bankruptcy estate
for monies owed or that should have been paid to the bankruptcy estate and/or
Debtors based on the above referenced partnership interests.
7.

The membership interests in Frantz, LLC and Frantz Family Ltd.

Partnership, including all claims of the Debtors and/or the bankruptcy estate
for monies owed or that should have been paid to the bankruptcy estate and/or
Debtors based on the above referenced interests.
8.

Other personal property assets of the bankruptcy estate identified

in Schedule A of the Trustee’s Motion Requesting Order Authorizing
Transfer/Sale of Estate Property, (Dkt. No. 630), and a 2006 Subaru,
2010 Polaris UTV, 2011 Polaris UTV, Mesa, AZ trailer park mobile
home, 2008 Yamaha ATV 125 cc (2), 1989 Chevrolet pick-up, old
garbage trailer, and miscellaneous personal items, including jewelry.
9.

The fraudulent transfer claims that are the subject of the

Adversary Complaint filed by the Trustee (Dkt. No. 281).
F. Acquired Assets Property of the Estate. The acquired assets, including
claims asserted in Adversary Proceeding 14-07005, are property of the
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate and title to the Acquired Assets is vested in
the Chapter 7 Estate.
G. Chapter 7 Trustee’s Marketing and Valuation. The Chapter 7 Trustee and
his professionals marketed the Acquired Assets, in part, and properly
exercised business judgment in estimating value of the Acquired Assets
for purposes of transfer and sale. Based on the record of these
proceedings, all creditors, parties in interest, and prospective buyers have
been afforded a reasonable and fair opportunity to bid for the Acquired
Assets.
H. Chapter 7 Trustee’s Authority. Subject to entry of this Order, the Chapter
7 Trustee had and has the power and authority necessary to consummate
the transfer / sales transaction contemplated under the Motions and
ultimately approved by the Court in accordance with the Offer to Purchase
of Idaho Independent Bank as described in Notice of Overbid (Dkt. No.
645).
I. Arm’s Length Sale and Buyer’s Good Faith. The transfer / sale of the
bankruptcy estate was negotiated and undertaken by the Chapter 7 Trustee
and Idaho Independent Bank at arm’s-length without collusion or fraud,
and in good faith within the meaning of Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Idaho Independent Bank is not an “insider” of the Chapter 7 Trustee
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as that term is defined by Section 101(31) of the Bankruptcy Code. Idaho
Independent Bank acknowledged that the Chapter 7 Trustee was free to
deal with any other party interested in acquiring the Acquired Assets,
complied with Overbid Procedures and agreed to subject its bid to the
competitive bidding procedures set forth in the Notice of Overbid. All
payments to be made by Idaho Independent Bank and other agreements or
arrangements entered into by Idaho Independent Bank in connection with
the sale / transfer have been disclosed and Idaho Independent Bank has
not violated Section 363(n) of the Bankruptcy Code by any action or
inaction. As a result, Idaho Independent Bank is entitled to the protections
of Section 363(n) of the Bankruptcy Code, including in the event this
Order or any portion thereof is reversed or modified on appeal, and
otherwise has proceeded in good faith in all respects in connection with
the proceeding.
J. Sale Highest and Best Offer. The consideration provided by Idaho
Independent Bank for the Acquired Assets is the highest and best offer
received by the Chapter 7 Trustee, and the Purchase Price constitutes
reasonably equivalent value and fair consideration under the Bankruptcy
Code, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act and any other applicable laws. No other person or entity

Case 11-21337-TLM

Doc 668 Filed 11/18/16 Entered 11/18/16 11:03:16
"EXHIBITS"
Master Guide
398 of 411
Document
PagePage
10 of 16

Desc Main

or group of persons or entities has offered to purchase the Acquired Assets
for an amount that would provide greater value to the Chapter 7
Bankruptcy Estate than Idaho Independent Bank. The Court’s approval of
the sale / transfer to Idaho Independent Bank is in the best interest of the
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Estate, its creditors, and all other parties of interest.

K. No Liability Under Section 363(n). Neither the Chapter 7 Trustee nor
Idaho Independent Bank engaged in any conduct that would cause or
permit the consummation of the sale / transfer to be avoided, or costs or
damages to be imposed, under Section 363(n) of the Bankruptcy Code.
L. No Fraudulent Transfer. The sale / transfer and Ancillary Agreements
were not entered into, and the sale / transfer is not consummated, for the
purpose of hindering, delaying or defrauding creditors of the bankruptcy
estate under the Bankruptcy Code or under the applicable non-bankruptcy
law. The Purchase Price constitutes reasonably equivalent value and fair
consideration.
M. Sale as Exercise of Business Judgement. The entry into the sale / transfer
of assets constituted the exercise by the Chapter 7 Trustee of sound
business judgement, and the consummation of the transactions
contemplated is in the best interests of the Chapter 7 Trustee, its estate and
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creditors, and all parties in interest, The Court finds that the Chapter 7
Trustee has demonstrated good and sufficient business reasons justifying
the sale / transfer of the Acquired Assets to Idaho Independent Bank
because, among other things: (i) the sale / transfer constitutes the highest
and best offer for the Acquired Assets; (ii) the sale / transfer contemplated
presents the best opportunity to realize the value of the Acquired Assets;
and (iii) the sale / transfer contemplated will provide a greater recovery for
the Chapter 7 Trustee’s creditors than would be provided by any other
presently available alternative. The Chapter 7 Trustee has demonstrated
compelling circumstances and a good, sufficient and sound business
purpose and justification for the sale / transfer.
N. Compelling Reasons for a Sale. Good and sufficient reasons for approval
of the sale / transfer have been articulated by the Chapter 7 Trustee. The
Chapter 7 Trustee has demonstrated compelling circumstances for the sale
/ transfer outside the ordinary course of business, pursuant to Section
363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED THAT:
1. Motions Granted: The relief requested in the Motions is GRANTED.
2. Approval. Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code Sections 105 and 363, the sale
/ transfer of the Acquired Assets to Idaho Independent bank as
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described in its Overbid (Dkt. No. 645), is hereby APPROVED.
Pursuant to Sections 105 and 363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Chapter
7 Trustee and Idaho Independent Bank are each hereby authorized to
take any actions necessary or appropriate to: (i) consummate the sale /
transfer of the Acquired Assets to Idaho Independent Bank and the
closing of the sale / transfer in accordance with the Overbid and this
Order. The Chapter 7 Trustee is hereby authorized and directed to
perform each of its covenants and undertakings as required prior to or
after closing without further order of the Court.
3. Valid Transfer. The transfer to Idaho Independent Bank of the
bankruptcy estate’s right, title and interest in the Acquired Assets shall
be, and hereby is deemed to be, a legal, valid, and effective transfer of
the bankruptcy estate’s right, title, and interest in the Acquired Assets.

4. Exculpation and Release. None of Idaho Independent Bank or its
affiliates, successors, and assigns shall have or incur any liability to, or
be subject to any action by the Chapter 7 Trustee or any of its
predecessors, successors, or assigns, arising out of the negotiation,
investigation, preparation, execution, and entry into and consummation
of the sale / transfer. None of the Chapter 7 Trustee and bankruptcy
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estate shall have or incur any liability to, or be subject to any action by
the Idaho Independent Bank or any of its predecessors, successors, or
assigns, arising out of negotiation, investigation, preparation, execution,
and the entry into and consummation of the sale / transfer, except as
expressly provided in this Order.
5. Good Faith Buyer. The sale / transfer transaction has been entered into
by Idaho Independent Bank in good faith and Idaho Independent Bank
is a good faith Buyer of the Acquired Assets as that term is used in
Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m). Idaho Independent Bank is entitled
to all of the protections afforded by Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy
Code.
6. No Bulk Sales. No bulk sales law or any similar law of any state or
other jurisdiction shall apply in any way to the sale / transfer.
7. Fair and Equivalent Value. The Purchase Price shall be deemed for all
purposes to constitute reasonably equivalent value and fair
consideration under the Bankruptcy Code and any other applicable law,
and the sale / transfer may not be avoided, or costs or damages imposed
or awarded under Section 363(n) or any other provision of the
Bankruptcy Code, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act, or any other similar state laws.
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8. Cooperation From Counterparties. The Chapter 7 Trustee shall
cooperate and expeditiously execute and deliver, upon the reasonable
request of Idaho Independent Bank. Idaho Independent Bank shall not
charge the Chapter 7 Trustee for any instruments, applications,
consents, or other documents which may be required or requested to
effectuate the applicable transfers in connection with the sale / transfer.

9. Failure to Specify Provisions. The failure to specifically include or
make reference to any particular provisions of the Idaho Independent
Bank Notice of Overbid in this Order shall not diminish or impair the
effectiveness of such provision, it being the intent of the Court that the
Overbid (Dkt. No. 645) is authorized and approved in its entirety.
10. Retention of Jurisdiction. The Court retains jurisdiction with respect to
all matters arising from or related to the implementation of this Order,
including, without limitation, the authority to: (i) interpret, implement
and enforce the terms and provisions of this Order; (ii) compel the
delivery of all Acquired Assets to Idaho Independent Bank; (iii) compel
Idaho Independent Bank to perform all of its obligations; and (iv)
resolve any disputes arising under or related to the sale / transfer.
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11. Immediate Effect. This Order constitutes a final order within the
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). Notwithstanding any provision in the
Bankruptcy Rules to the contrary, the Court expressly finds there is no
reason for delay in the implementation of this Order and, accordingly:
(i) the terms of this Order shall be immediately effective and
enforceable upon its entry; (ii) the Chapter 7 Trustee is not subject to
any stay in the implementation, enforcement or realization of the relief
granted in this Order; and (iii) the Chapter 7 Trustee may, in its
discretion and without further delay, take any action and perform any
act authorized under this Order.
DATED: November 17, 2016

TERRY L. MYERS
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Presented by:
MUNDING, P.S.
/s/ John D. Munding
JOHN D. MUNDING, ISB # 04703
Attorney for Chapter 7 Trustee
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Approved for entry by:
OWENS, MCCREA & LINSCOTT

HAWLEY TROXELL ENNIS
& HAWLEY

/s/ April Linscott
APRIL LINSCOTT ISB # 7036
Attorney for Interested Parties

/s/ John Kurtz
JOHN KURTZ ISB # 2396
SHELIA SCHWAGER ISB #
5059
Attorneys for Idaho Independent
Bank
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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF IDAHO
In Re:

Case No. 11-21337-TLM

FRANTZ, MARTIN D.
FRANTZ, CYNTHIA M.

Chapter 7
Debtors.

ORDER APPROVING SALE OF REAL PROPERTY
This matter came before the Court on the Trustee’s Motion for Order Approving Sale Of
Real Property (Dkt. 773) pursuant to §363(f) and (m) of the Bankruptcy Code, FRBP 2002(a)
and 6004, and LBR 2002.1 (“Motion”), seeking approval to sell the real property commonly
referred to therein as the 54-acres on Twin Lakes, Idaho (“54 Acres”) and a single lot on Cross
Creek Rd., in Rathdrum, Idaho, with any and all interests related to the development that consists
of the 54 Acres, and adjoining acreage of approximately 104 acres (“Development”), including
but not limited to all of the estate’s interest in any home owners’ association, bond rights,
redemption rights, and any other rights or interests held by the Debtors in the any of the
Development, and any personal property or fixtures in or related to the Development, including
the docks immediately adjacent to the Real Property’s shoreline and the leases related thereto
(See Dkt. 643, 643-1, 643-2, 659) (“Property”).
Upon consideration of the Motion, the Addendum/Supplement to the Motion (Dkt. 780),
Declaration of David P. Gardner in Support of Motion for Order Approving Sale of Real
Property (Dkt. 791), the Objections filed by the Debtors (Dkts. 787, 794, 821), the Memoranda
in Support of the Motion filed by Idaho Independent Bank (Dkt. 806) and by the Trustee (Dkt.
807), the evidentiary hearings held on January 16, 2018 and January 17, 2018 (Dkt. 822-827), as
well as the first Motion to Sell Property Free and Clear of Liens Under Section 363(f) (Dkt.
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714), the Affidavit Re Sale of Real Property (Dkt. 724), the Objection to that sale filed by the
Debtors (Dkt. 725), the evidentiary hearing regarding the First Motion held on June 27, 2017
(Dkt. 727, 729, 745), the Order Denying Motion to Sell Property Free and Clear of Liens (Dkt.
734), and the oral ruling held on July 6, 2017 (Dkt. 732, 735, 746); and all parties and interested
parties having been heard or having had the opportunity to be heard; and the Court having
reviewed and considered the above referenced motions, related pleadings, declarations,
presentations through counsel, and the evidence adduced at the hearings, and good cause
appearing therefor, with the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth by this Court at the
oral ruling held on January 30, 2018, which is incorporated herein by reference (Dkt. 843, 845),
it is hereby, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED THAT:
The Trustee’s Motion for Order Approving Sale of Real Property is approved. Further,
the sale of the Property to Idaho Independent Bank was negotiated and undertaken by the
Chapter 7 Trustee and Idaho Independent Bank at arm’s length without collusion or fraud, and in
good faith within the meaning of §363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code, and therefore Idaho
Independent Bank is entitled to all of the protections afforded by §363(m) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Pursuant to §363 of the Bankruptcy Code, the Trustee and Idaho Independent Bank are
each hereby authorized to take any actions necessary or appropriate to close the sale of the
Property in accordance with the terms of the Motion. The Trustee is authorized and directed to
perform each of the covenants and undertakings required, without further order of the Court.
This Order constitutes a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. §158(a).
//end of text//
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DATED: February 5, 2018

TERRY L. MYERS
CHIEF U. S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

Order submitted by DAVID P. GARDNER, Chapter 7 Trustee

ORDER APPROVING ORDER APPROVING SALE OF REAL PROPERTY– PAGE 1

40986.0211.10587637.1

"EXHIBITS" Master Guide Page 408 of 411

Sheila R. Schwager, ISB No. 5059
Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP
877 Main Street, Suite 1000
P.O. Box 1617
Boise, ID 83701-1617
Telephone: 208.344.6000
Facsimile: 208.954.5261
Email: sschwager@hawleytroxell.com

Attomeys for Idaho Independent Bank
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARTIN D. FRANTZ; CYNTHIA FRANTZ,
Debtors,

MARTIN D. FRANTZ; CYNTHIA FRANTZ,
Appellants,

v.

DAVID P. GARDNER, Chapter 7 Trustee
Appellee.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. 17-60080
BAPNo. ID-15-1060
Bk. No. 11-21337-TLM

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS
APPELLEE

Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB"), through its attorneys of record, HAWLEY TROXELL
ENNIS & HAWLEY LLP, hereby moves the Panel to substitute IIB as the Appellee in this Appeal
pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26 and 43(b). This Motion is based upon the
following facts:
MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLEE - 1
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I.

On July 24, 2017, IIB filed its motion to substitute as the appellant in the

underlying Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit case ("BAP Motion"). See BAP
Dkt. No. 45. A true and correct copy of the BAP Motion is attached hereto and incorporated by
reference herein as Exhibit A.
2.

The BAP Motion was based upon IIB executing on the right to the BAP appeal

held by Appellants Martin Frantz and Cynthia Frantz ("Appellants"). Id IIB argued in the BAP
Motion that it was the proper appellant in the BAP case because it had properly exercised its
state court collection rights and executed upon Appellants' rights to the BAP appeal. Id
3.

Appellants filed a response to the BAP Motion. See BAP Dkt. No. 47. A true

and correct copy of the response is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
Exhibit B.

4.

IIB thereafter filed a reply to Appellants' response. See BAP Dkt. No. 48. A true

and cmTect copy of IIB's reply is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
Exhibit C.

5.

On October 31, 2017, the BAP entered the Order granting the BAP Motion and

substituting IIB as the appellant in the BAP case ("BAP Order"). See BAP Dkt. No. 50. A true
and correct copy of the BAP Order is attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
Exhibit D.

6.

The BAP Order is the subject of this Appeal by Appellants.

7.

On November 1, 2017, IIB moved to dismiss the BAP appeal and the current

Appellee in this case, David P. Gardner, as Chapter 7 Trustee ("Trustee") and IIB, stipulated to
the dismissal of the BAP appeal. See Dkt. Nos. 53 and 54. A true and correct copy of the
motion to dismiss and stipulation are attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein as
Exhibit E and Exhibit F, respectively.
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8.

The BAP thereafter, on November 3, 2017, ordered the BAP case dismissed. See

BAP Dkt. No. 55. A true and correct copy of the BAP's dismissal order is attached hereto and
incorporated by reference herein as Exhibit G.
9.

Because the issued raised by Appellants' claim of error in this Appeal is the BAP

Order, granting the BAP Motion filed by IIB, then IIB is the proper appellee in this Appeal, not
the Trustee.
10.

Now, therefore, as IIB is the proper Appellee in this Appeal as set forth above,

IIB hereby request that it be substituted as the Appellee in this Appeal pursuant to Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 43(b).
DATED this , ~ day of December, 2017.
HAWLEY TROXELL ENNlS

& HAWLEY LLP

By ~
Sheila R. Schwager, ISB No. 5059
Attorneys for Idaho Independent Bank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _ _ day of December, 2017, I
electronically filed the forgoing MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLEE
with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which sent a Notice of
Electronic Filing to the following persons:
dpg@winstoncashatt.com

David P. Gardner

AND, I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served the foregoing document to
the following non-CM/ECF Registered Participants via U.S. Mail (list names and
addresses):
Martin D. Frantz
Cynthia M. Frantz
307 N. Lincoln St., Ste A,
Post Falls, Idaho 83854

Martin D. Frantz
Cynthia M. Frantz
P.O. Box 830
Rathdrum, ID 83858

AND, I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have served the foregoing document to
the following non-CM/ECF Registered Participants via Electronic Mail (list names
and addresses):
Martin Frantz martyfrantzcda@gmail.com

Isl Sheila R. Schwager 1211117
Sheila R. Schwager

MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE AS APPELLEE - 4
40986. 0211.10435408.2

